Ibn Taymiyyah says that the confusion between wujud khariji (external existence) and wujud dhihni (mental existence) is one of the main causes of misguidance among the philosophers.
He said that the philosophers looked at things before they existed and saw that they were known, intended, and distinguished between what could be done and what could not. From that, they thought that these meanings must be real and fixed outside the mind. Ibn Taymiyyah clarified that this is false, and that what is fixed before existence is only in the mind, not in the external world. (Majmu‘ al-Fatawa 9/97–98)
He explained: the mahiyyah (essence) is what the mind conceives from a thing, while wujud (existence) is the very reality that exists outside the mind.
This distinction forms one of the foundations of correct knowledge and sound belief. Whoever confuses them ends up with one of two corrupt paths, the path of the philosophers who turn mental concepts into realities, or the path of the sophists who deny the existence of the external world.
Understanding the Two Existences
Wujud Dhihni (Mental Existence)
This refers to what exists in the mind, such as:
- Universals (like “humanity” or “life”)
- Abstract concepts, definitions, and images
- Things that may not exist externally (like imagination, possibilities, or even impossibilities)
These things are real in the sense that the mind knows them, but they do not have existence in the outer world.
Wujud Khariji (External Existence)
This refers to what exists outside the mind, the concrete, particular, and real things that we can see, hear, touch, and sense.
Ibn Taymiyyah said that what exists outside is always specific and particular, never universal. The universal only exists in the mind, as a concept that represents many individuals. (Majmu‘ al-Fatawa 9/127)
The Two Main Errors When the Distinction Is Ignored
1. Confusing Mental Existence for External Existence
The falasifa claimed that universals such as “the absolute man” or “the absolute horse” exist outside the mind.
Ibn Taymiyyah explained that the Pythagoreans said numbers exist outside the mind, Plato said universal forms exist outside, and Aristotle claimed universals exist together with individuals. Ibn Taymiyyah rejected all of this and said, “What is outside is not universal at all. Outside there is only what is specific and determined.” (Majmu‘ al-Fatawa 9/127)
This kind of thinking leads to giving created mental concepts a kind of eternal reality, which contradicts Tawheed. It also leads to speaking about Allah using abstract ideas instead of what He revealed about Himself.
2. Confusing External Existence for Mental Existence
This is the error of the sophists and skeptics. They deny that the external world truly exists, claiming that everything is only mental or subjective.
Ibn Taymiyyah described them as those who doubt whether reality exists at all, or who think that reality changes with people’s beliefs. He said that this is the same as those who deny the senses and treat knowledge as imagination. (al-Safadiyyah 1/98)
When it comes to Aqeedah, this leads to denying the reality of revelation, angels, the Hereafter, and miracles, because these are all external realities affirmed by revelation, not mental concepts.
The Correct Position
A person must affirm that:
- Wujud khariji (external existence) is what Allah created, it is the true reality of the universe.
- Wujud dhihni (mental existence) is only a representation or image of that reality in the mind.
This means that:
- Universals exist only in the mind.
- What exists outside is always specific and real.
Ibn Taymiyyah said: “What is called the universal in the outside means that the universal in the mind matches the individuals that exist in the outside. What exists in the outside is specific and determined, not universal at all.” (al-Radd ‘ala al-Mantiqiyyin, p. 135)
Why This Distinction Is Crucial in Aqeedah
1. Protecting Tawheed
When philosophers gave independent reality to abstract ideas, they created false “eternal” things besides Allah such as “universal existence” or “absolute essence.”
Ibn Taymiyyah said that this kind of thinking leads to shirk in understanding existence, because mental notions ed up sharing eternity that belongs only to Allah.
By distinguishing between the two existences, we affirm that only Allah’s existence is truly eternal, and all other things are created and dependent.
2. Understanding Allah’s Attributes (Sifaat) Correctly
Some philosophers treated Allah’s attributes as separate realities or as mental concepts only. Ibn Taymiyyah clarified that the attributes are real and belong to Allah externally, not just in the mind. At the same time, we do not turn these meanings into mental abstractions or something made up of matter.
This distinction helps maintain the middle path of Ahl al-Sunnah, avoiding both ta‘til (denial) and tashbih (likening).
