Anything that is “composed” must be put together by something before it. Simply possessing attributes that are distinct does not mean they are “parts.” Mercy being the whole, for example, presupposes composition, making the question itself false. These attributes are simply descriptors of the “Described.” For a part-whole relation to exist, these attributes would have to be causally efficacious, but they are in fact causally inert.

It is stated that anything “composed” must have a composer. If by “composition” it is meant that we can distinguish the attributes from the dhat, then this is correct. If the one being described possesses an attribute, this does not necessarily mean that the one being described must have undergone a process in which it was put together to be “the whole.” The argument can be made that something which is simple and absolutely one cannot be simple in virtue of itself. It cannot unify itself nor simplify itself. Does this now mean that something else had to make it simple?

The Problem for ADS Adherents

The adherents of Absolute Divine Simplicity (ADS) who bring such arguments must also contend with the following issue: since God is identical to existence (Reality), then by virtue of Him being identical to it, He is reality. This would imply that He is not the only “Reality.” Here, existence is going to be the totality. According to their own definition, something about the subject that is not the whole of it is a part. If God is existence, is He the whole of it or is He part of it?

Now, they must claim that He is a “PART” by their own logic, or concede the fact that a counterfactual dependency in which there is a grounding relation does not make a being contingent.

The Jahmiyyah’s False Assertion of Jawarih (Parts/Limbs)

The Jahmiyyah have asserted that God having hands, a face, shins, and feet makes Him have jawarih (parts/limbs). This is an absolutely baseless assertion which the entirety of Ahl al-Sunnah reject 100%.

The normal Muslim does not adhere to DS (Divine Simplicity), which is the notion that God does not have any distinctions within His essence. Most Muslims, in fact, affirm that God has distinctions within His essence while rejecting composition (to not fall under huduth al-ajsam). This view is the most mainstream, and any other view is considered kufr as per Imam Ahmad (RA).

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Refutation

The refutation to this is very simple, and Ibn Taymiyyah addresses it wonderfully. Below is a summary of his points:

We should reject their definition of tarkib (composition), which states that God must be composite if He has distinctions. This is false. X being composite would require it to have accidental properties or incidental attributes, which God does not possess whatsoever. God’s intrinsic essence is necessary (speaking about the genus of the attributes, not the actions of God, as they are accidental but do not entail a change within His essence nor make Him composite, since they do not add or remove anything from His essence).

If the Jahmi rejects Divine Simplicity, then that is a huge problem for him because of the following:

• Ask him, does Allah have mercy and knowledge?
• He will say yes.
• Ask him, are they distinct?
• He will say yes.
• Ask him, are hands and shins attributes under our paradigm?
• He will say yes.
• Tell him: These attributes under our paradigm are also distinct. There is no difference between you and me. You affirm that God’s mercy and knowledge are distinct, and I do too. You also affirm that it does not entail composition, which I do too. On top of that, I affirm that God has hands and shins, which are distinct yet do not entail composition.

Ontological Existence: Substances and Attributes

Ontological existences divide into two categories:

• Substances (e.g., humans, trees, particles)
• Attributes (e.g., sight, colour)

Attributes do not detach from these substances (with regards to necessary existents) and cannot be considered composite. Whoever considers them composite via a Mu‘tazili definition of what a composite thing is must prove that definition. We, as Atharis, should not affirm their definition, as it is subjective.

Ibn Taymiyyah on the term “composite” being a summary term which has several meanings in Al Radd Ala Mantiqiyīn

“What the philosophers sought to avoid with regard to ‘[deeming something] composite’ – we have spoken about this on another occasion and explained that the term ‘composite’ is a summary term which denotes ‘the [aspect of a] body as composed of parts which were separate but have been joined,’ like for example the composition of ‘oxymel [vinegar and honey]’ and [the composition of other medicines, indeed of foodstuffs, drinks, clothes, housing composed of their parts which were separate and then joined together, the one part being attached to the other until it attains its complete state of composition.” On occasion, what is meant by ‘the composite’ is something in which the one part does not mingle with the other part, as for example when one says: ‘the door was mounted (rukkiba) in its frame’ or ‘the nail was affixed (rukkiba) to the door’. This kind of ‘composition’ (tarkib) is more particular than the first but is well known in language.”

Allah ﷻ has said: He assembled you in whatever way He willed (Quran 82:8). It is clear that a person of intellect would not say that Allah, Exalted be He, is “composed,” neither in accordance with the first meaning nor the second.

Moreover, one may apply the term “that which is composite” to that whose parts may be separated from one another, like the mixing of humours in man and his various limbs. Although they may not be rationally conceived of as being separate, they have been joined together—indeed, Allah ﷻ created them from a drop of sperm, then a blood clot, then a clump of flesh (Quran 23:14). However, it is possible to distinguish between the various limbs and parts, and it is also rationally possible to conceive that when a person dies, he disintegrates, and his limbs and humours separate. But a person of intellect does not say that Allah, Exalted be He, is “composite” in this sense.

However, calling “the One” described with His attributes “composite,” like calling “the Living, the Knower, the Powerful”—who is described with the attributes of life, knowledge, and power—”composite” is an expression used by philosophers that is unknown in any of the divine laws or languages. No one from among the greater philosophers and men of intellect has deemed this to be “composite” or called it “composite.”

