The Prophet’s Reports About Allah’s Actions and Attributes
The Messenger mentioned things about Allah’s actions and attributes not all found explicitly in the Quran—such as creating, speaking, rewarding, punishing, being pleased, angry, loving, laughing, and more.
The Three Main Views About These Reports
- Jahmiyyah & The Mu’tazilah: Consider all such descriptions to refer to created things, separate from Allah.
- Kullabiyyah and followers: Some are eternal and necessary, others created but external to Allah.
- People of hadith and some mutakallimun: A third position, that these attributes exist in Allah’s essence, linked to His will and power. Most distinguish between the type being eternal and individual instances being originated.
Philosophers and Eternal Types
Philosophers claim that the type of celestial motion is eternal, even if instances are not. But they offer no sound proof. They rely on confusing the origination of instances with the origination of the type. Refuting their confusion strengthens the position of the Book and Sunnah.
Agreement Between Reason and Revelatio
True reason does not oppose revelation. The foundation of Islam is belief in the Prophet’s truthfulness. Anyone claiming that his reports contradict reason is mistaken in both areas. The Muʿtazilah, for example, deny Allah’s actions and attributes due to flawed assumptions.
Mistakes of the Jahmiyyah and Mu’tazilah
They wrongly assume that affirming actions or attributes in Allah necessitates origination and imperfection. This led them to deny Allah’s speech, sight, power, and even the possibility of seeing Him in the Hereafter. They also denied that He can create after not having created. Their theological approaches rest on a flawed assumption: that any change or attribute must be created.
Scriptural and Logical Rebuttal
The Prophet never reported that Allah is a essence alone without attributes. Revelation affirms His actions and attributes repeatedly. Logically, denying attributes like knowledge or power leads to absurdity—just like denying a Creator for the universe.
The Error of Ascribing Eternity to the Universe
Philosophers who claim the universe is eternal contradict both revelation and reason. If the universe proceeds necessarily from an eternal being, then no events should ever occur. If events do occur, then their cause cannot be a complete, eternal cause. Therefore, the universe must be originated by will, not necessity.
Responses to the Argument of Intermediaries
Even if one argues that events come from intermediaries, the same problem returns: if they’re eternal, their effects must be eternal; if they’re originated, they require a cause. An infinite regress of causes does not solve the problem. Only a voluntary actor (not one who acts by necessity) can originate events.
Falsehood of Saying the Universe or Its Parts Are Necessary
To say the totality of the universe or any part (e.g. celestial spheres) is necessary is false. No part of the universe independently causes the rest. Events must come from a necessary being outside of creation who is not bound by necessity.
Denial of Occurrences in Allah Based on Weak Arguments
Philosophers and theologians like ar-Razi deny that anything new occurs in Allah, based on the claim that anything new implies deficiency. This is weak, for perfection is in His being capable of speech and action when He wills—not in the eternal existence of every act.
Evaluation of ar-Razi’s Arguments in Nihayat al-‘Uqul
Ar-Razi discusses various theological views and leans toward Muʿtazilah and philosophers, citing their works extensively. He presents weak arguments against the occurrence of actions or attributes in Allah, and admits flaws in earlier kalam arguments.
Early Philosophers’ Views
Before Aristotle, philosophers like Thales and Pythagoras affirmed that the First Being acts by will and originates creation successively. Some spoke of divine generosity and creative will. Aristotle and later philosophers deviated by denying that Allah knows particulars or performs actions.
Abu al-Barakat’s Two Views of Creation
- First view: Allah acts by will and creates things successively, with each act of will tied to a prior act and so on.
- Second view: All events arise from eternal motion and eternal movers (Aristotle’s position).
Abu al-Barakat was against the denial of will, speech, and action in Allah, and argues that relational knowledge and changing acts do not contradict divine perfection.
On Multiplicity of Knowledge and Will
Abu al-Barakat rejects the idea that multiplicity in Allah’s knowledge leads to imperfection. Knowledge of diverse things does not violate Allah’s oneness, as it is a matter of relation, not essence.
Refutation of Static Divine Will
He argues against those who claim that Allah has a single eternal will covering all things. He insists that multiple, successive wills better reflect the reality of Allah’s actions.
Historical Development of Theological Errors
Ibn Kullab and al-Ashʿari said that Allah has one will and one speech. Later mutakallimeen misunderstood this and concluded that Allah either has no speech or that all His speech must be eternal and identical. This confusion led to two opposing extremes—denying speech entirely or affirming eternal letters and sounds.
Statements of Earlier Mutakallimeen
Many of them like Hisham ibn al-Hakam and Hisham al-Jawaliqi affirmed that Allah’s actions occur within His essence, and not outside of Him.
Ar-Razi’s Argument Summarised and Rebutted
Ar-Razi’s main argument: any perfection newly attributed to Allah must imply previous deficiency. This is false, because:
- Having the ability to act when He wills is perfection.
- The non-existence of an act at one point does not imply imperfection.
- Revelation never denies such actions—only things that contradict His perfection, like death or fatigue.