3. Preserving Belief in Revelation and the Unseen
Revelation informs us about real things that exist outside of our perception, like angels, Paradise, and the Fire. If someone denies external existence or reduces it to mental experience, he will end up denying the unseen (ghayb).
Affirming wujud khariji means affirming that the words of Allah describe real external realities.
4. Balancing Reason and Revelation
Ibn Taymiyyah explained that existence in the mind is prone to error, while existence in reality is the standard by which the mind recognises and corrects its mistakes. The mind can imagine wrong possibilities, but revelation and sensory reality set the boundaries of what is real.
The Role of Possibility and Reality
Ibn Taymiyyah said that there are two kinds of possibility:
- Mental possibility (imkan dhihni): when something can be imagined without knowing whether it is possible or not.
- External possibility (imkan khariji): when something can truly exist outside, as shown by its existence or the existence of something similar to it. (al-Radd ‘ala al-Mantiqiyyin, p. 318)
This means that what is possible in thought is not always possible in reality.
This stops someone from saying: “Anything I can imagine must be possible.” Many false beliefs start this way. The correct way is to judge possibility by what Allah and His Messenger affirmed as existing or possible.
The Relationship Between Essence and Existence
Ibn Taymiyyah explained that the mahiyyah (essence) is what is conceived in the mind, while wujud (existence) is what is real outside. If both terms are used for the same thing (either both mental or both external), then they are the same. But if one refers to the mind and the other to the outside, then they differ. (Majmu‘ al-Fatawa 9/98–99)
When it comes to Aqeedah, this shows that what we think of as “essence” in our mind does not exist by itself outside. It only exists when Allah creates it as a real being.
The Attributes and Their Existence
Ibn Taymiyyah said that attributes do not have independent existence apart from the beings they describe. They exist with the beings, not before them. (Majmu‘ al-Fatawa 9/100)
This means that in the external world, an attribute cannot exist without its subject.
For example, “colour” does not exist alone; it exists in a coloured object.
When it comes to Aqeedah, this helps us understand that Allah’s attributes are not separate things but belong to Him in a real, perfect, and unique way.
Certainty and Knowledge
Certainty (yaqeen) is not an external thing; it is a state of the believer’s mind. Ibn Taymiyyah said: “The fact that a matter is certain or probable is a relative matter according to the state of the believer in it. It is not a description of the statement itself.” (Majmu‘ al-Fatawa 19/211)
This means that external realities exist independently, but our level of certainty depends on how clearly we know them through revelation, evidence, and reasoning.
Language and Meaning
Ibn Taymiyyah applied this same distinction to language.
He said that people make a mistake when they claim that the “literal meaning” of a word is what first comes to the mind, because words are never used in absolute isolation. They are always used in a context, and context determines their meaning. (Majmu‘ al-Fatawa 7/105–106)
When it comes to Aqeedah this protects us from interpreting the attributes of Allah based on imagined, isolated meanings. Instead, we interpret them according to the usage of the Arabic language and the context of revelation.
Full Article on How Ibn Taymiyyah explained the difference between what exists in the mind (wujud dhihni) and what exists outside in reality (wujud khariji),
and how failing to distinguish between them led philosophers and sophists into error.
How Ibn Taymiyyah used this principle to resolve matters in knowledge and aqeedah,
such as the nature of universals, the link between essence and existence, the reality of Allah’s attributes, the limits of human reason,
and how language conveys meaning in the Quran and Sunnah.
Ibn Taymiyyah holds that the philosophers’ confusion between the marks and properties of mental existence and external existence is the root of their misguidance.
The Shaykh says: “The root of their defect is only that they saw that a thing, before it exists, is known, intended, and distinguished between what can be done and what cannot be done, and the like.
They said, if it were not established, it would not be like that, just as we speak about the realities of things which are their essences while setting aside their existence outside.
So the mistake is imagined that these realities and essences are fixed matters in the outside. The correct view is that all of that is something existing and fixed in the mind, not outside the mind, and what is posited in minds can be wider than what exists in concrete individuals.
The true and sound distinction is that the essence is what becomes imprinted in the soul from the thing, and existence is the very thing that is in the outside.” (Majmu Fatawa 9/97-98)
Based on this, the distinction between the two existences, and a precise identification of the marks and properties of each of them, is in turn one of the roots of guidance.
