The Dhahiri approach is a fiqh madhhab based on taking the apparent meanings of the Quran, Sunnah, while rejecting qiyas, istihsan, reasoning by underlying causes, and all other forms of opinion.
The followers of this madhhab are called Dhahiris, attributed to its founder, Dawud ibn Ali ibn Khalaf ibn Ali al-Dhahiri, who was known for holding to the apparent meaning, defending the fiqh of the apparent meaning, and rejecting speaking about the religion of Allah through opinion and qiyas. The emergence of this madhhab began in the first half of the third century AH.
Reasons for the deviation of the Dhahiris in understanding texts
Holding to the apparent meaning and denying reasoning by causes and determining purposes except in what is apparent is a narrow and limited method for understanding texts and the wisdom of legislation. It does not go beyond the outward meaning to deeper indications and signals. This is insufficient for recognising renewed interests not explicitly stated. This limited method in understanding texts and their causes has led to several harms, including:
Excessive reliance on the apparent and on istishab (presumption of continuity) beyond what is needed When the Dhahiris denied qiyas and reasoning by causes, and felt the insufficiency of texts to cover all events and incidents, they were forced to expand excessively in using the apparent meaning and istishab, carrying them beyond what was needed. This led them to forced interpretations to derive rulings not indicated by the apparent, resulting in many errors.
Rejecting Rulings On New Matters That Appear Overtime
Limiting causes and purposes only to the apparent led some to reject qiyās. But qiyās is needed in ijtihād to deal with new matters not directly mentioned in the texts. Rejecting it leads to two problems:
- Either saying the Sharīʿah cannot deal with new issues, which is false because it is complete and for all times and places.
- Or treating all new matters as permissible, while some may be forbidden, which goes against the intent of the Lawgiver and wastes benefits.
The Dhahiris, due to excess in holding to the apparent, denied many of people’s renewed interests for which there is no explicit text, such as their denial of contractual and stipulated conditions in financial transactions and marriage. Ibn al-Qayyim refuted them on this sufficiently.
Restricting the scope of rational knowledge
Exalting the apparent meaning to the extent of denying reasoning by causes and qiyas is a method that confines knowledge to the linguistic understanding of words, without extending to the search for causes and reasons. This restricts rational knowledge beyond the linguistic scope of words. This method does not agree with the rationality of legislation and the purposefulness of its rulings, as it relies solely on linguistic logic.
Texts were revealed to achieve individual, social, and scientific benefit over time, and they are limited and finite, unlike the unlimited events and incidents. How then can one encompass them while denying reasoning by causes and refusing to search for them?
The evidences for the authority of qiyas
The imams of Islam and the fuqaha of the Sharia, by examining the revealed texts, found that the legal rulings often come connected to aims and wisdoms that relate to achieving the interests of people and preserving their religious and worldly affairs. From this it was known that non-ʿibadi (non purely devotional) rulings are tied to clear and regulated attributes that return to the interests of the Ummah. By this the authority of qiyas (analogy) is established. The evidences for its authority are many, such as the saying of Allah:
﴾فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولِي الْأَبْصَارِ﴿
“So take warning, O people of vision.” (al-Hashr: 2)
The consideration (iʿtibar) mentioned in this verse is returning one matter to its like, by giving it the same ruling. This is a general text that covers legal qiyas applied in rulings, rational qiyas, and taking admonition.
This verse was revealed regarding a particular incident, when the tribe of Banu al-Nadir rebelled, broke their covenant with the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), so Allah abandoned them and gave power over them to the Muslims, who destroyed their houses and expelled them from their land. The verse came down declaring the fate of these people, so that others would know that whoever followed their path would have the same outcome.
The wording of the verse is general and not restricted to the cause of revelation. This proves the general principle of attaching something to its like and equating the similar with its similar, and that is the essence of qiyas.