Kalam Arguments Rely on Contradictions, Not Proof
Ar-Razi and others rely on contradictions in opposing groups rather than logic. Their main premise—that every body must have accidents, and therefore is originated—is weak and disputed even among kalam groups.
Conclusion: Affirming Actions in Allah Is Sound
The denial of Allah’s actions and attributes by philosophers and some theologians is based on flawed reasoning and misunderstandings of both revelation and logically. The correct view, held by the Salaf and supported by both reason and revelation, is that Allah acts by will and power, creating things one after another, without implying deficiency or imperfection.
Translation: The Prophet’s Reports About Allah’s Actions and Attributes
The Messenger reports what agrees with the Book of Allah or what explains it, and also reports what is not explicitly mentioned in the Book. His reports in this subject include mention of the actions of the Lord—like His creating, providing, being just, showing kindness, rewarding, and punishing. They also mention types of His speech and His addressing of angels, prophets, and other servants. They include mention of His pleasure, anger, love, hate, joy, and laughter, and other matters in this category.
The Three Views About These Reports
People fall into three categories regarding this issue:
- The first group are the pure Jahmiyyah, like the Muʿtazilah and those who agree with them. They consider all of this (the reports about Allah’s actions and attributes) to be something created, separate from Allah.
- The second group are the Kullabiyyah and those who agree with them. They affirm what they affirm of this either as eternal and necessary in itself, or as created and separate from Him.
- The third group includes the majority of the people of hadith and some from among the people of kalam. They say: there is a third category—something that exists in Allah’s essence and is related to His will and power, as shown by many texts.
Some of these (the third group) believe that the type itself is originated, as the Karramiyyah say (Ibn Karram came later, after the trial of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal. So Ibn Karram came after Ibn Kullab by a period. Most of Ahl al-Qiblah before Ibn Karram opposed the Muʿtazilah and the Kullabiyyah. Ibn Karram died around the year 260 AH.).
But most of the people of hadith and those who agree with them do not say that the type is originated. Rather, they say the type is eternal and distinguish between the origination of the type and the origination of individual instances—just as most philosophers distinguish between the permanence of a thing and the permanence of certain instances of that kind.
The delight of the people of Paradise is permanent in its kind, but not every individual part of it is everlasting. And some originated things do not perish after they are created, like human souls—they are created after not existing, yet they continue to exist forever.
The philosophers accept the possibility that a kind can be eternal while its individual instances are not. But the eternalist philosophers believed that the movements of the celestial spheres fall into this category and are of an eternal type. So they believed in their eternity, though they have no evidence for this at all. Most of what they use as evidence merely refutes those who fail to distinguish between the origination of the type and the origination of the instance. They claim that the existence of individual originated things means the kind is also originated, and that all of it came into existence without any new occurrence.
If this view is refuted, then the refutation becomes a stronger argument against the eternalists and a clearer affirmation of what the Book and Sunnah have brought, as has been explained earlier, even if it does not directly refute their position.
Clear Reason Is in Agreement with Revelation
Clear reason is in full agreement with the revealed law in every way. There is nothing in clear reason that contradicts sound transmission—and that is what was sought.
It is known that the foundation of faith is to believe the Messenger in what he reported and obey him in what he commanded. The Salaf of the ummah and its imams agreed that no proof—neither rational nor otherwise—can ever contradict this. This is the intended point here.
But some people claimed that a group of his reports contradict reason.
The Root of Error
The root of this problem among some of those who affiliate with Islam and faith is that some people involved in speculative theology and kalam wanted to defend what they believed using what they assumed was logical. They saw that this evidence had necessary implications that they thought must be accepted, and these implications contradicted many of the Messenger’s reports.
They erred in both transmission and reason—like the Muʿtazilah and others among the Jahmiyyah who deny Allah’s attributes and actions. They believed the Messenger reported that everything other than the bare eternal essence (free of attributes) is originated in both kind and instance. They imagined this to be the monotheism brought by the Messenger. They argued that anything characterised by an attribute or action must be originated, and they made this the approach to prove the existence of the Creator, His oneness, and the truthfulness of His messengers.
So they claimed that His speech is created, created in something else—that no speech exists in Him. That He will not be seen in the Hereafter. That He is not separate from creation. That He has no knowledge, power, or other attributes.
That no action belongs to Him, not creating the universe, not rising over the Throne, nor anything else. For they believed that if any action or attribute were in Him, then He would be described and be a locus for attributes. And if an act were connected to His will, then that would mean successive actions and continuous occurrences. And if one permits the continuous or eternal existence of originated types, then their argument collapses, and what they imagined the Prophet reported becomes baseless.
They were wrong in both what was reported and what reason shows.
The Texts Do Not Indicate a Bare Essence Without Attributes
As for what was reported: the Messenger never said that there exists an eternal essence without attributes or actions. Rather, the revealed texts overwhelmingly affirm that the Lord possesses attributes and actions. This is known necessarily to anyone who has heard the Book and the Sunnah. They admit that this is what the texts clearly show. The revelation mentions Allah’s names, His verses affirming His attributes and actions, and that He “created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days, then rose over the Throne” (al-Furqan: 59).
