Meaning of The Dhaahir In Uṣūl Al-Fiqh

• The word dhaahir means the clear and more likely meaning that a word gives based on language or normal use, while the word may also have a less likely meaning.
• Al-Āmidī (d. 631 AH): The dhaahir is what points to a meaning through the original wording or through custom, but it can also carry another less likely meaning.
  Example: The word al-ghāʾiṭ literally means a “low place” but is used for “excrement.”
• Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646 AH): The dhaahir indicates a probable meaning, like al-asad (lion) which may mean an actual animal or a brave man. When you move it to the weaker meaning, that is taʾwīl.
• Al-Ḥaṭṭāb (d. 954 AH) and al-Ramlī (d. 1004 AH): The dhaahir is the stronger meaning; the muʾawwal (interpreted sense) is the weaker side.
• Taʾwīl: To move the meaning from the stronger to the weaker one because of a proof that makes the weaker meaning more fitting. If there is no proof, the taʾwīl is not valid.

What the apparent means in the verses and hadiths of the Attributes Of Allah

The basic rule

Maher Ameer explained that when we speak of the dhaahir in the verses and hadith of the Divine Attributes, we mean the linguistic dhaahir, the meaning most apparent to the first Arabic audience, not the imagined meaning of anthropomorphists.

This dhaahir shows affirmation (ithbāt) of the attribute without tashbīh (likening) or kayf (asking how). Revelation, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, never carries a corrupt dhaahir, and no verse or hadith implies anything false in its wording.

How the dhaahir functions in the Attributes

1. The dhaahir of the revealed wording affirms the attribute truly and clearly.
2. The dhaahir does not imply bodily form or resemblance to creation.
3. When Allah mentions “hand,” “face,” “rising,” or “descent,” the dhaahir gives affirmation of an attribute, and its reality is left to Allah without interpretation that denies it.
4. Any person who imagines corporeality is misusing the language; revelation itself does not carry that meaning.

Hence, the dhaahir in the ṣifāt means affirmation according to Arabic, in a way that befits Allah, free from likeness and negation.

Types of Dhaahir

1. Lexical or individual dhaahir: What a single word gives on its own when taken without context.
   Example: The word yad (hand) means the limb in normal Arabic.
2. Contextual or combined dhaahir: What is understood from the full phrase and the setting of the word.
   Example: In “Allah’s hand is over their hands” (48:10), the context can show support, power, or control.
3. Dhaahir with proof: When a valid proof tips a weaker meaning, that tipped meaning becomes the working dhaahir.

• Rule: The original rule in Arabic and Sharīʿah is to carry words on their dhaahir unless there is a sound proof that forces moving to another meaning.

Ibn Taymiyyah vs The Mutakallimūn: Main Differences

1. No “corrupt dhaahir” in revelation

Ibn Taymiyyah says revelation never gives a corrupt meaning. If someone sees corruption, the fault is in his thinking, not in revelation. The mutakallimūn claim some verses have a wrong dhaahir that must be rejected or reinterpreted.

2. No kufr-sounding dhaahir left unclear

Critics claim that many verses sound like corporeality or direction and must be corrected by intellect. Ibn Taymiyyah says revelation explains itself clearly and never leaves the reader in confusion or disbelief.

3. The dhaahir of revelation is complete and sufficient

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the apparent meanings of the Qurʾān and Sunnah, taken together, guide to full truth. The mutakallimūn make the dhaahir depend on philosophical reasoning; they do not see revelation as self-sufficient.

4. The context defines the dhaahir

In Ibn Taymiyyah’s method, the dhaahir includes all the attached words, limits, and descriptions. For example, “He rose over the Throne” (istawā ʿalā al-ʿArsh) is taken with its full phrase, not by isolating the verb istawā alone. The mutakallimūn isolate the single word, imagine it like a human act, call that the dhaahir, then claim they must reject it.

5. Clear rule vs. subjective rule

Ibn Taymiyyah’s rule is simple: affirm what Allah said as it came, “in a way befitting Him,” unless a linguistic or revealed indicator shows otherwise. The mutakallimūn have no fixed rule; each interpreter depends on his own reasoning or school of kalām.

6. Role of reason

Ibn Taymiyyah does not let reason cancel a Qurʾānic dhaahir. Sound reason supports revelation. The mutakallimūn often use rational theories to cancel what the dhaahir indicates, such as direction or rising.

7. Knowledge through the dhaahir

Ibn Taymiyyah, says the dhaahir gives direct knowledge of Allah’s Names and Attributes. The mutakallimūn say we only know what the mind proves first, then the text confirms it.

8. Ease vs. difficulty

Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach gives peace and clarity, since revelation guides directly. Philosophical methods cause endless steps:

First prove the dhaahir is impossible,

then make taʾwīl,

then justify that taʾwīl.

This all leads to confusion.

How The Mutakallimūn Treated The Texts Of The Attributes

The philosophers openly said that some Qurʾān verses and hadiths, taken upon their dhaahir, imply direction, sitting, or limbs. They agreed that such dhaahir meanings must be removed either by taʾwīl (interpretation) or tafwīḍ (consigning the exact meaning to Allah).

Examples:

• Al-Juwaynī (d. 478 AH): Said the people of truth cannot believe in the first meanings that come to Arabic minds from verses of istiwāʾ and nuzūl. These verses must be interpreted or their meaning consigned.
• Al-Ghazālī (d. 505 AH): Anything impossible by reason must be re-explained. The hadiths of resemblance are either weak or must be interpreted.
• Al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH): Admitted that the dhaahir of Qurʾān implies body parts, but said aql (reason) forbids this, so they must be denied.
• Al-Āmidī (d. 631 AH): Said these apparent meanings can never be decisive proofs in creed; when a dhaahir is impossible, we take the distant meaning.
• Al-Taftāzānī (d. 792 AH) and others: Affirm that all verses are upon their dhaahir unless reason contradicts them. When it does, the dhaahir is left, and they either interpret it or consign it.
• Later Ashʿarī and Māturīdī scholars like al-Laqānī, al-Bājūrī, and al-Sanūsī reiterated this: the verses that appear to show direction or form are not accepted in their dhaahir sense; they must be turned away because of rational proof.

