The Argument of the Philosophers:
The Peripatetic philosophers, like Ibn Sina, believed the world had no beginning—it has always existed. Their most important proof for this is based on what they call “the problem of specification.” Here’s how they argue:
- They say if something didn’t exist before, and then it starts to exist, there must be a reason why it started when it did and not before. There has to be something new that made it happen like a new will, a new power, or the removal of a blocker.
- If the cause has always been the same with nothing changing in it, they argue, then the effect should also have always been there. So if the world came after the cause, they say, this must mean the cause changed gained something new, or something else came in to complete it.
- They say: if the cause is complete, then the effect must come with it right away. If not, and the effect is delayed, then that cause was not complete to begin with. But if you say something else completed it, then that thing also needs a cause. And if every cause needs another, this leads to endless regression, which they say is impossible.
So in short, they argue that a complete, eternal cause must have an effect that is also eternal—meaning the world must have always existed along with its cause. They claim the cause cannot act after not acting without some change, and they say change is impossible for the Necessary Being (Allah).
Ibn Taymiyyah’s Response
He says their entire belief depends on thinking that a “complete cause” must always be joined with its effect. But he says this is not proven by anything real. In the world, we don’t see any cause that always produces its effect on its own without any conditions or help.
He gives examples like fire and the sun—these only cause effects when other conditions are met, like something flammable being present. So causes in creation don’t act alone, and their effects can be blocked. Therefore, no cause we see is truly “complete” on its own.
He says the philosophers treat Allah like other agents either like natural causes (that act without will) or like willing beings (who choose). Both comparisons are wrong.
He says Allah is not like anything else. So using logic based on other beings to talk about Allah is false. They gave Allah partners, equals, and peers in their thinking.
A willful being can choose when to act.
Even if someone has full power and will, that doesn’t mean he must act all the time. Ibn Taymiyyah says this is clearly seen in life: people with power and choice can act now or later. There doesn’t have to be something new in them each time they act. So why assume that Allah can’t choose to create after not creating?
Even if something new must happen for action to begin, that doesn’t prove their point.
Suppose someone insists that nothing new can come from a cause unless something new happens in the cause. Ibn Taymiyyah says: still, that doesn’t prove Allah can’t bring about something new. Why can’t Allah bring about a new will or action in Himself?
He says many philosophers believed Allah can do new actions, and there’s no clear proof saying otherwise.
Ibn Taymiyyah says they use the very thing they’re trying to prove as a proof. They say it’s impossible for Allah to act after not acting because nothing can act after not acting. But that’s just repeating the claim, not proving it.
Their claim of infinite regress is invalid
He says the philosophers try to use the fear of infinite regress to try and avoid the belief that Allah’s action began at a certain point. But he shows that this problem doesn’t follow. Conditions for something to happen may build up slowly. That’s not the same as endless causation.
So, the philosophers’ worry about an endless chain of causes doesn’t apply here.
Ibn Taymiyyah points out that all effects in the world depend on multiple things. Nothing brings about its effect by itself, just by existing. So the belief of a cause that always produces its effect automatically is just made up. It doesn’t exist.
Allah’s will is unlike all wills.
He explains that Allah’s will is not like the will of people or anything else. Human will is affected by outside things. But Allah’s will is perfect, not derived from something else or forced. He acts by His own choice, and He can create whenever and however He wants.
They turn Allah into something weaker than His creation.
By saying Allah cannot act unless He must act, or cannot act unless something forces Him to act, the philosophers actually make Him sound weak and unable to withhold action, unable to delay it. But that’s worse than how created things behave. That kind of thinking removes Allah’s power and choice.
He ends by pointing out that just because they ask, “Why did He act after not acting?” doesn’t mean there’s a problem. Not knowing the reason doesn’t mean there is no reason. Just asking the question does not prove their claim.
To conclude Ibn Taymiyyah says the philosophers built their belief of an eternal world on a flawed comparison. They imagined Allah like a cause that cannot help but produce an effect as soon as it exists. But nothing in creation works like that, and Allah is not like anything in creation. They made up rules based on weak logic and then applied them to Allah. Their argument is not just wrong—it treats Allah like the weakest part of His creation. The truth is: only Allah is the true cause. He acts by His own will, whenever He chooses, without needing anything else.
