Ar Razi’s Argument

Ar Razi says that if Allah were in a direction and in space, then He would have to be great in essence. He says that no one who places Allah in a direction says He is like a tiny indivisible point. Rather, they all say He is great.

Then he builds his proof on that. He says that the side of Allah which faces the right side of the Throne must either be the same as the side that faces the left side of the Throne, or different from it.

He says that if they are the same, then this is absurd, because it would make the right and left of a great thing like the Throne no different from each other, as though its greatness were no more than a point. He says no rational person accepts this.

He says that if they are different, then this means the essence is made up of parts. Then those parts must either be identical in essence or different in essence.

He says that if they are identical, then some of those parts would be touching while others would be separate. Since identical things must have the same rulings, what is touching could become separate and what is separate could become touching. So union and separation would become possible for Allah, and he says this is impossible.

He then says that if those parts are different in essence, then the body must go back to simple units that are not themselves composite. But each of those simple units would still have a right and a left. If its right and left are different, then it is composite again, and that goes against the claim that it is simple.

If its right and left are the same, then what touches the right could touch the left and what touches the left could touch the right. So separation and breaking apart would still be possible. From this he concludes that placing Allah in a direction leads to impossible consequences, so the claim must be false.

The Setting Of The Argument

This proof is really aimed at the claim that Allah is a body, even though Ar Razi placed it here in order to use it against those who say Allah is above the Throne.

The response says that Ar Razi wanted the proof to strike more than 1 group at once. He wanted it to work against those who say Allah is above the Throne, those who say He is great but not a body, and those who say He is a body but not composed or divided. So before even entering the details, the reply points out that the proof is not as neatly placed as Ar Razi presents it.

The First Reply

The first step in the argument is not binding. Ar Razi says the side facing the right of the Throne must either be the same as the side facing the left or different from it. The response says this is not the only possibility in the way Ar Razi wants.

The reply says that many theologians who affirm attributes do not always accept this kind of division in the simple form Ar Razi assumes. Some of them say a thing is neither the same as another nor other than it in the way the questioner intends. So the very first choice Ar Razi forces on his opponent is disputed.

What Does “Different” Mean

Ar Razi never fixed what he means by difference or otherness. Does he mean that 1 thing can exist without the other. Does he mean that 1 can be separate from the other in place or time. Does he mean that 1 can be known while the other is not. These are not all the same.

The response says that if by difference he means that 1 can exist without the other, then that is exactly what must first be proved, not assumed. Ar Razi uses difference to prove separability, but he can only prove that difference if he first proves separability. So the proof turns in a circle. He cannot use distinction to prove separation when that very distinction has only been claimed because of separation.

The Reply From Allah Being One And Self Sufficient

Ibn Taymiyyah refuted him by saying that Allah is not divisible and not subject to separation. So the whole line of argument that depends on possible division and separation fails from the start.

The response says that if Allah is one, perfect, and not in need, then separation is impossible for Him. If separation is impossible, then the move from distinction to possible breaking apart does not follow. So Ar Razi’s proof only works if the thing being argued for has already been granted.

The Claim That Difference Means Composition

Even if one side is distinguished from another in some sense, that does not by itself mean the essence is composed in the blameworthy sense Ar Razi wants.

The response explains that there are different ways people use words like distinction and composition. Sometimes they mean actual assembly after separation. Sometimes they mean only that 1 side is not the other side. Sometimes they mean a technical division used by later dialecticians. These are not all the same thing. So Ar Razi moves too quickly from distinction to composition without proving that the composition he fears is really there.

The Meaning Of Composition

The word composition itself is broad and unclear. If by composition Ar Razi means that something was put together from separate pieces by another, then this does not follow at all. Even many created bodies are not called composite in that sense. So how can this be made necessary for the Creator.

The response then says that if by composition he only means that the right is not the left, then this does not prove what he wants either. That is only a kind of distinction. It does not automatically prove that the thing is built up out of separable units.