In short, all of them agreed that the dhaahir of such verses is not intended. They said aql (reason) shows those meanings are impossible.

Maher Ameer’s Arguments against Saʿīd Foudah

1. The dhaahir is a precise scholarly term, not a false invention.
   The classical scholars defined it clearly: it means the stronger linguistic meaning. Taʾwīl means moving to the weaker sense with proof.
2. The mutakallimūn never claimed that the dhaahir belongs only to anthropomorphists.
   They accepted that the Arabic dhaahir really exists in these texts but said reason forbids taking it literally.
3. They clearly mentioned the “impossible dhaahir.”
   They said that the dhaahir shows direction, place, or limbs, but must be interpreted. So the dispute is not whether there is a dhaahir, but what to do with it.
4. Ibn Taymiyyah’s method is consistent.
   He affirms the wording as it came, accepts the dhaahir according to Arabic and context, and says, “in a way befitting Allah.” If any shift is needed, revelation itself provides it, not outside philosophy.
5. Critics’ method makes revelation dependent on kalām.
   They first judge by reason, then say the dhaahir is false, then interpret it. This destroys the clarity and authority of revelation.
6. Their own inconsistency.
   Their imāms like Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī sometimes affirmed attributes by the dhaahir (like yad and istiwāʾ) and at other times denied that dhaahir. This shows confusion in their method.

What Can We Takeaway From This

• We should accept the linguistic dhaahir as understood by the first Muslims, with all its connected clues, and affirm it in a way befitting Allah.
• Moving away from the dhaahir is only allowed with a clear revealed or linguistic proof, not by philosophical means.
• The real disagreement is not about “whose dhaahir” it is, but about what to do with the real dhaahir of the verses about Allah’s Attributes.
• Maher Ameer shows that the mutakallimūn admitted the same dhaahir that Ibn Taymiyyah affirms, but rejected it because of reason, while Ibn Taymiyyah kept it within the clear language and proofs of revelation.

Clarifying the apparent meaning according to the scholars of usul al-fiqh whom Sa’eed Foudah opposed

Let us consider the apparent meaning that the scholars of usul al-fiqh and the mutakallimun speak about, and whether they really meant by it what seems to some anthropomorphist minds, or whether they are more sensible than the critic and use a precise scholarly term.

As for the apparent meaning, al Amidi (d. 631 AH) defined it as what indicates a meaning by the original linguistic convention or by customary usage, while also bearing another meaning that is less likely. (Naqd al Tadmuriyya p. 86)

Like the word al gha’it [excrement]. (al Ihkam by al Amidi 3/52)

Ibn al Hajib (d. 646 AH) defined it as what indicates a meaning with probabilistic indication, whether by linguistic convention, like al asad [lion], or by custom. If it is carried to the less likely possibility, the word is called interpreted. (Sharh Mukhtasar Ibn al Hajib by al Asfahani 2/415)

Al Hattab (d. 954 AH) mentioned that the apparent meaning in reality is the more likely possibility. If the word is carried to the other side, then the interpreted is its opposite, which is the less likely side. (Sharh al Hattab min Sharh al Waraqat al Majmu’a min al Sharahin p. 291) (Sharh al Ramli min Sharh al Waraqat al Majmu’a min al Sharahin p. 291)

The definition of ta’wil [interpretation] according to Ibn al Hajib is to carry the apparent meaning to the less likely possibility. If you want the correct kind, you add the condition of a proof that makes it more likely. (Sharh Mukhtasar Ibn al Hajib by al Asfahani 2/415)

Al Asfahani explained, saying, this definition includes correct ta’wil and corrupt ta’wil. If you want to define correct ta’wil, you add to what was mentioned your saying, with a proof that makes it more likely. His phrase, with a proof, and what is meant is any proof, whether definitive or probabilistic, excludes ta’wil without a proof, for that is not called a correct ta’wil.

His phrase, makes it more likely, means, it makes the less likely side outweigh its apparent denotation. This excludes ta’wil with a proof that does not make the less likely side outweigh, for that is not called a correct ta’wil. (Sharh Mukhtasar Ibn al Hajib by al Asfahani 2/415)

According to al Juwayni (d. 478 AH), ta’wil is returning the apparent meaning to that to which its end returns in the claim of the interpreter, and it is only used when attached to what is received from words in explicit indication and implied indication. (Sharh Mukhtasar Ibn al Hajib by al Asfahani 2/115)

According to Ibn Hazm (d. 456 AH), ta’wil is to move the word away from what its apparent meaning requires and from what it was placed for in the language to another meaning. If moving it has been established by a proof, and the one who moved it is one whose obedience is obligatory, then it is true. If moving it is otherwise, it is discarded, not attended to, and that movement is judged false. (al Burhan 1/193)

The author of al Kawkab al Sati’, al Suyuti (d. 911 AH), said: The apparent meaning indicates with preponderance, and it is carried to the less likely meaning, an interpretation that is set. If there is a proof, then it is sound. If it is corrupted or for nothing, then it is play.

Thus a word can bear more than one meaning. It is more likely in a certain meaning, and it bears another meaning with a weak possibility. The clear, more likely meaning in the language is the apparent meaning.

The second meaning, which is weaker and more hidden, is the interpreted meaning. The basic rule is that words are carried upon their apparent meanings until you have a proof that justifies carrying them to the more hidden, less likely meaning.

This proof must be valid, otherwise your ta’wil is corrupt. If you interpret without a proof, that is play and foolishness.

Two kinds of apparent meanings

The term apparent meaning is also used for the interpreted meaning figuratively when the ta’wil rests on a proof. We therefore have

1. The lexical apparent meaning, which is the apparent meaning.
2. The apparent meaning by proof, which is the interpreted meaning with a proof.

Among the important divisions in this topic is the division into

1. The individual apparent meaning. This is what appears from a single word by itself without looking at its context or what is attached to it. (Sharh Mukhtasar Ibn al Hajib by al Asfahani 2/415)
2. The composite or contextual apparent meaning. In this we consider the context in which the word occurs, which determines the more likely meaning. (Sharh Mukhtasar Ibn al Hajib by al Asfahani 2/115) (al Burhan 1/193)

The individual apparent meaning matches the lexical apparent meaning in the previous division. As for the composite or contextual apparent meaning here, it is more specific than the apparent meaning by proof in the previous division, since it is limited to what appears from the flow of speech and its connected indicators, not to separate verbal indicators or situational indicators.

