Ar Razi’s argument

Ar Razi’s argument in this section has 2 main parts.

The first concerns human will and determinism. He says that when 2 options are exactly equal, one of them cannot be chosen unless something gives preference to it. If no determining cause exists, then one side would prevail over another without any cause, and this would destroy the principle that every possible thing needs a cause. He says this would also damage the main argument for affirming the Maker. So he concludes that human choice cannot independently produce one option over another. From this he moves toward determinism.

The second concerns the philosophers and the eternity of the universe. He says that if an eternal complete cause truly necessitates its effect, then its effect must accompany it eternally and nothing new can ever begin from it. But events do begin.

So the philosophers cannot explain how temporal events arise from an eternal cause that never changes. If they say some new condition appears, then that new condition itself needs an explanation, and the same problem returns.

The argument from human choice

Ar Razi says that if a person stands between 2 exactly equal options, he cannot choose one of them unless something gives it preference. He gives the example of the man fleeing from a lion. If the 2 paths were truly equal in every respect, choosing one would be impossible. So the occurrence of one choice instead of another must come from a cause.

He then turns this against those who say that the will itself decides. He asks why the will chose this specific option rather than the other. If that choice happened without a cause, then preference without a cause has been accepted. If it happened because of another cause, then the question continues.

The reply to the Mu’tazilah on free will

Ibn Taymiyyah says that the Mu’tazilah and those like them are forced into 1 of 2 positions.

Either Allah only made the person generally capable of choosing. If that is what they mean, then the occurrence of this specific choice rather than another still needs a cause.

Or they say that Allah made him choose this specific act. If they say that, then they have already admitted the point, namely that the specific act of willing came from Allah.

So their position cannot escape the need for a determining cause behind the specific human will.

The contradiction in saying the will has no cause

When asked who created this specific will that arose in the person, they say that the will is not caused.

This is plainly false if they mean that it has no maker at all. Because if 1 event may arise without an efficient cause, then there is no reason to stop that from applying to other events as well. That would destroy the principle of causation entirely.

So the criticism is that they try to preserve human independence by denying a cause for the will, but by doing that they undermine the very rational principle they need elsewhere.

The Mu’tazilah and the Ash’aris

The Mu’tazilah affirm goals and purposes, but deny the efficient cause behind the human will.

The Ash’aris affirm that Allah is the efficient cause of all events, including human will, but often deny wisdom and purpose behind what He wills.

So 1 side affirms final cause and denies efficient cause, while the other affirms efficient cause and denies final cause.

The philosophers’ contradiction

The philosophers claimed they affirmed both cause and purpose, but the response says they fail in both.

They deny real will. Once will is denied, wisdom and purpose are also emptied of their reality. Then they try to explain temporal events through an eternal necessitating cause. But if the cause is complete and eternal, its effect must be eternal as well. So nothing new can begin from it.

This is where their whole system breaks down.

Ar Razi’s strong objection against the philosophers

Ar Razi’s strongest point here is that a new event cannot arise from an eternal complete cause that never changes. If the cause is complete, the effect cannot be delayed. If the effect is delayed, then the cause was not complete. If some new condition appeared, then that condition itself requires explanation.

So the appearance of temporal events forces the philosophers into either denying real origination or accepting an impossible regress.

This is why Ibn Taymiyyah treats this as one of Ar Razi’s better arguments.

Why the philosophers cannot escape with “conditions”

The philosophers try to say that the eternal cause does not directly produce the event until a condition or readiness appears.

The reply is that the emergence of that condition is exactly the same problem all over again. Did that condition arise from a complete cause or not.

If from a complete cause, then it should have existed eternally.

If not, then another cause is needed.

So the problem is not solved. It is only pushed back by 1 step.

The problem of simultaneous regress

If every particular event needs a complete cause present with it, and if that complete cause itself depends on another complete cause, then an infinite stack of simultaneous causes is required.

That is not merely a sequence of 1 event after another. It is an impossible regress of complete causes all existing together. This is what makes the philosophers’ explanation collapse.

This is why the response says their theory does not merely lead to many events in sequence. It leads to an absurd simultaneous structure of causes and conditions.

The weakness of al Armawi’s answer

Al Armawi tried to weaken this by saying the regress is only in effects, not in causes.

The reply says this does not solve the issue. If the complete cause must exist with its effect, and every effect needs another completed cause with it, then the regress is not merely in effects. It returns to the causes themselves and the completion of those causes.

So his answer misses the actual point of the objection.

The wider conclusion

The wider conclusion is that these so called rational proofs against revelation are built on confused distinctions, contradictory principles, and unstable definitions.

Ar Razi’s objection against the philosophers is accepted here as one of his stronger moments, because it exposes the impossibility of temporal events coming from an eternal complete cause that never changes.

But the other groups are also shown to be trapped. The Mu’tazilah cannot explain the arising of the human will. The Ash’aris affirm universal causation but often strip it of wisdom. The philosophers deny real will and cannot explain origination at all.

When ar-Razi argued for determinism (jabr) in al-Mahsul, aiming to disprove rational good and evil (taḥsīn and taqbīḥ), he presented the following argument, saying: “It has thus been proven by this brilliant proof that these events either happen from the capable human agent necessarily or coincidentally.” (Footnote: ar-Razi, al-Maḥsūl, 1/200.)

He also said while establishing this view: “The main argument for proving the existence of the Maker is the dependence of the possible on a cause.