The Appeal To Simple Parts

Ar Razi’s move to simple indivisible parts is not binding, because that whole theory is itself disputed. Many intelligent people did not accept that bodies are made of indivisible units in the first place.

The response says that if it is not established even for created bodies that they are made of such simple units, then it is false to force that account upon the Creator. So a major section of the proof depends on a theory that is not agreed upon and not certain.

The Right And Left Of The Simple Part

Even if someone granted this theory of simple parts, the rest of the argument still would not succeed in the way Ar Razi wants.

The response says that Ar Razi assumes that if the right and left of such a part are the same, then what touches the right could just as easily touch the left, and this would make separation possible. But this again depends on confusing similarity with identity and on assuming that everything shared in essence must share every ruling in every respect. That assumption is false.

Similarity Does Not Mean Identity

Two things being alike in essence does not mean each 1 is literally the other, nor does it mean that every ruling tied to this individual must also apply to that individual.

The response explains this with a simple point. Even when 2 things are said to be alike, such as 2 grains or 2 particles, this 1 is still not that 1. The place of this 1 is not the place of that 1. What belongs to this 1 is not what belongs to that 1. If everything shared by them in kind had to be shared in every ruling, then 2 things would become 1 thing, and all distinction would disappear. So Ar Razi’s move from similarity to interchangeability is false.

Contact And Separation

Ar Razi only reaches the claim that contact can become separation, and separation can become contact, by using a false rule about what identical things must share.

The response says that being alike in kind does not erase individual distinction. So it does not follow that because 2 parts are alike, whatever relation belongs to this 1 can be transferred to that 1 in every sense. The whole step by which Ar Razi tries to make union and separation possible rests on that weak move.

The Wider Point Behind The Reply

The response says that Ar Razi filled the proof with technical words whose meanings keep shifting. Sometimes composition means assembly. Sometimes it means distinction. Sometimes it means divisibility. Sometimes it means having sides. Once these meanings are separated, the proof loses its force.

The response also says that terms like body, part, side, and composition are not simple words with 1 agreed meaning. Because of that, it is not enough for Ar Razi to use them in a broad way and then claim victory. Each meaning must be examined on its own.

The Core Of The Refutation

Ar Razi’s proof rests on several steps. He says greatness in a direction means real sides. He says the sides must be either the same or different. He says difference means composition. He says composition means parts. He says parts must be either identical or different. He says either option leads to possible separation and union.

Each of these steps is flawed. The first division is not binding in the way Ar Razi claims. The meaning of difference is left unclear. The proof turns in a circle when it tries to move from distinction to separability. The word composition is used in several different senses without proof. The theory of indivisible parts is disputed. Similarity does not mean identity. Individual distinction remains even where there is likeness in kind. So the argument does not establish what Ar Razi wants.

The Final Result

The result of the reply is that Ar Razi did not prove that affirming Allah above the Throne leads to composition, parts, or possible separation. He only built the proof by moving between disputed assumptions, unclear terms, and circular reasoning.

Ibn Taymiyyah refuted him by saying that once these assumptions are exposed, the whole proof falls apart, because it no longer shows that being above the Throne requires the kind of composition and division Ar Razi is trying to force.

Ar Razi said: The seventh proof is that if He were confined to direction and space, then He would have to be great, because there is no intelligent person who says He is confined to a direction and yet is as insignificant as an indivisible point or atom that cannot be divided.

Rather, everyone who says He is confined to direction and space also says that He is great in essence. If that is the case, then one says: the side of Him that faces the right side of the Throne, is it the same as the side that faces the left side of the Throne, or is it different?

If it is the same, that is false, because if one can understand this, then why not say that the right side of the Throne is the same as its left side, such that the Throne, in all its greatness, would be like an indivisible atom or point? No rational person says that.

If it is different, then that leads to saying that the essence of Allah is composed of parts. Then those parts are either identical in essence or different in essence.

The first is false, because then some of those parts would be separate from others and some would be in contact with others, while identical things must have the same rulings.