What then are we speaking about

The apparent meaning that we affirm concerns us only insofar as it is the more likely meaning in the language. It is more general than all these divisions. It may be the lexical apparent meaning that is understood from a single word when it is used without restriction and not included in any context. If it then enters a context that does not change it, it must be affirmed as it is upon its individual lexical apparent meaning.

At times there is something in the context that prefers a meaning different from what is understood from the word when it is used as a single, independent word. Here the apparent meaning is the composite apparent meaning.

This is the case with those who affirm majaz (figurative usage), who assign to the bare word a specific meaning and a first placement. As for those who do not affirm majaz, they do not recognise at all an individual lexical apparent meaning.

Rather the apparent meaning only becomes clear through composition and context. Then this meaning may be outweighed by other separate proofs, and by the explanation of the Messenger in the Sunnah for example. Here the apparent meaning becomes the apparent meaning by proof, and so on.

If it is said, what is the difference between Ibn Taymiyyah’s use of the apparent meaning and the use of his opponents from the people of kalam

We say, the first difference is that revelation with Ibn Taymiyyah never has a corrupt apparent meaning, and he never accepts describing a corrupt meaning as the apparent meaning, while they make the corrupt meaning the apparent meaning, as in the hadith, I was hungry and you did not feed Me, and the hadith, the Black Stone is the right hand of Allah, for example. They then say, just as we interpreted here, and the apparent meaning was corrupt, it is corrupt there, that is, in the verses of attributes. As for Ibn Taymiyyah, it is not corrupt here or there.

The second difference is that the implication of their words is that revelation contains kufri and ilhadi apparent meanings, without any clarification from Allah and His Messenger of what is intended. With Ibn Taymiyyah the apparent meanings are not like that.

Even if we concede for the sake of argument that some are like that, they have within revelation itself what clarifies them, without resort to kalam theories. With him the matter is from revelation and returns to revelation, and does not depart from it.

The third difference is that all the apparent meanings of revelation together are sufficient to clarify the intended truth, and nothing false is derived from them at all.

With them it is not like that if revelation is isolated from being judged by the rational kalam theories, and by what their minds allow or do not allow to be ascribed to the Creator.

The fourth difference is that when a word is accompanied, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, by what clarifies its meaning, that accompaniment is its apparent meaning. This is like a general word when it is accompanied by an exception, or a limit, or a description. They, on the other hand, focus on the individual apparent meaning.

They ascribe to the apparent meaning the corrupt meaning by looking at the independent word while they keep in mind its usage for a created being. Then they make it an interpreted apparent meaning because of what came with it and clarified its meaning. With them, due to this connected indicator, it is interpreted. With Ibn Taymiyyah, due to this indicator, it is the apparent meaning.

The fifth difference is that Ibn Taymiyyah’s rule in dealing with apparent meanings is straight and clear and without contradiction or slip. The default is to affirm them in a way that befits the Essence of Allah until the opposite is established by an indicator recognised by the people of the language. As for his opponents, they have no sound rule.

None of them is able to distinguish between the texts that need ta’wil and those that do not need it except by something that goes back to the interpreter himself who is hearing the speech, not by something that goes back to the very speaker of the speech. The reference point of ta’wil is therefore subjective, not objective and independent of the inclinations of selves, their outlooks, and their intellectual biases.

The sixth difference is that Ibn Taymiyyah does not allow the comprehensive apparent meaning, not the individual one, to be opposed by any decisive rational proof. They allow that and lay down kalam theories that oppose it. If they do not find a kalam theory that opposes it, some of them are content with the mere possibility of the existence of something that would oppose it to make it probabilistic and to prevent using it as a proof in matters of the Divine attributes.

The seventh difference is that Ibn Taymiyyah makes the apparent meanings useful in knowing the Creator, describing Him, and having knowledge of Him. They, however, consider them as a companion and a confirmer for what they deduced by pure reason alone.

Whatever their pure reason did not indicate, they halted in it, or they returned it to the attributes that their minds indicated. They do not accept that the apparent meanings of the Divine revelation independently define for them an attribute of the Creator without the intellect. This does not include them all. In some attributes some of them were satisfied with the apparent meaning.

The eighth difference is that the apparent meanings in matters of the Creator give guidance, protection from dispute, clarity, and rest for the mind and the soul with Ibn Taymiyyah. With them they give only misery and toil. The mutakallimun toil greatly to establish a certain meaning. Then they toil many times more to show the impossibility of the apparent meaning.

Then they toil beyond that to show that the texts can bear their ta’wil and the meaning interpreted that opposes the apparent meaning whose impossibility they claimed. Thus there is in revelation and in its apparent meanings no clarification and no guidance that removes the disorder of the souls regarding the Creator and knowledge of Him. Rather there is hardship and toil and affliction for minds and souls. In their view, they are keys to dispute among the believers and to evils and to disbelief and to innovation.

Therefore, the apparent meaning that is defended and upheld by Ibn Taymiyyah is the linguistic apparent meaning of revelation. It is the apparent meaning that is only understood through the linguistic consideration of the first audience. It is the more likely meaning in the language, without judging it by kalam theories or philosophical notions that would require interpreting it or consigning its meaning.

This is with a straight, balanced, clear, and objective rule, whose reference point is not the self of the observer and his personal biases. We are certain that no corruption appears from revelation at all, and nothing in it causes a problem except that it is explained within it. It does not compel us to resort to subtle kalam reasoning that escapes the giants of the Ummah from its first to its last.

As for the critic, the special concept he invented for the apparent meaning, which is the apparent meaning according to the anthropomorphists or what the anthropomorphists claim to be the apparent meaning, and his claim that this is what the scholars reject, has no value at all. They explicitly reject the more likely linguistic denotation for reasons they explained.

They do not debate at all whether it is only apparent to the anthropomorphists or not apparent. Rather they begin from the given that what they interpret is the apparent meaning which a decisive proof opposed and which required invalidating the apparent meaning, not that it is not apparent at all or that it is apparent only to the anthropomorphists.