Ibn Qudamah (d. 620 AH) said regarding the indication of this verse: One of the evidences for affirming qiyas is the saying of Allah:
﴾فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولِي الْأَبْصَارِ﴿
“So take warning, O people of vision.” (al-Hashr: 2)
The reality of iʿtibār (reflection) is to compare one thing to another, like saying “Check the dinar against the standard.” This is the very definition of qiyas.
If someone says: “The verse means to reflect on what happened to those who disobeyed Allah and His messengers, and take warning. So it would be inappropriate to explicitly mention qiyas here and say: link the branches to the roots to know the rulings.”
We say: The wording is general. What would be inappropriate is restricting it to one form, while the general meaning includes all types of reflection. (Rawdat al-Nazir 2/558)
(Similar wording can also be found in: Mizan al-Usul of al-Samarqandi p. 561. Nibras al-ʿUqul fi Tahqiq al-Qiyas by ʿIsa Manun p. 75 notes that this verse is cited in the usul sources of all madhhabs.)
Also, many texts from the Sunnah connect rulings to their ʿillah (effective cause). This occurs frequently in the hadiths, in ways that match the method of the fuqaha who use qiyas. Among them:
These texts and many others show the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) himself linking rulings to their ʿillah.
Linking a ruling to its ʿillah requires that it be applied wherever that ʿillah exists. This is qiyas. The foundation of taʿlil (reasoning) is that the ruling extends to wherever the ʿillah is present, so that the ruling is established in those places as well.
Indeed, we see in these hadiths that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) guided his ummah to how to connect rulings to their ʿillah, so that they can derive rulings for matters not explicitly mentioned in the texts by practical methods of istinbat (deduction).
By knowing the ʿillah of a ruling in a text, the ruling for similar non-textual cases becomes known.
Critiquing the Dhahiri madhhab in its evidences
The scholars studied the Dhahiri madhhab carefully, and found it weak in its evidences and proofs, and also weak in its outcomes and applications.
The Dhahiri madhhab relied on certain phrases in texts, interpreting them in ways other than their intended meanings. For example, they used as proof the verse:
﴾مَا فَرَّطْنَا فِي الْكِتَابِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ﴿
“We have neglected nothing in the Book.” (al-Anʿam: 38)
and the verse:
﴾وَلَا رَطْبٍ وَلَا يَابِسٍ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ﴿
“Nor is there anything moist or dry but it is in a clear Book.” (al-Anʿam: 59)
The “Book” here does not mean the Quran, but the knowledge of Allah or the Preserved Tablet, as is clear from the context.
Even if we assume the “Book” means the Quran, then its meaning is like the verse:
﴾وَنَزَّلْنَا عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ تِبْيَانًا لِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ﴿
“And We revealed to you the Book as clarification for everything.” (al-Nahl: 89)
The answer is that the Quran does not by itself contain all rulings directly. Many rulings are established by the Sunnah and by ijma.
The meaning of this verse is that it clarifies everything, either directly or through what it commands us to follow, such as the Sunnah, ijma, and qiyas. The Quran has already indicated the obligation of acting on qiyas in the verse:
﴾فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولِي الْأَبْصَارِ﴿
“So take warning, O people of vision.” (al-Hashr: 2)
Thus these verses actually support qiyas, not negate it, as the Dhahiris mistakenly understood with their rigid reading. Nor do these verses negate the authority of the Sunnah.
Furthermore, acting upon qiyas is acting upon the Quran in meaning. This is because rulings are connected to their ʿillah. For example, khamr was prohibited because it intoxicates. Wherever this ʿillah is present, the ruling applies.
Thus narcotics in our time are haram, and prohibiting them is acting upon the Quran in meaning, even if they are not named in the text. Whoever refuses to prohibit them because they are not mentioned by name is not a scholar, nor a faqih.
Hence, acting upon qiyas is acting upon the Quran in meaning, and the rulings of both the branch and the unmentioned case are established by the Quran so long as they share the same ʿillah.