And those who say that the world is eternal due to its Necessary Cause are the most well-known of them: the Peripatetic philosophers (that is, the late philosophers, as the early philosophers are called the masters of wisdom. The Peripatetic philosophers are followers of Aristotle, the master of logical teachings, and they are known for their writings in philosophy. Al-Qifti said that the term ‘Peripatetics’ applies to the followers of Plato because he used to teach philosophy while walking. See: al-Milal wa al-Nihal 2/60, and Akhbar al-Ulama by al-Qifti, p. 14, and Darʾ Taʿarud al-ʿAql wa al-Naql by the author, 6/242). These are the corrupters of the true religion of the Sabeans.
Their most prominent argument—which was relied upon by their best-known later figure Ibn Sina (Abu ʿAli al-Husayn ibn ʿAbd Allah ibn Sina, he and his father were followers of the Batini Ismaʿili sect under the rule of al-Hakim. He is known as ‘al-Sharaf al-Mulk’, ‘al-Faylasuf’, and ‘al-Raʾis’. His books include: al-Shifa, al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, and al-Najat. He was born in 370 AH and died in 428 AH. See: Wafayat al-Aʿyan 2/160, Lisan al-Mizan 2/912, al-Aʿlam 2/241, and al-Mawsuʿa al-ʿArabiyya al-Muyassara, p. 19)
and others among the heretics is their attempt to demand a reason for specification. They said: The sound intellect, which never lies, knows that if a being remains in a state of not acting, and then acts, then there must be something new introduced to it whether a power, knowledge, will, or another condition along with the removal of any preventers.
Otherwise, if it is as it always has been, then the occurrence of an act from it is impossible, because the specification of one time over another for the action must have a specifier. The same reasoning they apply to the origin of the world as a whole. If an act occurs from it, then it would not be something that came after nonexistence, so as not to fall into what they consider an absurdity.
In brief: either it is a complete cause for the action, or it is not. If it is a complete cause, then the action must accompany it. If it is not a complete cause, then there must arise something new to make it a complete cause.
And the same argument they use for the world, they apply to that new arising: if it is a complete cause, the effect must accompany it; and if not, then something else must arise, leading to infinite regress. Their argument is thus built on the claim that a complete cause necessarily entails the simultaneous presence of its effect, and that it is impossible for it to act after having not acted.
They hold to this argument and others have responded to it by denying the necessity of simultaneity between the effect and the cause, especially when the cause is one that has will and choice.
For the one who has power and choice can act if he wills and refrain if he wills. Others have responded by mentioning reasons for preferring one moment over another, and others still point to the fact that in existence, there are numerous specific characteristics in attributes, measures, and motions whose details are only known by Allah.
They say: the reasoning for specifying one time is the same as the reasoning for specifying a place, attributes, measures, motions, and other types contained in the world. They say: this very argument applies to daily occurrences, whose origination is witnessed.
This argument would apply to them too. Therefore, whatever refutes it in that case would refute it here as well.
The truth is that this argument refutes itself. Their claim of the world’s eternity is invalid. For one could say: if occurrences can happen from an eternal complete cause, then their argument fails.
And it becomes possible to say that the world came into being from an eternal agent. But if one says it is impossible for occurrences to come from an eternal complete cause, then the daily occurrences we see cannot have come from such a cause either. Then a new cause must arise. And the same problem applies again to this new cause.
So if the occurrence of events without a beginning is impossible, then their view is false. And if it is possible, then it can be said that the world’s creation depended on a series of events with no beginning.
They cannot deny the possibility of accidents occurring in the Necessary Being. In fact, many of them allow this, including many of the theologians, and they have no proof to prohibit it. Moreover, their argument does not prove the eternity of the heavenly spheres.
In conclusion, they are compelled to affirm a Creator who brought these occurrences into existence. Their denial of the origination of the heavenly spheres is therefore invalid.
The point here is that the basis of this argument is a false analogy: likening Allah to other agents, setting up rivals, equals, and counterparts to Him, and then applying to Him the same rules they apply to those agents.
They turned Him into one who gives birth to the world, making the world His offspring or partner. They denied thereby that He is a Creator, Originator, and Innovator of the world. They depicted Him as a producing cause from which the world emerged, having always accompanied Him.
Their argument is based on the belief that He cannot initiate or renew action, because that would be specification without a specifier. This analogy they make is one of the corrupt and contradictory analogies. We have already clarified that it is impermissible to make Allah equal to others—neither by analogy of resemblance nor of generalisation.
