Fakhr al Din al Razi on direction, ʿuluw and istiwa

Fakhr al Din al Razi denied that Allah Most High is above the Throne with His Dhat and denied real istiwa, because in his belief this would confine Allah to an upper direction and make His Dhat like a heaven, while all heavens are created, so He would be the creator of Himself. He used the verses about creating the heavens and the earth in six days to support this, and said that if Allah were in an upper direction He would be a heaven, which is impossible.

He also said that hayyiz and directions are real existing things outside the mind, with different “realities” and counted successive extents, and he argued from the verse “Everything will perish except His Face” that the Throne and all hayyiz and directions will perish while Allah remains exalted above them, and from this he tried to prove that Allah is now free of direction, or else His Dhat would change.

He also denied sensed ʿuluw, saying that highness like the Throne above the Kursi is only for bodies, and argued that if Allah’s highness were limited in the upper direction then something “above” Him would be higher than Him. (Asas al Taqdis p 32, pp 33 to 34; al Matalib al ʿAliyah 3/253; Mafatih al Ghayb 1/135, 1/14)

Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation of hayyiz and direction

Ibn Taymiyyah explained that hayyiz is not an existing substance outside the mind, but only a mental estimation of place. Before any body exists in it, it cannot be divided into parts, and no one can point to any part of it, because pointing is only to something that exists, so its multiplicity only follows the multiplicity of what is inside it.

Directions such as above and below only arise when there is something existing to be above or below something else, so Razi’s claim that hayyiz and directions are different existing “realities” is false. Ibn Taymiyyah also said that direction is a relative mental relation which needs one who turns, or one who turns and something he turns towards, while the one who turns does not need a specific direction.

Najjar shows that this mistake in picturing hayyiz and direction is one of the main roots of Razi’s denial of ʿuluw and real istiwa. (Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah 4/219, 4/130)

Saʿd al Din al Taftazani on figurative istiwa and Hayyiz

Saʿd al Din al Taftazani followed this and said that the texts about istiwa, the hand, face and eye are figurative. In his words, istiwa is a figure of speech for istawla and a picture of greatness, the hand is power, the face is existence and the eye is sight, which fits his denial that Allah is truly above the Throne with His Dhat.

He then denied that Allah is in hayyiz at all, because he believed this would make hayyiz eternal, and argued that if the Necessary Being were in hayyiz then hayyiz must be eternal, and if He were in a place He would need that place and so would become possible, and the place would be independent and therefore necessary.

He admitted that the foundation of these proofs is treating hayyiz as an existing matter and not as something imagined, and Najjar notes that if hayyiz is a non existent mental estimation, as Ibn Taymiyyah said, then these arguments collapse.

Taftazani also described those who affirm that Allah is in the direction of highness and above the Throne as mushabbihah, tying their belief to the claim that every existing thing is a body or in hayyiz and must be inside or outside the universe, and he rejected ʿuluw and direction on this basis. (Sharh al Maqasid 2/110, 3/128, 3/32 to 3/33; Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah 4/239)

Sayf al Din al Amidi on denying direction and reinterpreting istiwa

Sayf al Din al Amidi also denied direction and hayyiz for Allah. He argued that if Allah were in every direction then the “selves” of things in hayyiz and the “selves” of directions would enter His Dhat, or bodies in hayyiz would have no real direction, which he saw as impossible.

If Allah were in one direction and one hayyiz, he said this is also impossible, because if that hayyiz is eternal it would be another eternal besides Allah, and if originated then before it existed Allah would not be in direction, and if hayyiz is non existent then His being “in” it would not resemble bodies.

