The Views on Qiyās
- Some Hanbalī scholars allowed qiyās by both intellect and Sharīʿah, citing Imām Aḥmad’s words: “No one can do without qiyās.”
- The majority of fuqahāʾ and philosophers affirmed it.
- The Dhāhirīs and al-Naẓẓām denied it altogether.
- Imam Aḥmad’s caution was only against qiyās that contradicts a clear text.
- Some Shāfiʿīs said the intellect cannot rule on qiyās, but Sharīʿah made it obligatory.
Why Qiyās is Necessary
Qiyās is needed because texts are limited, but cases are unlimited. Without qiyās many issues would have no rulings. General principles cannot cover everything, such as inheritance from a grandfather. The ʿillah (legal cause) is knowable, and qiyās produces strong probability (ghālib al-ẓann), which Sharīʿah obliges acting upon.
Consensus of the Companions
The Companions practised ijtihād and analogy when there was no text. Examples include:
- Choosing Abū Bakr as caliph without a text.
- Abū Bakr appointing ʿUmar by comparison to bayʿah.
- Their agreement to fight those who refused zakāh.
- Collecting and arranging the muṣḥaf in the times of Abū Bakr and ʿUthmān.
- Rulings on inheritance between grandfather and siblings, with each Companion using reasoning.
- ʿUmar’s instruction to Abū Mūsā: “Understand analogies and similarities.”
- Their ruling on drunkards, treating the lie in drunkenness as deliberate lying.
These examples show that qiyās was well-established among them.
Objections and Their Answer
Some reports criticise opinion and qiyās. For example, ʿUmar called people of opinion enemies of Sunnah, ʿAlī said religion is not based on opinion, and the Prophet ﷺ warned against qiyās. Ibn Qudāmah explains that these only condemn misuse by the ignorant. The very Companions quoted in these reports are the same ones who practised qiyās correctly.
Evidence from Qurʾān and Sunnah
“فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولِي الْأَبْصَارِ”
“So reflect, O people of insight.” (al-Hashr: 2)
- The Prophet ﷺ approved Muʿādh’s ijtihād when no text was found.
- The hadith of the judge receiving one or two rewards shows ijtihād is required.
- The Prophet ﷺ compared Allah’s debt in ḥajj to human debt, kissing while fasting to rinsing the mouth, and judged by opinion when no revelation came.
All of these confirm the legitimacy of qiyās.
Response to Further Doubts
Ibn Qudāmah explains that Sharīʿah obliges acting on probable causes. Not all rulings are pure acts of obedience; many have clear wisdoms. It is invalid to demand that the Prophet phrase rulings differently, since Allah legislated ijtihād as a mercy. The farʿ only needs to share the ʿillah with the aṣl, not the same type of proof.
Conclusion
The Qurʾān, Sunnah, consensus of the Companions, and reason all affirm qiyās. Criticism only applies to false qiyās, not the principle itself. By rejecting qiyās, the Dhāhirīs opposed the way of the Salaf and left many matters without rulings.
Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī says: Some of our scholars said: It is permissible to use qiyas (analogical reasoning) both according to the mind and the Sharia.
This is based on the saying of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241 AH): “No one can do without qiyas.” (This was transmitted from him by Abu Yaʿla in al-ʿUdda (4/1280), and by Abu al-Khaṭṭāb in al-Tamhīd (3/365) from the narration of Bakr ibn Muḥammad from his father.)
This is the view held by the majority of the fuqaha and the philosophers.
The Dhāhiris and al-Naẓẓām held that it is not permissible to act on qiyas, neither according to the mind nor by the Sharia.
Ahmad hinted at this when he said: “The one who speaks about fiqh should avoid these two foundations: the ambiguous (mujmal) and qiyas.” (This was transmitted by Abu Yaʿla in al-ʿUdda (4/1281), and by Abu al-Khaṭṭāb in al-Tamhīd (3/368) from the narration of ʿAbd al-Malik al-Maymūnī.)
Al-Qāḍī interpreted this to mean qiyas that contradicts an explicit text.
Another group said: The intellect has no ruling over it in terms of declaring it impossible or necessary, but it is in the realm of possibility. As for using qiyas by the Sharia, it is obligatory. This is the view of some of the Shāfiʿis and a group of philosophers.