If they claim: We call this ‘composite’ because it contains an affirmation of various meanings pertaining to one essence, and we call it ‘composite’ while also establishing rational proof as to its impossibility.

Then one might reply: If the matter is as [you claim] then the examination is (to be conducted] with respect to the rational meanings not with respect to the sounds of the words, moreover we do not agree with deeming man to be “composed of animal-ness and the capacity of articulation”, nor that there is anything in existence which is “composed” of rational parts indeed “that which is composed” of rational parts is in the mind not in actual reality; and everything in existence from among “the composite realities” is “composed” of parts which may be composed of perceptible parts in the outward. People have differed regarding “the body, [the corporeal]” – as to whether it is “composed” of perceptible parts, they being the individual essences, or of rational parts, they being the matter and the form; or neither of the former two this making three opinions [in all].

The correct [opinion] according to us is the third, this is followed [in validity] the opinion of those who deem it “composed of perceptible parts”; while the third is invalidated, viz. the opinion of those who deem it “composed of rational parts” – as has been explained in its place Thus as for those who say that the Creator is “a body” and that the body is “composed” of perceptible or rational parts, a demonstration of proof as to the invalidity of this “composition” would be an acceptable demonstration of proof on the part of the person presenting it for what is required is valid; however, there remains the question as to whether the one making an inference is using a fitting proof against this or not.

As for the one who says that Allah is not “composite” – neither by way of this or that composition – [rather] “I call Him ‘a body’ or ‘an essence’ because ‘a body’ or ‘an essence’ according to me pertains to any existent reality which exists of itself”, then this difference of opinion in his regard concerning the name “body” or “essence” is a dispute over the wording, but is not a rational or legal matter. Indeed the Islamic Shari’a has not pronounced this name, neither in a positive or negative way and the intellect looks to the meaning, not merely at the wording.

Thus any investigation in this matter is either regarding the affirmation of the nature of “the body” as being “composite” in accordance with one of the two [above mentioned] compositions and this is a well-known rational discussion, or regarding the term of “body” being used linguistically to refer to anything composite including this composition [in question here] – and this is a linguistic matter which should be dealt with elsewhere.

However, such people do not merely intend to negate “Allah’s being composite [whole]” in that linguistic sense for many others who affirm the attributes of Allah are in agreement with them on this; rather, their intention is not to describe Allah with any affirmative attribute at all.

They indeed used the term “composite” – with regard to Allah concerning which some of the people of kalam are in agreement with them on negating its meaning and have extended its import to such a degree that they deem it more general than what those mutakallimin have agreed upon they have negated this composite and have become exactly like the Jahmis who reject the names and attributes of Allah ﷻ or who affirm them in a metaphorical way only.”

Shayk Al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah says when we deny tajazzi (division into parts) and inqisam (splitting) regarding Allah, we do not mean that parts separate from Him, nor do we mean that such a thing is even possible. Even if the wording may suggest this more than other meanings, most of the special terms used by those who speak in these matters do not carry their normal meanings in language. Instead, they refer to meanings that they themselves discuss in affirmation and denial. That is why Imam Ahmad (d. 241AH) said about them that they speak with mutashabih (unclear) words and confuse the ignorant by making things appear similar.

Muslims are agreed that Allah is Ahad (One) and Samad (the One who does not depend on anything). He does not divide or separate, meaning that nothing can be cut from Him as bodies are cut, like bread, meat, or clothes. Nor can anything detach from Him as waste detaches from an animal. These meanings do not exist for Him and are impossible in His case. His being does not accept division, nor is He hollow, as the Sahabah (Companions) and Tabiʿun (Followers) explained in their tafsir (explanation) of as-Samad: that He is the One who has no inside space, as will be shown.

Translation: And if it is known that what the imams of this saying mean by denying tajazzi (division into parts) and inqisam (splitting) is not the existence of splitting by some parts separating from others, nor the possibility of that—even if the wording in this case shows that more than in other cases… for most of their special words do not mean what is known in the language, but rather meanings that they alone spoke about in affirmation and denial. That is why Imam Ahmad (d. 241AH) said about them: They speak with mutashabih (unclear) words and confuse the ignorant among people by making things seem similar to them.

And these two meanings are among what the Muslims—based on what I know—are agreed that Allah is above and pure from. For Allah, the Exalted, is Ahad (One), Samad (the One who does not depend on anything), and does not become divided into parts or split up in the sense that one part separates from another like a divided body that is cut up, such as how connected things like bread, meat, and clothes are divided. And no part separates from Him like how waste separates from an animal. These meanings are things He is above in the sense that they do not exist and are impossible in His case. His being does not accept division and breaking apart. Rather, He is not hollow, as the Sahabah (Companions) and Tabiʿun (Followers) said in the tafsir (explanation) of as-Samad: that He is the One who has no inside space, as will be explained.

And most people do not understand from the denial of breaking into parts, division, splitting, and composition except these two meanings and similar ones. And this is agreed to be denied among the Muslims, unless there is someone I do not know among the ignorant and misguided who has allowed that a part of Allah separates from another part, like what is told about some disbelievers. For the children of Adam cannot be counted in what they say. But what is meant is that in the sayings narrated from the groups of the ummah (nation), I have not found anyone narrating this saying from any of the groups.

Bayan Talbis Al Jahmiyyah by Ibn Taymiyyah (3/128-130)