Therefore, one would have to say that what is in contact could become separate, and what is separate could become in contact, and that means that union and separation are possible for Allah, and that is impossible. (The indivisible particle is a body that has position but cannot be divided. Bodies are composed of these particles through their combination. It is also called the simple substance or atom. Philosophers denied it, but theologians affirmed it. See: al Sahā’if al Ilāhiyyah, p. 255, al Taʿrīfāt, p. 75, Kashshāf Istilāhāt al Funūn, 1/227.)

As for the second option, that the parts differ in essence, then we say: every body composed of parts that differ in essence must ultimately go back to simple parts, each of which is free of composition. For composition means the gathering of units, and that cannot be understood unless those units exist first.

Once that is established, we say: each of those simple parts must touch something on its right and something else on its left. But its right and left must be identical, otherwise it would itself be composed, which goes against the assumption that it is simple. And when it is established that its right is like its left, and that two identicals must share all rulings, then it must be affirmed that what touches the right can become what touches the left, and vice versa.

And if that is possible, then separation and disintegration of those parts are possible, and thus the possibility of union and separation applies to the essence of Allah, which is impossible. Therefore, saying that He is in a particular direction leads to these impossibilities, so the claim itself is false.

This argument, it is said, is actually an argument against Him being a body, so it would have been better to place it in the first section on denying that He is a body. But Ar Razi included it here so it would be a refutation against those who say He is on the Throne.

He also referred in it to those who say that He is great but not a body, since that debate is well known. Had he openly stated it, he would have needed another discussion.

And once it is established that He is not on the Throne, then it becomes possible to say He is not a body, for if He were a body, it would be possible for Him to be on the Throne. And this is debated among those who affirm corporeality.

(There are many differing views among those who described Allah with the term body. Al Ashari mentioned 16 views in al Maqālāt, 1/257 and after. Al Baghdadi also recorded some views in Usul al Din, pp. 77, 112, 113. Al Shahrastani also did so in al Milal wa al Nihal, 1/109 to 110. Al Ashari also mentioned in al Maqālāt the disagreements among the Rafidah on this issue, dividing them into 6 sects. The first to describe Allah as a body was Hisham ibn al Hakam, the Rafidi. See al Maqālāt, 1/102 to 105, 257 and onwards.)

(Ahl al Sunnah, such as Imam Ahmad and others, are known to have said neither that Allah is a body nor that He is not a body. Ibn Taymiyyah said in Minhaj al Sunnah, 2/224: “The third view, which is the one established from the pure Imams of the Sunnah like Imam Ahmad and his peers, is that they did not use the term body at all, neither in affirmation nor negation, for 2 reasons. The term is not used in the Quran, nor in the Sunnah, nor by the Sahabah, nor the Tabiʿin, nor any of the Imams of the Muslims, and using it falls into the blameworthy innovations.”)

So when this argument becomes clear, the discussion must be understood in 2 aspects:

First: regarding those who say He is above the Throne, and He is great but not a body, or who say He is a body, but neither composed nor divided. This has already been addressed.

Second: regarding the argument itself, it must be examined in several ways.

The first is the claim that the side that faces the right of the Throne is either the same as the side that faces the left, or different. One may reply: We do not accept that this is the only possible distinction.

Rather, it may be that it is neither the same nor different, or that we do not say it is the same or different. For many of the theologians among those who affirm attributes, or most of them, among the Kullabiyyah, Ashariyyah, and groups from among the jurists, hadith scholars, and Sufis, say: the attribute is not the same as the one it is attributed to, nor is it other than it.

Others say: I say it is Him, but I do not say it is other than Him, and I do not say it is not Him, nor is it other than Him. (The affirmers of attributes, al Sifatiyyah. Al Shahrastani said this term refers to those who affirm all attributes reported in the revelation, namely the Salaf, as well as those who affirm some attributes, like the Asharis, or those who affirm them in problematic ways, like the anthropomorphists and Karramiyyah. Since the Muʿtazilah denied the attributes and the Salaf affirmed them, the Salaf were called Sifatiyyah and the Muʿtazilah were called Muattilah. Later, this title transferred to the Asharis. See: al Milal wa al Nihal, 1/92 to 93.)