Rather, in His case, the only acceptable analogy is one of greater precedence: whatever is a praiseworthy attribute for a created being, Allah is more deserving of it; and whatever is a flaw in a creature, Allah is even more exalted and free from it. Their argument ultimately portrays Allah as incapable of action and origination unless it is something that necessarily emanates from Him, just as it is for a helpless cause in creation.
This analogy is therefore one that uses something that is a deficiency in creation, and applies it to the Creator. The discussion can be framed in several ways:
First: They either claim to know that He does not act after not acting because of knowledge of His essence and that this is impossible for Him as impossibility of nonexistence is for the Necessary Being or they base it on a universal proposition, or on analogy by resemblance.
If they claim it is based on knowledge of His essence, this is invalid for three reasons: They admit that they do not know the essence of Allah. They cannot identify the specific quality in Him that prevents the occurrence of an act, or explain it.
Knowledge of the essence of a thing only comes through sensory perception either internal or external and this would make knowledge of Allah perceptual or immediate, which they do not claim. Those who do claim it, know that the truth is contrary to their claim.
If they say it is through universal reasoning or analogy, it can be said: such reasoning is invalid, for Allah does not belong in the same category as other beings. In creation, there is no single thing that is a complete cause in and of itself.
Everything comes from multiple causes. If nothing in creation is a complete cause by itself, then one cannot argue that a complete cause must have its effect present with it, since no such complete cause exists in the observable world.
This is observed in all agents—whether those that act with will and choice (like animals) or those that act by nature (like inanimate objects). None of them act solely by themselves. Fire does not burn except with another cause—the receptivity of the object. A human does not act by will and power except with conditions external to him.
Also, the other being that would be included in their universal proposition would either be a living being with will, or a non-living one that acts by natural compulsion. In both cases, actions do occur from them after not occurring, as is plainly observed in all agents.
But the opponent says: “They do not act until they change and change is impossible for Allah.” This only works if your opponent is the one arguing from those analogies. But you are the one who cannot produce a universal proposition that includes more than one case to prove that an act cannot arise from a being after not arising from it. And if you cannot do that, analogy by resemblance is even weaker.
Thus, their claim that the Necessary Being cannot originate anything is without knowledge neither known by itself nor proven. The root of the error of these polytheistic Sabeans, Magians, and others is their false analogy, which treats Allah like others, giving Him equals and peers.
Sometimes they liken Him to a living being who acts by will, and sometimes to a being that acts by nature without life. These are the people most worthy of saying: “By Allah, we were certainly in manifest error when we equated you with the Lord of the worlds” (al-Shu‘ara: 97–98).
This is why the people of the Sunnah hold that there is no Creator but Allah, and no independent agent of action, and no complete cause other than Him. For everything else that is imagined to act or cause, its action is dependent on conditions from others, is blocked by opposition from others, has peers who can do what it does, and has associates and equals.
That is why Allah clarified His uniqueness in having no partner or assistant, no opposing equal, and no comparable peer. As He said: “Whatever Allah grants to people of mercy—none can withhold it; and whatever He withholds, none can release it thereafter” (Fatir: 2).
This means that there is no preventer or opponent to what He gives of mercy, and what He withholds, no one can release or grant except Him. This is as the Prophet used to say in prayer when rising from bowing and after finishing prayer: “O Allah, none can withhold what You give, and none can give what You withhold, and no wealth or might can benefit against You” (This hadith was narrated by Muslim from Abu Sa‘id al-Khudri and Ibn ‘Abbas in two versions with slight variation. It was also narrated by al-Nasa’i in al-Sunan, Book of Opening Takbir, Chapter: What to Say Upon Rising, 2/198–199, and by Abu Dawud in Kitab al-Salah, Chapter: What to Say Upon Rising from Ruku‘, 1/215). And there is no being in existence who gives something without another being able to prevent it, and no one who withholds something without another being able to give it.
[He] is not independent in what He gives; rather, He must have a partner and helper. [This is] because there is nothing in creation that is a complete cause (a sufficient cause), and nothing acts alone; nothing, when it acts, produces an effect necessarily and unconditionally. There may be opposing factors that prevent its effect.
One of the clearest examples of what is called a cause is the sun in its shining and heating, but it only shines when something else faces it and its rays fall upon it, so that light and rays are caused by two things: the sun and the object opposite it which receives the rays. Furthermore, obstacles to light and rays like clouds are present and observed.
