Breakdown of Maher Ameer’s Words

Every Existent Has A Specific Reality

Every existent thing in reality has a kayfiyyah (mode of being). This does not mean that its detailed “how” is known, described, or entered into. Rather, it means that every existent has a real haqiqah (reality), mahiyyah (essence), and kunh (inner essence) by which it is what it is, and by which it differs from other things.

This is why the Salaf affirmed the kayfiyyah of Allah’s sifat (attributes), while also forbidding anyone from explaining, describing, or delving into its hidden reality. The meaning is affirmed, the reality exists, but the detailed kayfiyyah is unknown to creation.

Distinction Cannot Come From Mere Shared Existence

Every existent shares in the general meaning of “existence.” Fire exists, water exists, creation exists, and the Creator exists. But this shared meaning cannot be what makes each one distinct from the other, because it is common to all of them.

The real distinction between things must come from their specific external existence. Fire is not water because the specific reality of fire is different from the specific reality of water. Likewise, the knowledge of Allah is perfect and all encompassing, while the knowledge of creation is limited and deficient, because the reality of the Creator’s knowledge is not the same as the reality of the creation’s knowledge.

So kayfiyyah (mode of being) and mahiyyah (essence) mean the particular realisation of a thing in reality, and the source of the effects and necessary traits that distinguish it from other existents.

External Existence And External Essence Are Not Two Separate Things

The specific external existence of a thing is not separate from its external mahiyyah (essence). Rather, the specific external existence itself is the thing’s realised essence.

Therefore, when an attribute differs from another attribute, this difference is due to the reality of each attribute being different. Attribute A is not Attribute B, and both are different from the Dhat (Essence). They are not merely one shared, bare existence in reality.

The Attributes Are Distinct Realities

Affirming a distinctive reality for Allah’s sifat (attributes) was not only the position of Ibn Taymiyyah. It was also the position of many who affirmed the attributes, from earlier and later imams, because they held that the attributes are real existents with real distinction.

Al Tilmisani said: “The mahiyyah of each attribute, such as life, knowledge, power, and will, is distinct from the other both in the intellect and in existence.” (Sharh Maʿalim Usul al Din, 122).

He also explained that the attributes cannot all return to one single attribute. Life, knowledge, power, will, speech, hearing, and sight differ in their meanings, relations, effects, and opposites. Power is opposed by incapacity, while knowledge is not opposed by incapacity. Some attributes relate to objects, and some do not. Some produce effects, and some do not. If all of them were one single attribute, then the same attribute would both relate and not relate, both be opposed and not opposed. This would combine two contradictories in one reality. Therefore, “they are realities that exist.” (Sharh Maʿalim Usul al Din, 335).

Sharing A Trait Does Not Mean Sharing The Same Reality

When the Muʿtazilah objected that eternal attributes would share eternality with the Creator, and that this sharing would require sameness, al Razi answered that different realities can share in some necessary traits without becoming the same reality.

He said: “Why can it not be that the Essence and the attributes, while differing in mahiyyah and reality, share in eternality? For it is not impossible that different things share in some necessary traits.” (Nihayat al ʿUqul, 2/240).

This means that sharing in one description does not make two things identical. Allah’s Dhat (Essence) and His sifat (attributes) may share eternality, while still differing in reality and meaning.

Existence Without Essence Is Inconceivable

Mustafa Sabri also affirmed that an existent without mahiyyah (essence) is impossible. He quoted the agreement of Ibn Rushd al Hafid and al Ghazali on this meaning. Ibn Rushd admitted that whatever has no mahiyyah has no essence, and al Ghazali said: “Existence without mahiyyah is inconceivable.” (Mawqif al ʿAql wa al ʿIlm wa al ʿAlam, 3/103; Tahafut al Falasifah, 191).

The point is simple. An unrestricted existence cannot be understood except as belonging to a specific reality. If the reality of an existent is denied, then existence itself becomes unintelligible. It would be like saying: “existence, but no existent,” which is a contradiction.

