Al-Amidi’s Definition of Emergent Attributes
Al-Amidi defines emergent attributes as anything that comes into existence after not existing, whether as an independent entity or as an attribute of something else. He excludes concepts like states and relations, saying these do not truly exist and are only imaginary. He claims that the consensus of reasonable people from the religions denies the possibility of such emergent things occurring in Allah, except for the Karramiyyah, who allowed some types of events—like speech or will—to occur in Allah’s essence. However, even they maintained that these do not introduce new names or descriptions for Allah, holding that His names are all eternal, including ‘Creator’ and ‘Provider’, even before any creation or provision.
Ibn Taymiyyah’s Response on Terminology and the Real Dispute
Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the distinction al-Amidi draws between ‘emergent’ and ‘renewed’ is purely terminological and does not affect the reality of the issue. He points out that even among those who affirm states, there are those who say these states do exist in a dependent way. He explains that the actual disagreement concerns whether any act, attribute, state, or perception can occur in Allah’s essence, such as speaking, willing, being pleased, or knowing something once it exists. Ibn Taymiyyah says it is not accurate to claim that all people of religion deny this—because no authentic report from the Prophets or their followers supports such a denial. Rather, both the scriptures and the traditions confirm that acts and attributes do arise in Allah.
Historical Context and the Rise of the Dispute
Ibn Taymiyyah explains that the denial of such attributes only began after the appearance of the Jahmiyyah, at the end of the era of the Tabiʿin. They rejected all attributes from Allah and claimed that no new act can occur in His essence. This view was taken up by the Muʿtazilah and strongly opposed by the early scholars. The saying that “the Quran is created” emerged from this denial, as it implied that speech could not exist in Allah.
Before Ibn Kullab, scholars affirmed that both essential and volitional attributes could exist in Allah. Ibn Kullab made a distinction, allowing only attributes like knowledge and life but denying those related to will and power. Ibn Taymiyyah traces this denial to him and his followers.
Views On The Matter
Ibn Taymiyyah mentions that Ibn Karram came after Imam Ahmad, and his views were opposed by most Muslims. However, even among opposing groups like the Shia and Murji’ah, there were those who affirmed that events can occur in Allah, such as speaking and movement.
These views were also upheld by hadith scholars who held that Allah acts whenever He wills and that denying this leads to more serious problems, such as imagining Allah’s speech as a single unchanging eternal meaning or accepting absurd ideas about seeing non-existent things.
Among philosophers, there were also disagreements. Some early philosophers before Aristotle affirmed that the universe came from new causes. Later scholars like Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi and al-Athir al-Abhari also accepted that movement and change could occur in Allah.
The View of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri and Others
Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledges that the position of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri—that Allah’s modes of knowing change as things come into existence—was supported by several earlier and later figures, including Hisham, Ibn Aqil, and even ar-Razi in some of his later works. Ibn Taymiyyah also clarifies that when the Karramiyyah say all Allah’s names are eternal, they refer to the meanings behind the names, not the uttered names themselves. According to them, Allah’s speech is emergent and happens within His essence, but they do not consider it created.
Refuting the Argument That Emergent Things Cannot Occur in Allah
Al-Amidi quotes an argument used to deny emergent attributes: if Allah can have events occur in His essence, He would always be involved in new things or their opposites. Since He would never be free of events, He must be emergent. Ibn Taymiyyah says this as the same argument made by eternalist philosophers like Ibn Sina, who claimed that nothing can arise from Allah after not existing. They argued that if something occurs due to His essence, it must be eternal, and if it occurs due to something else, it leads to a contradiction or implies Allah is not the true origin of all things.
Ibn Taymiyyah replies that even Al-Amidi (Ashari Scholar) acknowledged the Karramiyyah’s reply: that whatever happens in Allah’s essence can be explained in the same way theologians explain the occurrence of events outside of Him—through His eternal will and power.
The Mistake of Denying Chosen Acts Without a Cause
Ibn Taymiyyah points out a deeper contradiction. Many theologians and philosophers say that Allah has will and choice but then deny that He can bring about a specific outcome without a distinct cause to explain the preference.
But this undermines the entire basis of their argument for Allah’s existence in the first place, which relied on the claim that events must have a cause. If preference without cause is impossible, then nothing could begin. And if it is possible, then there is no need to deny acts occurring in Allah.