The reasoning of our scholars:
- Applying the rule universally is necessary. If qiyas is not used, this leads to many situations having no ruling due to the limited number of texts and the endless number of new scenarios. Therefore, referring them to ijtihād (independent reasoning) becomes necessary.
If someone says: It is possible to make general principles explicit and leave the details to ijtihād, this would be a matter of taḥqīq al-manāṭ (determining the applicability), and not qiyas.
For example, one could say: “Every edible item is subject to riba,” as a general rule, then make ijtihād in determining whether something is edible or not. This type of reasoning is agreed upon.
We say: Even if this can be imagined, it is not the reality, because most events are not based on clearly stated general principles, like the issue of inheritance from the grandfather and similar cases. Therefore, the mind dictates that these should not be left without a ruling.
- Second proof: The mind shows that legal causes can be known and understood. The wisdom (ʿillah) behind rulings is something that the intellect seeks to achieve and is found in the Sharia, like rational causes.
- Because through qiyas, we gain a strong probability in affirming the ruling. Acting on what is most probable (ghālib al-ẓann) is obligatory.
The objection from those who deny qiyas:
This is similar to their objection to acting on singular reports (khabar al-wāḥid).
As for proof of it being legislated in the Sharia:
There is the consensus of the Companions that they ruled by opinion (raʾy) in situations where there was no text.
Among these:
- Their agreement on choosing Abū Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) as caliph by ijtihād despite no text being reported about it. If there had been a clear text, it would have been transmitted and used by the person it supported.
- Their analogy comparing the appointment of a successor by one person to a contract, since Abū Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) appointed ʿUmar (may Allah be pleased with him) without a clear text. This was done by comparing the individual choice to the collective decision of the Ummah. (Reported by Ibn Abī Shaybah (12/46) from ʿĀʾishah: “ʿUthmān was writing the will of Abū Bakr. Abū Bakr fainted, so ʿUthmān wrote the name of ʿUmar. When he awoke, he asked: ‘Who did you write?’ He said: ‘ʿUmar.’ He replied: ‘You wrote what I intended.’” Also by Ibn Abī Shaybah (12/36), and al-Khallāl in al-Sunnah (337) from the narration of ʿUbayd ibn al-Ḥārith: “Abū Bakr said: O Allah, I have appointed the best of Your people over them.”)
- Their agreement with Abū Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) in fighting those who refused to pay zakah, based on ijtihād.
- Their agreement to write the muṣḥaf after a long pause. (Reported by Aḥmad (13/1), and al-Bukhārī (4679) from the hadith of Zayd ibn Thābit in the story of collecting the Quran.)
- Their agreement to gather the muṣḥaf under one arrangement during the time of ʿUthmān.
- Their agreement to use ijtihād in the issue of inheritance between grandfather and siblings, with different approaches, while all of them were certain there was no explicit text. (Reported by al-Bukhārī (4987) from Anas ibn Mālik. Also reported by ʿAbd al-Razzāq (10/266–272), Saʿīd ibn Manṣūr in al-Sunan (39, 58, 77), Ibn Abī Shaybah (11/290–296), al-Bayhaqī (6/246–251), from Zayd ibn Thābit, ʿUmar, ʿAlī, Ibn Masʿūd, and Ibn ʿAbbās, each with a different ruling on the issue.)
- Their statement on the case of mushārakah (shared inheritance): (Reported by al-Ḥākim (4/337) and al-Bayhaqī (6/256) from Zayd ibn Thābit who said: “Pretend their father was a donkey. He added nothing but kinship,” and gave them all a share in one third. Al-Ḥākim authenticated it. Ibn Ḥajar said in al-Talkhīṣ (4/2045): “In its chain is Abū Umayyah ibn Yaʿlā al-Thaqafī, who is weak.”)
- The saying of Abū Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) about kalālah (those without parents or children): “I will say my view. If it is right, it is from Allah. If it is wrong, it is from me and Shayṭān. Allah and His Messenger are free from it. Kalālah is anyone other than the father and child. (Reported by al-Bukhārī (4987) from Anas ibn Mālik. Also by ʿAbd al-Razzāq (10/304), Ibn Abī Shaybah (11/415–416), al-Dārimī (3015), al-Ṭaḥāwī in Mushkil al-Āthār (13/230), al-Bayhaqī (5/223) from al-Shaʿbī from Abū Bakr. Al-Ṭaḥāwī said the chain is disconnected. Al-Bayhaqī said in Maʿrifat al-Sunan (9/113): “This is also the view of ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās in the more authentic narration, and similar from Ibn Masʿūd in the case of Buruʿ bint Wāshiq.”)
