Abu al Hasan al Ashari’s mixed doctrine
Sultan al Umayri explains that Abu al Hasan al Ashari did not stay upon the pure way of the Salaf in the names and attributes. He took a mixed doctrine that combines parts of the creed of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah with parts of the doctrine of the deniers of attributes, especially Ibn Kullab. Ibn Taymiyyah says that Ibn Kullab was the first to affirm eternal attributes that subsist in Allah while denying any attributes linked to His will and power, and that al Ashari followed him, so his doctrine is a mixture between the way of Ahl al Sunnah and the way of the Jahmiyyah. (Majmu al Fatawa 12/178; 16/308; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah 254 to 281).
Ashari and later writers themselves say that al Ashari moved from his Muatazili teacher to the circle of Ibn Kullab, al Qalanisi and al Muhasibi, used kalam to support their line, and turned this into a new madhhab that people then started to call the madhhab of Ahl al Sunnah.
At the same time the imams of the Salaf, such as Ahmad and Ibn Khuzaymah, warned strongly against Ibn Kullab and anyone who adopted his foundations, especially his denial of voluntary attributes. This shows that when al Ashari built directly on Ibn Kullab, he moved away from the full way of the Salaf in this chapter. (al Milal wa al Nihal 1/91; Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah 1/74; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah 254 to 281).
Al Umayri also notes that al Ashari did not completely leave Muatazili roots after his repentance. He had spent many years on their creed and even wrote on names and attributes with them, and after he left he still kept major principles such as dalil al huduth and the obligation of speculative reasoning, only calling them innovated proofs.
Early scholars like Khalaf al Muallim, al Sajzi, al Samanani and al Umrani say that al Ashari repented from many branches but stayed on key usul from the Muatazila and that the Asharis stand with one foot in the Muatazili camp and one foot with the people of hadith. (Risalah al Sajzi p. 80; Dar Taarud al Aql wa al Naql 7/407; al Intisar 2/595; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah 254 to 281).
From his own books, such as al Luma, it is also clear that al Ashari denies that voluntary attributes subsist in Allah, even while affirming other attributes, which proves that he settled on a mixed doctrine that uses kalam to affirm some attributes and to deny others.
The later Ashari attack on Ibn Khuzaymah’s al Tawhid as tashbih and even shirk, although it matches the known affirmations of the Salaf, confirms that this mixed doctrine stands in real opposition to the path of the early imams. (al Luma; comments of al Razi and Ibn Jamaah on al Tawhid; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah 254 to 281).
The Asharis’ adoption and development of this doctrine
Al Umayri shows that the Ashari madhhab develops in stages but always within this mixed frame that starts from al Ashari. The early Asharis, such as al Ashari, al Baqillani, Ibn Furak and al Bayhaqi, generally affirm the reported attributes like face, hands, eyes, feet, highness and istiwa and argue against the Muatazila who interpret them, but they deny voluntary attributes and refuse to accept any attributes that are linked to the will and power of Allah in a real way. (Majmu al Fatawa 4/148; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah 254 to 281).
The middle Asharis, starting with al Juwaini, widen interpretation and begin to interpret all the reported attributes, and they bring Muatazili and philosophical material into the discussion. By this phase they only clearly affirm the seven rational attributes and no longer openly affirm the reported attributes.
The later Asharis, such as al Razi and al Amidi, keep this content but use heavier philosophical and Jahmi arguments, and they present a strong and wide negation of reported attributes. (al Irshad; works of al Razi; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah 254 to 281).
What the Asharis affirm and deny
Al Umayri summarises the final Ashari position in three points. First, all phases of the Ashari madhhab agree on affirming seven attributes of meanings, often called the rational attributes. These are life, knowledge, speech, will, power, hearing and sight.
Second, all Asharis, early and later, deny voluntary attributes, so they do not accept any real attributes that are linked to choice and will and arise when Allah wills. This denial is a fixed feature of their madhhab and comes from the line of Ibn Kullab. (Majmu al Fatawa 12/178; 16/308).
Third, they differ over the reported attributes. The early Asharis affirm them in general but with extra negations, while the middle and later Asharis move to full interpretation of them and limit clear affirmation to the seven rational attributes. (Majmu al Fatawa 4/148).
They also do not treat creating, providing, giving life and causing death as real attributes that subsist in Allah. Instead they call them relational attributes and say that creating is the created thing, providing is the provided thing, and so on, because in their usul the act is not distinct from the object of the act. (Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah).
Categories of attributes according to the Asharis
In practice, the Asharis divide the attributes in more than one way, but the most widespread later division has four main categories. The first is nafsiyyah attributes, which are positive descriptions that only point to the essence itself.
They reduce this to a single attribute, which is existence. The second is negative attributes, which negate what does not befit Allah. They list five mothers here: eternity in the past, eternity in the future, opposition to created things, self subsistence and oneness. (Sharh al Aqidah al Kubra p. 165).
The third category is attributes of meanings. These are positive attributes that subsist in Allah and add a meaning beyond the essence, namely the seven rational attributes of life, speech, knowledge, power, will, hearing and sight.
The fourth category is ma’nawiyyah attributes, which are the same seven, but spoken of as states or ahwal, such as the state of being knowing and the state of being able, which they say are neither existent nor non existent, but in between. Only those who affirm ahwal accept this fourth type. (Sharh al Aqidah al Kubra p. 165).
On this basis many Asharis say the total number of attributes is twenty. One attribute of existence, five negative attributes, seven attributes of meanings and seven ma’nawiyyah attributes.
Others speak only of seven, meaning the seven attributes of meanings, and there is a wide disagreement among them over adding more attributes like hand, face, istiwa, perception of tastes and smells, pre eternalness and everlastingness, states of knowing and being able, and even laughter. (al Isaad fi Sharh al Irshad p. 351; al Matallib al Aliyah 3 to 221; Muhassal p. 136; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah).
Rulings of the attributes according to the Asharis
Al Umayri notes that the middle and later Asharis agree that the attributes they affirm have two main rulings. First, the attributes are one in the sense that they do not renew. Allah knows all things by one knowledge, wills all things by one will and is able over all things by one power, regardless of the number and times of the things known, willed and made. Al Juwaini states that the speech of Allah is one and relates to all its objects, and that all the attributes are like this. (al Irshad p. 136).
Second, these attributes are eternal with the eternity of Allah. Their oneness and their eternity go together in Ashari usul and lead to many problems when they deny any real renewal in the attributes while still speaking about multiple objects and events. (Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah ).
Methodological errors in the Ashari doctrine
Al Umayri says that the mixed Ashari doctrine is built on combining principles that require affirmation with principles that require denial, which produces serious methodical problems. The first major problem is loss of consistency and arbitrary control.