So if we allow for a possibility where one side outweighs another without a determining factor, we can no longer judge that any possible thing needs a cause, and that would shut the door to affirming the existence of the Maker.”

He said: “As for a person running from a lion who finds 2 paths, we deny that both paths are truly equal in every respect, even if others accept that. The runner believes one to be better than the other in some way, or he is distracted from one of them. But if the runner actually believed they were equal in every way, then in that case it would be impossible for him to choose one over the other. The proof is that when conflicting motives pull a person in opposite directions, he hesitates at every point and cannot act until a determining reason appears.”

Then, some said that the determining factor is the will: “The will inclined toward that action rather than another.” But then the question arises: Why did the will choose that specific thing? If the will preferred something else instead, the question would still arise. Therefore, one must say that the will being decisive must itself be caused by something else, and that is impossible.

This is because the decisiveness of the will is a self contained property of the will itself, just as knowledge is defined by its ability to grasp the known. It is an essential characteristic. And since it is impossible to explain essential characteristics, it is also impossible to explain why the will is decisive.

He replied: “This answer is false. We are not asking why the will is decisive in general, but why it is decisive regarding this particular thing and not the opposite. Explaining why it determined this thing is not the same as explaining why it is decisive in general.

Don’t you see that when a possible being stands between existence and nonexistence, we judge that neither side outweighs the other except through a determining factor? But this doesn’t require us to explain why it is a possible being in the first place. Similarly, here.”

The Flaws in the Mu’tazilah’s View on Free Will

Ibn Taymiyyah comments: This is similar to what the Qadariyyah, the Muʿtazilah, the Shiʿah, and others say: “Allah created man as one who chooses. If he wants, he chooses this action. If he wants, he chooses another. He picks one through his own choice.”

It is said to them: Did Allah make him simply capable of choice, suitable for it, and able to do it, or did He make him choose this particular action over another?

If they say the first, then the fact that one choice occurred rather than another must have a cause. If the person is equally capable of choosing either, then the occurrence of one choice over the other must be due to something that made it happen.

And if they say the second, then they admit the truth, that the specific act of choosing came from Allah. As Allah said: “For whoever among you wills to be upright, but you do not will unless Allah, the Lord of the Universes, wills” (al-Takwir: 28–29).

When their claim is examined further and it is asked: “This choice that happened, which led to the action, this will that arose in the person: who created it?”

They say: “The will is not caused.”

I said to one of them: “Do you mean it is not caused by a final cause (ghāyah), meaning we don’t know its purpose, or do you mean it is not caused by an efficient cause, meaning it had no maker who made it?”

If they mean the first, then that is not the discussion here, and even then, they themselves say it was willed for a goal. But if they mean the second, that it has no efficient cause, then this is obviously false. Because if someone allows that 1 event happened without a cause, he must allow that for all events. And this is where the theologians became lost.

The Errors of the Mu’Tazilah and the Ash’aris

The Muʿtazilah Qadariyyah: either they deny that Allah has will, or they say there is a will that arises in something else without being willed, like the Basran Muʿtazilah, who are closer to the truth than the Baghdadi Muʿtazilah. Of them it was said: “They wandered through the gates of different sects and settled on the most worthless positions.”

They claim that there is an accident that arises without a subject, and an event that happens without a will, just as they claim that the human will occurs without a cause. They deny any cause for the human will while still affirming a goal for it, saying things like: “Allah only willed good for creation,” and so on.

Their opponents, the Ashʿaris and similar groups, affirmed that Allah is the cause of the human will, and they said that Allah’s will is eternal and includes all events. But they did not affirm a purpose or wisdom behind these events. So they are like those who affirm an efficient cause but deny a final cause, and the Muʿtazilah are like those who affirm a final cause but deny an efficient cause.

The Contradictions Of The Philosophers

As for the Peripatetic philosophers, they claimed to affirm both efficient and final causes and to explain the events of the universe through causes and purposes. But in reality, they are even more contradictory than the theologians. They affirm neither a true efficient cause nor a true final cause. In reality, they say that events happen without a cause.

That is because their “eternal perfect cause” necessarily produces its effect. It cannot produce it at a specific time, and thus nothing ever begins. Their claim really means that Allah’s actions have no wisdom, no good outcome. They deny will altogether and say He is not a voluntary actor. And whoever denies will necessarily denies its purpose, which is final wisdom. That is why they fall into greater confusion and contradiction than any group from the people of revealed religions. This has been elaborated elsewhere.

The goal here is to show the central ideas of the major groups, their contradictions, and that whoever opposes the divine texts with what he calls “logical arguments” is merely opposing them with ideas like these, which are the peak of their intellect and the utmost that their minds can reach in their so called logical principles.

Ar-Razi’s Summary of the Philosophers’ View

ar-Razi said: “The philosophers summarised everything by saying: What was necessary for creating the Universe did not exist in pre-eternity. They made the conditions for creating it: (1) the time in which the will attached to it, the time in which knowledge was linked to it, (3) the time that contained the hidden wisdom, the end of eternity, the time in which creation was possible, and the decision of the capable one to act. None of these existed in pre-eternity. Therefore, the Universe cannot be emergant.” (Footnote: ar-Razi, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyah, 1/208.)

