What the philosophers claim, and why Ibn Taymiyyah rejects their framing

Ibn Taymiyyah refutes a recurring claim among the philosophers, especially those influenced by ar Razi, that the discussion of Allah’s existence must only be accepted in three ways:

• Either “existence” is only a shared word with no shared meaning,
• or Allah’s existence is something added onto His essence,
• or Allah is nothing but “existence” and every affirmed attribute is denied.

Ibn Taymiyyah replies to how this supposed issue is just built on a hidden mistake about how universal terms work, and once that mistake is removed, the dilemma collapses.

His core refutation

Ibn Taymiyyah says their error starts when they assume that if we divide “existence” into necessary and possible, then there must be one identical external thing called “existence” present in both, like a shared substance spread across them.

He says this is false. What is shared is the word “existence” and the meaning understood from it in the mind, just as the written form of a word can cover multiple things.

As for what exists in external reality, each existent is itself, and any similarity between existents is only similarity in certain aspects, not a single identical essence or a single identical attribute existing in both.

So dividing existence into necessary and possible does not require a shared external existence that then needs an added differentiator. It only requires that the concept and term are general enough to include both.

How he refutes their conclusion that Allah’s existence must be “additional” to His essence

From that correction, Ibn Taymiyyah replies to their claim that if the term “existence” has a shared meaning, then existents must share in a single reality of existence, which would make Allah’s existence something added to His essence.

He says the inference is invalid because it confuses shared meaning in the mind with shared identity in external reality.

He then aligns “existence” with other broad terms used in these debates, such as essence, self, quiddity, and reality, and says the same rule holds: We can speak of these in general ways and still know that the necessary and the possible do not share one identical external reality.

Therefore, saying that existence is divided into necessary and possible does not lead to the conclusion that Allah’s existence is an additional thing that He “needs”.

What he affirms about Allah’s existence and essence, and what he denies

Ibn Taymiyyah affirms that Allah is not a “pure absolute existence” with no reality except “existence,” and he rejects the claim that affirming any positive attribute must be denied from Allah to protect uniqueness.

The shaykh says Allah’s essence is His reality, and His existence is not a detachable thing added onto Him, nor a hollow abstraction emptied of attributes.

He strengthens this by arguing from what people already accept in created things: even in creation, there are cases where the existing thing is not found as two separate external things called “essence” and “existence,” but as one real thing.

So the Creator is more deserving of being understood without the confusion of making Him dependent on an added existence, and without reducing Him to a mental abstraction.

The confusion of the mutakallimeen

Ibn Taymiyyah then says these philosophers repeatedly make one thing into two and two things into one.

They collapse distinct attributes into one, and they also treat one concrete being as if it were several independent essences simply because several descriptions can be predicated of it.

He treats this as the same mistake that drives their claims about matter and form, and their treatment of mental universals as if they were external independent entities.

He says much of what they call “abstract” is only a general concept formed by the mind, not an independently existing thing outside the mind, and their failure to keep mental existence distinct from external existence leads them to affirm what does not exist and deny what does exist.

The practical rule he sets for disputed terminology, and how it answers the philosophers

Ibn Taymiyyah says ambiguous technical terms are not accepted or rejected as vague words.

Terms like mutahayyiz, jihah, jism, jawhar, and ʿarad are not binding on anyone in affirmation or negation until the speaker explains what he means.

If the intended meaning is true and agrees with what the Messenger ﷺ brought, then the meaning is accepted as true.

If the intended meaning contradicts what the Messenger ﷺ brought, then it is rejected as false.

By this, he refutes the philosophers’ method of forcing people into verbal traps built on broad, shifting terms, and he returns the discussion to clear meanings that do not compete with revelation and do not confuse what exists in the mind with what exists in reality.

Refuting the Ambiguities in Philosophical and Logical Terminology

Through this, many doubts are resolved doubts that appear frequently in the speech of ar-Razi and others like him among the logicians and those who are confused about this matter. Because of their confusion in this issue, they became perplexed regarding the existence of Allah the Exalted: is His existence the same as His essence, or is it something additional to it?

And is the word “existence” (wujood) said of things in a uniform and equal way (tawatu’), or in a graded and equivocal way (tashkīk), or is it merely a homonym (ishtirāk lafẓī)?

So they said: if we say the word “existence” is a homonym with no shared meaning, it would follow that existence is not divided into necessary and possible which contradicts what the rational mind agrees on and what is clearly known by sound reason.

And if we say it is used uniformly or equivocally, it would follow that existents share in the meaning of existence. So existence would be shared between the Necessary (wājib) and the possible (mumkin).

Then we would need something to differentiate the existence of one from the other. This distinction would have to come from specific realities (ḥaqā’iq), which means that existence is additional to the essence. That would mean the Necessary Being’s existence is in need of something else.

They also mention what ar-Razi and his followers say: that people have only three positions regarding the existence of the Lord, the Exalted:

• The first is that the word “existence” is used only as a homonym (ishtirāk lafẓī).
• The second is that the existence of the Necessary is something additional to His essence.
• The third is that it is a pure, absolute existence, with no reality except existence itself, and any positive attribute is denied of it.

It is said to them: all three views are false. The true position is not one of these three.