So whoever says, “the celestial spheres are eternally pre-existent,”—his statement clearly contradicts what the Messenger said. Likewise, whoever says that the Lord has no knowledge, no power, no speech, and no action—his statement contradicts what the Messenger said. And neither of them has any logic behind them. In fact, clear reason contradicts them—as has been shown elsewhere in many ways.
It is said: clear reason knows that it is impossible to affirm knowledge without a knower, or power without a possessor of power—just as it is impossible to affirm a universe without a Creator or creation without a Creator. More absurd than this is to say that the knowledge is the knower, and the knowledge is the power. This is the belief of those who deny the attributes.
The Problem With Believing in an Eternal Universe
As for those who say the universe is eternal, their view requires the impossibility of any event occurring. For the eternal is either necessary by itself or a necessary consequence of something necessary by itself. But the consequences of a necessary being are not originated, nor do they result in anything originated.
So the occurrences are not among its necessary consequences. And what is not among its necessary consequences depends on the occurrence of a new cause.
If the eternal being is necessary by itself or a necessary consequence of it, then nothing new can come from it. This is the reality of their view. They claim that the universe has an eternal cause that necessitates it and that the universe is its necessary effect. For them, its cause necessitates its effect and the effect of its effect. Therefore, nothing new can ever occur in existence, because a specific originated thing would then be necessary from eternity by necessity and agreement of philosophers.
If they say: “It is possible for something new to come from the necessary being by means of an intermediary,”
It is said: the discussion about the intermediary is the same as the discussion about the first cause. If the intermediary is eternal and necessary to the first, then all its effects must also be eternal. If it is originated, then it requires a new cause.
If they say: “Every originated thing is conditioned by another originated thing before it, infinitely,”
It is said to them: then the individual originated things are not necessary consequences of the necessary being. And if the kind is a necessary consequence of the necessary being, then the necessary being cannot exist without the kind. But the kind of occurrences is itself merely possible—not necessary, so it cannot be a necessary consequence of the necessary being. So nothing in the universe—neither the celestial sphere nor anything else—must be eternal, and this contradicts their claim.
If they say: “The kind of occurrences is necessary to the body of the celestial sphere and to the soul, and both of these are necessary to the intellect, which is necessary to the necessary being,”
It is said to them: then His essence necessitates the kind of occurrences—whether directly or indirectly. But an eternal essence that necessitates its effect cannot produce anything new, neither directly nor indirectly.
Whether the occurrence is a kind or a particular instance, the kind of occurrences cannot accompany an eternal being, just like certain instances cannot. Because the kind only exists little by little over time, but what accompanies the eternal being is eternal and does not exist successively. So occurrences cannot come from a complete cause that necessitates either their kind or any instance. Therefore, the universe cannot be a necessary consequence of a cause that necessitates it—just as it cannot exist necessarily by itself—and that is the conclusion we sought.
Further Refutations of the Claim That the universe Is Eternal
Moreover, what is eternal necessitates the eternity of its cause, or that it be necessary by itself. The eternal is either necessary by itself or by something else. The possible—which has no cause—is not existent at all, let alone eternal—this is a necessity and agreed upon by the philosophers. And if it is necessary by something else, then its cause must also be eternal. That cause cannot be a cause for it unless all the conditions for it being a cause are also eternal. So it is impossible that any cause or condition of the eternal be itself originated. Because the cause that enables the actor to act cannot come later than its result, which is its effect—and this is known necessarily and agreed upon by philosophers.
Therefore, it is impossible for the entire universe to be necessary by itself. If it were, then nothing in existence could be originated—because every originated thing was once nonexistent and must have a cause that brings it into being, let alone be necessary by itself.
So it is established that there are things in the universe that are not necessary. And whatever is necessary by something else needs a complete cause that necessitates it. And a complete cause cannot have any of its effects delayed. So occurrences cannot come from a complete cause—just as they cannot be necessary by themselves. And if they are neither necessary by themselves nor by a cause that necessitates them, then they must come from a doer who does not act by necessity of his essence.
And if the most that these people claim is that the universe proceeds from a cause that acts by necessity—directly or through intermediaries that necessarily proceed from it—then on that assumption, occurrences cannot proceed from it. If no other doer exists to bring about these occurrences, then it would mean they happen without a cause, which is known to be impossible by necessity.
So it is established that occurrences have a doer who is not bound by necessity and whose action is not necessitated. Therefore, the cause of occurrences cannot be one that necessitates its effect, nor can it be one of the effects. But they claim that the universe proceeds from a cause that necessitates its effect, and that everything besides it is its effect. This is clearly false by necessity.
The Absurdity of Saying The Universe or Its Parts Are Necessary
Whoever says: “The sum total of the parts of the universe is necessary or eternal”—his statement is clearly false by necessity.
And whoever says: “Occurrences come from one part of the universe that is necessary”—his statement is also clearly false, whether he considers that part to be the celestial spheres or something else, for two reasons:
First: if that part is necessary by something else and is a complete cause for something else, then its effect must also be eternal with it, and therefore nothing new can occur. If that part is not a complete cause, then nothing can come from it. And even if it were possible for occurrences to come from an incomplete cause, then it would be possible for everything other than Allah to be originated—and in all cases, their argument fails.
