The Root of the Discussion

The debate on how to understand the attributes of Allah relates to what is shared in meaning between Creator and creation. Many fell into confusion when they sought the shared meaning of attributes like hearing or sight by relying on late dictionaries or by referring to how these attributes appear in created beings. When they saw deficiency, parts, and anthropomorphic  attachments in these descriptions, they denied that any shared meaning exists at all.

The Fallacy of Relying on Dictionaries

Those who rely on dictionaries found that hearing in created beings is described as an accident that depends on an ear which receives sound. They concluded that the hearing of Allah cannot share the same meaning and so denied the shared root of the attribute.

But the people of truth said that the hearing of Allah is an attribute by which what is heard becomes uncovered. Perceiving sound is only a result of hearing, not its true essence. Dictionaries were never made to define meanings stripped of the qualities of created beings. Whoever appeals to them absolutely falls into confusion, for they describe physical realities, not revealed meanings.

The Misuse of “Definition”

Some argue by asking: “What is the real meaning of the Hand that you affirm, and by what shared meaning do you differ from tafwid?” The answer is that not every known concept can be fully defined. Many meanings are known necessarily and cannot be expressed more clearly. People understand the words “face” and “hand” long before they learn the ideas of composition or limb. Most can only explain such words by example or by gesture, just as they point to their faces or eyes when asked.

Knowing Without defining

It is not necessary to define something in order to know it. You may know a meaning clearly but lack the words to define it. The meaning of the attributes is known to the believer because they are not like foreign or meaningless words. He understands that “hand” and “face” differ from one another and from the other attributes. This alone is sufficient proof of knowledge of the meaning. Whoever demands a complete definition must prove that knowing always depends on giving a strict definition, which is untrue.

The Ways to show Understanding of an Attribute

You can show that you understand the meaning of an attribute by several ways:

• By using a synonym that carries the same sense.
• By clarifying its opposite, as saying anger is the opposite of pleasure.
• By showing that the attribute fits its place in revelation, and that no other attribute could replace it.
• By mentioning its counterpart in creation, while affirming that Allah’s attribute is free of all created characteristics.

For example, one may say: the sight of Allah is understood as an attribute by which seeing occurs, unlike the limited sight of creation; and to Allah belongs the highest example.

The Limits of Language

Language cannot always provide words more complete or clearer than those in revelation. The words revealed in the Qur’an are the most perfect expressions for the meanings of the attributes. Any substitute term will either restrict the meaning to created forms or introduce ambiguity.

The words of revelation were chosen to awaken in the mind their general intended meaning, and no human expression can equal them. Ibn Taymiyyah said that even translation or tafsir of the Qur’an can only approximate the meanings but cannot match the precision of the revealed words. (Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Fatawa al-Kubra 6/573)

The Error of Seeking Aristotelian Definitions

Those who ask for a strict definition of the attributes make the mistake of expecting Aristotelian definitions based on genus and differentia. The attributes of Allah are not composed of such parts, nor is their full whatness known. The correct approach is to give descriptive or verbal definitions that distinguish the meaning, without claiming to define its full essence. Requiring more than this is arbitrary.

The Problem with Dictionary Definitions

If one insists on taking meanings directly from lexicons, then consistency demands doing so for all attributes. The result would make all descriptions of Allah metaphorical, since dictionaries define hearing as a physical act of the ear, sight as perception by the eye, and will as inclination or desire.

This is clearly false. The early Arabs did not divide between real and metaphorical usage, and dictionaries were never meant as standards for divine meanings.

The nature of Lexicons and early Definitions

Early lexicons rarely gave strict definitions. They often defined by opposites or by saying, “it is known.” No one claimed that they were ignorant of the meanings of such words. Thus, relying on late lexical definitions tied to physical descriptions is an error. At most, such definitions cannot be applied to Allah or must be clarified further, since their physical conditions do not suit Him.

Can The Shared Meaning be Defined?

If we assume it is possible to define the shared meaning, it must distinguish the attribute itself and separate it from others. The example given by Ibn al-Zaghuni and approved by Ibn Taymiyyah shows that the hand in Arabic refers to an essential attribute affirmed for the one described, real in meaning, and not metaphorical unless a clear indicator shows otherwise. (Ibn Taymiyyah, Bayan Talbis al-Jahmiyyah 1/260)

The definitions given by early scholars were meant to distinguish the attributes, not to uncover their full reality, which is impossible. What is obligatory is to affirm the attributes while knowing that their quiddity is unknown, as Allah said, “There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing.”