The point is: what do we mean by otherness or being 2 distinct things? Do we mean that one can exist without the other? Or that one can be separate from the other in time, space, or being? Or do we mean that one can be known while the other is not?

If we mean the first, then we do not concede that one side is the same as the other or different from it, unless we prove that one can exist without the other. But he uses this assumption of distinction to prove separability, which is circular reasoning. He cannot prove they are distinct except by showing they can be separate, and he cannot prove they can be separate unless he proves they are distinct, and that is circular.

If it is said: We call the sides of created bodies different because one can exist without the other, we reply: but Allah is al Samad, indivisible, not subject to separation, as already explained. That name implies unity and strength, and denies separation and division.

And if being al Samad is necessary for Him, then union is necessary for Him, and separation is impossible for His essence, and this has already been explained.

If someone defines otherness as what can be separate in time, place, or being, then he may say that the attributes such as knowledge, power, and life are not each other, nor other than each other, since their locus is one and the same.

As for boundaries, some say: this side differs from that side by position, even if not by time or being. But others would reply: that is not real spatial separation. These are semantic and terminological disputes.

Also, distinguishing between an attribute and the one it is attributed to, or between a part and the whole, is more difficult than distinguishing between one attribute and another, or one part and another. That is why people say: one part of a group of 10 is not the whole 10, nor is it other than it.

The hand of a person is not the person, nor other than the person. But they do say: one part of the 10 is not another part, and the hand is not the foot, but it is other than it because it is possible for one to exist without the other.

This is true for created physical things that are divisible. As for the Creator, Exalted is He, no separation can apply to Him. So they do not say: this side of Him is other than that side, and so they reject the first premise.

If it is said: I mean by other something broader, like that it is possible to know one and not the other, or to point to one with sensory perception but not the other, or to see one and not the other, then we reply with what has been reported from some of the Salaf when asked about the verse, “Sight does not encompass Him” (al Anam: 103).

Someone asked: “Don’t you see the sky?”

He replied: “Yes.” He was asked: “Do you see all of it?” He said: “No.” The answerer said: “Then Allah is greater.” (This report was narrated by al Ajurri in al Shariʿah from Ikrimah, p. 276, and it was attributed by Ibn Taymiyyah to Ibn Abbas in Minhaj al Sunnah, 2/317, 567, and Daqaiq al Tafsir, 3/126, compiled by al Jalind. Ibn Kathir also quoted it in his Tafsir, 2/161, from Ibn Abi Hatim, and al Suyuti in al Durr al Manthur, 3/335.)

So we say to him: If you say that the right of the Lord is different from His left by this explanation, then when you say the essence of Allah is composed of parts, do you mean that something composed and assembled Him, like in the verse, “In whatever form He willed, He composed you” (al Infitar: 8)? Or that He was separate and then composed?

Or do you mean that the right is distinct from the left, which is composition in the special technical sense already explained? (The word composition linguistically means to gather things together such that they are called by one name, and technically it means something made of multiple parts, as opposed to something simple. See: Kashshaf Istilahat al Funun, 1/588, al Muʿjam al Falsafi by Jamil Saliba, 2/362. Ibn Taymiyyah said: among the theologians, composition is used in different senses, such as the composition of essence from existence and quiddity, for those who say that the existence of a thing is separate from its essence.

See Darʾ Taʿarud, 3/403. Al Ghazali in Maqasid al Falasifah, p. 99, said that the body is divided into simple and composite, the simple being something with one nature, like water or air, and the composite being what combines 2 natures, like clay composed of water and dust. Ibn al Qayyim in al Sawaʿiq al Mursalah, 3/945 to 946, said the theologians and philosophers used the term in 5 senses.)