They separate between attributes that share the same nature, affirming some and denying others, for example affirming will while denying mercy and love, and affirming life while denying hand and face, even though all these are attributes of meanings in themselves. Scholars like Ibn Qudamah, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al Qayyim say that this distinction has no real basis and that any answer the Asharis give to the Muatazila in defence of their seven attributes can be turned back on them for the attributes they deny. (Risalah fi al Istiwa wa al Fawqiyyah p. 74; al Sirat al Mustaqim; Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah 254 to 281).
The second problem is clear contradiction. Once they make these unjustified separations, they fall into many clashes inside their usul.
Ibn Taymiyyah and later writers list several contradictions, such as using the proof of priority to prove hearing and sight but not wisdom and mercy, using the rule of negation and affirmation for some attributes but not others, using the perfection of creation to prove knowledge while at the same time denying wisdom and purpose in actions, using fear of composition to deny some attributes but not seeing that affirming seven distinct attributes also implies composition, and claiming that speech must be one simple attribute while allowing multiplicity in the other seven attributes.
Even leading Asharis like al Amidi admit that they have no real escape from some of these objections. (al Nubuwwat 1 to 242; Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah 1 to 499; Abkar al Afkar 1 to 100)
Critique of the false principles relied upon
Al Umayri points out that the negation side of the Ashari doctrine rests on the same philosophical and kalam foundations as the full deniers of attributes.
The main ones are dalil al huduth in the form used by the mutakallimun, the proof of composition and the proof of corporeality.
They assume that affirming attributes that relate to will, power and events implies composition and corporeality, and that composition and corporeality are impossible, so they deny these attributes.
Al Umayri shows that these premises are the same tools used by the Muatazila and that they have already been critiqued in detail by Ibn Taymiyyah and others, and that once these false foundations are removed, the Ashari negation of voluntary and reported attributes collapses and only the sound principles of affirmation remain. (Al Uqud al Dhahabiyyah).
The adoption by Abu al Hasan al Ashari of a mixed doctrine:
Before speaking about the positions of the Asharis in the chapter of names and attributes, it is necessary to establish an essential point. Its result is that mixed composition was in fact present with Abu al Hasan al Ashari.
What this means is that the way Abu al Hasan al Ashari followed in the chapter of names and attributes is not the way of the imams of the Salaf. Rather, it is a different way which contains a blameworthy and deviated kalam material, which led him to deviate in the chapter of names and attributes from the way of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah [the People of the Sunnah and the Community]. So his way in reality falls into a mixture between contradictory madhhabs [methods]: the madhhab of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah, and the madhhab of the muattila [those who deny the attributes].
Ibn Taymiyyah often draws attention to this meaning. He says about that: “This view was first said in Islam by Abdullah ibn Kullab. For the Salaf and the imams used to affirm for Allah the Exalted what He has of attributes and actions that are connected to His will and His power, and the Jahmiyyah used to deny both this and that.
So Ibn Kullab agreed with the Salaf on saying that the eternal attributes subsist in Him, and he denied that anything subsists in Him that is connected to His will and His power. Then Abu al Hasan al Ashari came after him and followed in the attributes the way of Ibn Kullab.” (Majmu al Fatawa 12/178)
He also says: “As for Ibn Kullab, his view is mixed with the view of the Jahmiyyah, and it is composed of the view of Ahl al Sunnah and the view of the Jahmiyyah, and likewise is the madhhab of al Ashari in the attributes.” (Majmu al Fatawa 16/308)
There are many proofs which show the truth of what he established and mentioned. In this place we will limit ourselves to five proofs that show the correctness of the description which Ibn Taymiyyah attributed to al Ashari.
The first proof: Some scholars of the Ashari madhhab clearly stated that their imam Abu al Hasan al Ashari combined between the doctrine of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah and other than it, and that he introduced a new way regarding the doctrine which Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah already had.
Explaining this meaning, al Shahristani says, after he mentions the way of the imams of the Salaf regarding the attributes: “Until the time reached Abdullah ibn Saeed al Kullabi, Abu al Abbas al Qalanisi, and al Harith ibn Asad al Muhasibi.
These were from the group of the Salaf, except that they engaged directly with the knowledge of kalam, and they supported the beliefs of the Salaf using kalam proofs and usuli arguments. Some of them authored and taught. Then there occurred between Abu al Hasan al Ashari and his teacher a debate on a question from the questions of al salah wa al aslah (Allah does what is best).
So they disputed, and al Ashari sided with this group, meaning the group of Ibn Kullab and those who came after him. He supported their doctrine with kalam methods, and this became a madhhab for Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah, and the description of Sifatiyyah [those who affirm attributes] moved to the Asharis.” (al Milal wa al Nihal 1/91)
There are many texts that confirm this proof, even from contemporary writers. Among the modern researchers who mentioned this proof, meaning that Abu al Hasan al Ashari combined between the two doctrines and was not purely upon the doctrine of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah, are Ahmad Mahmoud Subhi, who has a well known book about the Asharis, and al Fayoumi, who also has a well known book about the emergence of the Ashari madhhab.
The second proof: The admission that al Ashari was following the way of Ibn Kullab in affirmation. Among the earliest who clearly stated this is Ibn Furak. After he mentioned what Ibn Kullab was upon, he said: “As for our shaykh Ali ibn Ismail al Ashari, he only built upon what he had laid down,” that is, what Ibn Kullab had laid down, “and he arranged the speech upon what he refined, and he branched out upon what he established, without demolishing any foundation of it or undoing any knot of it. So Allah blessed him with His favour to spread and expand that.” (See: Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah fi Taasis Bidaihim al Kalamiyyah by Ibn Taymiyyah 1/74)
Al Shahristani mentioned this in the text already quoted. Al Juwaini, al Baghdadi, al Isnawi and others also mentioned it. They counted Ibn Kullab among the shuyukh of the Asharis. These scholars therefore admit that there is no difference between what they are upon and what Ibn Kullab used to establish.
Then when we go back to the positions of the Salaf and their statements, we find that they condemned and warned against the opinions which Ibn Kullab held or which agree with his sayings. Imam Ahmad warned people against al Harith al Muhasibi and forbade sitting with him, and the reason for that was that al Harith al Muhasibi used to establish views that entail the denial of the voluntary attributes, which is in agreement with the way of Ibn Kullab.
So Imam Ahmad was warning against anyone who followed a way that entails denial of the voluntary attributes. Likewise Ibn Khuzaymah had strong and sharp positions against those who followed the opinions of Ibn Kullab.
Based on this, whoever adopts the opinions of Ibn Kullab and takes his principles, the Salaf will necessarily judge that he is not upon their way.