The Example of Hearing and Sight

If we say that hearing and sight are two attributes by which things are uncovered, this distinguishes them generally, even if it does not describe their inner nature. If we add “of sounds,” the definition becomes sufficient for understanding. The aim is not to produce a strict philosophical definition but to make the attribute distinct in meaning.

The Method To Defining Attributes

To form a clear definition, one should:

1. Look at the special functions of the attribute as revealed.
2. Attach to it what revelation associates with it.
3. Mention synonyms used in revelation or by the early imams.

For example:

• The Hand of Allah is an attribute by which action is done, intent is made firm, grasping, spreading, and creating occur. Revelation adds that Allah has two Hands, both right, with characteristics such as fingers, grasping, folding, creating, and planting.
• The Foot is an attribute upon which the names leg and foot apply. Allah places it upon the Fire, and Ibn Abbas said the footstool is a place for the two feet.
• The Face is the attribute by which believers will see Allah in the Hereafter, having splendour and light that would burn all that His sight reaches if the veil were lifted.

All of this remains within the words of revelation and their linguistic sense without any addition.

The Proper Understanding of “The meaning is known and the how is unknown”

When we say the meaning is known and the how is unknown, we mean that the attribute is distinct and understandable within revelation, without being mixed with other attributes. Its modality and full whatness are unknown. This understanding alone is enough to escape tafwid. Whoever demands more is only requiring what also binds him in the attributes he affirms.

The Conclusion

1. The attributes are known in meaning, not by full definition of their whatness.
2. The meaning is established by the least shared concept that distinguishes each attribute from the others.
3. Demanding endless definitions of what a word is made of is sophistry.
4. Revelation itself gives sufficient knowledge of the meanings of Allah’s attributes in a manner suited to His majesty.

The fallacy of asking about the strict definition of the attribute and relying on dictionaries

Everything above was a discussion of the root of shared meaning.

As for the shared meaning itself, when they wanted to investigate the common meaning that we affirm, they looked into later dictionaries or they looked into the general meaning predicated of created beings, then they saw in it deficiency and details and concomitants, so they negated shared meaning entirely.

When they looked at hearing for example, they found that the hearing of created beings is an accident and a how that exists by an instrument and an ear that receives sounds. Then one of them said, it is not required for applying one name to two things that there be sharing in their reality. Rather it is enough that they share in something of their concomitants or rulings or attachments.

For hearing in the language is, sensing a thing with the ear by humans and every possessor of an ear, as Ibn Faris said. So this is the reality of hearing in the created being, and from it there follows the uncovering of what is heard and its being perceived. The people of the Sunnah [Ahl al Sunnah] defined the attribute of hearing of Allah, Exalted is He, as an attribute by which what is heard becomes uncovered.

Perceiving what is heard is not the real meaning of hearing. Rather it is a concomitant of it. So the hearing of the created and the hearing of the Creator are not shared in the root of the meaning and its reality, but in its concomitant.

It has been understood that this is the meaning of the shared hearing which you want to affirm when we say there is shared meaning. Since Allah is transcendent above this, there is no shared meaning then.

However the common meaning with the people of truth is not what he claimed, and the dictionaries did not commit to presenting meanings stripped of the characteristics of created beings. Whoever knows a dictionary like this, let him direct us to it. So the appeal to them without sifting was the locus of confusion.

Among what those people drew attention to is that familiar contentiousness from them when they ask about the meaning of the attribute when we discuss with them the invalidity of tafwid [consigning the meaning] and that the meaning is known while the how is unknown. One of them will argue with you and ask, what is the real meaning of the hand that you affirm and by which shared meaning occurs in contrast to metaphor or tafwid?

We do not know, plus

The answer to the question is by the following points.

First, who said that every mental meaning can be expressed in a way that increases it in clarity?

Some of them are necessary and cannot be expressed with anything clearer than them. No one denies that people understand hand and face and they spend their lives before it occurs to their minds or they understand composition or partition or limb.

In fact, if you asked them about the meaning of these two words, most people would only be able to express the meaning by example and by pointing to their faces or their hands to show the questioner some of what the word and the general meaning apply to, just as they point to their eyes and their ears if you asked them about hearing and sight.