On this basis he interpreted istiwa as bringing into service and falling under the grip of power, and used the poem “Bishr rose over Iraq without a sword and without blood being spilled” to show that istiwa can mean domination. Najjar links all of this back to the single assumption that hayyiz and direction are real existing entities, and says that when hayyiz is seen as a non existent mental estimation, the need for these denials and forced interpretations disappears. (Abkar al Afkar 2/35 to 2/36; Ghayat al Maram p 14)

Abu al Maʿali al Juwayni on hayyiz, direction and ʿuluw

Abu al Maʿali al Juwayni said that hayyiz does not go beyond the one in hayyiz himself, and that adding the word hayyiz to an atom is like adding the word existence to it, yet he still denied that Allah is confined to direction or place, because he saw direction, alignment, limits and measure as signs of originated things.

He held that anything confined to direction occupies hayyiz and can meet and separate from other atoms, and that whatever cannot be free from joining and separating is originated, so Allah must be purified from hayyiz and directions and cannot meet bodies. From this he interpreted “The Most Merciful rose over the Throne” as overpowering and domination using the same poem about Bishr, and he interpreted “To Him ascends the good word” as ascent in rank and acceptance, not real rising in space. (al Shamil p 156, p 547; Lumaʿ al Adillah pp 107 to 108)

ʿIzz al Din ibn ʿAbd al Salam on place, direction and texts of ʿuluw

ʿIzz al Din ibn ʿAbd al Salam likewise denied direction and real place for Allah. He wrote that directions do not surround Him, the earths and heavens do not enclose Him, He was before He formed place and arranged time, and “He is now as He was”, treating place as a real existing thing that cannot be ascribed to Allah.

In his tafsir of “Indeed your Lord is Allah Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, then He rose over the Throne” he said that istiwa may mean that His command rose over the Throne, or that He dominated the Throne as an expression for kingship, or that the Throne means the heavens because they are a roof, which moves away from a real Throne above the universe.

In his tafsir of Ayat al Kursi he said the Kursi is Allah’s knowledge, or the Throne, or a seat under the Throne, or the place of the feet, or kingship, and he explained “the Most High” as highness in power and authority or highness above likenesses and equals, not highness of Dhat in place, and about “the One above the heaven” he said it may mean Allah or the angels. (Rasaʾil al ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al Salam p 11; Tafsir al Quran 1/486, 1/237, 3/342)

Overall Ashari approach to space and direction and Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism

From these examples Najjar shows that most later Asharis deny that Allah Most High is above the universe and upon the Throne with His Dhat because of a chain of beliefs about hayyiz and direction.

They treat hayyiz as a real existing reality outside the mind and direction as another external thing that any “above” depends on, and from this they conclude that whoever is in hayyiz or direction is originated and in need, so they must interpret all texts of ʿuluw and istiwa as figurative.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism is that this whole structure rests on affirming external existence for things that cannot be sensed at all. In his understanding, hayyiz and direction are mental estimations tied to real existing things and have no independent being outside the mind, and once this is made clear the rational doubts used to deny ʿuluw and istiwa fall, so the many clear texts that affirm highness and rising over the Throne can be taken in their real meaning along with correct tanzih that Allah is not like His creation and is not surrounded or contained by anything. (Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah 4/219, 4/239; Majmuʿ al Fatawa 5/264 to 5/265)

The attribute of ʿuluw (highness) and istiwa (rising over) upon al ʿArsh (the Throne)

Unlike the early Ashʿaris, Fakhr al Din al Razi denied the ʿuluw (highness) of Allah Most High, and he denied His istiwa (rising over) upon His Throne (al ʿArsh) with His Dhat (Self). That is because, in his view, this would mean that Allah Most High is confined to a jihah (direction).

He said that this would certainly require that if He were above the Throne, then His Dhat (Self) would be like the heaven that the Throne sits within. So it would be established, in his view, that if He were confined to an upper direction, then His Dhat (Self) would be a heaven. And he said that if His Dhat (Self) were a heaven, then His Dhat (Self) would be makhluq (created), because Allah Most High says:

تَنزِيلًا مِمَّنْ خَلَقَ الْأَرْضَ وَالسَّمَاوَاتِ الْعُلَى

“A sending down from the One Who created the earth and the highest heavens.” (Ta Ha 20:4).

