Summary
A fabricated claim: when naql and ʿaql conflict, either both are combined, and that is impossible because it combines two opposites, or both are rejected, or naql is given precedence, and that is graded impossible because ʿaql is claimed to be “the foundation” of naql. From this claim, precedence is handed to ʿaql, then naql is forced into taʾwil or tafwid.
Al Razi (d. 606 AH) and followers turned this claim into a universal rule over the Books of Allah, Most High, and the words of His prophets عليهم السلام, so whatever is claimed to oppose ʿaql is stripped of proof value. By this path, proof from what the messengers عليهم السلام brought regarding the attributes of Allah, Most High, and other reports is rejected whenever a supposed conflict is asserted. Darʾ taʿāruḍ al ʿaql wal naql (1/4–10)
Its roots is traced to Abu Hamid al Ghazali (d. 505 AH), who applied it as a rule when answering difficult wordings.
Objection is reported from al Qadi Abu Bakr ibn al ʿArabi (d. 543 AH), including the saying, “Our shaykh Abu Hamid entered into the depths of the philosophers, then he wanted to leave them, but he could not”, and the report from Abu Hamid, “I am of meagre goods in hadith.”
This principle makes ʿaql into the superior crieria, then forces what the prophets عليهم السلام brought to follow it, accepting only what agrees and discarding what conflicts.
This is severe than the Christian path, because Christians at least tied themselves to what they thought they received from prophets, even if error occurred through misunderstanding or weak transmission.
Here, the foundation is opinion, then naql is bent to it, leading to rejection of prophetic proofs.
Why This Principle Is Problematic At Its Furthest End
A direct fruit of placing ʿaql over naql is the philosopher claim that prophets’ wordings were for the common people with apparent meanings that are not real, even calling them lies for public benefit.
Ibn Sina (d. 428 AH) built a rule on this foundation in al Adhawiyyah.
From there, some claim the prophet knew the truth but spoke contrary for interest, and others claim the prophet did not know the truth as philosophers claim to know it, so the “complete philosopher” is preferred over the prophet, and even the “complete wali” is preferred over the prophet, as claimed by Ibn ʿArabi al Taʾi (d. 638 AH) and others.
Complete Translation
The Claimed Rule When Revealed Proofs and Intellectual Proofs Conflict
The speaker’s statement:
If the revealed proofs and the intellectual proofs conflict, or revelation and intellect, or naql (transmitted reports) and intellect, or the outward meanings of transmitted reports and decisive intellectual proofs, and similar expressions, then either they are brought together, and this is impossible, because it combines 2 opposites.
Or both are rejected.
Or revelation is given precedence, and this is impossible, because intellect is the foundation of transmitted reports. If transmitted reports are given precedence over it, that is an attack on intellect, which is the foundation of transmitted reports, and attacking the foundation of a thing is an attack on it.
So giving transmitted reports precedence is an attack on transmitted reports and intellect together. So giving precedence to intellect becomes necessary. Then the transmitted reports are either interpreted (taʾwil), or their meaning is consigned to Allah (tafwid).
As for when they conflict as 2 contraries, combining them is impossible, but the absence of both is not impossible.
Making This Rule a Universal Law
Al Razi (d. 606 AH) and his followers made this speech a universal law about what may be used as proof from the Books of Allah, Most High, and the speech of His prophets, peace be upon them, and what may not be used as proof.
Because of this, they rejected using as proof what the prophets and messengers brought about the attributes of Allah, Most High, and other matters they informed about. These people thought intellect conflicts with them. Some of them also add that the revealed proofs do not give certainty. Speech about their claim regarding the revealed proofs has been expanded elsewhere.
The Earlier Origin of This Rule
As for this law that they set down, a group came before them to it, among them Abu Hamid al Ghazali (d. 505 AH). He made it a law in answering questions he was asked about wordings that were difficult for the questioner, such as the issues that al Qadi Abu Bakr ibn al ʿArabi (d. 543 AH) asked him about.
Al Qadi Abu Bakr disagreed with him in many of those answers, and he used to say: “Our shaykh Abu Hamid entered into the depths of the philosophers, then he wanted to leave them, but he could not.” He also reported from Abu Hamid himself that he used to say: “I am of meagre goods in hadith.”
Abu Bakr ibn al ʿArabi (d. 543 AH) set down another law, built upon the method of Abu al Maʿali al Juwayni (d. 478 AH) and those before him, such as al Qadi Abu Bakr al Baqillani (d. 403 AH).
Turning Revelation Into Something That Follows Personal Rules
A law like the one these people set down is what every group sets down for itself regarding what the prophets brought from Allah. They make the foundation that they believe in and rely upon what they thought their minds knew, then they make what the prophets brought follow it. Whatever agrees with their law they accept, and whatever conflicts with it they do not follow.
This resembles what the Christians set down of their creed which they made the belief of their faith, and they referred the wordings of the Torah and the Gospel back to it.
But that creed, in it they relied upon what they understood from the wordings of the prophets, or what reached them from them, and they erred in understanding or in trusting the transmitter, like other people who err while using heard reports, for his error is either in the chain, or in the wording. As for these people, they set down their laws based on what they saw with their minds, and they erred in opinion and intellect.
The Christians are closer to honouring the prophets and messengers than these people. Yet the Christians resemble those who innovated an innovation through a corrupt understanding of the wordings, or by trusting what is transmitted from the Messenger, such as the Khawarij, the Waʿidiyyah, the Murjiʾah, the Imamiyyah, and others.
This is unlike the innovation of the Jahmiyyah and the philosophers, because it is built upon what they claim is contrary to what is known from the words of the prophets. Those people think that what they innovated is what is known from the words of the prophets, and that it is authentic from them.
Two Ways Of Dealing With The Words Of The Prophets
Those who deal with the words of the prophets have 2 ways: the way of alteration, and the way of declaring ignorance. As for the people of alteration, they are 2 types: the people of delusion and imagination, and the people of distortion and interpretation (taʾwil).
The People Of Delusion And Imagination
The people of delusion and imagination are those who say that the prophets informed about Allah and the Last Day, about Paradise and the Fire, even about the angels, with matters that do not match the reality itself.
Yet they addressed people with what makes them think and imagine that Allah is a great body, that bodies will be returned, and that there is physical bliss and physical punishment, even though the matter is not like that in the reality itself.
They say this is because it is in the interest of the common people that they be addressed with what makes them think and imagine that the matter is like this, even though this is a lie. They say it is a lie for the interest of the common people, since their call and their interest cannot be achieved except by this way.
Ibn Sina (d. 428 AH) and those like him set down their law upon this foundation, like the law he mentioned in his treatise al Adhawiyyah.
These people say that the prophets intended by these words their outward meanings, and they intended that the common people understand these outward meanings from them, even if the outward meanings, in the reality itself, are lies, falsehood, and contrary to the truth. So they intended to make the common people understand benefit through lies and falsehood.
Then, some of these people say: the prophet knew the truth, but he showed what is contrary to it for the interest.
Some of them say: he did not know the truth, as the investigators among the philosophers and those like them know it. These people prefer the complete philosopher over the prophet, and they prefer the complete wali over the prophet, just as Ibn ʿArabi al Taʾi (d. 638 AH) prefers the seal of the awliyaʾ, in his claim, over the prophets, and just as al Farabi (d. 339 AH) and Mubashshir ibn Fatik (d. 480 AH) and others prefer the philosopher over the prophet.
Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal naql (1/4–10)