Second, who said that expressing a meaning is a condition for it being known?

You might be unable to express it although you know it, perhaps due to incapacity, and perhaps because the language falls short of expressing it with anything better and clearer than the word being asked about. You might affirm that it is known to you even if you do not express it with a definition and an explanatory statement. Whoever rejects that the generality of people use words that are known to them while they do not possess definitions of their meanings that are uncovering has rejected what is necessary.

If the Sunni were to hold to saying, its meaning is known, and the proof of that is that it is not to me like the disjointed letters, or it is not a foreign word from which I understand nothing, and I understand that it differs from the given attribute and the given attribute.

Then he mentioned the verses and the reports in which the attribute appears, and he showed that it is suitable for that attribute and that it is not permitted that another attribute take the place of it in those reports, or he showed that the given attribute is the opposite of the given attribute, and that its deficient counterpart in us is such and such, this would be enough for him, rather it would be an extra gift.

The disputant would then be obliged to prove his claim that whoever cannot define a thing with better than this does not know it and does not understand it, and that the mere distinguishing of the attribute from the disjointed letters and foreign words and the mere distinguishing of it from other than it is not sufficient in establishing knowledge of the meaning.

So it is enough for you to exit the mire of tafwid that you uncover the meaning of the attribute by one of the following.

1. By any synonymous word.
2. Or by clarifying its opposite, such as saying, anger is the opposite of joy.
3. Or by showing its suitability to the context in which it came in the revelation, such that another attribute cannot take its place. For example, you say, the hand is understood by the legally responsible person, and he understands that by it there is intent and selection. Because of this the addressee understands that Adam was created by it, unlike the face for example.

Or by mentioning its counterpart in us. Just as the attribute of sight can be brought near simply by saying, its counterpart in us is our accidental sight in our heads and to Allah belongs the highest example and complete incomparability. It is said, the counterpart of the hand in us is our hand which is a part of us, and to Allah belongs the highest example and complete incomparability. The hand is not a part of Allah like its counterpart in us, just as sight is not an accident in Allah like its counterpart in us.

This is sufficient and more, and with it every stubborn person is cut off.

Third, who said that the language is able to express with other words those unseen meanings with sufficient abstraction such that the expressed meaning is shared absolutely and not specific to the created?

These words that came in the revelation may be the furthest that language can offer in bringing the attributes of Allah, Glorified be He, near to the Arab mind that is addressed. This is what the completeness of revelation entails, that it came to you with the most complete words. Any other word or any detail within this word will lead to dragging along other meanings and contents that the revealed word does not convey in expressing the attribute.

It will make it restricted to the created and not include the Creator, or it will make its inclusion of the Creator a matter of conjecture that you cannot decide. The function of the revealed word is to be a cause for the sparking of its general meaning in your mind when it reaches your hearing. Who can assert that another word can deliver the same function and spark in minds the very intended meaning that is sparked by the original word and not other than it or something beyond it?

The shaykh says, and for this reason, even if the Quran were explained or translated, the explanation and the translation may bring the root meaning or approximate it, but as for bringing a word that clarifies the meaning like the clarification of the word of the Quran, this is not possible at all. (Al Fatawa al Kubra 6/573.)

This is not a negation of the ability of language to express unseen realities. Rather it is a questioning of its ability to bring something better and clearer than what came in the revelation.

Fourth, what is the definition that he wants?

If he wants an Aristotelian definition by genus and differentia, then none of us claimed that the attribute of Allah is composed of a genus and a differentia, or that we have known its whatness, let alone that we are able to uncover it by a strict definition. In reality he is not asking you for the linguistic meaning that you understood. He wants from you what is far more specific than that.

He stipulates that you bring him the uncovering of the whatness and the complete true definition for him to accept your statement. This is arbitrary from him. He is the one obliged to prove that every known meaning must have the knower able to define it with the Aristotelian definition. Otherwise we can set out the understood meaning by a descriptive definition. Indeed we can set out the understood meaning of the word by a verbal definition, bringing in its definition another word that equals it and is clearer than it, or by defining it by clarifying its opposite. Any claim from him that the requirement is above this is arbitrary.

Fifth, does he want a definition from dictionaries, or from books of tafsir and distinctions, or from another source?

