Ibn Taymiyyah explains that when some theologians say that Allah is free from accidental properties and occurring events, what they really intend is to deny that any real attribute or real action exists with Him at all, so in their view there is with Him no real knowledge, power, will, mercy, love, pleasure, joy, creating, justice, coming, arriving, descending, rising over the Throne, or any other attribute or action, and the great majority of the Muslims oppose them in this. ( Majmuah Rasail wa Masaail Mutanawwia, p. 166)

He says that the disagreement with the Muʿtazilah and other deniers of accidental properties is not about words alone but about the real things they have chosen to call by this name, and that in most philosophical disputes the real conflict is about the reality, while people waste their effort arguing over language. (Majmuah Rasail wa Masaail Mutanawwia, p. 166)

The Asharis say that if you affirm a hand for Allah then you are likening Him to human beings, since they claim that we only know the hand as the human hand.

Ibn Taymiyyah responds and says that the word hand is used for many things, that every attribute has a shared meaning, and that the exact way in which it exists belongs to the one who is described, so if someone cannot separate the basic meaning from the particular way it appears, he must say the same about knowledge, power, and life in the human being. (Majmuah Rasail wa Masaail Mutanawwia, p. 166)

He says that in what we see, parts like a hand are stronger in existence than incidental states, since a hand can be looked at as a part on its own, while knowledge, colour, life, and power only exist in something else, all of these known attributes only appear in bodies and without the body they do not exist, so if someone builds his fear of embodiment on what he sees, his problem is in truth stronger regarding incidental states than regarding parts. (Majmuah Rasail wa Masaail Mutanawwia, p. 166)

Ibn Taymiyyah then points out that our knowledge of the meaning of power and of the meaning of hand has one source, which is what we see and experience, and that we then form a general meaning from this and apply it to the unseen while leaving the exact way of the attribute to Allah, which also shows that Allah knows the detailed reality of His own life and the servant only knows that life is affirmed for Him without grasping its detailed reality. (Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmuah Rasail wa Masaail Mutanawwia, p. 166; Ibn Taymiyyah, Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah, 4/621)

Ibn al Qayyim, following this path, addresses the interpreter who changes the apparent wording of the texts and asks why he did not affirm the meaning he chose in a manner that does not involve likeness, and if he claims that this meaning cannot really be understood, he is reminded that all people only understand meanings of the unseen by building on what they know from what is seen.

So any new meaning that has something similar in what is seen carries the same problem of likeness, and any meaning with no similar case cannot be fully understood, and if his interpretation in truth makes the text point only to non existence then this is pure negation, so his interpretation is trapped between negation and likeness and harms the respect of the revealed text, while the safe way is to affirm the text as it came, deny likeness, and avoid negation. (Ibn al Qayyim, as Sawaiq al Mursalah, p. 237)

Ibn Taymiyyah also mentions that even basic rational rules, such as knowing that one is half of two or that two opposites do not come together, are first understood by sensing particular things and then comparing and generalising, so the mind has no special independent proof that forces it to treat the wording of hand in the texts in a way that likens Allah to creation, or a way that does not also affect how it treats knowledge and other attributes. (Ibn Taymiyyah, Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah, 4/621)

Answering the doubt of the Asharis about distinguishing between the concrete attributes such as the hand and the attributes of meaning such as knowledge

Ibn al Qayyim reports that a group of Asharis divided the attributes into two sets, saying that wording which does not give the sense of limbs and parts, such as knowledge, life, power, will, and speech, should be left on its apparent sense, while wording which outwardly gives the sense of limbs and parts, such as face, two hands, and foot, must always be interpreted away, because, they claim, affirming it would require composition and embodiment.

The scholars of Ahl al Sunnah answer this by pointing out that the Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah had already used the same type of argument to deny even knowledge, power, hearing, sight, and life, saying that if such real attributes exist with Allah then He becomes contingent, which in their view leads to composition and tajsim, so whatever reply the Asharis give to those earlier groups regarding these attributes, the people of Sunnah give that same reply back to the Asharis when the Asharis try to treat face and hand differently. 