The position of the mutakallimun toward the apparent meanings of the texts of the divine attributes

As for the words of their own imams on the apparent meanings of the texts and on tawil, we will cite what gives a general picture by which we refute the critic. Notice in the following citations that not one of them ever said that he is only conceding for the sake of argument and by way of descent to the mushabbihah what they claim to be an apparent meaning. Notice also that not one of them ever said that he is at peace with the apparent meanings and that he only disputes what his opponent claims to be the apparent meaning. Rather, all of them state plainly that they oppose the apparent meanings.

Some of those apparent meanings are accepted and some are rejected. The decisive rule for them is the absence of a rational contradiction. You will see that they transmit from Abu al Hasan al Ashari, and those who agreed with him the affirmation of additional attributes by some apparent meanings. You will see that others disagreed with him in affirming these apparent meanings, and other plain statements that they oppose the linguistic apparent meaning in reality, not only the apparent meaning according to the mujassimah as the critic claims.

I have prolonged the citations so that the reader has enough material to help him grasp the madhhab of the group, that they stand against the apparent meanings of revelation, to refute this new innovation by which they try to patch the tear in the madhhab, by claiming that the disagreement between us concerns the very notion of what is apparent, not the stance toward it.

Al Juwayni d. 478 AH says, The paths of the scholars have differed concerning the apparent texts that came in the Book and the Sunnah, and it was impossible for the people of truth to believe their purport and to apply them according to what occurs first to the minds of the possessors of the Arabic tongue from them.

Some of them held that these are to be interpreted, and they committed themselves to this method in the verses of the Book and in what is sound from the Sunnah of the Messenger. The imams of the Salaf went to refraining from tawil, running the apparent meanings upon their wording, and consigning the knowledge of their meanings to the Lord Most High. (al Risalah al Nizamiyyah, p. 188)

I say, Al Juwayni is speaking about the paths of the scholars and the stance of the people of truth. Notice his statement that the discussion concerns the apparent meanings that came in the Book and the Sunnah, and not, as the critic says, what the minds of the mujassimah produce. So his problem is with the apparent meaning required by the Arabic tongue, not as the critic says, that the problematic apparent meaning is only what we have claimed to be apparent even though it is not so in language.

He also says, If these people declare the negation of direction, then they have agreed with us in the madhhab and they have spoken by the greatest pillar of tawil. Those who deny tawil fear the removal of the apparent meanings. Whoever negates direction has removed the apparent meaning of istiwa, yet he has not assigned, after stripping the word istiwa of its apparent meaning, any destination for it. The people of tawil have assigned a destination for it. When the matter ends at this, it becomes easy to achieve. (Marginalia on al Nizamiyyah, p. 188.)

I say, Here Al Juwayni is debating one who does not affirm direction, namely the mufawwid. He clarifies that they both agree on removing the apparent meaning. For this reason the matter between them is easy. He is not speaking to a mujassim or a mushabbih, conceding for argument that the meaning of direction appears in the texts while holding that it is not so. Rather he addresses a mufawwid and confirms what they share in agreeing to remove the apparent meaning.

Therefore, the most important pillars of tawil, which the critic supports by the admission of Al Juwayni, is the removal of the apparent meaning. The critic’s attempt to combine tawil with clinging to the apparent meaning of an attribute is a failed attempt. It shows his weak grasp of the very concept of tawil and of what Al Juwayni mentioned about the importance of pushing away the apparent meaning as a first stage before interpreting to a secondary figurative meaning.

He says, As for anyone of our companions who took the path of affirming these attributes by the apparent meanings of these verses, the course of his words obliges him to make istiwa, coming, descent, and side among the attributes, holding to the apparent meaning. (Al Shamil, p. 512.)

I say, Notice how Al Juwayni is refuting some of his own Ashari companions and debating them and binding them with consequences. He is not debating the mujassimah or the mushabbihah and descending to them to concede for argument that the meanings they affirm appear. He therefore binds his companions as follows.

Just as you affirmed attributes type A by the apparent meanings of the verses, it follows that you must affirm attributes type B by the apparent meanings of the verses.

So the discussion from beginning to end concerns the indication of the texts by their apparent meanings for these attributes. They are not disputing their apparentness and indication. They dispute the permissibility of taking them and what follows from taking the apparent meanings of other verses.

Not that his opponents among the mujassimah claim that they are apparent in affirming these attributes while they are not so.

He says, The apparent meaning is therefore left, and reason judges that what brings creation into being is power. (Al Irshad, p. 157.)

I say, This is his admission that the apparent meaning of the texts is the affirmation of the hand, and that he nullified the apparent meaning that affirms the attribute of hand by appealing to reason. He did not dispute its linguistic and contextual apparentness. If not, he would have repelled it by language and context, had they not indicated it and had it not appeared from them.

Al Muqtarih said in his commentary on this discussion, You speak concerning apparent meanings that came in reports and in the Book, and it is necessary to remove their apparent meaning because they oppose what is rational. What we have verified is this. If one possibility remains in the wording after removing the apparent meaning, it becomes obligatory to carry it upon that one possibility. If two or more possibilities remain, one must stop. (Sharh al Irshad by al Muqtarih, 1, p. 280.)

I say, He clarified that his non affirmation of those attributes is only because they oppose the intellects. He did not dispute that they are apparent in revelation. He did not say that they are not apparent in reality and that they are only apparent to the opponent who is a mujassim claiming so.

Al Ghazali says, Whatever the intellect judges to be impossible must be interpreted when there is something reported by hearing that speaks of it. It is inconceivable that the revealed report should contain something decisive that opposes the intellects. As for the apparent meanings of the hadiths of tashbih, most of them are not sound. What is sound among them is not decisive, rather it accepts tawil. (Al Iqtisad fi al I’tiqad, p. 272.)

I say, He is debating what the intellect judges. He is not debating what appears to the mujassimah but is not apparent in reality. He affirms that there are apparent meanings of hadiths in tashbih. Either they are not sound or they are sound but not decisive, rather they accept tawil.

He did not say, as the critic claims, that there are no apparent meanings in tashbih at all and that what they meant by the apparent meanings of tashbih is only what appears to the mujassimah by concession to them. His very path of pushing them away, either by judging them unsound or by saying the sound ones are not decisive, is not a path he would have taken if he could have prevented the appearance of these meanings from the outset.