As for the Dhahiris citing verses like:
﴾وَأَنْ تَقُولُوا عَلَى اللَّهِ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ﴿
“And that you say about Allah that which you do not know.” (al-Aʿraf: 33)
and:
﴾إِنَّ الظَّنَّ لَا يُغْنِي مِنَ الْحَقِّ شَيْئًا﴿
“Indeed conjecture avails nothing against the truth.” (Yunus: 36)
and other similar verses, the scholars answered that these verses are not about qiyas or its rejection on the basis that it is zanni (probable). Rather, they prohibit building your ʿaqidah on zann, since creed must be established on certainty.
As for legal rulings, they are established by evidences that may be zanni, and this is agreed upon by the scholars.
The proof is that we are commanded to act upon authentic and hasan hadith, which yield zann not qatʿ. We also establish rights in courts through the testimony of two men or one man and two women, which are zanni evidences.
Therefore, these verses do not negate qiyas.
If we study how the Quran uses the terms ʿilm (knowledge) and zann (assumption), and its condemnation of following zann, we find:
1. The condemned zann is what occurs without evidence, mere guesswork or conjecture. This is illusion, not knowledge, and this is what Allah condemned.
2. The Quran sometimes called certain knowledge “zann,” praising those who held it, as in His saying:
﴾الَّذِينَ يَظُنُّونَ أَنَّهُمْ مُلَاقُو رَبِّهِمْ وَأَنَّهُمْ إِلَيْهِ رَاجِعُونَ﴿
“Those who are certain that they will meet their Lord and that to Him they will return.” (al-Baqara: 46)
These are people of full iman and certainity in knowledge.
3. The Quran sometimes called ghalabat al-zann (preponderant probability) knowledge, such as in His saying:
﴾فَإِنْ عَلِمْتُمُوهُنَّ مُؤْمِنَاتٍ فَلَا تَرْجِعُوهُنَّ إِلَى الْكُفَّارِ﴿
“If you know them to be believers, then do not return them to the disbelievers.” (al-Mumtahanah: 10)
This knowledge of their iman was by ghalabat al-zann (when assumption or probability outweighs doubt)
Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with him) explained the test of the women emigrants as swearing oaths that they had not left for a husband, or for worldly gain, but only for love of Allah and His Messenger. (Tafsir al-Tabari 28/14).
From all this, it is concluded that ghalabat al-zann is counted as ʿilm, since the Quran called it such. It is established by sound evidence, not illusion.
Thus what is established by qiyas is a type of knowledge, termed zanni by the scholars, just as knowledge from apparent texts is also zanni. Many ijtihads differ in these, and all are valid. The mujtahid must act upon what his ijtihad concludes.
Therefore, qiyas is a valid proof that must be acted upon by the mujtahid, under its established conditions in usul al-fiqh.
This shows the weakness of the evidences of the Dhahiri madhhab, their invalidity, and inconsistency.
Critiquing the Dhahiri madhhab in application
As for critiquing it in application and results, this madhhab is strange and dangerous, for it imposes rigidity and narrowness on fiqh and thought.
This approach led to stagnation in fiqh, strange rulings, and many anomalies rejected by the overwhelming majority of scholars past and present.
For example, his statement that a father or guardian may not marry off a virgin or previously married woman except with her consent. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:
«لا تُنكَحُ الأيمُ حتى تُستأمر، ولا تُنكَحُ البكر حتى تُستأذن»
“A previously married woman is not married until she is consulted, and a virgin is not married until her permission is sought.” (al-Bukhari 5136, Muslim 1419)
This ruling, though supported by the hadith, was considered a departure from the prevailing madhhahib of his time. Ibn Daqiq al-ʿId (d. 702 AH) discussed it in Ihkam al-Ahkam (1/65), and al-Nawawi (d. 676 AH) in his Sharh Muslim (2/118).
These and other examples show how the Dhahiri madhhab, in application, produced rulings regarded as anomalous and contrary to the consensus of the majority.
The scholars and the people of hadith said: If she laughs or explicitly speaks in agreement, it is valid and even more fitting, since it indicates consent more clearly.