He said that the word “the heavens” is a plural word joined with “al” (the), and this, in his view, requires that all the heavens are created by Allah Most High. So if He were a heaven, then it would follow that He is the creator of Himself.

He also said that the saying of Allah Most High:

إِنَّ رَبَّكُمُ اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ

“Indeed your Lord is Allah, Who created the heavens and the earth in six days.” (al Aʿraf 7:54) points to what he mentioned. So, in his view, it is established that if He were confined to an upper direction, then He would be a heaven, and if He were a heaven, then He would be the creator of Himself, and this is impossible. So it becomes necessary, in his view, that He is not confined to an upper direction. (Asas al Taqdis fi ʿIlm al Kalam, p 32, Fakhr al Din al Razi.)

Then he argued for negating jihah (direction) from the Lord Most High by saying that it is an existing matter. And because existing matters are what become distinguished, he claimed that the distinction of direction, such as when we say “above” and “below” and other than that, means that direction becomes distinguished. So if al hayyiz (spatial extent) becomes distinguished, then it becomes necessary, in his view, that al hayyiz and direction are two existing matters.

He said: “The fourteenth proof: the saying of Allah Most High: كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ “Everything will perish except His Face.” (al Qasas 28:88). The apparent meaning of the verse requires that the Throne perishes, and that the collection of all spatial extents and directions perishes. At that time, the Truth Most High remains exalted above spatial extent and direction. And if that is established, it is impossible that He is now in a direction, because otherwise change would follow in the Dhat (Self).”

If it is said: spatial extent and direction are not something that exists so that they would become perishing and passing away. We say: spatial extents and directions are different matters in their realities, distinct in their whatness, as proof of that is that you say: it is required that the Dhat of Allah Most High be in an upper direction, and it is impossible for His Dhat to be in the other directions.

So if the upper direction were not different in whatness from the other directions, then the upper direction would not differ from the other directions in this special matter and this ruling. Also, we say: this body was in this spatial extent after it had been in another spatial extent. So these spatial extents are counted, distinct, successive. Pure non existence is not like that. So it is established that these spatial extents are matters that differ in realities, distinct in number, and everything that is like that cannot be pure non existence, so it is an existing matter. (Asas al Taqdis fi ʿIlm al Kalam, pp 33, 34, Fakhr al Din al Razi.)

This is a flaw in the basic ontological foundation that we set out in the first section. This is affirming an existence and an external whatness that is never sensed at all. Then his argument from “distinction” is also false.

Shaykh al Islam replied to that and said: “Indeed, the division of spatial extent in itself before anything enters it is certainly impossible, whether it is said that the body is one or divided in itself.

That is because spatial extent here is not meant to be something existing, as he has claimed. Rather, it is a mental estimating of place, and this is what is called spatial extent in the usage of many of the philosophers. If that is so, then it is impossible for some of it to be distinct from other parts before what makes it measured comes into it. This is known by sense and by necessary reason.

And no one says that it becomes distinct by pointing, because pointing to non existence is impossible, rather one only points to something existing. If spatial extent does not multiply and does not divide before what is within it comes into it, then its multiplicity follows the multiplicity of what is within it. So if it is not established that what is within it is a body that is divided, then it would not be divided. And it is known that those who say that He is in spatial extent say this sometimes and say that sometimes, as has already been mentioned about them.” (Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah fi Ta’sis Bidaʿihim al Kalamiyyah, 4/219.)

As for his saying, may Allah have mercy on him, “If that is so, then it is impossible for some of it to be distinct from other parts before what makes it measured comes into it”, he means that spatial extent before what is within it comes into it does not become distinct, so it is non existence. And therefore pointing to non existence is impossible. On that basis, the claim of al Razi that directions are distinct from one another is false, because directions only become distinct after something existing is in spatial extent, and before that, non existence does not become distinct by any pointing at all.

So the saying of al Razi, “spatial extents and directions are different matters in their realities, distinct in their whatness”, becomes false, because it is not said “above” or “below” or “right” or “left” when there is no one within spatial extent.