If he commits to a source, then let him commit to it in all the attributes that he affirms. You will go to the dictionary, and the meaning of hearing will be, the sense of the ear, or a power in the ear that perceives sounds, and sight will be the sense of the eye or the sense of seeing, and will will be the leaning of the self or its inclination, or intent, or desire, or an implicit request, or resolve, or love, or volition, which they differentiate from will by making the second the beginning of resolve and they explain volition by the same as has passed. Such things you find spread without the compilers of the lexicons observing the addition of these attributes to Allah, Glorified be He.

Will he commit to this in every letter with which Allah is described? If he commits to it then all those descriptions by which Allah is described would be metaphor, because they oppose the real meanings mentioned above in the lexicons. This is obviously false. The descriptions of Allah are applied to Him in reality, not metaphor. What has led him into these straits is his stipulation that the real meaning must appear in dictionaries and lexicons.

The correct view is that no one committed to distinguishing between reality and metaphor before al Zamakhshari in Asas al Balaghah. So looking at the dictionaries as if they are the standard of the real meaning is a clear flaw and ignorance of the history of lexicons and the methods of their compilers.

You find that the lexicons, especially the early ones, do not define these matters. The most they do is that they define them by a word or by its opposite, or by saying, it is known. So you find the definition of the living as the opposite of the dead, and the hand as, it is known. No rational person says that they were ignorant of its real meaning, or that the definition of those who came later is the standard for their definition.

The point of our detail here is that the late definitions specific to the created and found in the lexicons, the least that can be said about them is that it is not permissible to describe Allah by them, or that they are ambiguous and we pause until we seek detail. Appealing to them absolutely is a mistake which entails what is false, and that falsehood is shared between us and the disputant in what he affirms, especially in these attributes which a person knows from himself by necessity. The lexicons did not commit to mentioning complete meanings in expressing the witnessed and the unseen, and no lexicographer claimed that.

Sixth, what if we fashioned a definition that clarifies the shared meaning?

If we concede that definition is possible and that it is a condition for establishing knowledge of the meaning, and that the language, even if it does not extend to clarifying the complete detailed meaning, does extend to bringing the general shared meaning closer by other words, then we can define the attribute with a well formed definition that distinguishes it and gives a shared concept not specific to the created. This is possible for us in everything we affirm of attributes. The context requires that we detail how to fashion the general shared definition of the attribute in the next discussion. However you must keep in mind, dear reader, that this is an extra gift only. What has preceded is sufficient and more. No one has obliged you by reason or by Sharia to bring a complete enclosing definition for everything you affirm whose meaning is known.

Under the definition of the shared meaning.

The correct view is that the shared meaning is shaped according to each attribute. The most important thing in it is that it distinguishes the attribute in itself and from other than it, and that it be the least concept that is necessary for the attribute to be itself. We find an example of this in what Shaykh al Islam reports from Ibn al Zaghuni, which he approves without criticism, regarding the attribute of the hand.

He says, the unrestricted hand in the Arabic language and in their knowledge and customs, what is meant by it is the affirmation of an essential attribute for the one described, which has characteristics in what is intended by it, and it is real in that.

Just as in their knowledge the attribute which is power and the attribute which is knowledge are established, so also are the rest of the attributes such as the face and hearing and sight and life and other than that. This is the root in this attribute, and that they do not move away from this reality to other than it which is said by way of metaphor except with an indicator that points to that. (Bayān Talbīs al Jahmiyyah 1/260)

One of the annotators on Sharh al Khareedah, when discussing the definition by the theologians of the two attributes hearing and sight, says, his statement, two eternal attributes by which things become uncovered and so on, these are two definitions in the strength of saying, hearing is an attribute and so on, and sight is an attribute and so on. What prevents making it one definition is that the definition must be such that it applies to every individual of what is being defined.

The dual or the plural does not apply except to a dual or a plural, not to every individual individually. Also, answering with a strict definition is only when the thing defined is singular in the question. As for when another is combined with the thing defined, then the answer is only by the shared part, which is the genus alone, not by the genus and the differentia which is the completion of the definition, because the differentiae are divergent, like rational and braying and neighing for example.

He only combined them because of the unity of their special function, that is, the uncovering of existents by them. If you say, the unity of the special function makes the definition of each of them apply to the other, so it will not prevent the entry of the other, rather it entails the entry of every perception by which existents become uncovered.