Then he responded to the philosophers with 2 replies:

First Response:

If His will was not suitable for acting in all times, then it would be a necessary cause by nature, and that would mean the Universe is eternal. But if His will was suitable for acting in any time, then preferring one time over another, if it doesn’t depend on a cause, means a possible event occurred without a cause. And if it does depend on a cause, we return to the same problem, and a chain occurs.

Second Response:

If His will to create is not tied to a specific time, then the creation must be eternal. And if it is tied to a time, that time must already have existed in pre-eternity, otherwise we return to the problem of how it began, and we face the same infinite regress.

Further Objections by Ar-Razi

He continues with several detailed philosophical objections to the idea of an eternal, necessary cause that produces time bound effects. Then he relays a reply from the philosophers, saying: “Perhaps there is an eternal intellect or soul that produces successive concepts, one after another, until one specific concept emerges, which is the condition for the Universe’s appearance.”

Ibn Taymiyyah replies: The objection ar-Razi made here is accurate and is the same one al-Ghazali used in Tahafut al-Falasifah. As for the objection by al-Armawi, it is flawed. If the full cause necessarily entails its effect, then nothing can begin from it. Any new thing needs a full cause. And if that cause is new, then it needs another cause, and that leads to an infinite number of causes all existing simultaneously, which is impossible.

Refuting the Philosophers’ Argument for the Eternity of the Universe Based on the Eternal Cause

As for the claim, “If by ‘cause’ you mean the complete cause (ʿillah tāmma), then its occurrence does not imply the occurrence of the efficient cause (ʿillah fāʿilah), but only its occurrence or the occurrence of some of its conditions”, it is said in reply: this distinction is correct if we are looking at events in general. But when we consider an event that cannot occur except through a complete cause, then it necessarily requires the occurrence of a complete cause.

And if someone says, “The eternal agent (al-fāʿil al-qadīm) brought it about because the condition for its occurrence had just come into being,” it is said: the discussion about the emergence of that condition is the same as the discussion about the emergence of what is conditioned by it. It is necessary that something new occurred that was not the result of the eternal complete cause.

This is because a complete and eternal cause must have a co-eternal effect, since its effect is necessary along with it from eternity, and what is emergant (ḥādith) is not simultaneous with something eternal.

And if it is said, “It came about due to the emergence of readiness and conditions,” it is replied: any supposed emergence from a complete cause that necessitates its effect is invalid. The occurrence of an event from a complete cause that necessitates its effect is impossible. This objection is sound and the philosophers have no answer to it.

And if they say, “It happened through successive events, one after another,” it is said to them: successively occurring events cannot arise from a complete cause. Because a complete and eternal cause necessitates its effect. It would be co-eternal with it. And successive events are not co-eternal.

This has been discussed at length elsewhere. It has been shown that the claim that events can arise from an eternal, necessitating cause is something reason itself refutes, whether those events happen with intermediaries that are necessitated by it, or without intermediaries, whether those intermediaries are called intellects (ʿuqūl) or souls (nufūs) or something else, whether the first thing to proceed from it is called an element, as some say, or an intellect, as others say. The intermediaries that necessarily accompany it are eternal with it and cannot be subject to origination, for the same argument about the impossibility of origination applies equally to them.

Their claim that the movement of the heavens arises from the successive perceptions and wills of a soul, and that these in turn are caused by the self-existent being (wājib li-nafsih) through the intermediary of an intellect, or directly, or that they arise from the intellect itself, or other such claims they use to explain the origin of events through an eternal, complete cause in which nothing changes, this claim amounts to saying that events emergant from a complete cause that remains unchanged.

But if the eternal, complete cause must always be accompanied by its effect, then it is impossible for any event to originate from it. Whether they say such a condition is required for the origination of something else or not, the outcome is the same: the event must rely on a complete cause. That leads to an infinite series of causes and effects existing all at once, as ar-Razi stated, and this is among his better arguments.

Refutation of al-Armawi’s Response

As for the response given by al-Armawi, which he describes as a powerful answer, it is taken from ar-Razi in al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya and other works, and it is invalid due to this very objection. While part of the response agrees with the view of the people of the religions (ahl al-milal), another part aligns with the dahrī philosophers (eternalists).

It is based on affirming the existence of intellects and souls that are not bodies, and that they are eternal and necessary by the essence of Allah. These ideas are not the views of the people of the religions. They are false ideas, as has been explained elsewhere. What they claim about such abstract entities (mujarradāt) only exists in the mind, not in reality.

Al-Armawi only used this response because the later figures like al-Shahrastani, ar-Razi, and al-Amidi claimed that what the philosophers say about abstract intellects and souls cannot be refuted by the theologians’ proofs. They said that the theologians’ arguments for the origination of bodies (ajsām) do not disprove the existence of these abstract entities.

But this is false. The leading theologians (mutakallimūn) explicitly stated that the nonexistence of these so called abstract entities, and the invalidity of claiming the existence of anything possible that is neither a body nor dependent on a body, is something known by necessary reason.

This was stated by al-Ustādh Abū al-Maʿālī and others. Some scholars even said that all existing things must fall into 1 of 2 types, and that this is known necessarily by reason. This has been explained in detail elsewhere.

The Falsehood of the View that Angels Are Eternal Intellects

The point here is that al-Armawi’s response is based on that false assumption. Its content is that the Lord is a necessary cause (mūjib bi-dhātih) of eternal intellects and souls that are essential to His being, not a voluntary actor (fāʿil bi-mashīʾah wa qudrah). They interpret these “intellects” as the angels, so the angels become eternal, necessary emanations from Allah’s essence.