As for the saying of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH), “If spatial extent does not multiply and does not divide before what is within it comes into it, then its multiplicity follows the multiplicity of what is within it”, he means that if spatial extent does not become distinct in parts before the existing thing comes into it, then directions follow the existing thing, not spatial extent. So spatial extent is non existence.

On that basis, direction is mentally estimated for the existence of al Rahman (the Most Merciful). So al ʿArsh (the Throne) is below al Rahman because of the existence of al Rahman and the Throne. So direction becomes distinct by the existence of one who directs himself, or one who directs himself and something he directs himself towards. Likewise, if the universe is not existing, then it is not correct to say that it is below the Throne, because that needs one who directs himself, and that is the universe.

Likewise, if the Throne does not exist, then it is not correct to say “under the Throne” or “above it”, because the Throne is not existing. So direction needs something existing in order to become a direction. For this reason Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) says: “As for direction, it is not a direction except with directing oneself, so in being a direction it needs one who directs himself. And the one who directs himself does not need a specific direction at all.” (Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah fi Ta’sis Bidaʿihim al Kalamiyyah, 4/130.)

So, one of the causes of Fakhr al Din al Razi denying istiwa (rising over) upon the Throne is a flaw in his understanding of spatial extent and direction. He stated this many times in his books. He said: We say that it is not permissible that what Allah Most High meant by istiwa is settling upon the Throne. (Asas al Taqdis fi ʿIlm al Kalam, p 117, Fakhr al Din al Razi.) Then he presented his arguments, and their central point is denying spatial extent and direction from Allah Most High.

He also denied the ʿuluw (highness) of Allah Most High above the universe in more than one place. He said: “As for the sensed kind, it is like when it is said: the Throne is above the Kursi, and the heaven is above the earth. This kind of ʿuluw only occurs in bodies. And since the Holy Truth is exalted above being a body, His ʿuluw is exalted above being in this meaning.” (al Matalib al ʿAliyah min al ʿIlm al Ilahi, vol 3 p 253, Fakhr al Din al Razi.)

He also said: “The mushabbihah (those who liken Allah to creation) understood the word ‘al ʿazim’ and ‘al kabir’ as bodily being and measure, and they understood the word ‘al ʿali’ as highness in place and direction.” (Mafatih al Ghayb, vol 1 p 135.)

Then he said in another place: Allah Most High said: وَهُوَ الْعَلِيُّ الْعَظِيمُ “And He is the Most High, the Tremendous.” (al Baqarah 2:255) And know that it is not permissible that what is meant by it is highness by direction. We have already shown that in many ways, and we add here two more ways.

The first is that if His highness were because of place, then it must be either limited in an upper direction, or not limited in that direction. The first is false, because if it were limited in an upper direction, then the part that is supposed above Him would be higher than Him, so He would not be higher than everything besides Him, rather something else would be higher than Him. (Mafatih al Ghayb, vol 1 p 14, Fakhr al Din al Razi.)

As for his saying, “if it were limited in an upper direction, then the part that is supposed above Him would be higher than Him”, he means that limitation in highness would require that there exists a spatial extent above Him, far above that.

That is because he treats spatial extent as an existing thing, not as non existence. This is a flaw in picturing spatial extent, as we have mentioned. It returns to a flaw in affirming something outside the mind that is not sensed.

These sayings are well known from Fakhr al Din al Razi, so we will not bring more of his texts than what we have brought. We only included a few texts from him to strengthen the meaning we point to with examples, meaning that his negation of the attribute of ʿuluw and istiwa has reasons, and among them are matters that return to a flaw in his controlling one of the points we set out in the first section, where he affirms an external existing thing that the senses do not reach.

Saʿd al Din al Taftazani followed al Razi in denying real istiwa. He said: According to the majority, and it is one of the two sayings of the Shaykh, these are figurative. So istiwa is a figure of speech for istawla (dominating), or it is an example and a picture showing the greatness of Allah Most High. And the hand is a figure of speech for power, and the face for existence, and the eye for sight. (Sharh al Maqasid fi ʿIlm al Kalam, vol 2 p 110, al Taftazani, Dar al Maʿarif al Nuʿmaniyyah. Or see: Sharh al Maqasid fi ʿIlm al Kalam, vol 3 p 128, al Taftazani, Dar al Kutub al ʿIlmiyyah.)