If the Ashari says that these accepted attributes are not real incidental states and are not called by that name, so composition and tajsim do not follow, then the scholars of Sunnah answer that the attributes the Asharis want to remove can also be affirmed in a way that does not make Allah a compound body with parts and limbs.

If the Ashari says that from the wording of face and hand nothing is understood except parts, they reply that in what we see nothing is understood from knowledge, will, and life except incidental states tied to bodies, and if he says that incidental states do not last while the attributes of the Lord last forever, they answer that parts are only things whose separation is possible, and since separation is impossible for Allah, these are not parts or limbs in the created sense.

If the Ashari argues that if face, hand, shin, and finger are all one thing that is impossible, and if each is distinct then this forces composition.

Ibn al Qayyim replies that the same reasoning would also apply to hearing, sight, knowledge, life, and power, so any answer that the Ashari uses here to avoid composition in his accepted attributes will also serve as the answer for the attributes he wants to interpret away.

Ibn al Qayyim says that when this clear necessary consequence pressed the Jahmiyyah they admitted that the whole matter is one and chose to negate all attributes, and he uses this to show that the Ashari attempt to stand in the middle, by accepting some attributes on their wording and changing others, has no firm ground, while the sound path is to affirm every attribute and action that Allah has affirmed for Himself, in a way that befits Him, without making likeness to the creation and without stripping the texts of their real meaning. (Ibn al Qayyim, Mukhtasar as Sawaiiq al Mursalah ala al Jahmiyyah wal Muattilah, pp. 32 to 33)

Ibn Taymiyyah said: The word al hawadith (occurring events) and al muhdathat (originated things) may be understood to mean what a human being brings about of blameworthy actions and bidah  that are not legislated, or what happens to a human being of illnesses and the like. And Allah the Most High must be declared with tanzih from what is higher than that, from everything that has any kind of deficiency in it, so how much more must He be declared with tanzih from these things.

However this was not what those who speak about tanzih intended by their words that He is free from al araad (incidental attributes) and al hawadith (occurring events). Rather what they meant by that are His sifat and His afal (actions).

So according to them there does not stand with Him any ilm (knowledge), nor qudrah (power), nor mashiah (will), nor rahmah (mercy), nor hubb (love), nor rida (pleasure), nor farah (joy), nor khalq (creating), nor ihsan (kindness and generosity), nor adl (justice), nor ityan (coming), nor majii (arrival), nor nuzul (descending), nor istiwa (rising over the Throne), nor anything else from His attributes and His afal (actions).

The great majority of the Muslims oppose them in that. Among the groups are those who dispute with them about the sifat (attributes) but not about the afal (actions), and among them are those who dispute with them about some of the sifat (attributes) but not others.

Majmu’ah Rasai’l wa-Masa’il Mutanawwa’ah By Shaykh Al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah page 166

Shaykh al Islam said the language meaning of the word al araad (incidental attributes), and that our disagreement with the Mutazilah and those who deny al araad (incidental attributes) is not only a language disagreement. Rather it is a disagreement about the realities which they have agreed to call araad (incidental attributes).

Here we must pay attention to the fact that most philosophical disputes are not really about the word itself, but about the reality to which the word is applied.

Many people argue about the very word and its meaning in language, thinking that this is the centre of the disagreement.

The Asharis  say, If you affirm a hand for Allah, then you are mushabbihah , because we only know the hand as this hand that is in the human being.

They have spoken falsely, because the word hand can be added to other than the human being. It is a attribute and the attribute takes its kayfiyyah from the one who is described with it, but it has a fixed meaning in itself. This is the case whether or not you are able to put a full definition of it into other words, because that is another subject and lies outside the place of dispute.