Second: it is known that no part of the universe independently originates another part. Even if some parts are causes for others, their influence depends on other causes and the absence of preventions. So it is not possible for any part of the universe to be the necessary, eternal, independent cause of others.
Occurrences must have a Lord who is necessary by Himself, eternal, and the Originator of everything else. And nothing in the universe qualifies as such. So it is known that the Lord, Most High, is outside of the universe and its parts and attributes. This is all expanded upon in another place.
There Is Nothing in Sound Reasoning That Contradicts What the Messenger Brought
The point here is to show that there is nothing in sound reason that contradicts what the Messenger (peace be upon him) brought.
It is known that those who claim reason contradicts revelation fall into two groups:
One group permits the idea that the Prophet and other messengers might lie, whether deliberately or mistakenly, in what they reported from Allah and conveyed to the nations— or that they might outwardly say the opposite of what they inwardly believe. This is what is claimed by some disbelievers in the messengers and by those who outwardly claim belief but inwardly oppose it, like the hypocrites among the philosophers, the Qaramitah, the Batiniyyah, and others who affirm such views.
The other group does not permit this about the messengers. This is the position of the mutakallimun (theologians) affiliated with Islam, despite their different sects.
The Mistakes of the Innovators in Scripture and Reason
The innovators from among this second group are mistaken both in scripture and in reason. They err in scripture by attributing to the Messenger (peace be upon him) what he never said—either deliberately or by mistake. And they err in reason by trying to prove their views using what they think are logical arguments. But if the claim itself is false, then its evidence must also be false—because a proof necessarily implies what it proves, and the implication of a truth can only be true.
As for what is false—it may sometimes be connected to something true, and so people may attempt to prove the truth using either something true or something false. But what is false can never be proven by something true. If it were, then the false would follow from the true, which is impossible. For if a proposition implies another, and the second is false, then the first must also be false. If the false were to imply the true, then the false would be true. A sound proof can only prove what is true.
One of the Greatest Errors of the Theologians Who Deny Allah’s Actions and Some of His Attributes
Among the greatest foundational errors of the theologians who deny Allah’s actions—and some or all of His attributes—is their rejection of any actions existing in Allah’s essence according to His will and power.
Abu Abdullah ar-Razi, Abu al-Hasan al-Amidi, and those who follow them presented the arguments of those who deny this and refuted all of them. Their only argument for denial is that if something existing in Allah were a perfection, then its non-existence before its appearance would be a deficiency. And if it were a deficiency, then it would entail that Allah was characterised by imperfection—yet Allah is free from that.
But this argument is weak—perhaps even weaker than what they themselves deemed weak. We will now mention what Ar-Razi mentioned in his most advanced theological book Nihayat al-ʿUqul fi Dirayat al-Usul, in which he claimed to include truths and subtle points not found in the works of any of the earlier or later scholars—whether allies or opponents. He praised the book extensively.
He said: “All of this is not understood except by one who has previously studied most of the words of the scholars and has deeply reflected on the comprehensive discussions of philosophers, both those who are correct and those who are mistaken, and both supporters and opponents.”
Different Responses to Their Arguments
Second: it may be said that Allah being such that He speaks and acts as He wills is a perfection, and He has always possessed this attribute. As for the occurrence of a specific action, it is neither a perfection nor a deficiency.
Third: what do you mean when you say, “its absence is a deficiency”? Do you mean His essence is deficient and not characterised by the necessary perfections? Or do you mean the absence of what will later occur? The first is false. As for the second—what proof do you have that it is impossible?
Fourth: you yourselves—such as Abu al-Maʿali al-Juwayni and ar-Razi—have said that His being free of deficiencies is known only through revelation, not reason. So if you say that there is nothing in reason to deny these things, then the only basis for denying them is revelation—and by your standard, that means consensus. It is known that revelation has not denied such things. It has only denied what contradicts the attributes of perfection—like death, which contradicts life, and sleep, which contradicts self-subsistence, and fatigue, which contradicts complete power.
This is why the correct view is that Allah is free of all deficiencies both according to the Sharia and according to reason. Reason proves He possesses the attributes of perfection, such as knowledge, power, life, hearing, and seeing—and this necessitates denying their opposites. For affirming one thing requires denying its opposite, and “deficiencies” are nothing but things that contradict the attributes of perfection.
What Ar-Razi Said in Nihayat al-ʿUqul
He said: “This is a book in which I have discussed the principles and preliminaries. Most of my attention was focused on…” Then he said in the book: “The twelfth fundamental principle is what is impossible for Allah. The fourth issue is whether it is impossible for Him to be a locus of events. The Karramiyyah unanimously allow this.”
As for the renewal of states—like perceiving, hearing, seeing, willing, disliking—the Muʿtazilah differed in whether to allow them. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri affirmed the renewal of knowledge in His essence.
He said: “As for the philosophers, even though they are famously the furthest from this view, they nonetheless affirm it without realising it. For they accept the renewal of relations pertaining to His essence, and for them, relation is a real attribute that comes into existence.”
Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi explicitly affirmed that Allah’s essence is characterised by created attributes.