When he mentioned his method of not involving the common people in tawil, he justified it by saying, This is because the minds of the common people do not have room to receive rational matters, and their grasp of the languages does not have room to comprehend the wideness of the Arabs in metaphors. (Al Iqtisad fi al I’tiqad, p. 272.)

I say, Therefore, these apparent meanings yield falsehood from which one only escapes by explaining the metaphors that push away the false apparent meaning. The true meanings which the critic claims are apparent are not the meanings apparent from revelation. One can only reach them through knowing the breadth of the Arabic language and its metaphors. Metaphor and istiara are contrary to the apparent meaning. His claim that the apparent meaning is with them contradicts this.

Al Salman al Ansari d. unknown says, What verifies what we have said is that what Abu al Hasan al Ashari and al Qadi Abu Bakr al Baqillani mentioned, the affirmation of two attributes additional to power, does not lead to decisiveness.

We, even though we do not deny that the intellect allows the affirmation of a rational and revealed attribute whose entailment is not indicated by the intellect and that one reaches it only by sam, still condition that the sam must be decisive and must produce knowledge.

What they held to are apparent meanings that are probable which do not produce knowledge. The apparent meaning of the word two hands is to carry them upon two physical limbs. If it is impossible to carry them upon that, and it is not permissible to carry them upon power, dominion, or bounty, then to say they are carried upon two pre eternal attributes is pure arbitrariness. (Al Iqtisad fi al I’tiqad with the marginalia of Mustafa Imran, p. 264.)

I say, Al Ansari, a disciple of Al Juwayni, is debating his two imams, Abu Hasan Al Ashari and Al Baqillani, concerning their affirmation of the two hands.

He states that they clung to apparent meanings to affirm them. Are the two of them mujassimah in his view. Does he mean by apparent meaning what appears to the mujassimah and not what is apparent in reality.

Al Ansari does not stop there. He disputes with them over the limits of this apparent meaning. He states that the apparent meaning includes more than what Al Ashari and Al Baqillani affirmed.

The apparent meaning of two hands in reality, according to him, is to carry them upon two limbs. He does not only disagree with them for holding to the apparent meaning. He obligates them to affirm an even more far reaching apparent meaning in affirmation and in tajsim. Otherwise they are being arbitrary in what they claim. All this shows you the inconsistency of denying that their imams diverged from the apparent meaning in reality and their plain admission of that.

He transmits the words of another disciple of Al Juwayni, Al Kiya al Harrasi d. 504 AH. In a book of his on usul al din he criticizes Abu al Hasan al Ashari d. 324 AH who affirms the attribute of two hands for Allah. He says, This is not sound. One says first. The affirmation of a pre eternal attribute must be by a decisive proof. What you mentioned is not decisive. Rather, it is an apparent meaning and tawil can reach it.  (Usul al Din by Al Kiya al Harrasi, Dar al Kutub al Misriyya MS no. 290 Kalam, fol. 144b.)

I say, The affirmation of the attribute is apparent in the texts in reality, not only what appears to the mujassimah. He is debating his own shaykh and imam.

He is not debating a Karrami or a mujassim to descend to him and concede for argument that the affirmation is apparent in the desired meaning while holding that it is not apparent in reality. Rather he starts from its being apparent so that he can permit interpreting it. If it were not apparent, it would have been easier for him to repel it by saying that it is false tawil than to interpret it because it is apparent but not decisive.

Al Razi d. 606 AH says, Know that we have two types of answer to these words. The first type is that we say to the Karramiyyah, you have assisted us by acknowledging that the apparent meanings of the Qur an indicate the affirmation of limbs and bodily parts for Allah Most High. I say, Notice that he is speaking to those who negate bodily parts and limbs and says to them. The apparent meanings of the texts require the affirmation of limbs and bodily parts. He is not descending with opponents to what appears to them and calling it apparent. He is not speaking about what is apparent for them. He admits it is apparent.

Notice that what we claim to be apparent is nearer to them than what they claim is apparent and which they obligate to interpret. They claim that the apparent meaning establishes corporeality and bodily parts and limbs.

We do not agree with them on this. The apparent meaning that we affirm, which the critic calls tajsim and tamthil and over which he disputes with us in its being apparent, is acknowledged by their own imams to be an apparent meaning that includes it and goes beyond it by explicit tajsim and tamthil.

If their imams admitted and affirmed the apparent meaning that we affirm without an addition, that would suffice to expose the critic’s claim that they are with the apparent meaning and that revelation should not show from it what is kufr or bidah. How then, when their imams affirm an apparent meaning which we do not affirm, and they go far beyond it with what only outspoken mujassimah would say.

It is as if the critic says, the apparent meaning is not with you and revelation does not show what you say. We answer, your imams did not only admit the apparent meaning that we claim. They affirmed that and more and then disavowed it and made tawil of it. Then you come to dispute us about the apparent meaning that we claim, which is much less than what your imams stated to be apparent, and you say that revelation does not indicate our apparent meaning while your imams have affirmed what is above it.

Al Razi then says, It is obligatory to cut off and deny these from Allah Most High and to be certain that He is transcendent above them. That is only because decisive rational proofs have established that limbs and bodily parts are impossible concerning Allah Most High. It is therefore obligatory to cut off by tanzih. (Asas al Taqdis, p. 198.)

I say, His saying, That is only because decisive proofs have established, shows that this is the sole reason for denying them. He is not saying that these are not the apparent meanings of the texts. Notice once more that the apparent meaning he claims goes deeper into tajsim than what is considered by us to be tajsim. He does not accept it. He expresses the apparent meaning with such wording.

Al Amidi says, As for what they mentioned among the apparent meanings, we do not allow holding to them in the matters of usul. Along with what opposes them among other apparent meanings, they accept tawil and can be specified. Decisive matters are not derived from what is presumed. (Abkar al Afkar, 1, p. 319.)

I say, Al Amidi mentioned this previously when discussing the texts that affirm al uluw. He did not dispute that they are apparent in affirming this meaning. He rejected them because they are presumptive in his view and thus cannot be a proof against rational certainties in his view.