The root of the error is their assumption that if we say “existence is divided into necessary and possible,” then it must follow that there is, in external reality, one existence that is identical in the necessary and the possible. This is a mistake.

There is no single, identical thing in external reality that is found in both types of existence. Rather, it is the word “existence” and its meaning, and the writing that signifies the word, that apply to both and encompass them both. This is where the commonality lies.

So the inclusion of both types in the meaning of “existence” is like the inclusion of both in the written word and in the uttered term. They are shared in this regard.

But what exists in external reality each existent is only similar to the other in some aspects. As for one essence or its attribute being shared in identity with the other that is clearly false to anyone who understands the matter. And if someone is confused about this, it is only because they haven’t truly conceptualised it.

The True Nature of Existence and Essence

So the discussion around the word “existence” is just like the discussion around the words “essence” (dhāt), “eye” (ʿayn), “self” (nafs), “quiddity” (māhiyyah), and “reality” (ḥaqīqah).

Just as reality is divided into necessary and possible, and likewise “essence” and “quiddity,” so too is “existence.” So when we say that “reality” or “quiddity” is divided into necessary and possible, it doesn’t mean that the quiddity of the Necessary includes any part of the quiddity of the possible.

Likewise, if we say “existence” is divided into necessary and possible, it doesn’t mean that the existence of the Necessary includes something from the existence of something else.

Rather, the Necessary’s existence is not an absolute existence, nor is His quiddity an absolute quiddity. Rather, His essence is His reality it is His existence.

And if even a particular created thing has an existence in the external world that is identical to its essence and reality, with no two distinct things existing, then the Creator is even more worthy of having His reality be identical to His existence. This existence is firm and independent, unmatched by any other, and it is the same as His essence.

Even if we were to imagine that there is something in external reality called “existence” that is shared between the Necessary and the possible, just as “animality” is said to be shared between a human and a beast, the distinction between the two would be made by a specific kind of existence just as the human is distinct by his specific animality, and just as black and white, though both share in the meaning of colour, are distinct by their particular hues.

The Confusion of Philosophers and Their Contradictions

These misguided individuals make one thing two, and two things one. They make an attribute the same as another attribute, and they make an attribute the same as the one described by it.

So they make two things into one as when they say: knowledge is power, and will, and that knowledge is the knower. And they make one thing into two as when they describe the specific individual (like a human) as composed of several substances: human, animal, rational, sentient, and volitional and treat each of these as a separate essence. Yet it is well known that it is one essence with many attributes.

They also distinguish between “matter” and “form” and treat them as two independent substances.

But what reason affirms is that attributes exist in the thing described by them, and accidents exist in substances like the artistic form of a ring, a coin, or a wooden staff, or a garment, which are all forms existing in substances like silver, wood, or yarn. Likewise, connection and separation are dependent on a subject that is the body.

They treat concepts as if they exist externally like their claim about abstract entities separate from matter. Yet they have no proof of such separateness except for the soul after it separates from the body at death. These so-called abstract entities are just general concepts which the mind abstracts from specific, concrete things.

So it all goes back to the soul and what occurs within it. They treat what exists in the mind as if it exists outside it, and they treat the existence of the Necessary as if it is a pure, abstract existence.

These are foundational errors in their misguided thinking: making one into many, many into one, treating what is in the mind as if it is in the world, and what is in the world as if it is just a concept.

From this arises affirming what does not exist and denying what does exist. These are the categories of their errors, and this is elaborated further elsewhere.

The Danger of Ambiguous Words and the Path of Deception

But these people adopted broad and ambiguous words that carry multiple meanings in the languages of various nations, then infused them with meanings not originally associated with them. Then they built long arguments upon them and made them seem grand and impressive to those who did not understand them.

No doubt, there is a degree of obscurity and complexity in these arguments because of the shared terms and confusing meanings. So when a seeker enters their discourse and hears things that conflict with his natural disposition (fitrah), he starts to object.

But they say to him: “You don’t understand this; it’s not suitable for you.” So the pride and protectiveness in his soul push him to accept those things without truly understanding them, and to avoid objecting out of fear that they will accuse him of lacking knowledge and intellect.

They move people step-by-step through different stages of discourse, until they reach what they call the “greater message” and the “supreme principle,” which in reality is the denial of the Creator, rejection of His messengers, invalidation of His laws, corruption of reason and religion, and full immersion in atheism containing the worst forms of corruption in both origins and ends.

The Principle of Affirming Revelation and Rejecting Vague Innovations

Know that this principle is useful both in Sharia and reason.

As for the Sharia: we are obligated to believe in what Allah and His Messenger have said. Whatever is authentically proven to have been said by the Prophet, peace be upon him, we must affirm even if we do not fully understand its meaning. That is because we know he is the truthful and trustworthy one who only speaks truth about Allah.

As for all the disputed words like “spatially confined” (mutaḥayyiz), “direction” (jihah), “body” (jism), “substance” (jawhar), “accident” (ʿaraḍ), and others it is not obligatory on anyone to accept the meaning of any of these terms, whether in negation or affirmation, until its intended meaning is made clear.

If the speaker means something true by them something that agrees with what the Prophet said then that meaning is true. And if he means something contrary to the words of the Prophet, then that meaning is false.

Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql (1/292-296)