The Sources Ar-Razi Relied On
I say: most of ar-Razi’s content is taken from the Muʿtazilah—especially from the works of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, his companion Mahmoud al-Khwarazmi, their teacher ʿAbd al-Jabbar al-Hamadani, and others. As for philosophy, he mostly uses the works of Ibn Sina, Abu al-Barakat, and similar figures. For the Ashʿari school, he relies on the books of Abu al-Maʿali like al-Shamil and others, and also on some works by Qadi Abu Bakr and the like. He also quotes from people like al-Shahrastani.
But as for the earlier books—like those of Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿari, Ibn Kullab, and others—and the early Muʿtazilah, Najjariyyah, Dirariyyah, etc.—his works show he had no knowledge of them. The same is true for the doctrines of earlier philosophers. For the view he attributed to Abu al-Barakat is actually the view of most of the ancient philosophers before Aristotle, and of many others—as the authors of al-Maqalat (books on doctrines) reported.
They said that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle said: “The First Being cannot be described except as ‘He’ (the essence).” He is pure being (al-huwiyyah al-mahdah), simple and not composed. He is pure wisdom and pure truth. He is not a form like other forms that appear in matter. He is the “is-ness” that the mind and intellect cannot fully grasp. He is beyond change, attributes, number, relation, time, place, and limits. He cannot be grasped by the senses or the intellect—not in terms of complete understanding—but only as One, eternal, not two. If we attribute number to Him, then we have introduced duality. If we attribute relation, then we are introducing time, place, before, and after. If we attribute location, then He would have limits and would be defined in relation to something else.
Views of Other Philosophers
Thales said: “The essence of the First Being cannot be known except through His effects. As for His own essence, no property of it can be known directly. Nothing in it is known from itself, only by analogy with ourselves.” He said: “Allah created the universe not because He needed it, but because of His generosity. If the acts of goodness had not become manifest, there would be no existence.” He also said: “Above the sky are universes that were created by One whose reality cannot be grasped by the intellects.”
Pythagoras held a view similar to that of Thales. He said: “He is not known by the soul; He is beyond all lofty spiritual attributes. He cannot be comprehended by His essence—only through His effects in each universe. He is described and named according to how those effects appear in the universe. He is the One who—if the intellect tries to know Him—realises that its own essence is created and preceded.”
The View of Anaximenes of Miletus (Greek Philosopher) and Others on Movement and Will
They said: Anaximenes expressed a view similar to the two preceding philosophers, except that one may say: the Creator moves with a movement beyond all known movements.
I (Ibn Taymiyyah) say: Abu al-Barakat also transmitted both of these views in al-Muʿtabar, not as his own, but as the view of those who affirmed the eternity of the universe. He said: “Those who affirmed the universe’s eternity were addressed by those who affirmed its origination: ‘If God has always been generous and creative eternally, then how did events in the universe come into existence? Were they from the Eternal or from other than Him?’ If you say: ‘He created them and they came into existence from Him,’ then you are saying the Eternal created the created, and that He willed their creation after not having willed it. But if you say: ‘They were caused by something else,’ then you have committed shirk after claiming to affirm the oneness of the One who is necessarily existent by Himself.” (This is from Abu al-Barakat’s al-Muʿtabar, 2/90)
He then said: “Those who affirm eternity responded: Rather, the first Eternal Creator is the sole creator of all created things—both eternal and originated—with no partner in His existence, creation, dominion, or command.” Their view split into two schools: one of them said He created the eternal things to persist as long as He exists, and He created the originated things one after another—He willed and then created, and created and then willed. His will necessitated His creation, and His creation necessitated His will.
For example: He willed the creation of Adam, the forefather, so He created and brought him into existence. He willed the existence of the son by means of the father. He willed and was generous, and was generous and willed—will after will, existent after existent. So if someone says: “Why did He bring it into existence?” It is said: “Because He willed and was generous.” And if someone says: “Why did He will it?” It is said: “Because He brought it into existence.” The chain of events necessitates one another, each one linked to the generosity of what came before and what follows. (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/90)
If they say: “How can will occur for Him? How can He be in a state of waiting for something that wasn’t and then came to be? How can He be a locus for events?” It is said: “And how can He be a locus for non-events—like an eternal will?”
If they say: “Because it is from Him,” it is said: “The new wills are also from Him.”
If they say: “The eternal will belongs to Him eternally,” it is said: “The new will also belongs to Him eternally—because the previous existence, by the earlier will, necessitates a subsequent will. Therefore He brings creation after creation by a will after a will, decreed by His wisdom. The later will is necessitated by the earlier one, through the mediation of what is willed—and so on.”
He said: “To declare Him free of new will is just like declaring Him free of eternal will—both being claims that He cannot be the locus of will. But there is no basis for such declarations, as will be discussed further in the chapter on knowledge, when we say: ‘Why did He know?’ and ‘How does He know?’” (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/90–91)
The Two Philosophical Views on the Origin of the universe
He continued: “This is one of the two views. As for the second view: its proponents say that every new event that appears after not existing must have a cause that necessitates its occurrence, and that cause is also something new. This leads back to the eternal motion in eternal movers.” He then presented the complete view of these philosophers—this is the view of Aristotle and his followers. (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/91)
Several scholars have reported that Aristotle was the first philosopher to claim the universe is eternal. As for the philosophers before him, the earliest sages, they did not affirm the eternity of the form of the heavens, even if they had other views about matter. This subject is detailed in the discussion on knowledge, particularly in refuting those who claimed that God does not know particulars—out of fear that this would imply change and multiplicity in His essence. The arguments of Aristotle and Ibn Sina on this are mentioned, as well as their refutation.