So in this article let us try to lay our hands on the most important differences between mental existence, that is scientific existence, and external existence.
I would also like to point out that this epistemic doctrine is often called nominalism, or the nominalist trend in knowledge, but I think to ignore this label now and to be content to name it the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences.
The reason is that there is still a lack of clarity in the conception of the old nominalism, the nominalism of Ockham, and the new nominalism, scientific nominalism, and their relation to conceptualism, which I see as closer to the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences than to the old nominalism.
Since Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, is one of the most important people who enriched the discourse on the distinction between the two existences and used this distinction to treat many deep philosophical problems, as we will see, I will rely on him mostly for this article.
I will also rely on contemporary writings on nominalism, especially what the philosopher Abu Ya‘rub al Marzouqi wrote about the nominalism of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun.
In order to preserve the consistency of the statements, the criterion for attributing them must be clear, and there is no criterion better than the criterion of the distinction between the two existences, which is one of the epistemic roots of Ibn Taymiyyah.
Mental existence contains universals, conceptions, and abstract concepts, while external existence contains concrete individual things.
Ibn Taymiyyah said, “It is fitting for a rational person to distinguish between the establishment of a thing and its existence in itself, and between its establishment and existence in knowledge.
For that is the concrete external real existence, while this is called mental and scientific existence, and there is nothing except that it has these two establishments.” (Majmu Fatawa 2/158)
If a person does not distinguish between these two existences he will be drawn to one of two possibilities.
First, that he makes mental existence as if it were external existence, as if he has conferred on mental existence the marks of external existence. This is the root of the realist doctrine in knowledge.
Ibn Taymiyyah explains the realist doctrine with its directions and madhahib by saying, “This is the beginning of their philosophy which Pythagoras devised, and they used to call his followers the people of number.
They thought that abstract numbers exist outside the mind. Then it became clear to Plato and his followers that this was wrong, and they thought that the abstract essences, such as the absolute human and the absolute horse, exist outside the mind and that they are eternal everlasting.
Then it became clear to Aristotle and his followers that this was wrong, so they said rather these absolute essences exist outside in conjunction with the existence of individuals. Some of those who followed Aristotle among the later ones proceeded on this, and this is also wrong, for what is outside is not universal at all, and there is outside only what is determinate and specific.” (Majmu Fatawa 9/127)
Second, that he makes external existence as if it were mental existence, as if he has cancelled external existence or has given external existence the marks of mental existence. This is the root of the sophistic doctrine in knowledge.
Ibn Taymiyyah explains the directions of this doctrine by saying: “And these are of the same kind as the sophists who pretend not to know and the agnostics. (Ibn Taymiyyah divided sophistry in his book, marked here as S, 2, p. 419, into three types, and he mentioned about the second type the following: “A type is the saying of the blameworthy ignorant agnostics who halt, who say, we do not know whether there is a reality and knowledge or not. Worse than this is the saying of one who says, I do not know and I do not say, it exists or it does not exist, or it is living or dead.”
Al Farabi (d. 339 AH) said in his book Ihsa al Ulum, p. 24, edited by Dr Uthman Amin, al Khanji, Cairo, 1350, 1931, “This name, I mean the sophists, is the name of the craft by which a person is able to practice fallacy, deception, and confusion through speech and suggestion. It is composed in Greek from sophia, which is wisdom, and from astis, which is the deceptive, so its meaning is a painted wisdom.” And see also what I mentioned in S, vol. 2, p. 18 a t ?, p. 419 t. 02.)
Those who say, we do not know whether realities are established or negated, and whether knowledge is possible or not possible.
Sophistry has kinds. One of them is the saying of these.
The second is the saying of the people of denial, rejection, and negation, who assert the negation of realities and of knowledge of them.
The third is those who make realities follow beliefs. Whoever believes a thing is established, then, in his regard, it is established.
Whoever negates it, then, in his regard, it is negated. They do not grant realities a state that they have in themselves.
The fourth class is the saying of one who says, realities exist, but there is no path to knowledge of them, either because the cosmos is in flux, so knowledge of its true nature is not possible, or for some other reason.” (al Safadiyyah, Ibn Taymiyyah, 1/98)
Ibn Taymiyyah’s division of them, by way of their stances toward reality and their statements about it, springs from their denial of external existence which is the locus of realities. For this reason they reduced external existence to mental existence. They treated it as they treat mental existence and so they split into the four groups mentioned.