- The ruling of Abū Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) on equal distribution of wealth among Muslims, saying: “They only submitted to Allah and their reward is from Him. This worldly life is only a means.” But when the matter reached ʿUmar, he gave preference between them and said: “I will not treat equally the one who left his home and wealth and migrated for Allah and His Messenger with the one who submitted unwillingly.” (Reported by Ibn Masʿūd, Maʿqil ibn Sinān and others, and mentioned earlier on page 197.)
- ʿUmar’s instruction to Abū Mūsā: “Understand analogies and similarities. Use your reasoning in matters.” (Reported by al-Ṭaḥāwī in Maʿānī al-Āthār (3/305), al-Bayhaqī (6/348), and in a shortened version by Aḥmad in al-Zuhd (p. 570).)
- ʿAlī (may Allah be pleased with him) said: “I and ʿUmar both agreed on not selling ummahāt al-awlād (slave mothers), but now I see they can be sold.” (Reported by al-Dāraquṭnī (4471), al-Bayhaqī (10/115), and al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī in al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih (1/492–493). Ibn al-Qayyim said in Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn (1/85): “This is a great letter, accepted by the scholars, and upon it they built the foundations of rulings and testimony.”)
- When ʿUmar was stabbed, he consulted the Companions on the issue of inheritance between grandfather and siblings. ʿUthmān said: “If you follow your view, it is guided. If you follow the one before you, he too had sound judgement.” (Reported by ʿAbd al-Razzāq (10/263), al-Dārimī (2959), al-Bayhaqī (6/246), from Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam.)
- Their view on a drunk person: “If he gets drunk, he raves. If he raves, he lies. So we punish him as a liar.” This is treating what leads to something as having the same ruling as the thing itself. (Reported by Mālik (2442), and through him al-Bayhaqī in Maʿrifat al-Sunan (13/50), from Thawr ibn Zayd al-Dīlī. Ibn Ḥajar said in al-Talkhīṣ al-Ḥabīr (1/2811–2812): “Disconnected chain. Thawr did not meet ʿUmar. Then he gave another reason for weakness.”)
- Muʿādh said to the Prophet ﷺ: “I will use my own judgement.” The Prophet ﷺ approved it. (Reported by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, and al-Tirmidhī. Al-Bukhārī graded it weak. It was previously mentioned on page 241.)
This and other examples beyond counting show that they used reasoning. It is well-known. Even if each narration is not mass-transmitted individually, the combined reports give definitive knowledge that they used opinion (raʾy).
There has never been a time where raʾy was not used. Those who did not use it were only excused due to their own inability to do so. It was never denied, and no one was criticised for using it. That makes it a consensus.
Objection: The Companions are reported to have criticised opinion.
- ʿUmar said: “Beware of the people of opinion. They are the enemies of the sunnan. The hadiths were too difficult for them to memorise, so they spoke with their opinions and went astray and led others astray.” (Reported by al-Dāraquṭnī (4280), al-Lālikāʾī in Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Iʿtiqād (1/138) no. 201, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr in Jāmiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm (2001–2005), and al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī in al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih (1/452–454).)
- ʿAlī said: “If the religion were based on opinion, then the bottom of the khuff would be more deserving of wiping than the top.” (Reported by Abū Dāwūd (162), and similar versions in Aḥmad (1/116). Authenticated by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq in al-Aḥkām al-Wusṭā (1/180), and ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Maqdisī. Quoted by Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī in Tanqīḥ al-Taḥqīq (1/338), and Ibn Ḥajar in al-Talkhīṣ al-Ḥabīr (1/432).)
- Ibn Masʿūd said: “Your reciters and righteous people will pass away. Then people will take ignorant leaders who give rulings without knowledge.”
- They said: “If you rule by opinion, you will make lawful many things that Allah has made unlawful, and you will forbid many things Allah has made lawful.” (Reported by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī in al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih (1/457) from Ibn Masʿūd, with the word “qiyās” instead of “raʾy”. Also reported by Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr in Jāmiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm (1679 and 2016) with similar meaning from al-Shaʿbī.)