Likewise, its heating is conditional on the subject in which the heat occurs, and obstacles to heating are also observed and present. While its action depends on a partner, and it has a preventing factor, and other causes too since the heat from the rays can come from fire or from motion, just as light can come from fire the same applies to the heat of fire and light and heat from motion. It needs another cause, like the body that carries the heat, and there are obstacles that can prevent the heat from occurring.
So what is brought into being by created causes of mercy can also be prevented by other created causes. What is blocked by one cause may be released by another. This is what is meant by the verse: “Whatever mercy Allah opens for the people, none can withhold it; and whatever He withholds, none can release it thereafter.” (Faatir: 2)
And Allah alone is the One who, when He opens mercy for people, none can withhold it; and what He withholds, none can release it after Him. That is why He says: “O people, remember the favour of Allah upon you. Is there any creator other than Allah who provides for you from the heavens and the earth?” (Faatir: 3)
And He says: “They have made partners with Allah.” (Al-An’am: 100),
and also: “Say: Do you see what you invoke besides Allah? If Allah intended harm for me, could they remove His harm? Or if He intended mercy for me, could they withhold His mercy? Say: Allah is sufficient for me. In Him let the trusting put their trust.” (Az-Zumar: 38)
and: “If Allah touches you with harm, none can remove it but Him; and if He intends good for you, none can repel His bounty.” (Yunus: 107).
He clarified that there is none besides Allah who can oppose or prevent what He wills in terms of benefit or harm, since every cause that is thought to bring benefit or harm has something that can prevent or oppose it. There is no cause in existence that necessarily brings about its effect without opposition. What is like this is not a complete cause or sufficient cause except by the will of Allah. For whatever Allah wills is, and He has no opposer or preventer of His judgment. No one removes hardship except Him, and no one repels His mercy except Him.
Also, every cause has an equal or counterpart that can replace it. So when it is absent, the effect can still occur by its counterpart. Whatever Allah does not will does not occur. This is very clear in specific causes such as the giving, preventing, harming, or benefiting done by humans—kings and others. Their hearts are in Allah’s hand; He turns them as He wills. Their choices and abilities—through which they act—are constantly changing.
None of them acts alone; rather, there are always additional causes beyond his control, and the matter depends on the whole collection. Even when these causes exist—from him and from others—there are opposing factors and obstacles.
Even when these causes exist and obstacles are removed, sometimes they are replaced by something else of their kind, and the goal is achieved through something else just as it would be from them. There is no cause that is indispensable except the Messenger who is the seal of the Prophets, whose guidance and clear proofs cannot be dispensed with. Even he himself admitted that he is the servant and messenger of Allah, and that Allah is the one who gave him this [status].
Likewise, the sun and what comes from it of daytime, and what results from its absence of night—no one claims that this belongs to anyone other than Allah. That is why Ibrahim said: “Indeed, Allah brings the sun from the east, so bring it from the west.” (Al-Baqarah: 258)
and Allah says: “Say: Do you see if Allah made the night continuous over you until the Day of Resurrection, what god other than Allah could bring you light? Will you not listen?
Say: Do you see if Allah made the day continuous over you until the Day of Resurrection, what god other than Allah could bring you night in which to rest? Will you not see? It is out of His mercy that He made for you the night and the day so that you may rest in it and seek from His bounty and so that you may be grateful.” (Al-Qasas: 71–73)
The second point: They relied on the claim that nothing new happens unless something else happens, so nothing else would happen unless something happened in Him or He changed.
This issue has been the subject of famous disagreement among the early and later generations. Many groups among the theologians of the Muʿtazilah and Ashʿariyyah, jurists, hadith scholars, Sufis, and others denied this claim. They said: Can something come from Him after not coming from Him without something new happening in Him?
Many other groups among the theologians of the Shia, Murjiʾah, Karramiyyah, hadith scholars, jurists, and Sufis affirmed this. And we concede to this affirmation and say: Suppose it is impossible for Him to bring about something unless something happens in Him—then you have not established any evidence that something cannot happen in Him except by claiming that this case is like that of the world.
And this new thing cannot occur unless there is a cause that brings it about. So we say: Even if that is granted, why do you say He cannot initiate an action or motion in Himself which brings about that effect?