If what is meant is the first type of composition, then that does not follow, and this is clear. For most created bodies are not composed in this way. So how can it be necessary to say that the Creator is composed in this way? This is not disputed, and even Ar Razi himself concedes that calling something a body does not necessarily imply this type of composition, for that is clearly not entailed.

But if by composition he means distinction, like the distinction between the right and the left, then we say: this kind of composition does not necessarily entail parts. For this is based on affirming the indivisible part, and that issue is well known to be disputed. And it has been made clear that intelligent people have withheld judgement on this. (Indivisible part: a substance with position that does not accept division at all. Bodies are composed of such indivisible units joined together. Philosophers denied its existence, while theologians affirmed it. See Darʾ Taʿarud, 5/142, and also al Taʿrifat, p. 75, Kashshāf Istilāhāt al Funūn, 1/227.)

If it is not established that created bodies actually consist of parts, then it is false to require this for the Creator.

(There are different kinds of composition: composition of essence from existence and attributes; composition of bodily matter from form and matter, as the philosophers say; composition from individual atoms, as many theologians say; composition from separate elements later joined. See Darʾ Taʿarud, 5/142, attributed to Ibn Sina and al Ghazali. Ibn Taymiyyah explained that this categorisation is an innovation of later dialecticians, and that no early authority preceded them in it. He also said that the composition of the essence from the attributes, such as being living, knowing, able, is affirmed by the majority of rational people, and no one meaningfully disagrees with them about it. He rejected the other types. See: Sharh Hadith al Nuzul, pp. 73 to 74.)

Also, those who affirm the existence of parts know that a simple body is not composed of parts in the sense that those parts were formed separately and then combined. So when it is said that something is composed of parts, it simply means some distinction between one part and another, and this goes no further than saying that one part is distinct from another. It is well known that some of the Salaf spoke using the word part. (The use of the term part is found in the speech of some of the Salaf from the Sahabah and the Tabiʿin. It is mentioned in books of Sunnah. See al Sunnah by al Khallal, ed. Atiyyah al Zahrani, pp. 262 to 263, no. 319 to 320.)

So when he then says: either the parts are identical in essence or different, and the first is impossible because on that basis some parts would be apart and others touching, and what applies to one identical must apply to the other, and therefore the touching ones could become separated, and the separated ones could become touching,

We say: similarity in essence does not mean that one is the same as the other, nor that it shares all the specific legal or logical implications that come with individuation.

To explain: if one says that 2 identical things share every attribute, then there is nothing in the universe that is actually identical in that way. For everything that we think of as identical, like 2 grains of wheat or 2 specks of dust, we know that this one is not that one, and the space that this one occupies is not the same as that of the other, and the accidents that adhere to it are not the same as those of the other.

What distinguishes them in essence, attribute, and location prevents the other from having the same location, because if it did, then this one’s identity would be that one’s, and its place would be the same as that one’s place, and its attribute would be the same as that one’s, and that would cancel out their being 2 and make them 1.

(Specks of dust, habaʾ, are the fine particles lifted by the wind. You see them on people’s faces, clothes, and skin. Al Tabari said: habaʾ is what appears like dust in a ray of sunlight coming through a crack. It looks like dust but cannot be grasped. See: Tahdhib al Lughah by al Azhari, 6/454, and Lisan al Arab, 15/350 under the root h b ʾ. Also see: Tafsir al Tabari, 4/19 under al Furqan: “We turned to what they had done of deeds and made it scattered dust” (al Furqan: 23). Ittihad is when 2 distinct things become 1 thing, or when 2 or more things merge completely into a continuous whole. This includes, for example, the union of the soul and body. See: al Muʿjam al Falsafi by Jamil Saliba, 1/35, and Majmaʿ al Lughah al ʿArabiyyah, p. 2. Also see: al Taʿrifat by al Jurjani, who said: union is making 2 essences into 1, and this only occurs in numbers of 2 or more.)

Bayan Talbis Al Jahmiyyah (4/76 87)