Criticism of Opinion and Improper Use of Qiyas
Ibn Abbas said: “Allah did not permit anyone to rule by his own opinion. He said:
“لِتَحْكُمَ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ بِمَا أَرَاكَ اللَّهُ”
“That you may judge between people by what Allah has shown you.”
(al-Nisa: 105)
He did not say: ‘by what you see.’” (Reported by Ibn Abi Hatim in his Tafsir and Ibn al-Mundhir)
The Prophet said:
“إيّاكم والمقاييس، فإنما هلكت الأمم قبلكم بالمقاييس”
“Beware of qiyas. The only reason the nations before you were destroyed was due to qiyas.”
(Reported by Ibn Abi Shaybah, al-Darimi, and Ibn Abd al-Barr from Ibn Sirin)
Ibn Umar said: “Leave me alone with your ‘what ifs’ and ‘what ifs.’” (Reported by Ahmad and al-Bukhari)
We say: This is their criticism of those who use opinion and qiyas in the wrong place or without its proper conditions. The criticism from Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, is directed at someone who speaks from opinion without knowing the texts.
You see that the criticism is for abandoning the right method, not for the use of reason itself. If someone were to prefer a saying from the sunnah over one that is stronger, they would be blamed. So too with every form of blame directed at the people of opinion. It is because they abandoned the ruling from the revealed text which should have been given priority. One of the scholars said:
أهلُ الكلامِ وأهلُ الرأي قد جَهِلُوا علمَ الحديثِ الذي يَنجو به الرجلُ
لو أنهم عرفوا الآثارَ ما انحرفوا عنها إلى غيرها لكنهم جهلوا
“The people of kalam and opinion are ignorant of hadith, which is the means of salvation.
If they had known the narrations, they would not have turned away from them. But they were ignorant.”
This is another answer: that the criticism was directed at the ignorant who are not fit for ijtihad, whose opinions amount to mere preference and invention of rulings based on their own reasoning. The proof is that those from whom these criticisms are reported are the very ones from whom opinion and ijtihad are also reported.
Those who affirm qiyas themselves reject certain types of qiyas. For example, the Dhahiri scholars say: “The foundational texts cannot be established through qiyas. Therefore, neither can the rulings derived from them.” If qiyas is to be rejected, then let their qiyas be rejected too.
If someone says: “Perhaps their ijtihad was based on a general text, a command, presumption of continuity, or linguistic analysis of the meaning of a verse or hadith, or reconciling between two texts.”
Or perhaps their ijtihad was about identifying the correct application of a ruling, not about deriving the ruling itself, such as choosing a leader through ijtihad or determining who is qualified to lead. The same applies to other such cases.
We say: The ijtihad of the Sahabah was not limited to what you mentioned. They ruled in cases that could only be resolved by qiyas.
Like when Abu Bakr appointed Umar as his successor. That was based on qiyas, comparing the appointment to the bayʿah (pledge) given by the people. Also, like comparing zakah to prayer. And like Umar’s ruling that witnesses to qadhf (accusation of zina) should also be punished if they could not bring proof, as he did in the case of Abu Bakrah. And like considering shukr (gratitude) to be like qadhf, since it outwardly resembles it.
Ibn Abbas once said:
“ألا يتقي الله زيد، يجعل ابن الابن ابنا، ولا يجعل أب الأب أبا”
“Will Zayd not fear Allah? He makes the son of the son a son, but does not make the father of the father a father.”
(Reported by al-Bayhaqi)
He criticised Zayd for failing to make a qiyas between fatherhood and sonship, even though they differ in some rulings. Those who equalised them said: “The brother inherits through the father, and the grandfather also inherits through the father.” They said the source is one, only the connection differs. They likened it to two branches stemming from one tree, or two streams flowing from the same source. (Reported by al-Daraqutni, supported by Ibn Hajar in Fath al-Bari)
Whoever examines the differences of opinion in faraid (inheritance) and other areas will know certainly that the Sahabah used analogy and comparison. They did not restrict themselves only to identifying the cases for which rulings applied, but also used qiyas in deriving the rulings.
Proof from the Quran
“فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولِي الْأَبْصَارِ”
“So reflect, O people of insight.”
(al-Hashr: 2)
The essence of iʿtibār (reflection) is to compare one thing to another, like saying “Check the dinar against the standard.” This is the very definition of qiyas.