Final Response to the Philosophers
In response to the philosophers, Ibn Taymiyyah says either events have a beginning, or they are an endless sequence.
If they have a beginning, then something must have occurred without a cause, invalidating the philosopher’s reasoning. If they are endless, then earlier events must have preceded the spheres they claim to be eternal.
In that case, it is entirely reasonable that those earlier events include successive acts of will occurring in Allah’s essence. This supports that acts and attributes can occur in Him without implying deficiency.
Translation: Ibn Taymiyyah’s Response to al-Amidi’s Argument Against Emergent Attributes Occurring in Allah’s Essence
We will now mention what Abu al-Hasan al-Amidi said about this foundational issue and respond to it. He said in his large book called Abkar al-Afkar, in the fourth issue of the fourth section, which he titled “Refuting Anthropomorphism,” in the chapter on the impossibility of emergent things occurring in the essence of Allah, exalted be He:
He said: “Before engaging in argumentation, it is necessary to clarify the matter under dispute. So we say: the intended meaning of the emergent thing that is disputed is: what exists after not existing, whether it is an entity that exists independently, or an attribute of something else such as an accident.
As for what does not exist—such as non-being or states (according to those who affirm them)—these are not described as existing or non-existing, such as knowledge, power, will, and similar concepts, or relationships and associations, which are, according to the theologians, imaginary things that have no existence. So whatever is realised after not being is called mujaddad (renewed), not hadith (emergent).”
He said: “And based on this, we say: the rational people among those with religious traditions and others agree that it is impossible for emergent things to occur in the essence of Allah, exalted be He—except the Magians and the Karramiyyah, who agreed on its possibility. However, even the Karramiyyah did not allow for every emergent thing to occur in Allah’s essence. Most of them said: what occurs in His essence is only that which is needed for creating and bringing things into being. Then they differed about what that emergent thing is—some said it is His saying ‘Be’, others said it is the will. So the creation of the will or the statement, within His essence, relies on the eternal power, not that it itself is caused as an emergent thing. As for the creation of other creatures, it depends on the will or statement, according to their various views. The created thing that exists in His essence, they call it hadith, and that which is outside His essence they call muhdath. Some of them also added two other emergent attributes: hearing and seeing.”
He said: “The Karramiyyah unanimously agreed that any emergent attribute occurring in His essence does not bring about a new name or ruling for Him. So they do not say: ‘He is one who speaks due to a statement,’ or ‘one who wills due to a will,’ but rather they say: ‘He is a speaker through qudrah to speak, and one who wills through qudrah to will. They do not allow attributing to Him any renewed name that did not always apply. Rather, they say that all His names are eternal—even the names ‘Creator’ and ‘Provider’—even though in eternity there was neither creation nor provision.”
He said: “As for the emergent attributes that have no real existence—those which are states—there is consensus among the theologians that Allah cannot be described with them, except for Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, who said that Allah’s modes of knowing change as the known things change. As for relationships, associations, and connections, the rational people agree that Allah can be described with them—like saying that He exists with the universe after it was not, or that He created the universe after it was not.
And as for negations and privations: if it is the negation of something whose existence is impossible for Allah—like saying He is not a body, not a substance, not an accident, and so on—then this is not considered emergent by consensus. But if it is the negation of something that could hypothetically apply to Allah—like relationships and associations—then it is not impossible for Allah to be described by it after it had not applied.
For if the emergent thing exists, then it is valid to say that the Lord exists alongside it, and this maʿiyyah (togetherness) ceases to apply when the emergent thing ceases. So He acquires a negative attribute after not having it.”
Ibn Taymiyyah’s Response: The Terminology Is Artificial and the Argument Contradictory
I say: he mentioned that by “emergent,” they mean something that exists after not existing—whether it exists independently, like a substance, or is an attribute of something else, like an accident. And he called what is not truly existent—such as states, privations, and associations—mujaddad (renewed) and not hadith (emergent). This distinction is just a matter of terminology, otherwise there is no real difference in meaning between “renewed” and “emergent.”
Also, as for states—according to those who affirm them—some of them say they do exist. They say it is valid that they are known through something else, and that their existence depends on something else. They disagreed with Abu Hashim, who said: they are neither known nor unknown, neither existent nor non-existent.
As for relationships and associations, the philosophers considered some of them to be real existents, depending on language and usage.