He says, When it becomes impossible to carry the wording upon its apparent meaning, it becomes necessary to carry it upon what is remote. He says, Know that these apparent meanings, even if one is deluded by them to the extent that one says that their indicated meanings are apparent by linguistic convention and by customary usage, that is without doubt rolling into the system of tajsim and entering the edge of tashbih. (Abkar al Afkar, 1, p. 470.)

I say, This is a plain statement in the very sense indicated by the previous citations. Affirmation is the apparent meaning linguistically and customarily for the first audience. It is not only the apparent meaning for some group. Al Amidi and others do not descend and concede that it is an apparent meaning.

Al Taftazani says, The texts of the Book and the Sunnah are carried upon their apparent meanings as long as no decisive evidence turns them away, as in the verses whose apparent meanings suggest direction and corporeality and the like. (Ghayat al Maram, p. 138.)

I say, He is stating a general scholarly rule and is not debating mujassimah or mushabbihah. He establishes that the texts are carried upon their apparent meanings originally, then he excludes some apparent meanings.

The excluded apparent meanings and the ones not excluded are both apparent meanings linguistically. They are not only what appears to the mujassimah as the critic likes to invent. These linguistic apparent meanings, clear Arabic apparent meanings, are originally to be affirmed except for those apparent meanings that are kufr or bidah which must be excluded because of rational evidence of kalam, a rationality that only they grasp.

He then says, after presenting a set of textual evidences for affirming al uluw and the answer to them, that they are presumptive reports set against rational certainties. One must be certain that they are not upon their apparent meanings. One consigns the knowledge of their meanings to Allah Most High while believing in their reality, or one interprets them with interpretations that are appropriate and agree with what the rational evidences indicate. (Sharh al Nasafiyyah with al Hawashi al Bahiyyah, 1, p. 201.)

Both Al Iji d. 756 AH and Al Jurjani d. 816 AH say, The answer is that they are presumptive apparent meanings that do not oppose the certainties which indicate the negation of place and direction.

Whenever two evidences oppose one another, one must act by both as far as possible. Thus the apparent meanings are interpreted either in general by consigning the detail to Allah, which is the view of most of the Salaf, or in detail which is the view of a group. (Sharh al Maqasid, 1, p. 50.)

They also say, The Shaykh in one of his two statements held that istiwa is an additional attribute not going back to the previous attributes even if we do not know it specifically, but there is no proof for it. It is not permissible to rely, for affirming it, upon apparent meanings from verses and hadiths given the stated possibility. (Sharh al Mawaqif, 8, p. 28.)

The author of Jawharat al Tawhid, Ibrahim al Laqani  says,

Every text that suggests tashbih,
Interpret it or consign it and intend tanzih.

His son Abd al Salam al Laqani d. 1078 AH explains, In the Qur an and the Sunnah there came what gives the impression of affirming direction and corporeality for Him Most High.

The madhhab of the people of truth among both the Salaf and the Khalaf is to interpret those apparent meanings because it is obligatory to declare Him transcendent from what that apparent meaning indicates, by agreement of the people of truth and others.

He alluded to this, giving precedence to the path of the Khalaf for its superiority, when he said, Every text, that is any wording which came in the Book or in a sound Sunnah, that suggests tashbih by the consideration of its apparent indication, that is it casts into the imagination the validity of affirming it, interpret it, which is obligatory, by carrying it upon other than its apparent meaning.

What is meant is to interpret it in detail upon the specific meaning. Or consign the knowledge of the meaning intended by that text in detail to Him Most High, and intend, that is mean and believe with the consignment of the knowledge of that meaning, His transcendence Most High above what does not befit Him.

The Salaf declared Him transcendent above what that apparent meaning suggests of the impossible meaning and consigned the knowledge of its reality in detail to Him Most High while believing that these texts are from Him Most High, sent by the Messenger of Allah.

From what we have clarified it appears that there is agreement between the Salaf and the Khalaf on declaring Him Most High transcendent above the impossible meaning indicated by that apparent meaning, and on interpreting it and taking it out of its impossible apparent meaning, and on believing that it is from Allah brought by the Messenger of Allah. (Sharh al Mawaqif, 8, p. 125. Hاشية Ibn al Amir on Sharh al Jawharah by Abd al Salam al Laqani, pp. 182 to 183.)

Al Bajuri says, His phrase that suggests tashbih means that it casts into the mind the validity of affirming it according to its apparent meaning. His phrase and intend tanzih means intend and hold His transcendence Most High above what does not befit Him with consigning the knowledge of the intended meaning. From what we have clarified it appears that the Salaf and the Khalaf agree on the general tawil because they turn the suggestive wording away from its impossible apparent meaning for Him Most High.

The result is that whenever there comes in the Qur an or the Sunnah what suggests affirming direction or corporeality or a form or bodily parts, the people of truth and others, except the mujassimah and the mushabbihah, agree on interpreting that because of the obligation of declaring Him Most High transcendent above what that suggests according to its apparent meaning. (Hashiyat al Bajuri on Sharh al Jawharah)

Murtada al Zabidi says, Those who refrain from tawil while believing the reality of tashbih are many. Yet they conceal this and say, a hand not like hands, a foot not like feet, an istiwa by the essence not as is known among us.

The muhaqqiq must say, this speech requires clarification. Between your saying, we run the wording upon the apparent meaning, and your saying, its meaning is not comprehended, there is contradiction.

If you run it upon the apparent meaning, the apparent meaning of a leg in His saying Most High, “The Day the leg is uncovered” (Surah al Qalam: 42), is the limb that contains skin, flesh, bone, sinew, and marrow.

If you take this apparent meaning and commit to acknowledging these limbs, that is kufr. If you cannot take it, then where is the taking of the apparent meaning. Did you not mention the apparent meaning. You know the transcendence of the Lord above what the apparent meaning suggests. How then is this taking the apparent meaning. (Tuhfat al Murid, pp. 156 to 157.)

I say, Notice how they claim that the apparent meaning of revelation is these ugly anthropomorphic representations. They declare that their problem is with the apparent meanings. They deem it impossible to affirm the apparent meaning. They are not like the critic who claims that the apparent meanings are on his side and that the dispute is over the very notion of apparentness.