If someone says: “The verse means to reflect on what happened to those who disobeyed Allah and His messengers, and take warning. So it would be inappropriate to explicitly mention qiyas here and say: link the branches to the roots to know the rulings.”
We say: The wording is general. What would be inappropriate is restricting it to one form, while the general meaning includes all types of reflection.
Proof from the Sunnah
The Prophet said to Muʿadh:
“بِمَ تَقْضِي؟”
“How will you judge?”
He said: “By the Book of Allah.”
He said: “And if you do not find it?”
He said: “By the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah.”
He said: “And if you do not find it?”
He said: “I will strive with my opinion.”
He said: “الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي وَفَّقَ رَسُولَ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ”
“All praise is due to Allah who has guided the messenger of the Messenger of Allah.”
(Reported in multiple sources; though some chains are weak, the Ummah has accepted it)
They object: the hadith is weak. It is narrated by al-Harith ibn Amr from unknown narrators.
We say: It has also been reported from ʿUbadah ibn Nusayy from ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn Ghanm from Muʿadh. And the Ummah has accepted the hadith, so its being mursal does not harm it. Also, the context clearly shows he was doing ijtihad when there was no Book or Sunnah, and that includes qiyas.
Another Hadith
The Prophet said:
“إِذَا حَكَمَ الْحَاكِمُ فَاجْتَهَدَ فَأَصَابَ فَلَهُ أَجْرَانِ، وَإِنْ أَخْطَأَ فَلَهُ أَجْرٌ”
“If a judge makes ijtihad and is correct, he gets two rewards. If he errs, he gets one reward.”
(Muslim)
They say: This may refer to ijtihad in identifying the situation, not in deriving a ruling.
We say: No, it refers to deriving a ruling when no text is found.
Another Hadith
The Prophet said to the woman from Khathʿam:
“أَرَأَيْتِ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أَبِيكِ دَيْنٌ فَقَضَيْتِهِ أَكَانَ يَنْفَعُهُ؟”
“What if your father had a debt and you paid it, would it benefit him?”
She said: “Yes.”
He said: “فَدَيْنُ اللَّهِ أَحَقُّ أَنْ يُقْضَى”
“Then Allah’s debt is more deserving to be paid.”
(al-Bukhari 7315)
This is clear analogy: comparing Allah’s right to the right of people.
Another Hadith
When ʿUmar asked the Prophet about kissing while fasting, he said:
“أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ تَمَضْمَضْتَ؟”
“What if you rinsed your mouth?”
(Musnad Ahmad 138 , Abu Dawud)
This is qiyas, comparing kissing to rinsing the mouth, because both are actions close to breaking the fast, yet neither invalidates it.
Another Hadith
Abu ʿUbayd narrated that the Prophet said:
“إِنِّي أَقْضِي بَيْنَكُمْ بِالرَّأْيِ فِيمَا لَمْ يُنْزَلْ فِيهِ وَحْيٌ”
“I judge between you by opinion when no revelation has been sent down.”
(Abu Dawud 3585 from Umm Salamah, Graded Da’if By Albani)
If the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) judged by ijtihad when no revelation had come, then others may do so when they have strong reason and understanding.
Allah said: ما فرطنا في الكتاب من شيء
“We have not neglected anything in the Book” (al-Anʿām: 38)
And He said: ونزلنا عليك الكتاب تبيانا لكل شيء
“We have sent down the Book to you as clarification for all things” (al-Naḥl: 89)
So whatever is not in the Quran is not mashrūʿ (legislated), and it remains upon the aṣl al-barāʾah (original presumption of non-obligation).
Allah also said: وأن احكم بينهم بما أنزل الله
“Judge between them by what Allah has revealed” (al-Māʾidah: 49)
And He said: فإن تنازعتم في شيء فردوه إلى الله والرسول
“If you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger” (al-Nisāʾ: 59)
Yet you refer matters back to al-raʾy (opinion).
As for their doubts:
They say: the dhimmah (legal responsibility) is originally free. This is certain.. So how can it be removed by qiyās (analogy), which is only ẓannī (speculative)?
They say: how can you apply qiyās in the Sharīʿah (revealed law), which is based on taʿabbud (pure obedience without knowing the reason), distinguishing between what appears similar and grouping what appears different?