Those who said we do not know whether realities are fixed or negated were doubting external existence and doubting the senses. This means that the outside for them is nothing but mental conceptions that cannot be established. Their like are those who deny reality.
As for those who make realities follow beliefs, these correct certain statements and conceptions taken by taqlid, not by rational discernment, then they make the outside follow these conceptions.
That is, conceptions are the foundation and the outside is the follower. They invert the matter, because conceptions are taken from the outside which is the origin and source of reality. As for denying the possibility of reaching reality, this includes affirming external existence yet with a doubt about the senses.
The mind then becomes unable to generalise and to produce universals and thus remains confined to the concrete.
This puts a person in absolute relativity whose basis is the denial of existence and the keeping of the mental. That is, to affirm existence while accompanying it with doubt about the senses becomes like the statement of denying existence, because there is no value to existence except with affirming the senses that carry knowledge from the outside.
Before ending this point I would like to point out the efficacy of the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences in explaining the philosophical differences between philosophical madhahib (schools).
Universals are rational, built upon induction of particulars, and particulars are external and sensible. Whoever has not conceived the thing that exists, how can he conceive its genus and its species.
External existence is wider than that it could be fully encompassed or comprehensively exhausted in respect to human perception of it.
There is no conception except that there is above it a more complete conception. This is the stance of the doctrine of the distinction.
As for the sophistic stance, it considered the variation of conceptions as casting doubt on the existence of truth or on the possibility of reaching it. As for the realist stance, it considered what it reaches of mental conceptions to be the very truths that exist in the outside. Based on that, it is not possible to encompass what exists outside, while the possible encompassing for a human being is partial encompassing.
Ibn Taymiyyah said, “There is no conception except that above it is a more complete conception, and we do not conceive something with all its concomitants so that nothing slips from them. The more the conception of the attributes of the conceived is, the more complete the conception is.” (Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 59, Dār al Kutub al ‘Ilmiyyah ed., Muhammad Hasan Isma‘il)
Mental existence is wider than external existence in terms of the plurality of possibilities and in terms of mental estimations. For mental conceptions are wider than external realities, for they include the existent, the non existent, the impossible, and the estimations.
This is the nominalist conception in knowledge. Its counterpart among the realists is to believe that multiple rational possibilities exist in the outside, and among that is to believe that non existence is something, while the correct view is that it is nothing except in the mind. As for the sophistic trend, it exploits this rational kind of possibilities in order to deny reality or deny reaching it. Mental possibility differs from external possibility.
Mental possibility is that a thing is presented to the mind and its impossibility is not known, not because its possibility is known but because its impossibility is not known, while that thing may be impossible outside.
External possibility is that one knows the possibility of a thing in the outside, and this occurs when one knows its existence in the outside or the existence of its like or the existence of what is farther from existence than it. If what is farther from accepting existence exists and is possible of existence, then what is closer to existence than it is even more deserving.
Ibn Taymiyyah says, “Possibility is used in two ways, mental possibility and external possibility. Mental possibility is that a thing is presented to the mind and its impossibility is not known. He says this can be, not because he knows its possibility but because he does not know its impossibility, while that thing may be impossible in the outside.
External possibility is that one knows the possibility of a thing in the outside. This will be by knowing its existence in the outside or the existence of its like or the existence of what is farther from existence than it. If what is farther from accepting existence exists and is possible of existence, then what is closer to existence than it is more entitled.” (Ar Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen Page 318)
Following the concept of mental and external possibility is another concept, the concept of mental and external participation. Participation in external possibility is the subject matter of applied mathematics. Participation in mental possibility is the subject matter of pure formal science such as pure mathematics. (Abu Ya‘rub al Marzouqi, Islah al ‘Aql fi al Falsafah al ‘Arabiyyah, p. 267)
Mental existence admits mistake, while external existence is the real existence by which a person corrects his conceptions and his concepts.