He also denied spatial extent absolutely regarding Allah Most High, because in his view this would require that spatial extent is eternal. He said: First, if the Necessary Being were in spatial extent, then the eternity of spatial extent would necessarily follow, because it is impossible for one in spatial extent to exist without spatial extent. This necessary result is false because of what already passed about everything besides the Necessary Being and His attributes being originated.

Second, if He were in a place, then He would necessarily need it. And one who needs other than himself is possible, so it would follow that the Necessary Being is possible. And the place would be independent of Him because emptiness is possible, and what is independent of the Necessary Being is independent of everything besides Him with greater reason, so it would then be necessary, while it is assumed that the Necessary Being is the one established in place, not the place. And the foundation of the two arguments is that spatial extent is existing, not merely imagined. (Sharh al Maqasid fi ʿIlm al Kalam, vol 3 pp 32, 33, al Taftazani.)

His saying, “the foundation of the two arguments is that spatial extent is existing, not merely imagined”, means that if it were established that spatial extent is a non existing matter that is only mentally estimated, then his two arguments would be invalid. It has already passed that spatial extent is a non existing matter that has no existence outside the mind. There is no external existence for what is not sensed.

Spatial extent cannot be sensed. Spatial extent without the existence of things is nothing. It is only an estimating of the place of existing things, nothing more. So if we say “that specific place”, then this intended place is only a surface upon the body of the earth. And if we say “the place of the Throne”, then it is only the Throne itself.

And if we say “the place of Jannah (Paradise)”, then it is only Paradise itself with its bodies. And if we say “the place of the universe”, then it is only the universe itself with its bodies, and all of it is within non existence as has already passed.

Then he denied highness by direction. He said: “The mushabbihah who say: He is in the direction of highness and above the Throne, touching it or being aligned with it, at a distance that is limited or not limited, holding to the claim that every existing thing is either a body or bodily, or in spatial extent or existing within it, and either connected to the universe or separate, and inside the universe or outside it, and holding to the apparent meanings of texts that suggest direction and bodily being.” (Sharh al Maqasid fi ʿIlm al Kalam, vol 3 p 33, al Taftazani.)

Then he denied ʿuluw and istiwa in many places, and we only keep to what we brought to show the flaw in these ways of setting things out.

Sayf al Din al Amidi also agreed with them in denying direction and spatial extent absolutely, and he tried to argue for that. He said: If He were in every direction, then it would follow that the selves of things that are in spatial extent, and the selves of directions, would be entering into His Dhat Most High and united with it, or it would follow that none of the atoms and bodies that are in spatial extent have any spatial extent or any direction, because the Lord Most High would be occupying every direction and every spatial extent. This is impossible.

And if He were in one direction and one spatial extent, then this is impossible for two reasons.

First, that spatial extent and that direction are either existing, or not existing.

If they are existing, then they are either eternal or originated.

If eternal, then it is impossible because of what will come in explaining that every existing thing besides Allah Most High is originated. And if originated, then before this originated thing existed, the Creator would not be in a direction and not in a spatial extent, and this goes against the madhhab of the opponent. And if it is not existing, then His being in direction and spatial extent is not like the being of bodies, and this goes against what was assumed. (Abkar al Afkar fi Usul al Din, vol 2 pp 35, 36, al Amidi.)

As for his saying, “it would follow that the selves of things that are in spatial extent, and the selves of directions, would be entering into His Dhat Most High and united with it”, he means that he affirms for directions “selves”, so for him they are existing matters. So, in his view, it is only correct to declare the Lord Most High to be far above all of them.

Then al Amidi interpreted the verse of istiwa like the Muʿtazilah. He said it can mean being made subject and falling under the grip of power. He said: As for the verse of istiwa, it is possible that what is meant is bringing into service and falling under the grip of power.