The Error In Saying Every Mutakayif Is Created

The claim “every mutakayif (thing with kayfiyyah) is created” is mistaken, because every existent in reality has a kayfiyyah (mode of being), meaning a real essence and reality.

The issue is not whether Allah’s attributes have a real kayfiyyah. They do. The issue is that the kayfiyyah of Allah’s attributes is unknown to creation, and it is impermissible to describe or imagine it. Affirming that Allah’s attributes have real meanings and real distinction does not mean likening Allah to creation.

False Universals Built From Creation

Some people create broad universal claims from their limited observation of creation. When they want to deny an attribute, they say: “Every A is B,” then force B upon the one who affirms the attribute.

But this type of universal is not always necessary. It may only come from observing creation. By contrast, some universal judgements are necessary in the intellect, such as the distinction between things through their specific realities.

So the correct principle is that every real existent has a specific reality, and every real attribute has a distinctive reality. This does not require tashbih (likening Allah to creation), because the reality of Allah’s Dhat (Essence) and sifat (attributes) is unlike the reality of creation.

Full Translation

There is nothing existent except with a kayf (mode of being).

This is made clear in several ways:

The first way: The numerous narrations transmitted from the Salaf affirming the kayfiyyah of the attributes of Allah, the unknown kayfiyyah which is forbidden to explain, describe, or delve into.

The second way: the natural disposition of man affirms that every existent that is distinct has a reality (haqiqah) specific to it, and an inner essence (kunh) by which it differs from other existents.

The third way: the rational judgement that it is impossible for an existent to have nothing but the ruling of existence as a shared universal, and that its existence in the reality is the very same as the universal existence itself.

So whoever denies affirming kayfiyyah in the sense of a reality and an inner essence is asked: what is the reason for the distinction of each existent from what is besides it in  reality, and for the origin of its external effects and necessary consequences that separate it from other things? Is it the shared existence which all existents are described with, or the specific existence?

Nobody of sound intellect would choose the first, because it is a shared universal that includes substance, accident, water, fire, the Creator and the creation. So it cannot be the cause of distinction and differentiation of existents in reality.

If you were to ask even the simplest of people, “Why is the knowledge of Allah encompassing of what was and will be, while the knowledge of the creation is deficient and failing?” he would not say to you, “The reason for that is that the first knowledge exists and the second knowledge exists.”

Rather, he would answer with obviousness that this distinction comes from the fact that the reality of the knowledge of the Creator differs from the reality of the knowledge of the creation.

Therefore, the basis of the distinction of an existent in the external world from other existents is its own specific external existence, which is what separates things in reality. So the specific external existence of fire is not the same as the specific external existence of water. And this specific external existence is the very reality (haqiqah) and essence (mahiyyah) by which the existent differs from other existents.

We do not say that the external mahiyyah is one thing and the external existence is another. Rather, the specific external existence is the very same as the external mahiyyah. By kayfiyyah and mahiyyah we mean only this, that is: the particular realisation of the thing in reality, and the source of its effects and necessary traits which distinguish it from other existents.

Accordingly, the distinction of attribute (A) from attribute (B) can only be due to the reality of the first being different from the reality of the second, and both being different from the reality of the Essence. So they are not pure abstract existence in reality.

And affirming the mahiyyah and the distinctive reality of an attribute was not something that Ibn Taymiyyah alone held.

Rather, it was the saying of the majority of those who affirmed the attributes, both the earlier and later ones, among those who affirmed that the attributes are existents with real differentiation.

In fact, they relied upon this very axiom, that the attribute has a distinctive reality, in order to prove that the attributes are existents, and that if they were all identical, and all one single identical thing, then it would follow that the different mahiyyahs and realities which differ most greatly in consequences, relations, and opposites would all be one single reality.