This is worse than the view of those who say the angels are the daughters of Allah. It agrees with the eternalist philosophers (dahriyyah) regarding cause and effect, though they only dispute whether the physical Universe is eternal. Even so, this invalidates their argument that the heavens are eternal, and at least cuts off half their falsehood.

This argument is also based on permitting an infinite chain of events in the past, and on accepting events with no beginning. This is 1 of the 2 opinions among the theologians, and it was al-Armawi’s view. He used it to object to ar-Razi more than once, including in the issue of causation, where the question is whether “effecting” (taʾthīr), including acts of creation and origination, is a real existent or merely a negation, and whether “creation” is the same as the created object, or something different.

There are 2 well known views on this issue. The majority say that creation is not the same as the created thing. This is the view of most of the scholars among the Hanafis, Shafiʿis, Malikis, and Hanbalis, and also of most theologians among the Muʿtazilah, Murjiʾah, Shiʿah, Karrāmiyyah, and Sufis. It was mentioned by Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi in al-Taʿarruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Tasawwuf, and it was the view of most of the early philosophers and some of the later ones as well. (Footnote: Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi is Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Ishaq, or perhaps ibn Ibrahim, al-Bukhari al-Kalabadhi, who died in 380 AH. He authored al-Taʿarruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Tasawwuf, published by Arthur J. Arberry and later edited by Dr. Abdul Halim Mahmood and Dr. Taha Surur, Dar ʿIsa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1380 AH / 1960. See: al-Aʿlām, 6/184.)

Another group said: creation is the created thing. This is the view of many Muʿtazilah, and of the Kalabiyyah like al-Ashʿari and his followers, and many scholars from the Shafiʿi, Hanbali, and Maliki traditions.

Refuting the Philosophers’ Argument for the Universe’s Eternity

The point here is: they argued for the Universe’s eternity by saying that Allah’s being a cause for the Universe is not part of His essence, because we can conceive of Him without conceiving of the Universe. They also said that His being a cause is known, but His essence is not. And since causation is a relationship between 2 things, it must come later and be distinct from both.

They said: “Causation is not a negative concept, because it is the opposite of ‘not being a cause’, so it is a real attribute. If it is emergant, it needs a cause, and its causative nature would then be additional and lead to a chain. But if it is eternal, and it is a relational attribute that cannot exist without both things, then both must be eternal.”

Ar-Razi replied: “Causation is not a positive attribute added to the essence. If it were, it would need a cause, and that would result in the causative nature being additional, and lead to a chain.” (Footnote: ar-Razi, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya, 1/214.)

Ibn Taymiyyah comments: This answer is based on the view that creation is the same as the created thing, and that “action,” “origination,” and “creation” are nothing more than the existence of the created thing, with no additional, real act involved.

Refuting al-Armawi’s Claim of an Infinite Regress in Effects

al-Armawi said: “Someone could argue that the chain of causation occurs in the effects, because ‘causation’ is a relational attribute that depends on both the cause and the effect. So it must come after the effect and requires another causation after the effect. So after every causation, there is another causation.”

He said: “What is denied is an infinite chain in the causes, not in the effects.”

Then he said: “The reply is: a relational attribute that occurs to a thing in relation to something else only depends on the existence of the subject it occurs in. For example, ‘precedence’ is a relational attribute that a thing has in relation to something that comes after it, even if by a large span of time, yet it is still logically impossible for the ‘precedent’ and the ‘subsequent’ to exist together.”

Ibn Taymiyyah comments: al-Armawi’s claim that someone might say: “The chain is in the effects, since causation is a relational attribute that depends on both cause and effect, so it must come after the effect”, this contradicts his later statement that “a relational attribute does not depend on the presence of both, only on the subject it applies to.” If the latter is true, then it would not follow that the cause and effect must exist together in time. The effect could follow the cause, and the causative relation would still hold.

But al-Armawi responds: “What I meant was to use this argument against others who say that causation requires the simultaneous existence of cause and effect. I meant to show that this would lead to a chain of effects, not causes, and this is a valid objection.”

He is then told: for this objection to be complete, you should say: if causation is a relational attribute that depends on both cause and effect, then it necessitates the existence of the effect. One cannot be a cause without there being an effect.

And it is known that the effect comes after the act of causation itself. When one creates, the created thing comes into being. When one causes something, the effect arises. So the effect follows causation, and to say causation follows the effect is invalid.

Refuting the Philosophers’ Argument for the Eternity of the Universe Based on Causality and Infinite Regress

The matter is not as claimed, that causation is preceded by the effect or delayed after it. Rather, causation is either prior to the effect or simultaneous with it, according to some. No philosopher ever said that causation comes after the effect. Rather, some say the effect comes after causation and is separated from it. Others say it is concurrent with it. Still others say it is connected to it, neither separated nor fully simultaneous. This last view is the most correct.

But in both views, whether the effect follows or connects to the cause, causation occurs with the completion of its components. That implies a causation that comes after a prior causation. This is acceptable with no contradiction. The first causation makes the agent a cause of the separate effect, and being a cause for that effect produces the effect itself.

This is according to the majority who say: the cause (mūjib) comes before the effect (mujāb). The effect follows the complete cause. The product follows the full ability of the agent. And the effect follows the completeness of the cause.