So this proof is built from two parts: the admission of the imams of the Ashari madhhab, and the position of the imams of the Salaf towards Ibn Kullab and his way. When we combine these two sides, we realise that al Ashari was not upon the way of the imams of the Salaf in the chapter of names and attributes.
The third proof: A number of scholars clearly stated that al Ashari did not free himself from all the deviated kalam material which he had been upon. You know that Abu al Hasan al Ashari was upon the madhhab of the Muatazila for a long period. Some scholars mentioned that it reached forty years.
He even reached a high rank in that madhhab to the point that he authored a large book on names and attributes upon the method of the Muatazila. Then he repented from the madhhab of the Muatazila and left it. However, when he left it he did not free himself from all the Muatazili material. Rather he kept some of it, the most famous of which is the dalil al huduth [proof of origination]. Abu al Hasan al Ashari did not invalidate the dalil al huduth. Rather he affirmed its correctness, and the most that he did was to say: it is an innovated proof which was not used by the Prophet.
Among those who clearly said that Abu al Hasan al Ashari did not free himself from all the kalam material is Khalaf al Muallim, who was one of the early Maliki jurists. He says: “Al Ashari remained forty years upon i’tizal [the Muatazili doctrine]. He showed repentance and returned from the branches, but remained firm upon the roots.” By the roots he means the bases upon which the sayings were built, especially his acceptance of the correctness of the dalil al huduth.
Among those who affirmed this is Abu Nasr al Sajzi. He said about Ibn Kullab and his followers: “When Ibn Kullab and others of his type appeared and tried to refute the Muatazila using pure reason alone, while they did not understand the roots of the Sunnah and what the Salaf were upon, and did not use the reports in this matter, claiming that they are ahad reports which do not give knowledge, the Muatazila obliged them by saying that there is agreement that speech is letters and sound.
He is speaking about the issue of speech and the fact that succession and composition enter into it, which in the seen world only occurs with movement and stillness. These are necessary implications which the Muatazila pressed upon Ibn Kullab and his followers. So Ibn Kullab and others of his type found their hearts constricted by this obligation because of their little knowledge of the Sunnah, their abandonment of accepting it, and their complete submission to pure reason. Thus they committed themselves to what the Muatazila had said and rode upon clear obstinacy of what is witnessed.” (Risalah fi al Radd ala man Ankar al Harf wa al Sawt by al Sajzi p. 80)
Among those who affirmed this also is Abu Jafar al Samanani, who was one of the followers of Abu al Hasan al Ashari. He said: “The obligation of speculative reasoning is a remainder that stayed in the madhhab from the sayings of the Muatazila.” (Dar Taarud al Aql wa al Naql by Ibn Taymiyyah 7/407)
Among those who described the Ashari madhhab as mixed is al Umrani, the imam of the Shafiis in his time. He says: “The Asharis offered one leg to the Muatazila and placed it where the Muatazila had placed their legs, and they moved with the other leg to where the people of hadith had placed their legs.” (al Intisar fi al Radd ala al Qadariyyah al Ashrar 2/595)
The fourth proof: What al Ashari himself establishes in his books. If we return to the books of al Ashari, we find that regarding the voluntary attributes he establishes what is contrary to what the imams of the Salaf were upon. He states that the voluntary attributes do not subsist in the divine essence.
This is repeated in his famous books, whether in al Luma or others. So the reality of the books of al Ashari himself shows that he did not free himself of the kalam material and that he remained upon a mixed madhhab.
The fifth proof: The state of the imams of the Ashari madhhab. They clearly stated that what Ibn Khuzaymah mentioned is contrary to what their shuyukh and companions established. For this reason al Razi judged the book al Tawhid by Ibn Khuzaymah to be a book of shirk, and Ibn Jamaah said that it is a book in which he establishes tashbih (likening Allah to creation).
The imams of the Ashari madhhab admit that what Ibn Khuzaymah established in this book al Tawhid is contrary to their way. Yet when we come to this book and compare what it contains with what the imams of the Salaf used to establish, we do not find any difference between them. So their judgement in reality extends to what the imams of the Salaf used to establish.
The conclusion of the madhhab of the mixed Asharis in the attributes:
We can explain the madhhab of the Asharis in the chapter of names and attributes through three main issues.
The first issue: To determine what names and attributes they affirm, and what they deny and interpret.
The second issue: The categories of attributes according to the Asharis.
The third issue: The rulings of the attributes according to the Asharis.
The first issue: Determining what they affirm of the names and attributes, and what they deny and interpret:
We must first point out that the Ashari madhhab is marked by development and change. It is a moving madhhab and not fixed upon one set of principles in all its stages.
Researchers have differed about how many stages the Ashari madhhab passed through in its development. Some said that the stages are three, some said four, and some said five.
Clarifying these developments and describing their characteristics would make the discussion very long. We will focus only on the developments related to the issue of attributes. The Ashari madhhab in the chapter of names and attributes went through three main phases.
The first phase: This is the phase of the early imams of the Ashari madhhab. The reality of the Ashari madhhab in this phase in the chapter of names and attributes can be summarised in that they affirmed the reported attributes in general. They explicitly state that the reported attributes are fixed for Allah.
They say, for example: “Chapter on affirming the attribute of the face for Allah,” and they refute those who interpret it. They also say: “Chapter on affirming the attribute of the two hands, the two eyes, and the two feet,” and the like. They also explicitly affirm the attribute of highness and the attribute of istiwa (rising over the Throne), and they use evidence for them and refute those who interpret them from among the muattila.
So al Ashari, for example, clearly stated this and spoke at great length refuting the Muatazila in their interpretation of the reported attributes. He proved the invalidity of their interpretation of the attribute of the hand, the two eyes and the two feet with many proofs. Abu Bakr al Baqillani did the same.
If you refer to his books, you find that he clearly affirms the reported attributes. Likewise Ibn Furak, al Bayhaqi and others. Although some of the details they mention concerning the reported attributes do not amount to full and complete affirmation, what matters is that they affirm the basis of the reported attributes and the attribute of highness and istiwa in general, while they interpret the voluntary attributes. They do not affirm the voluntary attributes which are connected to the will and power of Allah.
Even so, some of them do not affirm all the reported attributes. Rather they only affirm what is in the Quran from them. Summarising what the early Asharis were upon, Ibn Taymiyyah says: “The imams of the mutakallimun [kalam theologians] affirm the reported attributes in general, though they have different ways in them, such as Abu Saeed ibn Kullab, Abu al Hasan al Ashari and the imams among his companions, like Abu Abdullah ibn Mujahid, Abu al Hasan al Bahili, Qadi Abu Bakr ibn al Baqillani, Abu Ishaq al Isfarayini, Abu Bakr ibn Furak, Abu Muhammad ibn al Libban, Abu Ali ibn Shadhan, Abu al Qasim al Qushayri, Abu Bakr al Bayhaqi and others. Each of these affirms of the reported attributes whatever Allah wills.