This is the view of many theologians, jurists, the majority of hadith scholars, Sufis, and others. It is also the view of various earlier and later philosophers, including the one who was the most distinguished of his time, Abu al-Barakat, the author of al-Muʿtabar, who said: “God’s being active (iltiha) cannot be affirmed except with this view.” (Abu al-Barakat is Hibat Allah ibn ʿAli ibn Malka al-Baghdadi, a Jewish philosopher-physician who converted to Islam and died in Baghdad in 570 AH. His book al-Muʿtabar fi al-Hikmah is well known. See: Qifti, Akhbar al-ʿUlamaʾ, p. 224; Ismaʿil al-Baghdadi, Hadiyyat al-ʿArifin, 2/650-651.)
And ar-Razi said: This view is inescapable for all groups, and that there is no rational proof that negates it. (Ibn Taymiyyah discussed in detail the issue of volitional actions occurring in Allah and the scholars’ differing positions in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, vol. 2, until p. 244. He also quotes ar-Razi on p. 20 and discusses al-Muʿtabar’s view from p. 164–172. Ar-Razi also discusses this in al-Arbaʿin fi Usul ad-Din, p. 119 under the tenth issue, where he quotes the author of al-Muʿtabar saying something similar to what is quoted here, and then admits that most rational sects adopt this view, even if they deny it publicly.)
But that is not what is being affirmed here. Rather, we say: You have not presented any argument except your statement, “The case of this event is like that of the world, which requires a cause for its occurrence.” That is true, but you did not present any evidence that this event is impossible other than your original claim—that it is impossible for something to originate from Him after not having originated. But this is merely the doctrine itself being used as its own proof, which is circular reasoning. (Circular reasoning means using the conclusion as one of the premises, often with rephrased terms. See al-Amidi, al-Mubin fi Sharh Alfaz al-Hukamaʾ wa al-Mutakallimin, p. 76; al-Jurjani, at-Taʿrifat, p. 216; and Jamil Saliba, al-Muʿjam al-Falsafi, 2/382.)
But the claim of an infinite regress here is not even rejected by you, for you affirm something even more extreme than that regarding the motion of the heavenly spheres.
Whoever considers this will realise that these people have presented no actual argument at all except the repeated question: “Why did He act after not acting?” But simply asking for a reason is not itself a proof that the event could not have occurred. If you do not know why He caused something, that is not a proof that He could not cause it.
So it becomes clear that they do not know whether origination is impossible; and there is a difference between knowing something is impossible or nonexistent, and simply asking for a proof of its possibility or a reason for its occurrence.
This clarification shows that these people are just as Allah said: “And thus We have made for every prophet an enemy—devils among mankind and jinn, inspiring one another with decorative speech in delusion” (al-Anʿam: 112).
Whoever understands these two points will understand the refutation of the various forms they present of this flawed analogy, for the substance of their reasoning is always the same—like when one of them says: The reason a created thing is created must either be fully present in eternity or not.
If not, then it needs a cause, and the same argument repeats, resulting in infinite regress, which is impossible. But if it is fully present, then it is known necessarily that a complete cause cannot be present without the effect following it. So, it becomes necessary that the world must always have existed with God. (This statement is from ar-Razi in al-Arbaʿin fi Usul ad-Din, pp. 41–42, in the first issue regarding the origination of the world. Also see p. 37, and Nihayat al-ʿUqul, folio 32, under the fifth objection.)
But both parts of this argument can be answered using the two points just explained:
As for the first: We do not accept that if the cause was not fully present in eternity, then infinite regress follows. Because what is meant here by “the cause” is the cause of created things. This may indeed be fully present. But the action or effect such as creation, speech, or will was not present; or the required condition or removal of a preventing factor was not present.
All of that is part of what completes the cause. If by “cause” he means the collection of things which must be present for the effect to occur, then if these things are not all present, the cause is not fully present.
But if some are missing, the first cause has not yet arrived, and so infinite regress does not follow. Rather, that second thing is the cause of the condition or the removal of the obstacle. The true cause of the world is not the cause of some of the things upon which the world depends—whether that be creation, speech, will, or something else.
So if it is said that the cause of that completion the reason that necessarily brings about the effect must either be fully present in eternity or not, we say: The correct view is that it was not fully present in eternity. There are two responses to this:
First: We do not accept that there exists any cause in the known universe which necessarily brings about its effect in a way that precludes its absence. Nor is there any necessary cause for events except Allah’s will. And His will has no parallel to be compared with, for “There is nothing like unto Him.”