We naturally disagree with them that this is the apparent meaning. Just as the apparent meaning of hearing is not an accident occurring in a limb, the apparent meaning they present is not binding. It suffices us that their imams acknowledge a claimed apparent meaning that includes what we claim as apparent, even though they add to it what the apparent meaning does not require. This is contradiction from them since they do not do this with attributes that they affirm upon their apparent meaning.

Ibn Jamaah d. 733 AH discusses the verse, Are you secure from He who is in the heaven, al Mulk 17. He says, Know that the decisive rational proof and the widespread transmitted proof show that the mentioned verses are not upon their apparent meaning, for several reasons. The preposition fi indicates containment. Allah is exalted above being contained within any of His creatures. (Ithaf al Sadah al Muttaqin, 2, pp. 109 to 110.)

Al Sanusi d. 895 AH says, As for the sixth foundation, which is holding in the doctrines of faith to the mere apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah without distinguishing between what is impossible in its apparent meaning and what is not impossible, there is no doubt that this is a foundation of kufr and bidah. (Iydah al Dalil, p. 145.)

I say, This is a very important text. His problem is not with one verse or one hadith taken out of context and isolated from other textual evidences. Rather, the entirety of the Book and the Sunnah should not be relied upon when stripped of the sieve of kalam. He says, One must take the doctrines and learn them first from the certain rational demonstrations to which many of the muhkamat point which are the mother of the Book, such as Surat al Ikhlas and the like.

If after that there is found among the verses and hadith what contradicts in its apparent meaning what we learned from the clear muhkamat verses which rational certain evidences testify to, then it is obligatory to believe concerning it that its impossible apparent meaning is not intended by Allah nor by His Messenger, decisively. He says, The bidah that arises from holding to the mere apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah is very abundant. (Sharh al Muqaddimat by Al Sanusi, p. 117. The investigator’s note on the margin of Sharh al Muqaddimat of Al Sanusi, p. 117.)

I say, He has explained that the Book and the Sunnah are not sufficient for guidance and clarification and hitting the mark. We seek refuge in Allah.

He says, As for the Salaf, they say, our portion from this verse is that we cut off with tanzih for our Master, majestic and exalted, from carrying istiwa concerning Him Most High upon its apparent meaning of sitting and the like of the attributes of bodies which are impossible for Him Most High rationally and textually.

Then we consign the intended meaning after this to Allah Most High. This is because designating the intended meaning of that according to Arabic usage at most yields presumption, and the issue is not among the branches of the Sharia, so one does not rely upon presumption in it. He says, As for what is impossible in its apparent meaning, such as He rose over the Throne in Ta Ha 5, we turn it away from its apparent meaning by agreement. (Sharh al Muqaddimat by Al Sanusi, p. 119. Al Manhaj al Sadid fi Sharh Kifayat al Murid, p. 207.)

Al Dusuki  comments on the previous. The sum of what the author mentioned is that whatever the Lawgiver informed about, if reason allows it, then it is obligatory to believe in it upon its apparent meaning. If reason deems it impossible, it is turned away from its apparent meaning. If it has one interpretation, it must be carried upon that. If it has multiple interpretations, then consign the matter in designating what it is carried upon among those interpretations to the elders.

The designation of one of them becomes obligatory according to the Imam. The author said this. The madhhab of the Imam is tawil, which is the madhhab of the Khalaf. Thus they deem obligatory turning it away from its apparent meanings. If its interpretation is one, it must be carried upon it. If there are many, it is obligatory to carry it upon one of them. The madhhab of the predecessors, the righteous Salaf, is tafwid. That is, one turns the wording away from its impossible apparent meaning, then one consigns the intended meaning of it after that to Allah Most High. (Hashiyat al Dusuki on Sharh al Kubra of Al Sanusi, MS, fol. 669b.)

I say, The matter depends on the minds of the mutakallimun. Whatever their minds accept, they accept its apparent meaning. Whatever their minds reject, they reject its apparent meaning. The Mu tazilah come to judge the apparent meanings by their minds as well. Then the Batiniyyah. Every person of falsehood lays out for you a theoretical proof that yields a claim with which he contends against the apparent meanings of revelation.

Where then is the authority of revelation. Notice that all this serves to indicate our desired point. All of them plainly state that their problem is with the apparent meaning. They make obligatory turning it away by reason and kalam. They do not deny that it is apparent in reality.

Al Baydawi d. 685 AH says, A fourth category consists of other attributes which the Shaykh affirmed. These include istiwa, hand, face, and eye, affirmed because of the apparent meanings that came mentioning them. The rest interpreted them.

I say, Al Baydawi acknowledges that the apparent meanings affirm these attributes and that this is what led his imam to affirm them by following these apparent meanings. This is contrary to the critic’s claim that they are not apparent when we agree with him in affirming. Al Baydawi here speaks about Al Ashari’s reliance on these apparent meanings, not the reliance of the mujassimah.

Al Asfahani d. unknown explains, The Shaykh Abu al Hasan al Ashari affirmed other attributes. He affirmed istiwa as another attribute.

He affirmed hand as an attribute beyond power. He affirmed face as an attribute beyond existence, and eye as another attribute, relying upon the apparent meanings that came mentioning them. The rest interpreted the apparent meanings. (Isharat al Maram, p. 220.)

Al Asfahani says in another place, One answered concerning the mentioned verses, which accept tawil because of their apparentness, that they do not oppose rational certainties which do not accept ta wil because of their being decisive. (Matali al Anzar on Tawala al Anwar, p. 184.)

Al Abri d. unknown says in his Sharh on the same passage of Al Baydawi, One answered concerning the mentioned verses that even if they indicate corporeality, spatial delimitation, and direction, they do not oppose rational certainties which do not accept ta wil. (Sharh al Abri on Tawala al Anwar, MS, fol. 151b.)

al Subki  says, The great calamity and the terrible disaster is to pass the texts upon their apparent meaning and to believe that this is what is intended, and to believe that it is not impossible concerning the Creator. That is the statement of the mujassimah, the worshipers of idols. (Tabaqat al Shafiiyyah, 5, p. 192.)