For this reason the Arabs say: the amir rose over his kingdom, meaning when the servants come under his obedience in what he wants, and he subjects them in his commands and his prohibitions. And to this points the saying of the poet:

قد استوى بشر على العراق
من غير سيف ودم مهراق

“Bishr rose over Iraq, without a sword, and without blood being spilled.” (Ghayat al Maram fi ʿIlm al Kalam, p 14, al Amidi.)

As for Abu al Maʿali al Juwayni, he is unlike al Razi in one respect. He said that spatial extent does not go beyond the one in spatial extent himself, as we already mentioned earlier. He said: The best that can be said about spatial extent is that it is the one in spatial extent himself. The meaning of “one in spatial extent” has already passed. Then it is not far to add “spatial extent” to the atom, just as it is not far to add “existence” to it. (al Shamil fi Usul al Din, p 156, Abu al Maʿali al Juwayni.)

Even so, he denied the reality of istiwa and direction, because for him and for other Ashʿaris these are from the attributes of originated things. The doubts of the innovators in denying those attributes do not stop at only the claim of spatial extent being an existing thing, as we mentioned earlier.

So al Juwayni said: istiwa is in the meaning of overpowering, dominating, and being above. He said: Everything that points to originated things and to a mark of deficiency, then the Lord is far above it and purified from it. This sentence becomes clear through sections that contain details, among them: that the Lord Most High is purified from being confined to directions and from having alignment. Regions do not surround Him, and borders do not enclose Him.

He is exalted above accepting limits and measure. The proof for that is that everything confined to a direction occupies it and is in spatial extent. And everything in spatial extent can meet other atoms and separate from them. And everything that can join and separate cannot be free from joining and separating. And whatever cannot be free from joining and separating is originated, like atoms.

So if it is established that the Creator is purified from spatial extent and from being confined to directions, then it follows from that that He is exalted above being confined to a place and above meeting masses and bodies.

If we are asked about the saying of Allah Most High: الرَّحْمَنُ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ اسْتَوَى “The Most Merciful rose over the Throne.” (Ta Ha 20:5), we say: what is meant by istiwa is overpowering, domination, and being above. From that is the saying of the Arabs: so and so rose over the kingdom, meaning he became above it and it became firmly his. From that is the saying of the poet:

قد استوى بشر على العراق
من غير سيف ودم مهراق

“Bishr rose over Iraq, without a sword, and without blood being spilled.” (Lumaʿ al Adillah fi Qawaʿid ʿAqaʾid Ahl al Sunnah wal Jamaʿah, pp 107, 108, Abu al Maʿali al Juwayni.)

Then he rejected real ʿuluw of Allah Most High in other places from his books. He said: “As for His saying: إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الْكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ “To Him ascends the good word.” (Fatir 35:10) it is something that was interpreted by agreement of those who have firm knowledge, because speech is not allowed to move and transfer, and it is not allowed that it rises in the air.

So this shows that what is meant by the ascent of the good word is that it falls, from Allah, in the place of acceptance. The general point in that is that rising points to the raising of a thing in rank and standing, not ascent and climbing.” (al Shamil fi Usul al Din, p 547, Abu al Maʿali al Juwayni.)

ʿIzz al Din ibn ʿAbd al Salam followed him. He said in his epistles: “Directions do not surround Him, and neither the earths nor the heavens enclose Him. He was before He formed place, and He arranged time, and He is now as He was.” (Rasaʾil al ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al Salam fi al Tawhid, p 11.)

Meaning that he denied direction completely, and he understands place in the existing meaning, meaning not as a non existing matter. Then he held to the added wording attached to the hadith of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ when he says: “and He is now as He was”. This is that added wording that is not established.