Second: We say that its occurrence afterwards is due to the appearance of its condition or the removal of its obstacle. And infinite regress in conditions and removals is not impossible according to the opponent. What is impossible is infinite regress in fully sufficient causes, where each cause necessitates the next.
But that is not the case here. Rather, the emergence of this condition depends on another condition which is not a cause for it, and successive conditions are permissible. The proof is that daily events do exist, and the world is full of such occurrences. So the complete cause for every such event must either be eternal or not, and the division repeats.
The most these people claim is that these events follow the successive motions of the celestial spheres. But that is not the focus here. What matters is that when they require conditions, and that is not the kind of infinite regress that is impossible, then all the more so here it is not a problem.
The second point is this: even if the complete cause existed eternally, why do you claim that its effect must necessarily accompany it?
As for the statement: “It is known by necessity that if the complete cause exists along with all the factors that complete its causality, the effect cannot be absent from it,” this is a general claim. Its meaning is that every complete cause necessarily has a corresponding effect. However, every general statement must have specific examples that are outside the scope of the current dispute, which can support the principle.
But it is known that in all of existence, there is no complete cause other than Allah. Nothing among created things produces an effect by itself. Rather, effects only come from a combination of two or more things.
None of the created things are causes on their own. Their effects can be absent even when they are present—whether they are volitional or natural causes. So how can one claim that the complete cause must necessarily have an accompanying effect, let alone that this is known by necessity, when there is no comparable case to this, and the matter in question is unknown?
If it is said: “I mean by the complete cause that which necessarily brings about an effect whenever it exists,” then the assumption would be that this cause either exists eternally or does not.
The response: such a cause does not exist eternally, nor do we find among existing things any cause that necessarily produces its effect. The refined version of this response is that all observed causes can exist without their effects. Nowhere in the world is there a single cause that necessarily produces its effect.
Effects arise from the combination of at least two causes. These causes can exist without producing their effects. Therefore, the intellect cannot assert that these causes necessitate their effects without fail. The claim that the complete cause must be accompanied by its effect is baseless.
Ultimately, the claim boils down to: if an effect proceeds from the cause sometimes and not at other times, this would imply specification without a specifier. We previously responded to this claim, showing that they apply it to Allah by comparing Him to His creation, despite the essential difference between the two.
This response can be summarised as:
Third point: When you say, “That which causes a thing to come into existence must either be eternal or not,” what exactly do you mean by that cause? Do you mean the one that necessitates the effect upon its existence? Or do you mean that which makes it possible for Him to act—such as His power and other attributes?
If you mean the former, we say: that is not eternal, and we do not concede that it must be present for the action to occur. Even if we concede it must be present, we still do not concede that this necessitates an infinite regress. If you mean the latter, then that is even more appropriate, but it is not something that necessitates the effect upon its presence.
Fourth point: This argument revolves around the assumption that if the complete cause exists, the effect must accompany it, and if the cause is not complete, the effect cannot occur. Further, the cause cannot become complete afterwards, because this would entail an infinite regress. From this, they conclude that an act cannot begin after it was previously not being done.
Thus, their conclusion depends on these premises: that there is a complete cause, and therefore the effect must accompany it; and that the effect cannot be delayed once the complete cause is present.
They also claim this applies to a willing agent, saying: “His choosing a specific thing is necessitated by His essence.” Even so, whether you say the cause is complete or not, or whether the action is done or not, there is no way for them to prove these premises about Allah—except through analogical reasoning, which is invalid. For Allah has no equal, counterpart, or likeness to compare Him to.
So, we reject all three of these assumptions: why must action necessarily follow from one who is fully able to act? Your entire argument rests on comparing Allah to some of His creation, assuming that the limitations and weaknesses of created beings apply to Him.
Some of the theologians who responded to this like ar-Razi and others answered based on the same faulty analogy. They said: “If Allah’s full capacity to act was present from eternity, then the world must also be eternal.” We say: this only follows if He were acting by necessity of His essence. But if He acts by will, then not so.
They went further and made a general claim: a capable agent does not need an external factor to prefer one of two equal options. For two reasons:
First, a person may choose one of two equally available options like a traveller who finds two identical paths, or a hungry man presented with two equal loaves of bread and he chooses without an external reason.
Second, a capable agent chooses one of two possible options by willing it, and this will itself serves as the reason for preferring it. Will is a subjective attribute. It cannot be explained by something outside of it. Just as knowledge allows one to know and power enables one to act, will allows one to specify one option over another.