So we say: the words hadith (emergent) and mujaddad (renewed) cover many meanings in Arabic. In common usage, these terms can imply harmful events—like illness, grief, and sorrow—when people say, “something happened to so-and-so.” Many people even use the word events to describe sins and disobedience. This is widely known.
The Real Point of Dispute
The actual point of dispute is: can there occur within Allah anything related to His will and power—whether in the form of acts, like establishing Himself above the Throne, coming, descending, and so on; or in the form of speech and words; or in the form of states, like joy, anger, will, approval, and laughter; or in the form of knowledge and perception, like hearing, seeing, and knowing something once it exists after having previously only known that it will exist?
If this is the real dispute, then his claim that “rational people from all the religious communities and others agree that this is impossible, except the Karramiyyah…” is not an accurate report.
The Misattribution of Denial to the People of The Religions
As for the people of the religions, nothing can be attributed to them as religious people except what is proven from the Prophet of that religion—peace and blessings be upon him—or what there is consensus about among his followers. As for what some followers of a religion may say from their own reasoning or interpretation—especially when scholars disagree with them—it is not allowed to attribute it to the religion.
And it is well known that no one can bring a single authentic report from Muhammad, peace be upon him, or his brother messengers like Musa and Isa—peace be upon them all—that supports the view of the deniers, not explicitly nor even implicitly. Rather, the scriptures reported from them with certainty, and the widespread hadiths reported from them, support the opposite of the deniers’ view, and are in agreement with the view of those who affirm Allah’s attributes.
Likewise, the companions of the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, their followers, the leading imams of Islam from the famous madhhabs, and the early shaykhs of Islam—no one can bring an authentic report from any of them supporting the view of the deniers. Rather, what is widely and reliably reported from them agrees with the view of those who affirm Allah’s attributes. So to attribute the denial of emergent attributes to the people of the religion is clearly false.
The Origin of the Dispute: The Innovation of Jahmiyyah
Theologians and dialecticians from among the people of Islam began to dispute this issue only after the emergence of the Jahmiyyah, who denied the attributes. That occurred after the first century, at the end of the era of the Tabiʿin. Before that, no one was known among the people of Islam to say that Allah has no attributes, nor that emergent volitional matters do not occur in His essence.
When this belief appeared, and the Muʿtazilah took it up, they said: accidents and emergent things cannot occur in Him. What they meant was: no attribute such as knowledge or power can exist in Him, nor any act such as creating or establishing Himself. The leading early scholars strongly opposed them on this, and this is widely known and reported.
That is why the Muʿtazilah said: “The Quran is created”—because if it were to exist in His essence, it would mean that actions and attributes exist in Him. The Salaf and the leading imams all unanimously rejected this view.
The Introduction of a Distinction Between Attributes
Everyone who came before Ibn Kullab affirmed the existence of attributes, words, and actions in Allah that relate to His will and power. But Ibn Kullab and his followers introduced a distinction: between the essential attributes, like life and knowledge, which they said do exist in His essence; and attributes linked to will and power, which they said do not. They argued that affirming these would require a succession of emergent events in Allah—something they denied, as will be discussed.
The Position of Ibn Karram and the Salaf
Ibn Karram came much later—after the trial of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Ibn Karram died around 260 AH, which was some time after Ibn Kullab. Most of the Muslims before that opposed both the Muʿtazilah and the Kullabiyyah—including even the theologians among the Shia and Murji’ah, such as the followers of Hisham, Abu Muʿadh at-Tumani, Zuhayr al-Athari, and others, as reported by al-Ashʿari in his Maqalat.
These types of groups affirmed that emergent things occur in Allah. Some even openly stated that movement occurs in Him, as did various hadith scholars and scholars of the Sunnah. They affirmed that He has always been speaking whenever He wills, and that movement is among the necessities of life, and so on. They also held that the innovations introduced by the theologians that contradicted the scriptures and sound reason were rooted in this very denial—like those who said that speech is a single, eternal meaning; or that non-existent things can be seen and heard; or that a particular sound could be eternal.
The Philosophers and Their Differences
As for those outside the religious traditions, the philosophers themselves differed on this foundational issue. What has been reported from many of their leading early figures is that they affirmed it, as was discussed previously in the collection of their views. Some of them openly stated that movement occurs in Allah. Indeed, the philosophers before Aristotle affirmed that the universe emerged from occurrent causes. They believed in this principle—some explicitly, some by implication.