The main dependence of the madhhab among them is affirming every attribute that is in the Quran. As for the attributes that are in the hadiths, then some of them affirm them and some of them do not affirm them.” (Majmu al Fatawa 4/148)
A useful note:
Whoever follows the explanations of the early Ashari imams will find expressions that suggest they do not affirm the reported attributes with complete and perfect affirmation. For this reason people used the expression “in general” when describing their position, as an indication that many of them did not complete the affirmation as it should be. Their affirmation is therefore not identical with the affirmation of the imams of the Sunnah and hadith.
Ibn Furak, al Bayhaqi and others mentioned that the affirmation by al Ashari of the reported attributes like the two hands, the two feet, the two eyes and the like is an affirmation in meaning, while he denies that they are limbs or parts.
Ibn Furak says: “As for what is affirmed through the way of report, there is no denial that reports may come affirming attributes for Him which are considered reports and whose words are used because they are heard, and we confirm their meanings in a way that befits the One described by them, such as the two hands, the face and the eye. For these are, in our case, limbs and tools, and in His description they are descriptions and attributes, because it is impossible for Him to be described by composition and structure and to be described by limbs and tools.” (Jumel Maqalat al Ashari p. 40)
Al Bayhaqi says: “As for what is known through hearing, it is what the way of affirming it is the Book and the Sunnah alone, such as the face, the two hands and the eye. These also are attributes that subsist in His essence. It is not said about them that they are the same as the named or other than the named, and it is not allowed to ask about their how.
The face is an attribute for Him and is not a form, the two hands are two attributes for Him and are not two limbs, and the eye is an attribute for Him and is not a pupil. The way of affirming these attributes as attributes of the essence is the coming of a truthful report about them.” (al Iitiqad by al Bayhaqi p. 71)
This report from them shows that they do not bind themselves to what the imams of the Salaf bound themselves to in affirming the reported attributes. Rather they add a measure of general negations, such as their saying that they are not limbs or tools and the like. This kind of general negation needs detail and distinction.
But it must be stressed that the affirmation by al Ashari and his early companions of the reported attributes contradicts interpretation of these attributes and contradicts tafwid [claiming that only Allah knows their meaning]. They are neither interpreters nor people of tafwid regarding these attributes. This contradicts what many of their later followers attribute to them.
The second phase: This is the phase of the middle generation and begins with al Juwaini. A clear and obvious development occurred in the Ashari madhhab in the chapter of names and attributes in two main issues.
The first issue: Expanding the field of interpretation. They interpreted all the reported attributes such as the face, the two hands and the two eyes. They started to mention the interpretations which the Muatazila used to mention. The headings that we used to find in the books of the early Asharis disappeared. You hardly find in the books of the middle and later Asharis a heading that says: “Chapter on affirming the attribute of the face for Allah,” or similar expressions.
The second issue: Bringing some Muatazili material and some philosophical material into the discussion of names and attributes. This appears in the explanations of al Juwaini in his book al Irshad, in al Shamil and in the works of others who belong to his phase.
Bringing Muatazili material and philosophical material into the discussion of names and attributes produced the developments that occurred in the second phase. The Asharis ended in this phase with interpreting all the attributes and not clearly affirming them, except for the attributes which they call the rational attributes. These are the seven famous attributes: life, knowledge, speech, will, power, hearing and sight. As for the reported attributes, the Asharis no longer clearly affirm them, unlike their situation in the early phase.
The third phase: This is the phase of the later generation. Among the most famous representatives of this phase are al Razi and al Amidi. In this phase there was no big change in the content of the doctrines. The change occurred at the level of the proofs. A number of pure philosophical and pure Jahmi materials entered their explanations, and the dose of negation of the attributes increased and spread, to the point that many of the proofs which they relied on coincide with the philosophical foundations.
The middle and later Asharis started to distinguish between two kinds of attributes. Attributes which do not imply corporeality, origination and composition. These are just the seven rational attributes. And attributes which imply origination, corporeality and composition. These are all the reported attributes and other similar attributes.
The argument between the middle and later Asharis and the Muatazila therefore became limited to the rational attributes only. As for the early Asharis, the circle of dispute between them and the Muatazila was in two groups of attributes, the reported attributes and the rational attributes.
If you look in the books of al Baqillani and compare them with the books of al Razi or al Juwaini, and compare between them in the chapters and how they deal with the attributes, you will notice that this difference between the two phases is very clear.
The conclusion of the Ashari madhhab in the attributes:
Based on this detailed distinction between the phases which the Ashari madhhab passed through, it can be said that the conclusion of the Ashari madhhab in the chapter of names and attributes can be gathered in three points.
The first point: They all agreed on affirming the seven rational attributes, which are collected in lines of poetry such as:
He has life, speech and sight
Hearing, will, knowledge and power.
The second point: They all agreed on denying the voluntary attributes in all phases.
The third point: They differed in their position regarding the reported attributes.
The second issue: The categories of attributes according to the Asharis:
The Ashari scholars differ in how they classify the divine attributes according to the angles from which they look at them.
The first method: Classifying the attributes based on the object which the attribute relates to. According to this angle the attributes are divided into two categories.
The first category: Attributes that do not require an object. These are the attributes which do not imply anything beyond being established in the subject they belong to. This is the attribute of life.
The second category: Attributes that require an object. These are the attributes which imply something beyond being established in the subject they belong to. This category of attributes is divided into three well known kinds.
The first kind: What relates to necessary things, impossible things and possible things. These are the attributes of knowledge and speech.
The second kind: What relates only to possible things. These are the attributes of power and will.
The third kind: What relates only to existing things. These are the attributes of hearing and sight.
The second method: Classifying the attributes based on their nature and how they relate to the divine essence. The Asharis differ in their methods and classifications of the attributes based on this angle.
Some of them do not classify the divine attributes at all and only mention the seven attributes of meanings and stop at that.
Some of them classify them into two categories, like al Juwaini and al Amidi. Both of them mention that the attributes of Allah are divided into nafsiyyah attributes and ma’nawiyyah attributes.
Some of them classify them into three categories. Those who classify them into three differ in their own divisions. Some say: nafsiyyah attributes, ma’nawiyyah attributes and attributes of meanings. Some say: attributes of meanings, attributes of action, and negative attributes. Some say: attributes of meanings, attributes of action, and negative attributes.
Some of them classify them into six categories: nafsiyyah attributes, negative attributes, ma’nawiyyah attributes, attributes of meanings, attributes of action, and what includes these five categories. This method is followed by a number of the later Asharis.