Some said that will still requires a reason to prefer, others said knowledge plays that role, others said the goodness or benefit in the action does, and others said power does so. Yet others said it is impossible altogether. (Ar-Razi discussed all these views in great detail in al-Matalib al-Aliya and al-Arba’in. He elaborated on these theories, the implications of knowledge, will, power, and benefit, with examples.)
The point here is to refute those who accept these claims about causes that necessitate their effects by their essence but deny it in the case of the willing agent. The correct position is to draw the distinction between Allah and creation not between the necessitating agent and the willing agent. So we say to them: your claim is impossible in every sense regarding Allah. There is no being in existence who acts purely by necessity of essence.
Everything we observe only acts when more than one cause combines. No effect comes from one thing alone. Even then, the effect might not occur due to the absence of necessary conditions. So how can you claim that there is a cause that necessitates its effect by essence, when no such thing exists in reality?
Even among things that supposedly produce effects whether by will, power, or nature none do so independently. So how can you attribute that to Allah, who is beyond all comparisons?
Effects come from combinations like fire causing burning only when there is something flammable present. Sunlight only appears when the sun meets an opposing body. And even then, the effect might not happen. There might be no light or no burning. So nothing we see in reality produces effects necessarily, let alone by its essence.
Therefore, the claim that some cause necessitates its effect by essence is baseless. These people committed shirk and equated Allah with His creation. They gave Him the worst of analogies, just like their predecessors who said Allah has daughters while disdaining daughters for themselves, or who claimed a slave could be a partner to his master while rejecting such partnership in their own affairs.
They made the effect inseparable from Him—something He cannot prevent—by likening Him to these so-called necessitating causes. And yet, even those causes do not produce effects unconditionally. So they attributed to Allah a type of generating and helplessness that they would not even attribute to man-made things.
The view of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah is that there is no complete cause in existence except Allah alone. He has no Lord besides Him and no god other than Him. That is why some theologians among the affirmers like al-Ashari said that the most specific description of Allah is “the power to originate.” (Abu Hasan al-Ashari said: If the true Creator is Allah alone, and none share in creation with Him, then His most specific attribute is the power to originate. See: al-Milal wa al-Nihal of al-Shahrastani 1/100.)
And there is no doubt that this is one of the most specific attributes of Allah—if not the most specific. al-Ashari clarified this principle and distinguished himself from all the groups of misguidance.
The People of the Qiblah—and his defence of this principle was among the best, if not the best, of his defences of the positions of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah (as stated in Darʾ al-Taʿāruḍ, 1/226; al-Shahrastani also discusses this point in Nihayat al-Iqdam, pp. 108–109).
As for those who differentiate between the one who acts by necessity and the one who acts by choice—whether in the observable world or beyond it—such a distinction is false. In the observable world, when a volitional agent possesses decisive will along with full capacity, he resembles one who acts by necessity. Such a person can even be described as acting necessarily. The one who acts necessarily does so due to an inherent, natural quality within him, just as choice is present in the volitional agent.
Both possess a capacity through which action proceeds; both have inclination or tendency toward action. Both may be referred to as having a natural disposition or instinct. In the case of the living being, this is referred to as a nature (tabiʿa), just as it is for inanimate objects.
The difference between the two is that one possesses awareness, which entails pleasure and pain. Hence the two are distinguished by calling one “will” (irada) and not the other—even though the latter may still be called will, as in the verse: “a wall that wants to collapse” (al-Kahf 18:77).
This distinction was first introduced in Islam by the Qadariyyah. They exaggerated in affirming the actions of the living, capable person to the extent that they considered man to be independently responsible for his actions. They excluded his actions from being created by God and willed by Him (as documented in Sharh al-Usul al-Khamsa by ʿAbd al-Jabbar, pp. 332ff, and Rasāʾil al-ʿAdl wa al-Tawhīd, pp. 211, 224, 350ff).
The Ashʿariyyah and others, though they disagreed with them in this, went even further in denying that physical bodies have forces and natures through which they act—forces which God created to enable them to act (as discussed in the books of the Ashʿaris under the theory of kasb, which ultimately removes real will and agency from the human. Ibn Taymiyyah criticises them for approaching the position of al-Jahm in asserting complete determinism. See al-Safadiyyah 1/149–153 and Majmuʿ al-Fatawa 8/387, 403, 467).