The answer is that the essence of Allah and His attributes, the perception of their quiddity is impossible. From them nothing is perceived except what His action indicates. The textual proof only indicated the establishment of the attributes.

The utmost of the matter is that the definitions of His attributes, Exalted is He, only gave the distinguishing of some of them from others. They did not give the quiddity of the reality, because the quiddity of the reality is unknown to us. The early scholars did not stipulate that the definition must equal the thing defined.

They sufficed with what achieves distinguishing. What is obligatory is the establishment of His attributes without knowing the quiddity, in a way that opposes the attributes of the created. There is nothing like Him, and He is the All Hearing, the All Seeing. (The marginalia of Muhammad al Siba‘i on Sharh al Khareedah for al Dardir, p. 104.)

In the objector’s example, if we say about hearing, it is an attribute, it will not be distinguished from the rest of the attributes and we will not understand it yet. If we say, uncovering, it will not be distinguished from sight and knowledge.

If we say, of sounds, that will be sufficient in understanding it, and praise belongs to Allah. This is the general shared meaning that is required, whether the sharing in it is called sharing in meaning within a real meaning or sharing in wording in a mere concomitant and one of the specific rulings. Saying that it is not the real meaning is arbitrary and an imposition of a private terminology. Rather a descriptive definition is a real definition as is known, and this is not restricted to the strict definition. To realise our aim it is enough to establish the distinguisher.

As for bringing a strict definition compounded of a genus and a differentia that reveals to us the whatness and clarifies to us its components, this is not binding upon us at all. The Arabs did not stipulate this in what they understand of meanings. If you defined for one of the Arabs a thing with a verbal definition or a descriptive one, it is not conceivable that he would say to you, this is not the meaning of the word, young man, and you have not defined its meaning for me yet, so bring me the Aristotelian definition. This only exists in the imagination of those people. For this reason, they do not understand from affirming a real shared meaning anything other than affirming a shared essential whatness. This is from one angle.

From another angle, the fashioning of the definition of a specific meaning should be enlightened by the light of revelation. Revelation has uncovered for us realities and characteristics that must be taken into account when fashioning a definition for a meaning of any described one. We understand, for example, that the knowledge attribute of Allah entails a distinguishing that does not admit of contradiction, or an attribute by which the known things are uncovered as they are.

However, if we want to define the knowledge that is added to Allah, Glorified is He, and we want to move away from what accepts sharing with created beings, we add to the general shared meaning divine characteristics that raise the meaning to its proper station, Glorified is He. It becomes, an attribute by which what was and what will be and what was not, if it were to be, how it would be, becomes uncovered. The definition is a branch of the conception. Every Muslim must control his conceptions by the realities of revelation.

Likewise the attribute of the hand for Him, Glorified is He. We understand from the hand a shared meaning, which is that by which action is done, and by which intent is made firm, and by which there is grasping and spreading. We did not say limb, and we did not say organ, because they are ambiguous words used for what is separable and for what the created needs.

If we were defining the hand of the created we would say limb or organ. But here we define while considering that the Creator is the One described with this attribute, intending what accepts sharing, not what is specific to the created.

The givens have changed, and it is necessary for us to strip the attribute of the characteristics of the quiddity of the created and what it requires and branches from it. We then understand that it is an attribute by which action is done and intent is made firm and grasping and spreading occur.

It is a positive attribute and it is not identical with the essence. Then we looked into revelation and we found that it affirms two hands, not one. It gives them characteristics additional to the shared meaning, such as fingers and grasping and spreading and folding and shaking and creating and planting and writing and other than that. We add to that shared meaning these characteristics, and the concept of the hand added to the Creator, Glorified is He, becomes, an attribute by which action is done and intent is made firm and grasping and spreading and folding and creating and planting occur.

The Creator has two hands, Glorified is He. All of this while you have not committed to anything of the concomitants of the created. All of this while we have not moved away from the light of revelation. The latter is what distinguishes the hand of Allah, Glorified is He. What comes before it was the general shared meaning that the people of truth talk about. It is not the dictionary meaning or that which is shared among created beings and is specific to them.

So take this as a general method.