Some of them classify them into four categories: negative attributes, attributes of meanings, ma’nawiyyah attributes and nafsiyyah attributes. This classification is very famous and is among the most widespread classifications among the later Asharis.
Although dividing the attributes is a matter of effort and judgement, as we mentioned earlier, the difference of the Asharis in dividing the attributes is not all due to different angles of effort in division. Rather, much of its detail is built upon certain kalam principles about which they differ.
Among the strongest kalam principles that influenced the Asharis in their division of the divine attributes is their position regarding the issue of hal (state). What is meant by hal among the mutakallimun is an attribute that subsists in an existing thing but which is neither existent nor non existent, rather it is between non existence and existence. Al Sanusi defines hal by saying: “The reality of hal is an affirming description which is not described as existent nor as non existent.” (Sharh al Aqidah al Kubra by al Sanusi p. 165)
This issue, the position regarding hal, is one of the most famous issues over which the mutakallimun differed, and it was described as one of the issues that have no real content, like the issue of kasb with al Ashari and the issue of tafrah with al Nazzam.
The mutakallimun differed greatly in their position regarding ahwal [states]. Whoever affirms the existence of hal mentions a category called ma’nawiyyah attributes and divides the attributes upon the basis of the existence of this category.
Affirming the ma’nawiyyah attributes is only done together with affirming the existence of hal. Whoever denies the existence of hal does not affirm the existence of ma’nawiyyah attributes and does not include in his classifications any division that contains this category. (Among the scholars who were careful to show the effects of the position regarding hal in doctrinal questions is Taqi al Din al Maqrizi in his book Sharh al Aqidah al Barahiniyyah pp. 39, 42, 43.)
We will limit ourselves to the classification which divides the divine attributes into four categories, because this classification gathers most of the terms used by the Asharis when they refer to many of the names and attributes, and because it is among the widest classifications in Ashari writings and most widespread.
The four categories:
The first category: Nafsiyyah attributes. Their definition is: a positive attribute whose description points to the very essence and does not contain a meaning that is extra to the essence. This is a single attribute, which is the attribute of existence. According to them, existence does not contain any meaning beyond indicating the essence.
The second category: Negative attributes. Their definition is: attributes that indicate the negation of what does not befit Allah the Exalted. They are, according to them, five attributes which they call the mothers: the attribute of pre eternalness, the attribute of everlastingness, the attribute of opposition to created things, the attribute of self subsistence and the attribute of oneness.
The third category: Attributes of meanings. In some contexts they call them the essential attributes. They also call them the positive attributes. Their definition is: attributes that subsist in the One described and which contain a meaning beyond the essence. These, according to them, are the seven famous attributes: life, speech, knowledge, power, will, hearing and sight.
The fourth category: Ma’nawiyyah attributes. Their definition is: attributes which establish a hal (state) for the One described and which are not described as existent or non existent. These, according to them, are the same seven attributes, but they are in the state of hal not in the state of stable existence.
They refer to them by saying: the state of Allah being living, the state of Allah being knowing, the state of Allah being speaking, the state of Allah being willing, the state of Allah being able, the state of Allah being hearing and the state of Allah being seeing.
They made the expression about them in the form of hal. They do not establish something that subsists in the essence. Rather, they make it exist as a state which is not described as non existence nor existence. This kind of attribute is only affirmed by someone who affirms ahwal [states].
The number of attributes that the Asharis affirm:
According to the previous fourfold classification, the total of what the Asharis affirm of attributes is twenty. The attribute of existence, five negative attributes, seven attributes of meanings and seven ma’nawiyyah attributes. The total of all of that is twenty.
Al Sanusi explicitly affirmed this number in several of his books. Some Asharis clearly state that the attributes of Allah are seven. This is not a real difference between them. It is just a difference of expression.
A useful note:
The Asharis disagreed whether the positive attributes are limited to a specific number or not. This is one of the issues in which al Razi differed in his explanation. In some of his books he clearly states that they are limited to seven, and in some of his books he clearly denies that limitation. (See: al Farq bayn al Firaq by al Baghdadi p. 334, al Matallib al Aliyah by al Razi 3/221, and Muhassal Afkar al Mutaqaddimin wa al Mutaakhkhirin by al Razi p. 136.)
Summarising their disagreement and some of their statements, Ibn Bazizah says: “Among the Asharis are those who claim that there are no attributes for Him except the seven attributes. Among them are those who affirm the hand as an attribute in addition to power, and the face as an attribute in addition to existence. Among them are those who affirm istiwa as another attribute that subsists by itself.
Al Isfarayini affirms an attribute that makes Him not in need of place. The Qadi affirms three attributes which are perception of tastes, smells and tactile things. Ibn Kullab affirms pre eternalness as an attribute. Others affirm everlastingness. Those who affirm ahwal [states] affirm al alimiyyah (the state of being knowing) and al qadiriyyah [the state of being able]. Abu Sahl al Salluki affirms a separate knowledge for each thing known and a separate power for each thing possible. Some of them affirm laughter.” (al Isaad fi Sharh al Irshad p. 351)
If it is asked: What is the position of the Asharis towards the attributes of creating, providing, giving life, causing death and other such attributes?
The answer is that they do not consider these to be real attributes that subsist in the essence of Allah the Exalted. Rather they consider them to be relational attributes. These are attributes that are linked to the One described because of His relation to something else, and they are not meanings that subsist in the One described. One of the strongest kalam foundations that influenced this position among the Asharis is their refusal to distinguish between the act and the object of the act.
They do not see the act as the cause of the object of the act. According to them, therefore, al khalq [creating] is the created thing, and al rizq [providing] is the provided thing, and so on. The meanings connected to these acts do not subsist in the essence of Allah. Rather they are relational and considered attributes and not real attributes. The Asharis affirm these attributes for Allah in this relational sense.
The third issue: The rulings of the attributes according to the Asharis:
Many Ashari scholars agreed, and this is almost consensus among the middle and later Asharis, that the divine attributes which they affirm for Allah have several rulings.
The first ruling: The attributes are described as being one. What is meant by oneness here is that the description of Allah with these attributes does not accept renewal. The knowledge of Allah is one knowledge that does not renew. The will of Allah is one will that does not renew, no matter how many things willed and no matter how different their times. The power of Allah is one power, no matter how many things that are subject to power and no matter how different their times. So, according to them, Allah is able over all things by a single pre eternal power, and He wills all things by a single pre eternal will. Likewise is the case with all the attributes of meanings.
Al Juwaini explains this ruling by saying: “The speech of Allah the Exalted is one, and it relates to all the things it relates to. Likewise is the case regarding all of His attributes. He is knowing of all things by one knowledge, able over all things by one power, and likewise is the case for life, hearing, sight and will.” (al Irshad by al Juwaini p. 136)
This ruling, the ruling that the attributes are one, led the followers of the Ashari madhhab into many methodical problems.