If it is said, The hand of a human being has a certain shape, it is said in reply, This enters into the meaning of kayfiyyah. So if you say, I cannot understand the difference between the meaning and the kayfiyyah, we say to you, Then say the same thing about ilm (knowledge), qudrah (power), and hayat (life).

These attributes, in the human being, have a certain kayfiyyah (how). For example, knowledge is a kind of inner awareness, and it comes about in a human being with certain kayfiyyat, and it exists in the human being with a certain kayfiyyah. So it has a kayfiyyah that belongs to the human being.

It is, in the terminology of the Mutazilah, from the type of araad (incidental attributes), meaning something that exists in something else in concrete things. We do not understand ilm (knowledge) in what we see in this life except as something that exists in a jism (body) and is in the heart or the brain.

Secondly, al araad (incidental attributes) are weaker in existence than al abaad (parts). In what we see in this life, the part stands by itself.

The hand of a human being is a part that stands by itself from the human being. As for ilm (knowledge), colour, hayat (life), and qudrah (power), they exist in something else. For example, some of the qudrah (power) of a human being exists in his hand, while the hand does not exist in the qudrah. The hayat (life) of a human being exists in his body, while his head does not exist in the hayat.

So everything that we understand in the human being from sifat al maani (attributes such as knowledge, power and life) all exist in the jism, and without the body they would not exist, while the abaad (parts) exist without sifat al maani.

So if you want to judge by what you see in this life, then here in front of you is this shocking reality.

Thirdly, the source of our ilm (knowledge) of the meaning of qudrah (power) and the meaning of hand is one and the same, which is what we see and know by experience. Then the general meaning is applied to the unseen without entering into the kayfiyyah.

We understand the shared inner meaning, and we say that there is also a special measure that is unique, but we hand over the knowledge of that to Allah.

In this context Imam Ibn al Qayyim says in his book al Sawaiq al Mursalah.

Ibn Al Qayyim said: It is said to him, So why did you not affirm the meaning which you made tawil (interpretation) of in a way that does not require tashbih (likening Allah to the creation).

If he says, That is a matter that cannot be understood.

It is said to him, So how did you understand it in the meaning which you affirmed, while you and all the people of the earth only understand the meanings of the unseen by what you understand from what is witnessed and seen. If that was not so, you and no one else would ever understand anything from the unseen at all.

So whatever you have brought in tawil, if it has something similar to it in ash shahid (what is witnessed), then tashbih becomes necessary for you. And if it has nothing similar to it in ash shahid (what is witnessed), then you are not able to understand it at all. And if you make tawil  of the nass (text) as meaning non existence, then you have done tatil (negating the attributes).

So in your tawil you are between tatil and tashbih,  while you are also offending the nass (text) and breaking its sacred respect. So why did you not make its status great, keep its sacred respect, affirm it and let it pass as it came, while denying tashbih and keeping safe from tatil. And with Allah is success.

Sawa’iq al-Mursalah by Ibn al-Qayyim page 237

And this is the same position as that of his shaykh  Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, about marifah (awareness) and gaining knowledge of meanings.

Where he says in the fourth volume of Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah.

In every case, no universal rational judgement, whether it is necessary or not necessary, comes to be in his own mind except by means of qiyas (analogy) and iʿtibar (reflection and comparison).

Even his knowledge that one is half of two, and that a body is not in two places, and that two opposites do not come together, in all of that he has first grasped this through his senses, in some bodies, physical things, and opposite colours.

Then he understood that what he has not sensed is like what he sensed in that, and that the ruling does not change between one and one, and body and body, and colour and colour, and opposite and opposite. So he gives a general universal ruling based on that.

When this is the case, he has no hujjah ʿaqliyyah (rational proof) in knowledge of Allah.

Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah (4/621)

To make the matter even clearer, the kayfiyyah is the attribute of the attribute, and it is known by seeing the one who is described, or something similar to it, or one individual from its kind. It is by this that the difference appears between your knowledge of the attributes of Allah and His knowledge.