He said: “As for the claim that knowledge of others necessitates change and multiplicity due to the multiplicity of things known, the true response is that this does not imply multiplicity in His essence, but only in His relations and associations—and these do not entail multiplicity in His identity.” (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/91–92)
His essence and identity, and the unity which makes His existence necessary by itself, and His status as the first cause, by which we know Him and affirm what we affirm and negate what we negate—none of that is undermined by the multiplicity of what He knows or relates to. His oneness lies in the reality of His essence and identity.
He said: “Do not think that the oneness ascribed to the attributes of the One who necessarily exists is an arbitrary or abstract oneness. Rather, it is proven by the necessity of His being and His status as the first cause. What follows from that applies only to His reality and essence, not to what He knows or relates to. As for change through knowing changing things, that is a relational matter, not something that affects His essence. The proof does not negate it. It is not something blocked by reason. To deny it out of glorification and transcendence has no basis. Rather, true glorification and transcendence affirm it.” (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/92)
He also discussed Aristotle’s argument, which was that: “It is impossible for His perfection to lie in knowing anything else, since He is a pure essence in the highest degree of divinity, honour, and intellect. Therefore, He does not change—because change is transition to deficiency. That is a kind of motion, so this intellect would not be actual intellect, but merely potential.”
Abu al-Barakat said: “The argument that no change is allowed whatsoever—even in knowledge and understanding—is not sound. Even if we accepted it, it would only apply to certain changes in bodies, like heat and cold, and in certain times—not in all states and times. It does not apply to souls, which are specific to knowledge and understanding, unlike bodies. If change and effect always required spatial movement, then all change would require movement in place.” (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/92–93)
But this is impossible—since souls gain new knowledge and understanding without moving in place. According to his own view, souls do not exist in a place at all—so how can they move in it?
This only applies to bodies in certain cases, like heating and cooling. And it does not always apply. For example, vapour rising from water or smoke from the earth comes from particles like mist—not from large solid stones, which can become extremely hot and even burn while remaining in place. Water can become very hot while remaining still. Only some parts of it evaporate. Spatial movement comes after transformation, not before.
Some objects blacken or whiten while remaining still. They do not move before or after transformation. So this is not true of all bodies, only some. Not in all states and times, only some. It is not a matter of precedence but a consequence. Even if it applied to bodily transformations, it does not apply to changes in the soul. And if it did apply to changes in the soul, it still would not apply to knowledge, understanding, will, or intent. A specific judgment does not entail a universal rule. It cannot be applied from one category to another. Otherwise, all things would remain in a single state.
He then elaborated on the topic of knowledge and mentioned the two previous views. He said: “Those who affirm origination said: there is no need for a ‘receptacle’ for it. They only called it that in debate to belittle and dismiss. Rather, we say: the Creator, who brings forth and restores, created the universe and originated it by an eternal will. In eternity, He willed to create the universe, and so He created it.” (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/93)
He said: “Their answer was: the First does not change, and His specification in eternity only occurs through a concept that renders something intended in eternal knowledge along with the eternal will. He willed it during the time of previous non-existence—which was infinite in its beginning. What cannot be conceived or imagined cannot be known. What cannot be known cannot be known by a knower—not because God cannot know it, but because in itself it is unknowable.”
Then he said: “What do they say about the events of the universe? About Allah’s will and intent—through which He accepts the prayer of the one who prays, treats kindly the one who does good, punishes the wrongdoer, accepts the repentance of the one who repents, and forgives the one who seeks forgiveness—do these actions originate from Him or not?
If they say they do not, then they have invalidated the Sharia that they claim to support. They have invalidated its commands and prohibitions and everything it came for—such as urging obedience and prohibiting sin.
If they say all of these actions originate from Him—then are they by His will or without it? If without His will, that is even more repugnant. If by His will—then is that will eternal or created?
If it is eternal, then the many things that are willed cannot have come from one single eternal will. I don’t think they will say that the many willed things came from one identical will.” (See al-Muʿtabar, 2/93–94)
He said: “If they say these came through new wills, then they have affirmed the very thing they were trying to deny.”
Ibn Taymiyyah says: Because Abu al-Barakat’s reason found it inconceivable that numerous willed things could come from one will, he assumed they did not say this. But in fact, they do say this. This is the view of Ibn Kullab, al-Ashʿari, and those who follow them from the theologians, jurists, hadith scholars, and Sufis. They say: Allah knows all known things with one identical knowledge. He wills all willed things with one identical will. And His speech—through which He commanded all commands and informed of all information—is also one and the same in essence.