The second ruling: The attributes are described as pre eternal. That is, they are pre eternal attributes with the pre eternalness of Allah the Exalted. Oneness and pre eternalness go together.
Critiquing the madhhab of the mixed group in the attributes:
Critique of the madhhab of the mixed group in the attributes and clarifying the deviation and flaws in it can be done in several ways. Here we will limit ourselves to two ways. The first is to show the methodical errors that their madhhab contains. The second is to critique the foundations of their proofs and show the flaws in them.
The first way: The methodical errors in the madhhab of the mixed group:
It has been pointed out many times that the madhhab of the mixed group in the attributes is based on combining two types of foundations. Foundations that require affirmation, and foundations that require negation. This mixing led them into several methodical problems.
The first problem: Loss of consistency and unjustified control. This problem can be expressed by saying: differentiating between things that are the same. The followers of the mixed madhhab in the chapter of names and attributes differentiated between attributes that are the same in their reality and nature.
They distinguished between the attributes of meanings and the essential attributes, such as the attribute of the hand, the foot, the face and others, on the basis that affirming the first group does not entail corporeality and composition, while affirming the second group does entail both. In fact, they even distinguished between the attributes of meanings themselves. They affirmed the attribute of will and did not affirm the attribute of mercy and love, for example, even though mercy and love are also attributes of meanings.
Many scholars criticised this distinction and showed that what they did is an unjustified distinction that does not stand on sound scholarly foundations. The meanings for which they denied those attributes are also present in the attributes they affirmed. The meanings by which they justify affirming some attributes are also present in the attributes they denied.
It is said to them: Why did you deny the attribute of the two hands? If they say: because whoever is described by it cannot be other than a body that is composed of parts, we answer: life also is not found except in a composed body. There is no life without a body. If they say: but in the case of Allah it is not like that, we say: the same can be said about the attribute of the two hands.
It is also said to them: Why did you affirm the attribute of will and say that He the Exalted is truly willing and choosing, but denied the reality of love and mercy and the like? If they say: because affirming the reality of love and mercy is tashbih, since mercy is a softness that affects created beings and the Lord is exalted above that, we reply: the same can be said about will. The will known among created beings is an inclination that arises in a human toward what benefits him or harms him, and Allah is exalted above any inclination.
If they say: but the will which we affirm for Allah is not like the will of created beings, we answer: the mercy and love which we affirm for Allah are not like the mercy and love of created beings. If they say: we do not know from mercy and love except what is in the attributes of created beings, the opposing party can answer, and the muatil from the Muatazila and others can say: we also do not know from will except what exists in created beings. So any answer they give to the muatil is a direct answer against them regarding these attributes.
Among the scholars who made this criticism are Ibn Qudamah, Imad al Din al Wasiti, Ibn al Hanbali, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al Qayyim and others. They constantly repeated criticism of the mixed group, saying that they only brought arbitrary distinctions without any real basis between what they affirmed and what they denied.
We will limit ourselves here to quoting the words of al Kharaaiti. He says: “There is no difference between istiwa and hearing, and no difference between descent and sight, since they all came in the text.
“If they say to us regarding istiwa: you have made resemblance. We say to them regarding hearing: you have made resemblance and you have described your Lord with an accident.
“If they say: it is not an accident, but it is as befits Him, we say about istiwa and highness: it is not restriction, but it is as befits Him.
“All that they obligate us with regarding istiwa, descent, face, hand, foot, laughter and amazement, from tashbih, we oblige them with regarding life, hearing, sight and knowledge. Just as they do not consider these to be accidents, likewise we do not consider those to be limbs, nor things that the created beings are described with.
“It is not fair that they understand from istiwa, descent, face and hand only the attributes of created beings and therefore feel obliged to interpret and alter, while if they understand these attributes that way then they must also understand regarding the seven attributes the attributes of created beings, which are accidents.
Whatever they obligate us with regarding those attributes of tashbih and corporeality, we obligate them with regarding these attributes of being accidents. Whatever they declare their Lord free from regarding the seven attributes of the features of bodies, we do the same for the attributes for which they accuse us of tashbih, with no difference at all.” (Risalah fi al Istiwa wa al Fawqiyyah p. 74)
The other statements of the scholars contain many other strong points, especially the words of Ibn Qudamah in his debate about the creation of the Quran and in his other book al Sirat al Mustaqim, in which he refuted the saying of the Asharis regarding the attribute of speech. He presented arguments of great strength and quality. Quoting them in full here would make the explanation very long.
Criticism of the mixed group from this angle is not limited to the imams of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah. Even the muattila criticised them from this angle and said: there is no sound justification that allows you to distinguish between the divine attributes. This shows that there are in reality only three madhhabs in the chapter of names and attributes. Either negation, or likening, or the madhhab of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah.
The Asharis, especially the later ones among them, do not accept this criticism and claim that they have real and sound grounds on which they based that distinction. We have mentioned them earlier in the explanation and answered them there.
The second problem: Falling into contradiction. This is in fact the necessary result of the first problem. Loss of consistency and differentiating between things that are the same necessarily leads to falling into contradiction.
Ibn Taymiyyah gave great attention to recording the contradictions which the followers of the mixed madhhab fell into in the chapter of names and attributes. He mentioned many of them. (Shaykh Muhammad Bara Yasin compiled a large number of Ashari contradictions in his book Maqalat fi Tanaqudat al Ashairah.)
In this explanation we will limit ourselves to mentioning nine contradictions.
The first contradiction: They rely on the proof of priority when affirming some attributes and then they deny other attributes even though the proof of priority clearly points to them. Al Juwaini used the proof of priority to affirm hearing and sight. He says: “How can it be correct in reason that the Lord creates perception for the servant and He does not perceive the reality of what He created for him?” (al Aqidah al Nizamiyyah p. 31).
Al Ghazali says, when affirming hearing and sight: “As for the path of reason, it is that we say: It is known that the Creator is more perfect than the created being, and it is known that the one who sees is more perfect than the one who does not see, and the one who hears is more perfect than the one who does not hear, so it is impossible that the attribute of perfection is affirmed for the created being and we do not affirm it for Allah.” (al Iqtisad fi al Itiqad by al Ghazali p. 66)
There is no doubt that this proof is sound, and we mentioned it earlier in the explanation. However, the Asharis did not apply this proof consistently. They denied many attributes which the proof of priority necessarily requires. Among these is the attribute of wisdom. For it can be said that wisdom is an attribute of perfection for the created being, so the One who granted it to the created being is more deserving of it.