Imam al Shatibi says, to bring knowledge down on the courses of customary ways is a correction of that knowledge and a proof for it when it runs straight, and if it does not run it is not correct. (Bada’i‘ al Salk fi Taba’i‘ al Mulk, Ibn al Azraq, p. 76)
Ibn Taymiyyah said: It is known that external realities, which exist independently of us, are not dependent on our perceptions. Rather, our perceptions depend on them. Therefore, if we assume one of the two to come before the other in thought, that does not mean it is so in external reality. (Majmu Fatawa 9/99)
This matter is clear in the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences. In the realist conception the conceptions become ruling over existence, because they removed the richness of existence and considered what they reached of knowledge to be ruling over existence. As for the sophistic trend, they consider the mistake in mental conception to be the foundation, and it is the entry to deny the ability to reach the realities in external existence. (Abu Ya‘rub al Marzouqi, Islah al ‘Aql fi al Falsafah al ‘Arabiyyah, p. 224)
The problems that were treated based on the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences
The first problem, solving the problem of the relation between essence and existence through the distinction between the two existences.
Ibn Taymiyyah said: The correct distinction is that the mahiyyah (essence) is what forms in the mind from a thing, and wujud (existence) is the very thing that is in external reality. This is a sound distinction, for the difference between what is in the mind and what is external is established, known, and beyond doubt. As for assuming a reality that is not fixed in knowledge nor in existence, this is false. (Majmu Fatawa 9/98-99)
He also said: It is known that the term mahiyyah (essence) can refer to what exists in the mind and to what exists externally. The term wujud (existence) can also be used to refer to what exists in the mind and to what exists externally. Therefore, if both are intended to refer to what is in the mind, then the mahiyyah is the same as wujud.
If both are intended to refer to what is external, then the mahiyyah is the same as wujud as well. But if one of them refers to what is in the mind and the other to what is external, then the mahiyyah is different from wujud. (Al-Radd ʿala al-Manṭiqiyyin (p. 67) At-Tadmuriyyah (p. 129), Majmuʿ al-Fatawa (vol. 9 pp. 98–99)
The second problem, solving the problem of essential and accidental necessary attributes.
Ibn Taymiyyah said: “There is no doubt that the necessary attributes of the described divide into what is evident for a human being and what is not evident but whose being necessary needs a proof. Its being evident or not evident for a human being is not a property of the thing in itself, rather it is a report about the knowledge of the human being and a notification for him. It is a report about mental existence, not about external existence.”
The realists did not notice that and thought that essential and accidental attributes are actually like that in external things and not according to what appears to us.
They then built on this their logical science, and especially the notion of definition which grasps essences. As for the sophistic trend, the throwing of doubt on external existence prevents them from dividing attributes, for what may be essential might be accidental in reality and what may be accidental might be essential in reality. (Al Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 399)
The third matter, this also follows, Ibn Taymiyyah sees that attributes do not have independent existence apart from essences. Their existence does not precede the existence of essences.
He says, may Allah have mercy on him, “The being of a description as belonging to the described is something that follows its reality by which it is, whether our minds conceive it or do not conceive it.
If one of the two descriptions is essential rather than the other, the difference between them must be a matter that goes back to their external realities that are fixed without the mind, or else there would be among external realities something that has no reality except mere priority and posteriority in the mind.
This will not be unless reality and essence are what the mind estimates, not what is found in the outside, and that is something that follows the estimation of the person who owns the mind.” (Majmu Fatawa 9/100)
He also says, by way of confirming this matter, that conceiving a thing without conceiving attributes for it occurs only in the mind, while what exists in the outside must have attributes.
“The one of whom they said that only one proceeds from him is the one stripped of all attributes. Rather he is existence restricted by every negation, and this has no reality except in the mind.” (Al Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 232)
As for the realists, they considered non existence to be something, based on what we mentioned of their conferring existential weight to rational universals.
The fourth matter, the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences contributed to dividing the sciences in a way different from the prevailing division that followed the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, or the distinction between the sciences built on necessity and those built on freedom.
In the following text Ibn Taymiyyah speaks about the division of the sciences according to the Greek philosophers.
He says, “As for the science that does not separate from matter, neither in the mind nor in external reality, it is natural science, and its subject is the body.
As for the science that is abstracted from matter in the mind but not in external reality, it is mathematical science, such as discussion about measurable powers, magnitude, and number.