As for those, like a group among the philosophers, who say the effect is simultaneous with the cause, their view leads to results that contradict it. If, whenever a complete causation exists, there must also be another complete causation, and so on infinitely, that would be a regress in causations, not merely in effects. A regress in effects means: 1 effect after another.

A regress in causes means: for every cause, there is another cause that exists with it, and not before it. That is absurd, because nothing acts while it does not exist. It can only act when it exists. So, with the act of causing, the cause must exist. The complete cause only exists with its effect. But if its very act of causing produces the effect, then making the complete causation simultaneous with the effect is a kind of regress in causes, not just effects.

Some may say this is what ar-Razi meant when he said: “Causation is not a positive attribute added to the essence. Otherwise, it would need a cause, and its causation would be something added, leading to infinite regress.” He may have meant a concurrent regress, not a sequential one. Because if causation is something added, it would need a cause that coincides with it.

This is the view of some philosophers and theologians. ar-Razi may agree, and in that case, such a regress is invalid by agreement.

So someone might say: this is the very argument ar-Razi used to refute the philosophers, when he said: “The reply is that this implies the permanent presence of the first effect, because of the eternal presence of the Necessary Being. Then the permanence of the second effect would follow the permanence of the first, and so on, and this eliminates all origination of events.”

He said: “If you say: the Necessary Being is the universal source of emanation, and the arising of effects depends on the preparedness of the recipients, then every event is preceded by another event without a beginning.”

I respond: The arising of a particular effect must have a cause. If that cause is itself emergant, then the question returns: what caused that cause? This would lead to infinite causes and effects existing simultaneously, which is impossible. And if that cause is eternal, then just because the cause is eternal doesn’t mean the effect is eternal. The same applies to the Universe in general.

So we say: this argument by ar-Razi is sound. It is a valid objection against their explanation of events, those events referred to as daily occurrences. Every event must have a complete cause. If that cause is eternal, then a new event arising from it disproves their view.

And if the cause is itself new, then by their own standard, it must come with the effect and not before it. Because they insist that a complete cause must be simultaneous with its effect. So, by their logic, any particular event must have a cause that is itself an event happening at the same time. That cause must have its own cause, and so on infinitely, leading to an impossible stack of simultaneous causes and effects. This is clearly absurd and rejected by all philosophers.

Refuting al-Armawi’s Objection

al-Armawi’s objection, then, collapses. His summary: “What follows is the occurrence of the cause or one of its conditions. And they (the philosophers) allow for conditions and preparations to arise successively.”

We reply: yes, they allow for an event to follow another, and they say: “the occurrence of the first event is a condition for the second.” So the condition must exist before the conditioned event. But this contradicts their own principle: that a complete cause must be accompanied by its effect, and that the effect cannot be delayed once the cause is complete.

This requires that when the condition for the cause is complete, the effect must happen with it, not after it. So, every time a new event occurs, it means that the condition for its cause was completed at that very moment, not before. That condition also needs a condition completed at that very moment, and so on forever. This leads to infinite completion of causes happening all at once.

And an infinite regress in causes and in the completion of causes is clearly impossible, known to be false by necessity of reason, regardless of whether you say the effect follows the cause or coincides with it.

But these philosophers cannot maintain the eternity of anything in the Universe unless they affirm that the effect coexists in time with the complete cause. In that case, every event must have a complete cause that is simultaneous with it, and every completion must also have its own simultaneous completion, and so on, resulting in an infinite number of concurrent events.

This is something they themselves acknowledge is impossible and that is obviously false by reason. It resembles the view of Maʿmar and his followers. (Footnote: Maʿmar ibn ʿUbad as-Sulami was a Muʿtazili from Basra who lived in Baghdad and debated an-Nazzam. He was among the most extreme Qadariyyah and founded the Maʿmariyyah sect. He died in 215 AH or perhaps around 220 AH. See: al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, p. 91; al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, 1/97–101; Lisan al-Mizan, 6/71; al-Khiṭaṭ, 2/347; al-Aʿlam, 8/190. For his view on meanings (maʿānī), see: Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn, 1/168; 2/372–373; al-Intiṣār, p. 46–47; al-Fiṣal, 5/46–48; Falsafat al-Muʿtazilah by Albert Nader, 1/221–224; and al-Muʿtazilah by Zuhdi Jarallah, p. 67–69.)

So if this absurdity is a necessary consequence of their view, then we must accept 1 of 2 options: either their argument fails, or nothing new happens in the Universe. The second option is clearly false by observation, so the first is proven: their argument collapses.

Thus, what ar-Razi forced them into is an inescapable consequence. And al-Armawi did not understand the nature of the argument, so he responded with something that does not undermine it.

The confusion arises from how the term “infinite regress” (tasalsul) is used. If one does not specify that it refers to a regress in the act, one might think it refers to a regress in effects, 1 effect after another. But what is really meant here is a regress in the completion of the actor’s agency, that is, if the complete cause and its effect are said to coexist, then what completes the cause must arise with the effect, and what completes that must arise with its effect, and so on. This exposes the flaw in their argument.

As for those who say the effect comes after the complete cause, they might agree with what al-Armawi said, that being a cause for a particular event depends on something new arising, and that the effect follows that. It is not simultaneous.

But this undermines the claim that anything in the Universe is eternal. It supports the view of the scholars of hadith who say: “He has always been speaking when He wills.”