It can also be said: the wise one and the one who is not wise cannot be equal. It is therefore impossible that we describe the created being with wisdom and we do not describe Allah with this attribute. The same can be said about mercy and other attributes.
The second contradiction: They rely on the principle of negation and affirmation in affirming some attributes, but they do not commit themselves to its requirement with regard to all attributes.
Al Sanusi says in al Aqidah al Kubra, when mentioning what is affirmed of the divine attributes: “Allah is hearing, seeing and speaking, otherwise He would be described, because He is living, with their opposites, and their opposites are defects and shortcomings, which are impossible for Him.” (al Aqidah al Kubra by al Sanusi p. 7)
This proof is sound and straight, and the imams of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah relied upon it. However, the Asharis did not apply this principle consistently. They distinguished between attributes and fell into contradiction. This principle requires affirming other attributes as well. It can be said: if Allah were not described with the attribute of wisdom, then He would be described with its opposite, but they do not affirm the attribute of wisdom. This is a contradiction in using principles.
The third contradiction: They use the perfection and precision that are present in the universe as proof for the attribute of knowledge. There is no doubt that this proof is sound and firm, and the Quran points to it in the verse:
أَلَا يَعْلَمُ مَنْ خَلَقَ وَهُوَ اللَّطِيفُ الْخَبِيرُ
“Does He who created not know, while He is the Subtle, the All Aware” (al Mulk 14).
But in reality the Asharis have no right to rely on this proof, because they deny wisdom for Allah. According to them, nothing that Allah does is for a wisdom or for a purpose. So how can they use perfection and precision as proof of knowledge?
According to them, precision can exist without any aim and without any intended purpose. The occurrence of an act without aim and without a cause does not necessarily indicate knowledge.
Raising this objection and pointing to this contradiction, Ibn Taymiyyah says: “You say that the Lord does not create anything for anything. Therefore He does not intend by what is in created things of perfection and precision any intended aim. Thus perfection and precision do not show knowledge according to your principle.
For perfection is making something achieve its intended aim in such a way that it is made for that aim, and this according to you is not permissible. So proving His knowledge and affirming the truthfulness of His messengers depends on Him doing something for something, which according to you is not permissible. Therefore we say that you are contradicting yourselves.” (al Nubuwwat by Ibn Taymiyyah 1/242)
The fourth contradiction: Some of them rely on the proof of composition when denying the attributes which they deny, using the argument that if Allah were described with them He would be a composed body, and a composed body is a defect which Allah is free of.
At the same time they say that He is described with many attributes, namely the seven attributes. They say that knowledge is other than will, will is other than power, power is other than speech, and so on until the seven attributes. This difference between the attributes necessarily implies composition, because all things that are different, when they are gathered together, are composed.
Raising this objection, Ibn Taymiyyah says: “This proof, meaning using oneness as proof for composition, is used by those who deny all attributes and say that Allah has no knowledge, no power, no life, because multiplicity of attributes prevents the One described with them from being one and contradicts oneness.
For there is a number of attributes, and oneness contradicts number. For this reason the pure Jahmiyyah used arguments like this, as Imam Ahmad and others mentioned. The one who uses this proof, referring to al Razi, is someone who affirms attributes in general and says that the seven attributes of life, knowledge, power, hearing, sight, speech and will are affirmed. If this proof is sound, then his madhhab is invalid.
If it is invalid, then this reasoning is invalid. Whatever answer he gives to those who use this proof to deny all attributes is the answer he must give to his opponents in affirming highness and what follows it.” (Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah by Ibn Taymiyyah 1/499)
The result of this is that whoever relies on the proof of composition to deny attributes is obliged to deny all attributes. For this reason the muattila used this proof, and their use of it is more consistent in general. As for relying on the proof of composition to deny some attributes while affirming other attributes that differ from each other, this is in reality a clear theoretical contradiction.
Some of the later Maturidis felt this contradiction and stated that affirming seven or eight attributes was only done out of necessity. Al Farhari says in his commentary on the words of al Taftazani: “The suitable position regarding tawhid is denying the attributes, but we have affirmed eight attributes out of necessity.
So the better path is to reduce the attributes as much as possible and deny whatever is more than necessity.” Then he explains the problem in affirming some attributes and denying others for the sake of maintaining tawhid. He says: “We have a discussion at the end of the discussion on takwin, and its summary is that if multiplicity of attributes contradicts tawhid, then saying there are eight attributes is shirk. If not, then there is no problem in affirming a thousand thousand attributes, and this would be more suitable for perfection.” (al Nibras Sharh al Aqaid al Nasafiyyah p. 294)
The fifth contradiction: They use a rational proof to deny making resemblance between Allah and His creation.
The proof is well known. Its result is that if Allah resembled His creation, then He and creation would be equal in what is possible, what is necessary and what is impossible. This would involve gathering between opposites, because then Allah would be capable of ignorance and knowledge, health and sickness, life and death, and other such matters. When this necessary consequence is invalid, the thing which leads to it is invalid, which is tashbih.
This proof is sound and straight. However, the followers of the mixed madhhab did not apply it properly. They used this rational proof to deny the attributes which they denied, but did not notice that the same rational proof could be applied to the attributes which they affirmed. Either they affirm all attributes and say that affirming them does not entail tashbih, or they deny all attributes and say that affirming them entails tashbih. There is no third option.
The sixth contradiction: In their refutation of the saying of the Muatazila and other muattila, they rely upon the fact that the meaning of the texts is clear and definite in affirming the attributes which they themselves affirm, and they say that the Muatazila are going against clear and definite meanings.
They forget that the attributes which they denied are also clearly and definitely affirmed in the texts.
Abu al Muin al Nasafi, who is one of the Maturidi scholars, says in his refutation of the Muatazila: “Allah has affirmed for Himself knowledge and power. The Muatazila refuse this. So according to themselves they are more knowledgeable than Allah about His own Self, and this is obviously corrupt.” (See: Sharh al Aqaid al Samiyyah by al Sufi p. 140)
This statement is correct, but this proof turns against al Nasafi himself. For it can be said: Allah has affirmed for Himself highness, istiwa, wisdom and mercy with widespread and definite texts. So here it is possible to say to the mixed group: are you more knowledgeable about Allah than Allah is about Himself?
The seventh contradiction: They state, when criticising the Muatazila, that derived names indicate that their meanings are established in the essence. The name al Alim (the All Knowing) when used to describe someone indicates that he is described with the attribute of knowledge. The name al Rahim (the Most Merciful) when used to describe a man indicates that the attribute of mercy is established in him. The Muatazila deny this, as we already mentioned.
The followers of the mixed madhhab, when refuting the Muatazila, say that this is contrary to the language, because derived names, when attributed to something, necessarily indicate that the meaning is established in that thing.