As for the science that is abstracted from matter both in the mind and in external reality, it is metaphysical science, and its subject is absolute existence along with its attributes that accompany it as existence, such as its division into necessary and possible, and into substance and accident.” (Al Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 153)
The fifth matter, solving the problem of universals, which is a well known philosophical problem, through the distinction between the two existences. The universal is not universal except in the mind. When some of its individuals are known to be realised in the outside, that helps to know that it is a universal that obligates.
When a person senses some external individuals, he extracts from them a universal description, especially when its individuals are many. Knowing that the common description has an origin in the outside is the root of the knowledge of the universal proposition. In another text Ibn Taymiyyah completes the meaning.
He says, “What is called the natural universal in the outside means that what is universal in the mind matches the individuals that exist in the outside, as the general matches its individuals. What exists in the outside is determinate and specific. It is not universal at all. But in it there is a share of the universal. What is in the mind is said about it that it may exist in the outside, as one says, I did what was in my soul. In my soul are matters which I want to do.
Among that is His statement, the need in Jacob’s soul which he satisfied. Among that is the statement of ‘Umar, I had arranged in my soul a statement that I liked to say. Examples of this are many. When the universal is found in the outside it is only determinate. It is not universal. For its being universal is conditioned by being in the mind.” (Al Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 135)
The sixth matter, the kinds of certain propositions among the philosophers and others. Clarifying the kinds of certainties they have that contain no universal proposition. Since every syllogism needs a universal proposition, we say, the certain materials they have confined in their known kinds.
زعمهم تساوي النفوس سبب ضلالهم في معرفة النبوات:
وضموا هذا إلى أن جميع الحوادث إنما تحدث عن حركة الفلك وهو من افسد أصولهم التي ضلوا بها.
لا تستعمل القضايا الكلية في شيء من الموجودات:
والأشياء المساوية لشيء واحد متساوية ونحو ذلك وهذه مقدرات في الذهن ليست في الخارج كلية.
Ibn Taymiyyah said:
The first type is sensory perception. It is known that the senses do not perceive anything universal or general at all. There is no purely sensory universal proposition that can serve as a premise in a demonstrative proof. When they give the example that fire burns and similar statements, they have no knowledge of the universality of this proposition. What they actually have is experience and habit, which are of the same kind as analogical reasoning by likeness (qiyas al-tamthil). Their knowledge of the general rule is no different from the reasoning of analogy or syllogism. Even if it is said that this is known through recognising that fire contains a burning power, then the knowledge that every fire must contain this power is also a universal judgement.
If it is said that the fiery form must necessarily include this power and that whatever lacks this power is not fire, this statement, even if accepted as true, does not prove that everything possessing this power necessarily burns everything it meets, even though that is what usually happens. This is shared by analogy, syllogism, habit, and incomplete induction. It is known that whoever says every fire burns everything it touches is mistaken, for the substance must be receptive to burning. It is known that fire does not burn everything, as it does not burn the salamander, the ruby, or bodies coated with protective substances. As for the breaking of natural order, that belongs to another category.
I do not know of any sensory universal proposition that cannot be contradicted, for a sensory proposition is only that this fire burns, since the senses perceive only something particular. As for the rational judgement, they say that when the mind sees these particular instances, it becomes prepared for a universal judgement to flow into it. It is clear that this is of the same kind as analogical reasoning, and its generality cannot be trusted unless it is known that the general judgement necessarily follows from the shared element. When that is known, it is known in all the particulars, and thus knowledge of the particulars is not dependent on this.
Moreover, among customary propositions, there is not a single universal that cannot be contradicted, by agreement of the rational people. Even the philosophers allow for the breaking of habitual order, though they attribute it to celestial causes, psychic powers, or natural causes. These three are, in their view, the reasons for the breaking of natural order, and to these they attribute the miracles of prophets, the karamat (honours) of the awliya (allies of Allah), magic, and similar things. I have elaborated on this in the discussion of whether the miracles of prophets are due to psychic powers or not, and I have shown the falsity of their claim even according to most of the great masters among the philosophers, with sound evidences, in what is known as the issue of al-Safadiyyah.