1. Look at the special functions of the attribute. The attribute only came in revelation paired with what realises its meaning. Attach that to it and say, an attribute by which action is done, by which such and such occurs, by which it is specific to such and such, by which it is connected to such and such. Then follow that with what has come of its characteristics and its description in revelation.
2. If it has a synonym in revelation or in the usage of the Salaf [early imams] and the imams whose leadership is agreed between you and your opponent, then state it along with the previous, paired with its source. For example, al Tabari expressed descent by al hubut [coming down]. He expressed displeasure by anger. It is also correct to express descent by nearness and closeness. The hand has been expressed as the palm. Speech has been expressed as utterance. Other such expressions are interwoven within.

If you are asked about the hand, say, it is an attribute by which there is grasping and spreading and intent is made firm and folding occurs. Allah singled out some of His creatures by it and selected it for planting and creating and writing. It is a right hand like the other hand since they are two hands. The name palm has been applied to it. In the context of speaking about it, the attribute of fingers has been affirmed in a prophetic hadith. All of this has come with its very wording in revelation.

If you are asked about the foot, then say, it is an attribute upon which the names leg and foot have been applied. He places it upon the Fire, so it says, enough, enough. Ibn Abbas made the footstool a place for the two feet. With that we know that they are two feet. All of it is with the very wording in revelation and the reports. The text did not speak with any extra term.

As for the face, it is the attribute of Allah that we see when we attain what we have been promised of looking at Him, Glorified is He. None sees except the one who is facing or what is in its ruling. It has splendours and lights. If the veil were removed from it, the Fire would burn the world and what is in it.

Notice that in what has preceded we did not move away by a single letter from the words of revelation and what has come in it and what is understood from it linguistically. These are definitions that suffice to distinguish the attribute in itself and to distinguish it from other attributes. This is the sought fruit. When we say that the meaning is known and the how is unknown, we only intend by the known meaning this fruit and this distinguishing that is sparked in our minds, which prevents the attribute from being confused with its sister and prevents the establishment of its opposite alongside it. If you are demanded to go above that in negation or affirmation, know that the opponent will not demand from you anything except what is binding upon him in what he affirms.

If you are demanded for the meaning of some of the words that appear in your definition, such as if you are asked about the meaning of grasping, then either you descend and define it for him by the same method, so you say, it is an act of the hand that entails complete encompassing and control and disposal, or you do not descend and you suffice with its obviousness and that the shared part of it is understood in the witnessed world.

If he obstinately contradicts you in that and says, I only understand from grasping such and such, or I only understand from the hand a limb, then oppose him with what is binding upon him. He affirms hearing, and he defines it as an attribute by which sounds become uncovered. Ask him about the meaning of uncovering and say, I only understand from the uncovering of sounds a change and a receiving of sound waves that are translated in the brain. I only understand from hearing the power that is in my ear, the accident that needs a limb. Be certain that this is the point at which he is cut off.

What has preceded is an extra gift that brings the meaning near, nothing more. The Arabs sufficed with explaining matters by a word or two. What has preceded exceeds that by far. Their Aristotelian strict definition is what made them seek the whatness and the complete meaning so that the conception would be valid. They thought that affirming the meaning is the very conception that they sought of the whatnesses. They did not know that it is established by the least concept that makes generalisation valid over two described ones by sharing with a unified source.

If he says, you did no more than make it an attribute, then you affirmed for it the characteristics that are established in revelation, and you did not define the meaning which you claim is not consigned.

Say, this is enough for me in following revelation, and I do not ask you for more than that. Call it a meaning or call it sharing in wording, call it affirmation or call it tafwid, the important thing here is that the attribute is understood within its context and is not an ambiguous word or a talisman.

The summary of what has preceded.

First, we say that these attributes are known in meaning. We do not say that they are known by a complete strict definition that uncovers their entire whatness.

Second, the meaning is established by the least shared concept that makes the attribute distinct in itself and distinct from other than it. Whatever makes you distinguish the hand and prevents your understanding of it from becoming mixed with your understanding of the rest of the attributes, that is the shared meaning that makes understanding possible.

Third, the infinite sequence of asking about what the definition is composed of is sophistry, and it can be used as a fallacy in any definition that the opponent sets forth, such as defining hearing as an attribute by which sounds are perceived.

What is perception, and what is an attribute? They will say, this is self evident, and they are not an accident, and they are not psychic qualities. We say that the hand is understood by self evidence, and it is not a part and not a limb. This is enough in this context.

Intisar al-Tadmuriyyah by Maher Ameer Page 350-359