Some of the people of the Dhahiri madhhab, however, said: “It is not valid, because the hadith said ‘her silence,’ so if she does not remain silent, it is not valid.” This is extreme rigidity in clinging to the outward wording of the hadith, caused by their rejection of qiyas. Ibn Hazm says this himself in the screenshot below in al-Muḥallā bi al-Āthār (9/57-58).
Translation: Every previously married woman, her permission for marriage is only by her speech with which her approval is known. Every virgin, her permission for marriage is only by her silence. If she remains silent, she has given permission and the marriage is binding on her. If she speaks with approval or with refusal or with anything else, then the marriage is not valid upon her by that.
The proof for this is what we mentioned before from the words of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, regarding the virgin: “Her permission is her silence.”
Abu Muhammad (Ibn Hazm) said: A group of the later people went to the view that if the virgin speaks with approval then the marriage is valid by that.
This is in opposition to the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, and to the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them. Glory be to Allah who made them imagine that they are sharper in understanding than the Companions of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, and made them think that they grasped a meaning and explanation hidden from the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him. We seek refuge in Allah from such a thing.
Among the examples of this is the hadith of the man who was cheated in business dealings. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said to him:
«إِذَا بَايَعْتَ فَقُلْ: لَا خَلَابَةَ»
“When you enter a sale, say: there is to be no deception.” (Sahih Al Bukhari 2117)
The meaning of “la khilabah” is “no cheating.” The scholars said: The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) taught him this phrase so that the seller would know his situation and consider him as he would himself.
The intended meaning is that he stipulates by this phrase the right to annul the contract if deceit is discovered. So if he used any other wording with the same meaning, such as “no cheating,” or “no deception,” or “no betrayal,” then he would have the same right.
But the Dhahiris said: “If he said ‘no deception,’ or ‘no cheating,’ or the like, then he has no right of option unless he says: ‘la khilabah.’” (al-Muhalla 8/272).
This is extreme rigidity, for it is obvious to anyone that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) did not intend the wording for its own sake. What was intended was the meaning, which is stipulating freedom from deceit. Whenever that meaning is achieved with any wording, the purpose is achieved, and the right of option is established by this condition. This is something decisively certain, not of the domain of mere probability.
This extreme anomaly, of which we have mentioned only a few examples while many others exist, along with the weakness of the foundation of Dawud al-Dhahiri’s (d. 270 AH) madhhab, led the scholars to critique the madhhab from its very basis and warn against taking from it.
They did not recognise it as a madhhab to be followed. Its spread was limited to some parts of Iraq and certain regions of the East beyond the river, until some scholars of al-Andalus carried it to the Maghrib and practised it themselves and with some of their companions.
This prepared the ground for the emergence of Ibn Hazm (d. 456 AH), who had strong ability and a powerful pen. He promoted the Dhahiri madhhab, took it to extremes, and attacked the madhhabs and their imams with harsh language.
He did not hesitate to insult the four imams or one of them, or to accuse them of fabricating against the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), or to call their fatwa a “dog’s Sharia,” and other such crude expressions (see Fath al-Bari 9/166 Bulaq print, Sharh Muslim 9/202. Also al-Mudawwana 2/65, Muslim 5/11).
Through this harshness and coarseness, Ibn Hazm immortalised the madhhab of Dawud al-Dhahiri in his many books, so that the madhhab reached us, to be exploited in this time by various groups.
It is as if this madhhab came as an experiment, showing what happens when one abandons the madhhabs of the fuqaha of the Muslim lands and the usul of the great imams of Islam who are followed. Those imams had the greatest merit in clarifying the methods of fiqh which the noble Companions practised, clarifying them into principles from which branches were derived.
They became a unique distinction and pride for this Ummah, not found in others, as acknowledged by all researchers from every background. They presented Islamic fiqh as a complete, coherent system, woven into precise scientific disciplines, never contradicting itself, encompassing all aspects of life in accordance with the rulings of the noble Sharia, upon strong and firm foundations.