The second type is inner perceptions, such as everyone’s awareness of his own hunger, thirst, love, hate, pain, and pleasure. All these are particulars. A person only knows the state of another and the universal judgement concerning such states through analogical reasoning by likeness. People do not all share in perceiving each of these particulars as they may share in perceiving some external sensory things such as the sun and the moon. In these inner perceptions there is a particularity in both perceiver and perceived that is not found in external sensations, even if they share in their type. These therefore resemble habitual perceptions.
Their claim that all beings are equal in their inner states was one of the causes of their misguidance in understanding prophethood. They did not establish any proof that all beings are equal in these conditions, nor that the rational being (al-nafs al-natiqah) is equal among its individuals. This was one of the causes of their deviation in understanding prophethood. They recognised many judgements shared by beings in the usual course of things, though exceptions to them are possible.
Then they learned of other matters beyond the reach of their reasoning and tried to apply the same reasoning to them. They saw that some beings possess intuitive power (hads), that they may influence some things, and that something may be imagined to them as a sleeper imagines what he sees in his dream. They thought that all revelations to beings, the descent of angels, and hearing the speech of Allah were of this kind.
They made the distinguishing mark of prophethood these three things, and said that whoever possessed them was a prophet, and that prophethood could be acquired. Their so-called virtuous among them sought to become prophets themselves, as happened with al-Suhrawardi al-Maqtul (d. 587 AH), Ibn Sabin (d. 669 AH), and others.
When Ibn Arabi (d. 638 AH) realised that claiming prophethood was not possible, he claimed instead the seal of sainthood, and claimed that the seal of the awliya is more perfect in knowledge of Allah than the seal of the prophets, and that he receives from the same source from which the angel who brings revelation to the prophet receives. The cause of this was the belief of those heretical philosophers that the prophet receives from Jibril, who in their view is an image in himself, and that this image receives from the intellect. He said, the prophet receives from this image, while I receive from the intellect from which that image receives.
They combined this with their belief that all events occur only through the motion of the celestial sphere, which is among their most corrupt principles and a main cause of their misguidance.
The third type is experiential knowledge. It is entirely particular, for experience applies only to specific matters. Likewise, reports known by widespread transmission (tawatur) are particular, for what is known through hearing or sight is always something definite: a specific statement, a specific body, a specific colour, a specific act, or a specific matter.
As for intuitive insights (hadsiyyat), if they are considered certain, they are similar to experiential knowledge. The difference between them does not concern generality or particularity, but rather that experiential knowledge relates to the acts of those who experience, while intuitive insights arise from their own acts. Some people call all of these experiential.
No universal propositions are used in any of the existing things.
What remains with them are the first principles, which are the self-evident intellectual axioms. The universal first principles are only absolute propositions concerning numbers, magnitudes, and similar matters, such as their saying: “One is half of two,” or “Things equal to one same thing are equal to each other,” and the like. These are mental constructs, not universal in external existence.
It has therefore become clear that the universal demonstrative propositions that must necessarily be affirmed as universal, which they use in their syllogisms, are not applied to any particular existing things. They are used only for mental constructs. Hence, they cannot know real existing things through demonstrative reasoning, and that is what was to be shown.
Ibn Taymiyyah said: The universal is not universal except in the mind. When a person knows that some of its instances exist externally, that helps him know that it is a true universal.
When a person perceives some external instances, he extracts from them a universal description, especially when those instances are many. Thus, knowledge of the existence of the shared attribute in reality is the foundation of knowledge of the universal proposition. (Al Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 233)
The seventh matter, the first principles and their relation to mental and external existences. Contrary to the realist conception, the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences holds that first principles are not essential properties in the proposition. Rather they depend on a human’s conception of it and his ordering of the propositions in his mind.
Ibn Taymiyyah says:
“It has become clear that the distinction they mentioned between first principles and the well known, that the first principle is that which is predicated on its subject in the two existences with a primary predication, not a secondary one, is a mistake that does not stand. Not in external existence, for there is no order in the concomitants such that some of them are primary and some secondary.
Nor in mental existence, for the middle term is only the proof. The distinction returns to the fact that first principles are what does not need a proof and theoretical matters are what need a proof. This is correct speech on which there is agreement. It does not need what they mentioned. But what makes a proposition first principle and theoretical is among relative matters.