According to them, 1 says: His action regarding a new event is conditioned by something new that completes His causation, and then the event follows that completion. On this view, nothing in the Universe can be eternal. The eternal must always exist with its complete cause, and the effect cannot precede its cause in time.

And if someone says: “He alone is sufficient to bring about what He brings into being, and His act depends on no other,” we say: yes, everything He does depends on nothing outside Himself. But His act of bringing about each created thing happens after a real act in Himself, which is then followed by the created thing. And that act is also preceded by something.

Logic Aligns With The Way Of The Prophets

So we see that these abstract philosophical constructs that have confused even the most main philosophers, who call them the foundations of divine knowledge, when thoroughly examined, are in full agreement with what the scholars of the Sunnah and hadith say, those who truly know the teachings of the messengers. It becomes clear that sound reason confirms and supports the truth brought by the Messenger ﷺ.

Refuting al-Armawi’s Limiting of Regress to Causes

As for al-Armawi’s weakening of the argument by claiming: “the unacceptable regress is in causes (muʾaththirāt), not in effects (āthār), and if causation is preceded by causation, it only means a regress in effects”, this is correct only according to those who say the effect comes after the cause, not at the same time. Because a causation that is preceded by another only shows that it was made a cause by the previous one, not that it is the cause itself.

And the difference between the actor and his action, the creator and his creation, the initiator and what he initiates, is clear. It is the difference between the striker and the strike, the just one and justice, the benefactor and beneficence, this is obvious.

But his argument, that if causation is a relational attribute that depends on both the cause and the effect, then it can come after the effect just as it can come before it, is invalid. For a thing being the cause of something else cannot come after its effect. It must either precede or coincide with it. Otherwise, the effect would exist before the cause, and that is impossible.

Even without relying on this weak proof, the fact that any supposed regress here occurs in effects is too obvious to need such weak evidence.

The answer he gave, that a relational attribute of a thing depends only on the subject in which it resides, is the view of those who say that causation is eternal, while the effect is created. This is the position of some scholars among the Hanafis, Shafiʿis, Hanbalis, theologians, and Sufis. It is based on the idea that creation is not the same as the created thing, and this is the view of most groups.

Some explicitly say the act of creation is eternal and the created thing is emergant. Others say acts are renewed. Some have unclear views on the matter. (Footnote: Abu al-Hasan ibn Shāghlā, Ibrāhīm ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿUmar ibn Ḥamdān ibn Shāghlā, Abū Isḥāq al-Bazzār, died 396 AH. See Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, 2/128–131.)

Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi in al-Taʿarruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Taṣawwuf stated that it is the Sufi view that Allah has always been creating. It was also mentioned by al-Ṭaḥāwī and many of the companions of Abū Ḥanīfah, and by the majority of the Ḥanbalis like Abū Isḥāq ibn Shāghlā, Ibn Ḥāmid, al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā and others. Some Mālikīs said the same and described it as the view of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah. Some of them described the concept of motion without using the word explicitly.

Those who affirm an eternal causation, creation and origination, with a created effect, treat this like the eternal will that precedes a willed object, as stated by the Kalābiyyah and other affirmers of attributes.

So al-Armawi’s answer agrees with the view of these groups. He says that a relational attribute only depends on the subject it belongs to, just as the eternal will only depends on the one who wills, not the object of will. Likewise, ability related to future things depends on the one who possesses it, not the object. So also, they say, with creation: it is an act that depends only on the creator.

Critique of al-Armawi’s Generalisation

However, this answer is weak. His claim that “a relational attribute only depends on the subject in which it resides” is a universal claim that he proves with a single example, precedence. But this single example does not prove a general rule.

This is like those who say: “The object of speech is not a real attribute, because being mentioned or reported about is not an existing attribute.” They argue: “Even non-existent things can be mentioned or reported about.” But this is just a particular example, and it does not prove the general rule.

In reality, the object of a statement may sometimes imply a real attribute, such as the object of commands, prohibitions, and rulings. And it may sometimes not, such as in simple reports.

Furthermore, relational attributes, whether those that imply a real connection, like will, power, and knowledge, or those that are pure relations, may require both related entities. For example: fatherhood and sonship require both individuals. So too do higher and lower, right and left, complete cause and its effect. These do not have a time gap, even if the effect follows the act of causing, their moments are inseparable, according to most philosophers.

You also argue elsewhere that receptivity (qubūl) is a relation between the recipient and the received, and that it cannot be conceived unless both exist. You use this argument against the Karrāmiyyah in the issue of Allah receiving events, and say: His being receptive to events must be an intrinsic attribute. That only makes sense if the events already exist, which contradicts the impossibility of eternal events.

Clarifying the Contradiction in Philosophical Claims

This contradiction is of the same kind as your claim that Allah is capable from eternity while the object of that power is impossible in eternity. And you said: if He is receptive to events in eternity, it would follow that events could exist in eternity. So what then is the difference between the possibility of receptivity, the possibility of the object of power, and the possibility of the effect?

When something precedes something else and resembles it, this specific relation does not require that they both exist in the same time, but only that the time of 1 precedes the other.

But it does not follow that, just because the later is not present with the earlier, the thing to be received, the object of power, and the effect are impossible alongside the existence of the causing, the power, and the receptivity, such that it would be said: He is a Creator while creation is impossible, or He is capable while the thing capable is impossible, or He is receptive while the thing received is impossible.