They say: the ḥukm (legal ruling) in the aṣl (original case) was proven by the text and the ruling is certain. So how can the ruling in the farʿ (new case) be based on a ʿillah (effective cause) that is speculative? If the ruling in the farʿ follows from the ʿillah, then how can it be confirmed through a different method from the aṣl?
They say: even if the ʿillah is manṣūṣ ʿalayh (explicit in the text), it does not require ilḥāq (extension). For example, if someone says, “I freed Sālim because he is black,” it does not mean he must free every black man. That is not the same as saying, “I freed every black man.”
They say: the Prophet was given jawāmiʿ al-kalim (concise comprehensive speech). Why would he leave off a short, clear ruling like “ribā is ḥarām in everything that is edible” and instead say “ribā is ḥarām in wheat,” forcing us to extend the ruling through qiyās?
They say: the ḥukm in the aṣl is based on naṣṣ qatʿī (definitive text), while the ʿillah is ẓannī. So how can something certain be extended using something speculative?
They say: language recognises qiyās, but the Sharīʿah does not. If someone says “do not eat this, it causes harm” or “do not sit with him, he is a mubtadiʿ (innovator),” we understand the reason, but that’s linguistic, not legal.
The response: The Quran contains all aḥkām (legal rulings), either directly or by indication to consensus and sunnah. Both ijmāʿ and sunnah confirm the use of qiyās.
Otherwise, where in the Quran is the ruling of al-jadd wa al-ikhwah (grandfather and siblings in inheritance)? Or al-ʿawl (proportional reduction in inheritance)? Or the mubattah (woman divorced three times)?
Or the mufaawwaḍah (woman with no mahr specified)? Or al-taḥrīm (prohibition through breastfeeding)? All of these have aḥkām sharʿiyyah (legally binding rulings).
You have prohibited qiyās, but there is no naṣṣ in the Quran forbidding it.
As for Allah’s saying: وأن احكم بينهم بما أنزل الله
“Judge between them by what Allah has revealed” (al-Māʾidah: 49)
We say: qiyās is proven by ijmāʿ and the sunnah. And both are indicated by the Quran.
We do not return matters to raʾy. We return them to maʿānī (meanings) extracted from the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger.
Qiyās is tafaqquh fī al-naṣṣ (understanding the text), by identifying the manāṭ al-ḥukm (basis of the ruling) and removing irrelevant details.
You have rejected qiyās without a naṣṣ and without referring to any clear maʿnā from the naṣṣ.
You say: how can you override something qaṭʿī (definitive) with something ẓannī?
We say: you do this yourselves with the apparent meanings, ʿumūm (general expressions), khabar al-wāḥid (single-chain reports), and taḥqīq al-manāṭ (verifying the application of a ruling).
We also say: we do not override qatʿī except with another qatʿī. If the Sharia obliges us to follow a probable ʿillah, and we are certain that the ruling follows it when it exists, then this is qatʿī from another perspective.
You say: the Sharīʿah is based on taʿabbud.
We say: yes, some rulings are pure taʿabbud, but others are not. The rulings are three categories:
– What is clearly not muʿallal (rationalised)
– What is obviously muʿallal, like the restriction on minors due to lack of reason
– What is mutaraddid (disputed), and we only use qiyās if there is a dalīl that it is muʿallal
You say: why did the Prophet not simply say “ribā is ḥarām in everything measured by weight” and spare us the need for qiyās?
We say: this is taḥakkum (arbitrary judgement) against the Messenger. You are not allowed to dictate to the Prophet how to phrase his speech.
And if you say this, someone else could ask: “why didn’t the Prophet forbid qiyās explicitly? Why didn’t he list every ḥukm in the Quran and mutawātir sunnah so all doubts would be removed?” This line of argument is invalid.
We say instead: Allah, out of His kindness legislated ijtihād (juristic effort) and encouraged taʿammuq (deep reasoning) in understanding the objectives of Sharia. So He said: يرفع الله الذين امنوا منكم والذين اوتوا العلم درجات
“Allah raises those among you who have believed and those given knowledge in ranks” (al-Mujādilah: 11)
You say: the farʿ must follow the same method as the aṣl.
We say: this is false. The farʿ only needs to be atached to the aṣl by the ʿillah. It does not need to follow the same method of proof. Just like necessities can be a source for naẓariyyāt (inferred rules) without sharing the same method.
Rawdat al-Nāẓir wa Jannat al-Manāẓir By Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī (2/547-567)