Then in his tafsir (explanation) of the saying of Allah Most High:

إِنَّ رَبَّكُمُ اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى الْعَرْشِ يُغْشِي اللَّيْلَ النَّهَارَ يَطْلُبُهُ حَثِيثًا وَالشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ وَالنُّجُومَ مُسَخَّرَاتٍ بِأَمْرِهِ أَلَا لَهُ الْخَلْقُ وَالْأَمْرُ تَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ رَبُّ الْعَالَمِينَ

“Indeed your Lord is Allah Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, then He rose over the Throne. He covers the night with the day, chasing it rapidly, and the sun and the moon and the stars are subjected by His command.

Surely to Him belongs the creation and the command. Blessed is Allah, Lord of the universes.” (al Aʿraf 7:54) he said that it may mean that He dominated the Throne, far above that, high above it. Then he denied the reality of the Throne of Allah Most High. He said: “His command rose over the Throne, as al Hasan said. Or He dominated the Throne, and it is an expression for kingship because kings are used to sitting on thrones. Or it means all the heavens, because it is a roof, and every roof is a throne.” (Tafsir al Quran, which is an abridgement of Tafsir al Mawardi, vol 1 p 486, al ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al Salam.)

Then he interpreted the ʿuluw of Allah Most High in the saying of Allah Most High:

اللَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الْحَيُّ الْقَيُّومُ لَا تَأْخُذُهُ سِنَةٌ وَلَا نَوْمٌ لَهُ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ مَنْ ذَا الَّذِي يَشْفَعُ عِنْدَهُ إِلَّا بِإِذْنِهِ يَعْلَمُ مَا بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَمَا خَلْفَهُمْ وَلَا يُحِيطُونَ بِشَيْءٍ مِنْ عِلْمِهِ إِلَّا بِمَا شَاءَ وَسِعَ كُرْسِيُّهُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ وَلَا يَئُودُهُ حِفْظُهُمَا وَهُوَ الْعَلِيُّ الْعَظِيمُ

“Allah, there is no god but Him, the Ever Living, the Sustainer. Neither drowsiness nor sleep overtakes Him. To Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth. Who is it that can intercede with Him except by His permission.

He knows what is before them and what is behind them. They do not encompass anything of His knowledge except what He wills. His Kursi extends over the heavens and the earth, and preserving them does not burden Him. And He is the Most High, the Tremendous.” (al Baqarah 2:255).

He said: His Kursi is His knowledge, or the Throne, or a seat under the Throne, or the place of the feet, or kingship. And the root of “kursi” is knowledge, from it comes “kurrasah”, and the ulama are “karras”, because reliance is upon them, as it was said, or they are the pegs of the earth.

And “the Most High” means by power and the reach of authority, or “the Most High” means above likenesses and equals. (Tafsir al Quran, which is an abridgement of Tafsir al Mawardi, vol 1 p 237, al ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al Salam.)

His saying, “the Most High means by power and the reach of authority, or the Most High means above likenesses and equals”, is only because he does not affirm the ʿuluw of Allah Most High by His Dhat above the universe.

Then he tried to interpret the saying of Allah Most High: أَأَمِنْتُمْ مَنْ فِي السَّمَاءِ أَنْ يَخْسِفَ بِكُمُ الْأَرْضَ فَإِذَا هِيَ تَمُورُ “Do you feel safe from the One above the heaven that He will cause the earth to swallow you and then it would shake.” (al Mulk 67:16). He said: “the One above the heaven” is Allah, or the angels. (The same reference, vol 3 p 342, al ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al Salam.)

So most of the Ashʿaris, especially the later ones, interpret the ʿuluw of Allah Most High above the universe, and His being above the Throne with His Dhat (essence), because of their declaring Allah Most High to be far above place in the existing meaning, and declaring Him far above direction which is from the necessary results of place, along with other doubts they took from Greek philosophy, like the Muʿtazilah and the Jahmiyyah, and this is against many texts that are certain in transmission and certain in meaning in affirming ʿuluw and istiwa with the Dhat (essence).

Nazariyyat al Zaman wa al Makan ʿinda Ibn Taymiyyah by Ahmad ʿIsam al Najjar page 321-330