The Dhāhirīs’ Rejection of Consensus
The Dhāhirī school follows principles that cancel out the authority of ijmāʿ leading them to oppose it frequently. They restrict ijmāʿ to the consensus of the Companions and are extremely strict in accepting it.
The reason why the Dhāhirīs claim that only the consensus of the Companions is binding is due to their literalist origin, which includes rejecting qiyās (analogy). Ibn Hazm affirms this below.
Sulayman and many of our companions said: There is no consensus (ijmāʿ) except the consensus of the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them. They argued that the Companions witnessed direct instruction (tawqīf) from the Messenger of Allah ﷺ. It is authentically established that valid consensus must be based on such instruction.
They also said: The Companions, may Allah be pleased with them, were at that time the entire body of believers. No other believers existed outside of them. Whoever holds this status, then their consensus is the consensus of all believers. This is the consensus that is definitive and certain.
Kitāb al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām By Ibn Ḥazm (4/147)
They believe that the consensus of the Companions must be based on a specific instruction from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). This logic would not hold if they accepted the consensus of the Tābiʿīn and the generation after them. For the rest of the jurists, ijmāʿ includes the three first generations. As for later generations, there is disagreement, though most accept their ijmāʿ as binding. In my view, it is not.
It also seems clear that Ibn Hazm only speaks of consensus as definitive (qaṭʿī), since he often declares that anyone who disagrees with consensus is a disbeliever. This may explain his inconsistencies in defining ijmāʿ.
For this reason, the Dhāhirīs are extremely cautious in reporting ijmāʿ. Scholars have considered Ibn Hazm’s book Marātib al-Ijmāʿ among the most accurate records of consensus, as stated in al-Miʿyār by al-Wansharīsī (12/32).
However, no one is free of error.
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah criticised that very book and clarified that Ibn Hazm misunderstood some texts, which led to mistakes in transmitting ijmāʿ. Ibn Hazm wrote that book in the early stages of his learning, and it does not contain the scholarly strength and broad awareness found in his later works, like al-Muḥallā.
To claim that consensus after the Companions is impossible, as the Dhāhirīs do, is false. Ijmāʿ is not about the agreement of the masses, but rather the agreement of qualified jurists from Ahl al-Sunnah upon a single position.
The number of jurists, whether from the Companions or the Tābiʿīn, was limited. Each had students who narrated and recorded their views. They would gather and debate among themselves. So, the agreement of their statements is without doubt ijmāʿ.
Perhaps the broadest area in which the Dhāhirīs opposed consensus is in their treatment of recommended actions as obligatory. Whenever a hadith uses an imperative form, the Dhāhirī interprets it as an obligation, even if the scholars have unanimously agreed it is merely recommended.
But the texts often allow more than one interpretation—whether command or prohibition. So if the scholars of the Ummah agree on one interpretation, no one may go beyond it.
An example is the claim of the Khawārij, who used Allah’s words, “The judgement belongs only to Allah” (Yūsuf 12:40), to declare anyone who accepted arbitration a disbeliever.
There is no doubt the statement itself is true, but their interpretation is false. They were refuted by the fact that their interpretation contradicted the understanding of the Companions.
That is why ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib said about their statement: “A word of truth, but intended for falsehood.” The same applies to the Shīʿah, who use the verse, “Say: I ask of you no reward except love for the close relatives” (al-Shūrā 42:23), to claim that leadership belongs only to the descendants of ʿAlī.
But this is rejected by the consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah, who understand the verse to mean: I ask you to honour the kinship between me and you—not to give authority to my relatives. Every sect—even the Qādiyāniyyah—quotes the Quran and sometimes the Sunnah, but they are refuted by the consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah.
The Dhāhirīs also declare that any consensus that contradicts a text is disbelief. Ibn Hazm said: in al-Iḥkām (4/549):
قال الإمام ابن حزم رحمه الله في (الاحكام) (4/ 549): إجماع الناس علي خلاف النص الوارد من غير نسخ أو تخصيص له وردا قبل موت رسول الله صلي الله عليه وسلم فهذا كفر مجرد
“If the people agree on something that contradicts a text—without abrogation or specification—and that text was conveyed before the Prophet’s death, this is pure disbelief.”