The Problem of Ancient Will and the Objection of Preference Without a Cause

Also, this response is like the response of those who say that events occur through an eternal will. Their opponents forced them to admit that this would be preference without a cause, as already mentioned. So those critics refuted al-Armawi’s answer, and others also objected, saying: when a particular effect occurs, either the full causation occurs anew, or it does not.

If something new happens, infinite regress follows, as previously explained. And if nothing new happens, then the effect occurs without a new cause, which has already been invalidated, because a complete cause cannot fail to produce its effect.

The Armawian Position and the Role of Sequential Thoughts

Al-Armawi could have replied, based on his own view, that the emergence of bodies depends on the succession of thoughts in the intellect or soul, as he responded to the first objection.

The Inadequacy of The Philosophers Responses

I say: the aim here is to show the final outcome of what these philosophers presented in answering the eternalists (dahriyyah) concerning the most difficult and dangerous of dilemmas. And no intelligent and virtuous mind will fail to notice what is wrong in these responses.

By Allah’s grace, we have already explained the answers to all the philosophers’ arguments in other places and expanded on the matter. We showed how their reasoning can be shown to be false in many ways, and how every group of Muslims is able to refute them using a combined argument drawn from their own statements and the statements of another Muslim group.

So, if a situation arises where 1 has to choose between agreeing with the eternalists in saying the celestial spheres are eternal and denying that Allah created the heavens and the earth in 6 days, thus contradicting the Prophet ﷺ, or agreeing with another Muslim group on a point that neither contradicts the Prophet ﷺ nor sound reason, then siding with a Muslim group on something that does not involve denying the Prophet ﷺ or reason is better than siding with the eternalists on something that contradicts both. This shows clearly that sound reason does not oppose the established reports from the prophets, peace be upon them all. And this is the intended point in this section.

Refuting the Philosophers’ Argument on the Eternity of the Universe

An example of the responses given to the philosophers is to say:

Your first argument for the eternity of the Universe is based on 2 premises:

1: that every contingent thing requires a complete cause.
2: that infinite regress is impossible.

But the term “infinite regress” is ambiguous, as has been discussed earlier. For infinite regress here means that the kind of event depends on another event, and this is agreed upon to be impossible. But in other contexts, “infinite regress” can refer to regress in agents or in effects, or in the full realisation of agents, and that too is a kind of regress.

So the correct judgement is that the forbidden infinite regress is the one in causes and their completions. As for regress in conditions or in effects, scholars have 2 views on that, and you affirm its permissibility.

So we say: either this kind of regress is permissible or not. If it is not, then regress of events is also not allowed, and events must have a beginning. Then your claim that there are events with no beginning collapses, and it becomes impossible that the motions of the heavenly spheres are eternal. This alone invalidates your doctrine.

Now suppose the Universe were eternal: it must either always contain events, whether you say those events occur in bodies or in minds, or it must be the case that in the beginning, there were no events, like the claim that the eternal Universe was a body at rest.

If the first, then it implies an infinite regress of events, and we are assuming that such regress is impossible, so the argument fails. And if the events happened after previously not existing, then it follows that new things emerged from an unchanging eternal being, and this invalidates your argument and implies the possibility of new things occurring without a new cause.

If you say: “infinite regress in effects is permissible”, which is your view, then your argument for the eternity of any part of the Universe falls apart. For it does not prove that any specific thing in the Universe is eternal. It only proves the need for Allah to be continually acting.

At that point we say to you: why is it not possible that the celestial spheres, or everything currently existing in the Universe, or everything Allah creates, are all dependent on a series of events, 1 after another, and that the entire existing Universe is just like any other individual created being?

So your argument is invalid, whether infinite regress of events is permissible or not. In fact, if it is not permissible, then your whole argument collapses, along with your central doctrine that the motion of the spheres is eternal. For that claim is only valid if infinite regress is allowed.

If infinite regress is not allowed, then the motion of the spheres must have a beginning. If infinite regress is allowed, then this provides no proof for the eternity of any particular part of the Universe, since the origination of the spheres could still depend on prior events, and so on endlessly.

Responses to the Claim That This Implies Events Within the Eternal

If you say: “This implies that an infinite series of events occurs within the Eternal Being,” the answer has several parts:

1: this is your own claim, and it is not impossible according to you. For you say the celestial sphere is eternal and also subject to motion, which is an event.

2: even if it were impossible for such events to exist in the Necessary Being, they could still exist in created things, 1 after another. If the succession of these events from the eternal is possible, your argument is invalid. If it is not, then your doctrine and your argument both collapse, for your view is that the sequence of celestial events comes from an eternal being.

3: we are speaking here assuming the possibility of an infinite regress of events. And in that case, 1 must accept either that events occur in the Necessary Being, or that an infinite chain of events comes from Him without occurring in Him.

4: either the occurrence of events within the eternal is impossible, or it is possible. If it is impossible, then the celestial spheres must have a beginning, which is our conclusion. If it is possible, then your argument is invalid.

5: those among the theologians who say “the eternal cannot undergo events” only say this because they believe that an infinite sequence of events occurring in 1 subject implies that the subject itself is emergant. If their view is correct, then the heavens, souls, and everything with successive events must be emergant. And that disproves your argument, for it shows that a created Universe can indeed come from the eternal. This would also invalidate your entire view, since if something that has events is emergant, then events cannot occur in the eternal, whether it is necessarily existent or not.