Likewise, among the later ones, Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi (author of al-Muʿtabar) held this view. A group of later scholars also adopted it, such as al-Athir al-Abhari and others.
The View of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri and Its Supporters
What al-Amidi reported from Abu al-Husayn al-Basri is also the view of others, both before and after him—like Hisham and those like him. Ibn Aqil supported Abu al-Husayn’s view, and this is in line with what the Salaf said. Ar-Razi leaned towards Abu al-Husayn’s position, and even went beyond it—as he himself mentioned in al-Matalib al-ʿAliyah. In fact, he defended it.
As for what was quoted from the Karramiyyah—that they say all of His names are eternal—they mean: the meanings of His names, that is, the reasons for which He deserves those names, like creatorship and provision.
As for the names themselves, they are part of His speech, and His speech, according to them, is emergent and exists in His essence. They do not allow for there to have been speech or names in eternity, because that would necessitate emergent things without beginning, or the eternity of a specific utterance—both of which they reject.
What was reported from the Karramiyyah—that the creation of will and speech within His essence is connected to eternal power, and the creation of things in the universe is linked to will and speech—is merely his way of expressing their view. In reality, they do not call anything that occurs within Allah “created” or “brought into being.” They only refer to it as “emergent,” and do not say His will or speech is created or originated.
A Weak Argument Against Emergent Attributes in Allah
He (al-Amidi) said: “Those of the truth have argued that it is impossible for emergent things to occur in Him with weak arguments.”
The first: they say: “If the Creator were capable of having emergent things occur in His essence, then He would never be free of them or of their opposites. And the opposite of an emergent thing is also emergent. So whatever is not free of emergent things must itself be emergent. But Allah is not emergent.”
He said: “This argument is built on five premises: first, that every emergent attribute must have an opposite; second, that the opposite of an emergent attribute must also be emergent
Refuting the Philosophers’ Argument Against Occurrent Attributes in Allah’s Essence
We say: this is the argument of the eternalist philosophers, like Ibn Sina and those like him, who claim that nothing ever emerges from Allah after not having been. They use this reasoning to reject both attributes that occur within His essence and those that occur outside it. Their argument is this: If the cause of any occurrent effect is the divine essence, then the effect should be eternal as the essence is eternal.
But if the cause is something outside the essence, then either it is produced by Allah or it is not. If it is produced by Him, a circular cause results—since the occurrent effect depends on an external occurrent cause, which itself would need a prior cause, eventually requiring something within Allah’s essence. But if the external cause is not produced by Him, it must be independent and self-existent—making it more deserving of divinity than Allah Himself.
This, they say, is why no occurrent attribute can occur in His essence or outside of it.
Al-Amidi himself showed the weakness of this argument, even among philosophers who debated the Karramiyyah. He said: “The Karramiyyah say about emergent things occurring in His essence what you say about emergent things outside it. You say those things are brought about through His eternal will and power. They say the same about what occurs within Him.”
And there is no doubt that this response cuts off the objections of the mutakallimeen—like the Muʿtazilah and Ashʿariyyah—but it does not end the objections of the philosophers. That can only be done by what all groups agree upon: that the One who has will and choice may give preference to one possibility over another without an external cause, or that His eternal will chooses one possibility over another without needing a separate explanation.
But many among the scholars of hadith, kalam, and philosophy opposed this view and said: it goes against what is known by necessity. They argued that if you say that choosing between equal possibilities needs no cause, then you undermine the very principle by which you proved the existence of the Creator—because you had earlier argued that preferring one thing over another without a cause is impossible, and therefore there must be a Creator.
Response to the Philosophers on Behalf of the Followers of the Prophets
We now present a response to the philosophers, on behalf of all the followers of the Prophets:
The first point: Either the sequence of events must come to an end, or it is allowed to continue infinitely. If you claim that it must come to an end, then you must admit that there was a first event. And this requires that something occurred without a prior cause, which invalidates your claim that every event needs a prior event. And it would also mean the collapse of your view that the motions of the celestial spheres are eternal.
But if you allow for the infinite continuation of events, then every event must still be preceded by another. In that case, if you say the spheres are occurrent, then something must have occurred before them. And it is possible that those earlier events were the successive wills that occurred in the essence of the Necessary Being. You yourselves say that every event must be preceded by another—so why can’t this sequence include volitional acts occurring within Allah Himself?
Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql (4/18-45)