So how can we find modern Dhāhirīs who deny that consensus on interpreting some hadiths as recommendation is sufficient to limit them from indicating obligation?
For instance, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr reported consensus that offering salām is not obligatory, but recommended. Ibn Kathīr said this is the unanimous view of the scholars. Then a modern Dhāhirī insists that giving salām is obligatory.
They argue, following a statement of al-Shāfiʿī, though they misunderstand its application—that the default ruling of commands is obligation unless a proof shifts it to recommendation. But al-Shāfiʿī and others said that consensus indicating a text refers to recommendation is sufficient proof to shift from obligation to recommendation.
The same applies to prohibitions being reduced to disliked. There is no disagreement on this among the jurists of the madhāhib. This is where the Dhāhirīs err in applying the principle.
Whoever says something that contradicts consensus, his view is anomalous. Imām Aḥmad is far from such error. He used to say, “Do not speak on an issue unless you have a scholar of the past to follow.” Whoever attributes the opposite to him is mistaken.
It is impossible for the Ummah to unite on falsehood. Whoever claims that ijmāʿ can oppose the Quran and Sunnah is deluded. How could the scholars of Islam from the time of Prophethood until the end of the blessed generations all agree on the same mistake without Allah sending someone to correct them? This reflects ill opinion of the scholars of this Ummah, which is the best Ummah ever raised for mankind.
Imām al-Shāfiʿī said: “The rulings in the Quran are upon their apparent and general meanings. No one is allowed to change an apparent meaning into a hidden one, or a general meaning into a specific one, except with evidence from the Book of Allah, the Mighty and Majestic. If not, then with the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, or the consensus of the general body of scholars.”
He also said: “What can carry possible interpretation is supported by the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ. If no Sunnah is found, then by the consensus of the Muslims. If there is no consensus, then by analogy (qiyās).”
Maʿrifat al-Sunan wa al-Āthār By al-Bayhaqī (1/175), (Also found in Kitab Al-Um by Imām al-Shāfiʿī 8/281)
Notice how it says: “from the Book, the Sunnah, or ijmāʿ.”
So ijmāʿ does specify the text—or more precisely, ijmāʿ is proof that such a specification or shift from obligation to recommendation is valid, and this applies across the field of legal theory (uṣūl).
If the Companions truly disagreed, then those after them cannot be forbidden from using the same reasoning, unless there is a text from the Quran or Sunnah, in which case it must be followed. Difference is not an excuse when a text is present. The exception is when the Companions later retracted and agreed unanimously.
For instance, Ibn ʿAbbās retracted his opinion on temporary marriage. The Companions could end up agreeing on what they once differed about, such as their agreement on appointing Abū Bakr. But this does not mean something was once ḥalāl and later became ḥarām, or the opposite.
Does the Dhāhirī disagreement count?
Al-Shawkānī said in Irshād al-Fuḥūl (1/148): “al-Nawawī said in the chapter on siwāk in his Sharḥ Muslim: ‘The disagreement of Dāwūd does not invalidate the consensus agreed upon by the majority and the verifying scholars.’
The author of al-Mufhim said: ‘Most jurists and legal theorists do not consider their disagreement. In fact, they treat them like the common people. If anyone does consider their disagreement, it is only because his method treats the disagreement of the common folk as valid, but the truth is the opposite.’”
Translation: Our companions have reported that Dawud (al-Dhahiri) held the view that selling her (in context he is referring to umm al-walad, a slave woman who has borne a child for her master) is permissible, while also saying that there is a consensus on its invalidity. It is as though they did not consider Dawud’s disagreement valid.
It has already been mentioned that the more correct view is that his disagreement, and the disagreement of others from the Dhahiri school, is not taken into account, because they denied qiyas (analogical reasoning), and a condition for ijtihad (juristic reasoning) is that the mujtahid must be knowledgeable in qiyas.