And if infinite regress of events is impossible, then even those things you mention, like the “intellects” and so on, must be emergant.

And if no event occurs in the eternal, then it must follow that events have a beginning. If the souls have a beginning, then the intellects must also have a beginning, since the existence of the intellects depends on the existence of souls, and not vice versa.

In that case, there is nothing in the Universe that is eternal and has events occurring in it. Rather, either events began to happen in it after a time when they did not exist, or events have always been occurring 1 after another.

The first option means that something new happened without a new cause, which you yourselves say is false, since it would imply preference without a cause. The second option means that nothing in the contingent realm is eternal, which contradicts your doctrine.

If they say: “We do not reject events occurring in the Necessary Being because He is eternal and cannot undergo events. We allow that. But because He cannot have attributes,”

We say to them: this makes the matter easier. For the majority of the people of revealed religions, including most philosophers, reject your foundational premise. And your claim denying attributes is much weaker than the claim that the eternal cannot undergo events.

That is why many Muslims, such as the Kalabiyyah and those who followed them, affirm attributes for the Necessary Being, even if they deny that events occur in Him. So if your only argument for denying events is also your argument for denying attributes, then the arguments proving the falsehood of your view are numerous.

And so, the falsehood of your view in denying the attributes becomes clear, your view that multiple meanings are 1 and the same. Your claim that the lover, the beloved, and love itself are 1 and the same, that the knower is knowledge and the known, that knowledge is the same as will and as power, this is among the most corrupt of statements, as has already been explained when we pointed out how you misled Muslims.

We addressed what you call “composition,” by which you deny the attributes, and we showed that this is not composition in reality, even if, in your terminology, you call it that. And we made clear that even if we accepted your corrupt terminology, you would still have no proof for rejecting what you call composition. The same goes for your argument based on “causality” (ta’thir).

Your claim: “If the causation is eternal, then the effect must be eternal. But if it is emergant, and the emergant thing is the genus of causation, and this is said to be possible, then events have a beginning, and your doctrine is invalid. And if it is impossible, that is, that nothing happens unless something else happens first, this is unanimously rejected by philosophers, and is sometimes called ‘regress’ or ‘circularity.’ And if you say that the specific causation happens after a particular event before it, this implies an infinite regress and events happening within the Eternal.”

We say to you: causation is either something real (wujudī), or it is not real. If it is not real, your argument collapses, this is the response of ar-Razi, and the response of those who say that creation is the same as the created. But if causation is real, it is either inherent in the essence of the cause, or it is external to it. If it is inherent in it, then it is permissible for real things to subsist in the Necessary Being, and this is the view of those who affirm the attributes.

On this assumption, if infinite regress in effects or in conditions is possible, your argument collapses, because it would be possible for a sequence of effects to subsist in the Eternal. If it is impossible, then it must be possible for events to occur through an eternal causation, and this would also invalidate your argument.

If the causation, or its completion, is external to the cause, then it implies the possibility of infinite regress in the conditions, which you deem permissible. And if that is permissible, then infinite regress in causation becomes possible, and again, your argument collapses.

This is because, under this assumption, the full causation is external to the cause.

If infinite regress is not permissible, then a real eternal causation would have to exist outside of Allah’s essence, and no one has said this. But if it is deemed possible, then it becomes possible for the celestial spheres to have emergant from it, and this is what we are aiming to establish.

A Final Response to the Argument from Causality

Another way to answer the argument from causation is to say: if infinite regress in effects is possible, then your argument collapses, since it would be possible for the celestial spheres to arise from 1 causation after another. And if such regress is impossible, then 1 of 2 things must follow: either events arise from an eternal causation, or causation is non-existent, not real. Either way, your argument collapses.

This is because events are observed in the Universe, and they must have a cause. That causation is what you call ta’thir. If that causation is not something real, your argument collapses. If it is real and eternal, then events arise from eternal causation, and your argument collapses again. If it is emergant, and infinite regress is not allowed, then it must be that this emergant causation caused an event, which again invalidates your argument.

This is an answer from which there is no escape. It silences all their arguments.

But if 1 tries to answer them with a position that contradicts the majority of intelligent people, Muslim or otherwise, and makes the creation of the heavens and earth depend on such an argument, which is nothing more than a response to an objection, no rational or religious person would accept this.

It must be known that matters established by the religion of the Muslims must be defended with clear, decisive responses, without ambiguity. This is unlike the approach taken by some of the mutakallimun who claim to clarify knowledge and certainty through proofs and demonstrations.

In reality, what the reader gains from their speech is nothing but confusion and doubt. Even they themselves are filled with uncertainty about what they claim to be definitive proofs. 1 of them may say in 1 place, “This is a decisive proof,” and in another place say, “This same proof produces probability.”

Those who oppose the truths found in the Book and Sunnah with what they claim are definitive logical arguments are, in fact, only opposing them with these flimsy and invalid arguments.

So, whoever does not engage with the heretics and people of innovation in a way that truly cuts off their arguments has not given Islam its due, nor acted in accordance with the requirements of knowledge and faith. His speech brings no healing to hearts, no tranquillity to souls, and no benefit in terms of knowledge or certainty.

Were it not that we have already expanded on these topics elsewhere, and this section is merely for pointing and signalling, not detailed exposition, we would have laid it out in full. But for now, we have pointed to the matter clearly.

Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql (1/327-357)