In reality, all of creation has forces and natures that are the starting point for movement and action—whether in those with life or without. God is the Creator of all of this (Majmuʿ al-Fatawa 1/119). However, non-living things do not move on their own but in response to something else. When removed from a state of rest, they return to it naturally, so their motion is not intrinsic.
In contrast, for the living, every movement in the universe begins with the will of a living being. The angels are those through whom God manages the affairs of creation, just as He manages things through humans. But the angels are greater and more numerous, as in His saying: “Those who manage the affair” (al-Naziʿat 79:5) and “Those who arrange the matter” (al-Dhariyat 51:4).
Thus, those philosophers associated God with others and equated Him with them when they likened Him to a necessary cause from among the creation. Others, who compared Him to a volitional agent among creation, were in fact better than them in some respects. But both groups, had their original analogy been sound, would still have made a corrupt comparison by equating the Lord of the Worlds with created things.
But the premise is invalid in both cases. One group compared Him to a necessary cause whose effect is concomitant with it; the other to a willing agent who chooses one of two possibilities—who acts if he wants, and refrains if he wants. Yet in existence, there is no such volitional agent. Every willing, capable agent among creation does not act until a decisive and specific will is formed in him, and this comes from outside him. This is better than the first in some ways.
As for God, He has the highest attribute and is not like that. Rather, He acts independently by His own will, which He did not acquire from another. He is not compelled to act neither His action nor His will compel Him. These are descriptions of humans.
The Qadariyyah rejected this, yet the necessary cause posited in creation, whether it is said to act by nature without life and awareness or said to have life and awareness, is not like what these people claim. In existence, there is nothing that acts except with the help of a partner assisting it together forming the cause.
God has no partner (as explicitly added by the editor). And when there is a partner, the effect proceeds from them both without choice or will, and the agent is powerless to stop the effect once the partner is present. But God acts only by His will and choice. He is not unable to withhold an effect due to someone else producing it. Whatever He wills is, and whatever He does not will is not.
Thus, all these people fell into error by likening God to His creation. Moreover, they erred in their understanding of the basis upon which they made their comparison (e.g. al-Razi and his like likened Him to a necessary cause, while the Qadariyyah likened Him to a volitional agent).
God says: “And they have made the jinn partners with Allah, though He created them, and they falsely attributed to Him sons and daughters without knowledge. Exalted is He and high above what they describe. Originator of the heavens and the earth! How can He have a son when He has no consort? He created all things, and He is, of everything, Knowing” (al-Anʿam 6:100–101).
This concludes part of what relates to their first premise: that if the cause is complete, the effect must accompany it.
As for the second premise—that if the complete cause does not exist, the effect cannot proceed from it, and it is impossible for the cause to become complete after not being so, and thus it is impossible for it to act after not acting—they affirm that it is only a necessary cause that has this kind of simultaneity. But we have shown that such a cause does not exist, so their argument that unless a complete cause exists in this way the effect is impossible collapses. All observable causes in the world may fail to bring about an effect; thus, they are not complete causes, yet effects still occur alongside them.
Even if it were accepted that no effect could proceed from such causes, it still would not follow that God is like that. To claim that God cannot act unless it is impossible for Him not to act and that He cannot act unless it is necessary for Him to act is to deny His ability. It is to say that His actions are either necessary and unavoidable, or utterly impossible which negates His capacity, the very meaning of His power.
By this reasoning, He is weaker than His own creation, for nothing among them produces an effect in this way that the effect is either necessary and cannot be withheld, or impossible and cannot occur.
We know that existing things only exist because God willed them, and what He did not will did not occur. So, necessity and impossibility in relation to created things are defined by God’s will or the absence of it. To suggest that necessity and impossibility result from another cause is false, and contradicts observable reality.
Whoever observes existing things will not find anything in them that necessarily produces its effect in this way. If necessity and impossibility in possible things depend on God’s will, and there is no equal to His will, just as there is no equal to Him, then to compare His will to something else is like comparing Him to something else an act of polytheism, of assigning to Him equals and peers.
This is impossible in itself, because resemblance implies that each party possesses the quality of the other, which would entail a contradiction (as contradiction cannot be combined in the same entity). Furthermore, they liken Him to something deficient and powerless something whose very existence would be considered a flaw and He, glorified be He, is not to be likened even in attributes of perfection, so how can He be likened in attributes of deficiency?
Bayan Talbis Al Jahmiyyah (5/225-256)