What is self evident to Zayd may be theoretical to ‘Amr in view of completeness of conception. When one conceives the thing with a conception more complete than another conceives it, he will conceive among its concomitants what the one with a deficient conception did not conceive. He did not then need a middle term to know those concomitants, while the one with a deficient conception needed a middle term.” (Ar Radd Ala Mantiqiyeen, Ibn Taymiyyah, pp. 416–417)
The eighth matter, distinguishing between what is certain and what is probable based on the distinction between the two existences.
For Ibn Taymiyyah, certainty is not something existing in the outside. Rather it is certainty in relation to the human being, because it belongs to the world of minds. In the outside there is nothing called certain. There are realities, and our knowledge of these realities is what can be described as certain and as probable.
In this meaning he says, “The fact that a matter is certain or probable is a relative matter according to the state of the believers in it. It is not a description of the statement in itself.
A person may hold as certain matters that he knows by necessity, or by transmission whose truth is known to him while another does not know that, not as certainty and not as conjecture. A person may be intelligent, strong minded, quick in perception, and he will know of the truth and hold as certain what another cannot even conceive, and does not know, neither as knowledge nor as conjecture. Certainty and conjecture will be according to what has reached a person of proofs and according to his ability to infer. People differ in this and in that. The fact that a matter is certain or probable is not a description permanently attached to the contested statement.” (Majmu‘ al Fatawa, Ibn Taymiyyah, 19/211)
The ninth matter, solving the problem of the relation between literal use and figurative use. In this matter you notice the extension of the effects of the doctrine of the distinction between the two existences into the linguistic field.
Ibn Taymiyyah says in criticising the distinction between literal and figurative: “The claim that the literal is what first comes to the mind when the word is released is among the most corrupt statements. If a word is not uttered except qualified, then what first comes to the mind in every occurrence is what that occurrence indicates.
If it is released, it is never used in speech absolutely. So there remains no state of pure release for it such that one can say, does the mind first go to it or not. Just as what the logicians claim of the absolute meaning stripped of all restrictions exists only as a posit in the mind. There is nothing that exists outside stripped of every restriction.
The correct view is that the universal absolute meaning does not exist in the outside except determinate and restricted, and the word that points to it does not exist in use except restricted and specified. When the meaning is posited as stripped, its place is the mind, and then a stripped word is posited for it that does not exist in use as stripped.” (Majmu‘ al Fatawa, Ibn Taymiyyah, 7/105–106)
The tenth matter, distinguishing between designation and usage in language also rests on the distinction between the two existences.
This becomes clear through Ibn Taymiyyah’s statements attached to this regard, among them. One, it is not possible to strip the word of usage. Just as it is not possible to strip movement from the moving thing, so too is the relation between the word and usage.
Two, stripping the word of usage is possible in the mind, but it should not be called a word. Rather it is a posited word.
Three, those who separated designation from usage, such as the logicians, stripped meanings and isolated them from their contexts. When they discovered that their results contradict the meanings, they found themselves at a loss. Either they deny external existence or they deny what they claimed is the absolute.
They affirmed a human being who is neither tall nor short, neither black nor white, then they saw the external human being different from this abstract.
So they said, these are accidental attributes external to his essence. Four, in order to avoid the mistake of the traditional philosophers we must look at things as they are in reality, as a whole, without neglecting any of their properties. Applying this to meanings requires considering the context.
The eleventh matter, distinguishing between meaning and intended meaning is also tied to the distinction between the two existences. Ibn Taymiyyah sees the following. One, he used the term meaning to indicate the mental image to which the word refers.
Two, the mental image has been given many names from different regards. It is the meaning when it is intended by the word. From the angle that it calls for the word in the mind, it is called a concept. From the angle that it is an answer to the question what is this, it is called an essence. From the angle that it is realised in the external world, it is called a reality. From the angle that it is distinguished from others, it is called an identity. From the angle that it is the subject of the word, it is called a named thing. From the angle that it is inferred, it is called a denotation.
Three, denotation, which is understanding the meaning when it is released, never occurs without usage. With this concept the meaning becomes equal to the intended meaning. Neutralising the difference between meaning and intended meaning follows from not distinguishing between designation and usage.
Among the results of neutralising it is reducing the status of the conventional meaning in favour of the terminological meaning. (Muhammad Muhammad Yunus, ‘Ilm al Takhatub al Islami, pp. 127–173)