He says, They are a group who strayed from the path and whose sight became blind. They run the verses of the attributes upon their apparent meaning and believe that this is the intended meaning. (Tabaqat al Shafiiyyah, reference as above.)

I say, Notice how he censures them for running them upon their apparent meanings. He does not claim that their apparent meanings are with him and his companions and that they have affirmed for them apparent meanings that are not, in reality, the apparent meaning.

Al Bayadi says, Clarification of the general ta wil. When it is not possible to carry those texts upon their literal meanings of bodily limbs, corporeality, spatial delimitation, and emotional effects because decisive rational demonstrations prevent that, it is not permissible to invalidate the foundation because the reality of the attribute without a kayf is not grasped. One carries them upon figurative usage, upon attributes without a kayf. One believes what the verses and well known hadiths reported while declaring transcendence from what their apparent meanings suggest of kayfiyyat, spatial delimitation, and emotional effects, even if their details are not known. (Al Ibharj Sharh al Minhaj, 1, p. 361.)

Akmal al Din al Babarti says, The Ashari affirmed other attributes such as istiwa and hand as an attribute beyond power, and face beyond existence, and eye, arguing from the apparent meanings that came. The rest interpreted the apparent meanings. The better is to follow the Salaf. (Isharat al Maram, p. 220.)

I say, Al Ashari and the Salaf affirmed the attributes by following the apparent meanings. The apparent meanings indicate affirming them. They are not only what appears to the mujassimah and mushabbihah while not being apparent in reality.

Al Farhari says, The Ashariyyah held that any text that contradicts the rational proof is turned away from its apparent meaning. The soundness of the text is either known by rational reasoning, which is that it is the speech of the one who possesses the miracle, truthful, from Allah. Reason is the foundation of transmitted report.

The foundation is therefore not repelled by the branch. To clarify the matter, these texts are called the mutashabihat. The texts of attributes are mutashabih. The scholars of the Sunnah, after their agreement that their apparent meanings are not intended, went two ways. (Sharh Tajrid al I’tiqad, MS, fol. 130a.)

Wahbi Sulayman Ghawji al Albani d. 1434 AH says, This is the way of the Salaf, may Allah have mercy on them. Do you not see that they say, pass them without a kayf. If they had not interpreted them by a general ta wil with the meaning that we have clarified, it would not be correct for them to say that.

Why do they pass them without a kayf when the indication of the language and the clear Arabic formulation prevents any confusion or ignorance, whether in the origin of the meaning or in its kayfiyyah. They were certain that the kayfiyyah is not upon the apparent sense indicated by the Arabic formulation and the language because of what other muhkamat verses indicated. (Al Nibras, pp. 263 to 264.)

I say, Their problem, in the two previous texts, is with the linguistic apparent meaning. They hold that it necessitates tajsim, which is kufr. What ta untold in revelation is greater as an attack than saying that it came in clear Arabic yet is a guide to tajsim and a guide to kufr.

He continues, If your work had been merely to cite the verses and to list the hadiths and the aathar and you had stopped there, no blame would be directed to you. But you interpreted these texts and said that the words used in them allow a number of meanings. We believe the true apparent meaning. It is known, decisively, that the real apparent meaning that first comes to the minds for the word yad is the limb, the organ, the part, the extremity which is the instrument of taking and giving. (Al Qawl al Tamam, p. 126.)

I say, See how he plainly censures whoever affirms the real apparent meaning. He does not dispute that it is apparent. Then see what he extracted from revelation and what he intended by expressing its apparent meanings by words with which he seeks to censure those who affirm, with what they do not hold.

He says, An important alert. There is no disagreement between the two parties that the texts of the attributes are turned away from their apparent meanings, even if they differ whether one can know the meaning to which the wording was turned or not. The sum of the matter is that the two parties have agreed on turning the texts of the attributes away from their apparent meanings. They have agreed that the texts of the attributes are not among the muhkamat whose meanings are known by themselves. (Al Qawl al Tamam, pp. 60 to 62.)

This relates to what is transmitted from them on this specific issue.

What then if you add to what preceded of citations the explicit statements of the Ashari rhetoricians that the mutashabihat among the texts of the attributes are mentioned in the text by way of tawriyah. Tawriyah is contrary to the apparent meaning. They also plainly state that the indicators that turn the apparent meaning away are hidden and obscure. What is close and first to come to the mind from these texts is not intended.

The intended meaning is the remote hidden meaning that is only known by a hidden and non apparent indicator. This intended meaning is the very meaning that the critic claims is the near apparent meaning, contradicting thereby those who know more than him and are more aware of the Arabic and the art of rhetoric. Their words will come to you later in their exact phrasing.

Thus, the critic has judged himself and all these imams to be ignorant when he mentioned a verification that all of them say is contrary. When he presented himself as holding to the apparent meaning and that the apparent meaning of the texts being tajsim and therefore bidah or kufr is impossible and should not be said, we answer that this has indeed been said by the tongues of his own imams and by his own tongue. From the preceding citations we have observed the following matters.

One. All of them use the term apparent meaning in its known usuli sense and for what is reached linguistically without applying the rational kalami indicator.

Two. None of them claimed that he descends and concedes for argument to the opponents’ saying that these apparent meanings affirm attributes while they are not so. Rather all of them speak of the apparent meaning in these verses without limitation. They do not restrict it to what appears to the mujassimah.

Three. None of them claimed to be at peace with these apparent meanings and that they are on his side. Rather they are problematic for all of them.

Four. None of them claimed that his problem is with how some people understand these apparent meanings. Rather their problem is with the very linguistic apparent meaning.

Five. None of them claimed that he rejects the apparent meaning because it is not apparent as the opponent claims. Rather they reject it because it contradicts reason while they submit that the apparent meaning indicates affirmation that opposes their rationalities.

Six. Most of them state the apparent meaning by drawing a comparison with the created being. They claim an ugly apparent meaning of tamthil so that they can later interpret it.

Seven. They contradict themselves by attributing to their imam the affirmation of the attributes and that he affirmed them by following the apparent meanings, then claiming that these apparent meanings are apparent meanings of tajsim and tamthil that must be interpreted. How then did your imam affirm these attributes by following the apparent meanings.

Al-Intisar lil-Tadmuriyyah By Maher Ameer Pages 871-890