Then those who held this foundation differed: is His speech merely meaning, and the Arabic Quran is not His actual speech? Or is His speech composed of letters—or letters and sounds—by which the Quran and other scriptures were revealed, and are these letters and sounds eternal in essence? They held two views.
Some of those who affirmed the eternity of letters and sounds said they are multiple, even infinite in number, existing at once, and that they have always existed and will always exist.
This view is what led others to say that the speech of Allah is created, and that He has no speech established in His essence—because they thought that anything not created must be eternal in essence, and they considered that impossible. So they concluded it must be created.
The other group said: the first view is impossible—so the second must be true.
Both of these groups only said this because they assumed that voluntary actions could not exist in His essence—not speech by His choice, nor any other voluntary act. (This last view—that of affirming the occurrence of events in Allah’s essence—is the view of Hisham ibn al-Hakam, Hisham al-Jawaliqi, Ibn Malik al-Hadrami, and Ali ibn Maytham.)
Groups Who Held That the Quran Is Not Created
And their followers, and groups from the early people of kalam and fiqh, like Abu Muadh at-Tumani, Zuhayr al-Athari, Dawud al-Asbahani, and others—as mentioned by al-Ashari in al-Maqalat—said: “All who say that the Quran is not created, like Abdullah ibn Sa‘id ibn Kullab, and those who say that it is ‘muhdath’ (brought about), like Zuhayr al-Athari—meaning Dawud al-Asbahani—and those who say that it ‘occurred’ (ḥadatha), like Abu Muadh at-Tumani, all say that the Quran is not a body nor an attribute (ʿaraḍ).”
As for the sayings of the imams of fiqh, hadith, tasawwuf, tafsir, and others from the scholars of the Muslims—as well as the sayings of the Sahabah and the Tabiʿin who followed them in goodness—al-Razi’s words show that he was not aware of them.
The Core Argument of the Deniers
What we intend to show here is the limit of the argument used by the deniers. For after mentioning the disagreement, he said: “What we rely on is this: everything that is affirmed to subsist in Allah the Exalted is either a attribute of perfection or it is not. If it is a attribute of perfection, then it cannot be originated, otherwise His essence would have been devoid of that attribute of perfection before acquiring it, and one who lacks a perfection that it is possible to possess is deficient. And deficiency in Allah is impossible by consensus of the Ummah. If it is not a attribute of perfection, then it is impossible for Allah to be described by it, for the consensus of the Ummah is that all of Allah’s attributes are attributes of perfection. So to affirm an attribute that is not a attribute of perfection is to break the consensus, and this is not permitted.”
Then he said, “This is what we rely on, and it is built on revelation and reason.” He also said: “What our companions rely on is this: that if it were sound to describe Him with occurrences (ḥawadith), then He must have been described with them or with their opposites in pre-eternity. That necessitates that He was described with occurrences in pre-eternity—and that is impossible.”
He said: “This argument is based on the principle that one who is receptive to two opposites must have one of them present. But we have already shown the falsity of this principle.”
He said: “Some of our companions presented this argument in a form that does not rely on that principle, which is this: that if He were receptive to occurrences, then He would be receptive to them in pre-eternity. And the receptivity of a thing to something is based on the possibility of the existence of the thing being received. So this would necessitate the soundness of occurrences arising in pre-eternity—and that is impossible.”
He said: “But this is countered by saying that Allah is eternally capable (qadir), and yet it does not follow from the eternity of His capability that the thing capable of being done is eternal. So likewise here.”
He said: “Some said: if occurrences subsist in Him, He must have changed—and that is impossible.”
He said: “This is a weak argument. For if ‘change’ is defined as the subsistence of occurrences in Him, then the conclusion is identical to the assumption. And if it is defined otherwise, the conditional statement becomes unprovable.”
He said: “As for the Muʿtazilah, most of them argued that the concept of an attribute subsisting in a subject entails that it resides in a spatial location following the location of the subject. But Allah is not in a location, so it is impossible for an attribute to subsist in Him.”
He said: “We have already clarified the weakness of this argument.”
He said: “Their elders also argued that the reason a substance (jawhar) can have newly occurring meanings subsist in it is that it occupies space, and that since an attribute (ʿaraḍ) is not spatially located, newly occurring meanings cannot subsist in it.”
He said: “This is invalid, for it is possible to say that the substance can have occurrences not due to its spatial nature, but for another reason that it shares with Allah and does not share with the attribute. Even if we grant that, it is still possible that the substance receives occurrences because of its spatial nature, and Allah receives them due to another attribute—since equal rulings can have different reasons.”
He said: “They also argued: if it is sound for one occurrence to subsist in Him, then it is sound for every occurrence to subsist in Him.”
He said: “This is a claim that cannot be proven.”
He said: “These are the central arguments the people rely upon in this issue.”
Evaluation of Ar-Razi and the Kalam Schools
I say: Abu Abdullah al-Razi was among the harshest opponents of the Karramiyyah—to the point where he is known for numerous forms of disagreement with them. His inclination toward the Muʿtazilah and the philosophers is greater than toward the Karramiyyah. His statements on whether they are disbelievers vary, though he eventually concluded that none of the People of the Qiblah should be declared disbelievers—not the Karramiyyah, nor the Muʿtazilah, nor their likes.