Al Bayadi, one of the Maturidi scholars of the eleventh century, says: “The name al Alim and other derived names are not names of the essence without considering the meaning. Rather they name the essence together with their meaning, which is affirming what is necessarily related to the origin of derivation for that subject.
There is no meaning in that except perception of meanings, which is knowledge, and the ability to do and not to do, which is power. It is therefore necessary that these meanings are affirmed for the One who must be worshipped.” (Isharat al Maram by al Bayadi p. 119)
These words are correct, but the followers of the mixed madhhab did not apply this rational and linguistic principle consistently. It is correct to say: the name of Allah al Hakim [the All Wise] requires that Allah is described with the attribute of wisdom. The same is true for many of the names of Allah which the followers of the mixed madhhab interpreted away.
The eighth contradiction: The mixed group differentiate between what they call accidents and what they call attributes. They say: accidents do not subsist in Allah, but attributes do subsist in Him. Yet in their treatment of created beings they do not differentiate between accidents and attributes in their rulings.
Ibn Taymiyyah points to this contradiction when he says: “As for their contradiction in rational matters, it cannot be counted. For example, they say that the Creator does not have accidents in Him, but He does have attributes. However, in a created being, attributes and accidents are the same according to them. Life, knowledge, power, will, movement and stillness in a created being are all accidents according to them. Then they say regarding life and similar things that in the case of the Creator they are attributes, not accidents, because an accident is what does not remain for two moments, and the pre eternal attribute remains. It is obvious that their saying that an accident is what does not remain for two moments is a distinction based on mere claim and control. According to them, attributes in created beings do not remain for two moments either. So calling something an attribute or an accident does not create a difference. They claimed that the attribute of a created being does not remain for two moments while the attribute of the Creator remains. They could therefore say that an accident existing in a created being does not remain while one existing in the Creator does remain. If this is correct, then their statement that the attributes which are accidents do not remain means that most intelligent people disagree with them.” (al Fatawa al Kubra by Ibn Taymiyyah 6/625–626)
The ninth contradiction: The mixed group affirm seven attributes, or eight attributes in the case of the Maturidis. These attributes are different in their meanings. The meaning of life according to them is different from the meaning of power, the meaning of power is different from the meaning of will, the meaning of will is different from the meaning of sight, the meaning of sight is different from the meaning of hearing, the meaning of hearing is different from the meaning of speech, and so on in all the attributes. But they came to the attribute of speech and said: multiplicity is not affirmed in it, because affirming multiplicity in the attribute of speech leads to origination and composition. So speech is a single meaning that subsists in the divine essence.
It is said to them: if multiplicity in the attribute of speech entails origination and composition, then multiplicity in the seven attributes which you mentioned also entails origination and composition. For you affirm that they are multiple. This implies origination and composition.
Either you say that all the attributes are one single thing in order not to imply origination and composition, or you say that multiplicity exists in the attribute of speech and that this does not imply origination and composition.
This is a deep contradiction in the Ashari madhhab. The Asharis themselves admitted it and mentioned it repeatedly in their books. They mention several paths to answer it.
Among the most famous of these paths and among the earliest is relying on consensus and texts. This is the path which al Juwaini mentioned in al Irshad and al Ghazali adopted. They said that they only affirmed multiplicity, even though reason requires its absence, because the texts mentioned it and because the Ummah agreed upon it.
This method is in reality an escape from the problem and not an answer to it.
The first reason is that it can be said: the other attributes also came in the texts, and the scholars also agreed upon them.
The second reason is that it can be said: the scholars did not agree upon the reality of your doctrine. The scholars did not agree that speech is a single meaning. This is one of the questions in which the scholars most clearly disagreed with you. So how can you claim consensus?
Then Sif al Din al Amidi, who is the chief of the later generation of the Ashari madhhab, came and invalidated all the paths which his companions had mentioned to escape that problem. He stated that there is no solution to escape this difficulty. He said: “The truth is that what they mentioned of objections to the view that the speech is one and that the difference returns to its relations and to the objects of speech is problematic, and perhaps someone other than me has its solution.” (Abkar al Afkar fi Usul al Din by al Amidi 1/100)
If such an imam could not escape this very clear difficulty in the madhhab, then this shows that the madhhab is unstable and contains many contradictions. This is one of the strongest contradictions in the madhhab of the mixed group.
The second way: Critiquing the false foundations upon which they relied:
The madhhab of the mixed group, as mentioned earlier, is based on two types of foundations. Foundations that require affirmation, and foundations that require negation.
The foundations that require affirmation are sound foundations that are not criticised. For this reason we expressed the heading here as “critiquing the false foundations upon which the madhhab of the mixed group rests,” and we did not use this expression when speaking about the muattila or the mushabbihah, because their foundations are entirely false.
The false foundations upon which the madhhab of the mixed group rests are themselves the foundations upon which the madhhab of the muattila rests. They then added some extra justifications. Their essence is as follows.
The first foundation: The proof of origination. We have mentioned the premises of this proof and mentioned a number of difficulties which it contains.
The second foundation: The proof of composition. We have mentioned this proof and discussed its premises and a number of difficulties in it.
The third foundation: The proof of corporeality. This proof in reality enters under the previous proof, which is the proof of composition. However, we mention it separately here because of its importance and the frequency with which it appears.
The proof of corporeality rests on two premises.
The first premise: Affirming attributes for Allah the Exalted entails corporeality.
The second premise: It is not correct for Allah the Exalted to be a body.
This argument, the argument of corporeality, is one of the most frequently used arguments in discussions of the chapter of names and attributes. You hardly read a book or a discussion in this chapter without seeing the word “corporeality” or its meaning. It is one of the most commonly repeated meanings in this chapter, because every group flees from this false meaning and accuses other groups of it.
You see every group accusing the other of corporeality. The philosophers like Ibn Sina accuse the Muatazila of being corporealists. The Muatazila accuse the mixed Asharis and Maturidis of being corporealists. The mixed group accuse the imams of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah of being corporealists. Every group accuses another group of corporeality, because the Muslims are agreed upon condemning the meaning of corporeality.
From this survey it becomes clear that the group which has been accused of corporeality the most is Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaah, because the philosophers, the muattila and the mixed group all accuse them of corporeality. The man who has been accused of corporeality the most in Islamic history is Ibn Taymiyyah, because he loudly criticised all of these groups. You hardly read a book of the later writers or the contemporary writers in the chapter of names and attributes without seeing in it an accusation that Ibn Taymiyyah is a corporealist. In this age Ashari researchers, as well as Rafidi researchers, Ibadi researchers and others, often repeat this accusation.
Al-ʻUqūd al-dhahabīyah by Sultan Al Umayri page 254-281