So al-Tilmisani said: “The mahiyyah of each attribute, such as life, knowledge, power, and will, is distinct from the other both in the intellect and in existence…” (Sharh Maʿalim Usul al-Din, 122).

And he said: “It becomes clear that they are additional to the Essence and existent, and they cannot be reduced to one single attribute, for they are distinct realities, and each one is proven by its own particular proof.

Knowing some of them is not knowing others. Some of them are not related, like life. Some of them are related, like knowledge, power, and will. Some of them produce effect, like power and will. Some of them do not produce effect, like knowledge, speech, hearing, and sight.

Some of them are opposed by what others are not opposed by. Power, for instance, is opposed by incapacity, while incapacity does not oppose knowledge.

If they returned to one attribute, then it would follow that the same attribute both is opposed and not opposed, both relates and does not relate.

That would be to judge with two contradictories upon one essence. And they cannot be reduced to mere ahwal (states) additional to the Essence. For those who deny ahwal, and this is the truth, there is no problem. So it is established that they are realities that exist.” (Sharh Maʿalim Usul al-Din, 335).

And when the Muʿtazilah wanted to refute them for affirming existent attributes, and forced upon them that the eternal attribute would then share with the Creator His eternality, thus the two would resemble each other due to sharing in the description of eternality, al-Razi answered them that different realities can share in some necessary traits, and such sharing does not mean sameness of realities.

So he said: “Their statement that the eternal attributes would be equal to the Essence in eternality, and that sharing in eternality necessitates sameness, we answer: why can it not be that the Essence and the attributes, while differing in mahiyyah and reality, share in eternality? For it is not impossible that different things share in some necessary traits.” (Nihayat al-ʿUqul, 2/240).

And among those who confirmed that it is impossible for there to be an existent without kayfiyyah, meaning reality and mahiyyah, was Mustafa Sabri. He transmitted the agreement of Ibn Rushd al-Hafid and al-Ghazali.

He said in words that summarise the stance of all three: “Ibn Rushd, who followed their path in his book al-Kashf ʿan Manahij al-Adillah, admitted that whatever has no mahiyyah has no essence. And Imam al-Ghazali said in Tahafut al-Falasifah: existence without mahiyyah is inconceivable.

Just as non-existence without reference to an existent whose non-existence is imagined is inconceivable, likewise an unrestricted existence is inconceivable except with reference to a specific reality, especially if it is restricted to one single essence. So how could something be restricted to one, distinct from others by meaning, yet have no reality?

Denying mahiyyah is denying reality. If the reality of the existent is denied, existence itself cannot be understood. It is as if they said: existence but no existent, which is a contradiction.” (Mawqif al-ʿAql wa al-ʿIlm wa al-ʿAlam, 3/103; Tahafut al-Falasifah, 191).

If we were to bring all their words, the space would not suffice. What we have mentioned is enough, and the reader can refer to the places where they debated the Muʿtazilah in order to compel them to affirm the attributes, and that one of the evidences they used for affirming them was that they are distinct realities, distinct also from the Essence.

With this you know the mistake of the objector when he said in one of his lessons: “Every mutakayif (thing with kayfiyyah) is created.” For we have shown that every existent in reality has a kayf and reality, according to them and according to us.

These general universal statements are among the easiest things for every false claimant to say. Whenever you differ with them regarding something, let us say you differ with them regarding attribute (A), they come to you and say: “Every (A) is (B),” in order to force upon you (B).

And (B) will either be a necessary trait which they have made falsehood, or it will be falsehood which is not a necessary consequence.

Their universals are taken from incomplete observation of created beings. But when your turn comes and you say to them: “Every existent is either inside another or outside it,” they say: “This is a result of incomplete observation.”

Yet in reality this is necessary and universal for existents in the intellect, unlike what they claim of universals which the intellect does not find necessary to generalise, nor any problem in affirming (A) without (B).

Intiṣār Tadmurīyah Page 146-149