The Shiʿah also said that selling her is permissible, but the disagreement of the Shiʿah is not taken into account.
al-Majmūʿ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab By al-Nawawī (9/291)
All or most of these scholars clearly stated that not considering the Dhāhirīs is the view of the majority. The reason is that knowledge of analogy is a condition of ijtihād, as ʿUmar ordered the judges to know it. Among the agreed-upon conditions for being a mujtahid is the knowledge of qiyās.
al-Dhahabī objected in Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ (13/105):
وقد ذكره ابن ابى حاتم فاجاد في ترجمته فانه قال: روى عن اسحاق الحنظلي وجماعة من المحدثين وتفقه للشافعي رحمه الله تعالى ثم ترك ذلك ونفى القياس والف في الفقه على ذلك كتبا شذ فيها عن السلف وابتدع طريقة هجره اكثر اهل العلم عليها وهو مع ذلك صدوق في روايته ونقله واعتقاده الا ان رأيه اضعف الآراء وابعدها من
طريق الفقه واكثرها شذوذا
al-Dhahabī also transmitted that Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ said: “The imams would not have mentioned his madhhab in their famous books if they did not consider him.”
The answer to this claim is that they transmitted his views as they transmit the views of the Shīʿah, Khawārij, and Muʿtazilah (like al-Aṣamm and Ibn ʿUlayyah)—for wonder, not for reliance. They often quote the Dhāhirīs only to say: this contradicts ijmāʿ. Their aim was to highlight the strangeness, not give weight to their views.
Ibn al-ʿArabi found difficulty with the statement of al-Bukhari and said (in ʿĀriḍat al-Aḥwadhī (1/169)): The obligation of ghusl (ritual washing) is something the Companions and those after them unanimously agreed upon.
No one disagreed except Dawud, and his disagreement carries no weight. What is truly difficult is the disagreement of al-Bukhari and his ruling that ghusl is recommended, while he is one of the imams of the religion and among the foremost scholars of the Muslims. Then he began criticising the weakness of the hadith of the chapter in a way that is not acceptable, and we have already pointed to part of that.
Fath Al Bari By Ibn Hajar (2/81)
Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī aid in Fatḥ al-Bārī (4/110):
“Even if someone were to disagree and pray while food is present and his soul desires it, his prayer is still valid according to all the recognised scholars.
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463 AH) and others have transmitted consensus on this. The only opposition came from a few later scholars among the Dhahiris, and their opposition holds no weight against the earlier consensus.”
Many branches of jurisprudence rely on analogy. For this reason, the Dhāhirīs are not considered jurists in those topics. Nor should one think they are among the people of hadith either.
The people of hadith were part of the known madhāhib: Ibn Maʿīn was Ḥanafī, Abū Dāwūd was Ḥanbalī, al-Nasāʾī, al-Dāraquṭnī, and Ibn Khuzaymah were Shāfiʿī. Some, like Aḥmad, al-Bukhārī, al-Thawrī, and Ibn al-Mubārak, were independent mujtahids. Ibn Rajab mentioned this clear difference between the Dhāhirīs and Ahl al-Ḥadīth. The difference is vast, praise be to Allah.
As for issues built solely on transmitted texts, not analogy, then what reason is there to exclude the Dhāhirīs from those discussions? We must restrict the exclusion of the Dhāhirī view only to the areas that rely on analogy.
Today, it is difficult to adopt the Dhāhirī school except by imitating Ibn Hazm. Where are the published books of the Dhāhirī madhhab that are recommended, apart from Ibn Hazm’s books? Where are the Dhāhirī scholars?
Or Ibn Ṭāhir, the permissive one, who issued fatwās that looking at beautiful boys with desire is allowed?
The books of Dāwūd, his son, and others have not reached us. But many scholars were influenced by Dhāhirī thought, not the madhhab. A madhhab requires a teacher and students. These people reject being linked to Ibn Hazm, though they were influenced by his ideas and approach.