For example, Allah knows that He has life, and you know that Allah has life. So what is the difference between your knowledge of that and His knowledge. The difference is that He knows the true reality and the way that life exists in Himself, while you only know that it exists with Him, without grasping the detailed reality of that.

In short, everything that you say about concrete things, that they can only be a body made of parts, the Mutazila  say the same thing to you about the attributes which, in us, do not exist except as arad (incidental properties) that exist in the body and in its parts. So if you can understand arad that do not require the forbidden kind of composition, then you must allow the same for the parts.

Imam Ibn al Qayyim presented this argument in a brief way in his book al Sawaiq al Mursalah as follows.

Ibn Al Qayyim said: Another group from the Asharis said: Whatever whose outward wording does not give the meaning of jawarih (bodily limbs) and abad (parts), such as knowledge, life, power, will, and speech, is not to be interpreted away from its apparent meaning.

But whatever whose outward wording gives the meaning of jawarih (bodily limbs) and abad (parts), such as face, two hands, and foot, must definitely be interpreted away, because affirming it would necessitate tarkib (composition) and tajsim (making Him into a body).

The reply of the affirmers from Ahl al Sunnah

Those who affirm the attributes, the Salafiyyah (those upon the way of the Salaf), said: Our answer to you is exactly the same answer that you give to your opponents from the Jahmiyyah  and the Mutazilah who deny the attributes. For they said to you: If there subsisted in Him, glorified is He, a real existing sifah wujudiyyah (positive attribute that truly exists), such as hearing, sight, knowledge, power, and life, then He would be a place for aarad (accidents), and this would entail tarkib (composition), tajsim (embodiment), and inqisam (division), just as you said:

If He had a face, a hand, and a finger, that would entail tarkib (composition) and inqisam (division). So whatever answer you give to these people, we will give you that same answer.

If you say: We affirm these attributes in a way that they are not aarad (accidents) and we do not call them aarad, so composition and tajsim do not follow from that.

It is said to you: And we also affirm the attributes that Allah affirmed for Himself, which you denied for Him, in a way that does not entail parts or jawarih, and the One described with them is not called a compound, nor a jism, nor something divided.

If you say: From these attributes nothing is understood in the mind except parts and abad (parts).
We say to you: And from those other attributes nothing is understood in the mind except aarad (accidents).

If you say: An accident does not remain for two moments, while the sifat of the Lord, exalted is He, remain forever and always, so they are not aarad (accidents).

We say: Likewise, abad (parts) are only that whose separation and detachment is possible, and this, in the case of the Lord, exalted is He, is impossible, so they are not abad (parts) and not jawarih (bodily limbs).

So the separation of the attributes from the One who is described with them is absolutely impossible in both types, while the makhluq (created being) can be separated from both its abadand its aarad.

If you say: If the face is the very same thing as the hand, and the same as the shin, and the finger, then this is impossible. But if it is something other than them, then distinction is necessary, and tarkib (composition) is necessary.

We say to you: Likewise, if hearing is the very same thing as sight, and both are the same as knowledge, and that is the same as life and power, then this is impossible. But if each of them is distinct, then tarkib (composition) is necessary. So what is your answer? The answer is shared between us and you.

If you say: We can understand sifat (attributes) that are not aarad (accidents) which subsist in that which is not a jism (body), even if there is no example for this in what we witness. And we do not deny, in general, that there is a difference between the two kinds. However, this is a difference that does not benefit you in separating between the two kinds in the way you claim, that one of them entails tajsim (embodiment) and tarkib (composition), while the other does not entail that.

And when this ilzam (a necessary conclusion that they cannot escape from) gripped the Jahmiyyah by the throat, they said: The whole issue in our view is one and the same, and we negate all of it.

Mukhtasar as Sawaaiq al Mursalah ala al Jahmiyyah wal Muattilah page 32-33