This issue is among the most famous ones in which he opposed the Karramiyyah. Despite this, he stated that their view follows from the views of most sects. He acknowledged that there is no valid argument against them except the one he himself presented—and that is among the weakest of arguments, as we will show if Allah wills.
As for the arguments used by the Kullabiyyah and Muʿtazilah, he himself showed their invalidity, even though he gathered all the arguments of the deniers that are found scattered throughout the books of the people.
We will now clarify these matters.
The First Argument: Receptivity and Necessity of Actualisation
The first argument is: that the one who can receive a thing cannot be devoid of it or its opposite. So if it is possible for Him to be described with it, He cannot be devoid of it or its opposite. And whatever cannot be devoid of occurrences is itself an occurrence.
This argument is built on two premises, and both are problematic.
The first premise is that the one who can receive a thing cannot be devoid of it or its opposite. Most philosophers disagree with this. The dispute about this exists among the schools of fiqh and among the mutakallimun. Among the fuqaha from the four madhhabs—Ahmad, Malik, al-Shafiʿi, and Abu Hanifah—some affirmed this view. But those who said it had to also affirm that every body has taste, colour, smell, and other types of attributes—and they had no proof for that.
Abu al-Maʿali in his famous book al-Irshad ila Qawaṭiʿ al-Adillah needed this premise to argue for the origination of the universe. He wanted to prove that the body does not lack attributes from every category, so he referred to his discussion with the Karramiyyah. Then, when discussing with the Karramiyyah about this issue, he referred back to his argument about the origination of the universe with the philosophers—and in neither place did he mention anything logically sound. He only argued against the Karramiyyah by highlighting their contradiction.
The essence of what those who affirm this premise rely upon is that bodies do not lack the four states: combination, separation, motion, and stillness. The rest of the attributes are measured accordingly. They argue that a body that can receive one of them after being described with it must have been such that it could not be devoid of it beforehand, and the Karramiyyah accepted this. So they generalised it.
But their opponents, like al-Razi and others, replied that this is an analogy without a valid common basis. Even if it is accepted that a body necessarily has one type of attribute, why does it follow that it must have the rest? Moreover, the ones the Karramiyyah accept are motion and stillness. But whether stillness is a thing or a non-thing is disputed. As for combination and separation, that depends on the issue of the indivisible atom. Those who deny the existence of indivisible atoms—which is the majority—do not say that the body is never devoid of combination or separation. The simple body, according to them, is one entity whether it accepts separation or not. Likewise, even if it has different attached realities, that does not mean it must accept combination and separation.
As for whether the subject cannot be devoid of a attribute after it acquires it, they denied this for attributes that do not remain, like motions and sounds. As for things that do remain, that depends on the issue of whether something that remains needs a contrary to end it or not. Those who say that it does not need a contrary can say that it is possible to be devoid of a transient attribute without the existence of a contrary. Those who say it must end with a contrary say that after an attribute occurs, the subject cannot be devoid of it or its opposite. This rests on the truth of that principle. If the principle is true, the distinction holds; if false, the distinction is denied—and their contradiction shows one of their claims is false.
And those who affirm this principle are many—indeed, most people affirm it. So the contradiction of the Karramiyyah does not imply that others also contradict themselves.
Completion of the Argument on the Invalidity of Philosophical and Theological Objections
…then he said: “As for the third principle, which is that a body does not lack accidents,” this is the one he discussed. He mentioned that it is the principle from which it is deduced that bodies are originated, as they do not lack accidents, and accidents are originated, so their substrate must also be originated. He then said: “We have spoken about this in the chapter of opposing the views of the Karramiyyah, and whoever wants its details should look there.”
( In this he admits that the third principle—which is essential to the argument for the origination of the universe and the invalidation of an eternal universe—is not established by him independently, but only through contradiction with the Karramiyyah, and that it depends on their internal inconsistencies, not proof. )
So when he came to discuss with the Karramiyyah, he relied on their contradictions and did not present a distinct logical argument for this premise. Then he discussed with the philosophers and, again, did not give a logical argument. He only criticised the contradictions in the claims of his opponents.
This shows clearly that this foundational principle was not established by logic nor by explicit scriptural evidence, but rather relied on pointing out internal contradictions in some sects. Hence, it cannot be considered a definitive proof.
Final Summary of the Argument
The conclusion is that those who deny the possibility of occurrences—such as will, speech, or action—being attributed to Allah, only do so based on weak arguments. They claim that anything subject to change or any occurrence must be a deficiency, while in reality, what the revealed texts and sound reason affirm is that Allah is characterised by will and power and does as He wills and speaks when He wills. These are not deficiencies, but attributes of perfection.
There is no proof from reason or scripture that necessitates denying this. In fact, both affirm it. And those who deny it fall into greater inconsistencies, such as affirming that Allah has will and power but then denying the effects of these attributes in the actual universe. Or they affirm effects without attributing them to Him in reality, therefore contradicting themselves.
Therefore, what is correct—by consensus of the imams of the Salaf, and supported by sound reason and authentic reports—is that Allah does what He wills and speaks when He wills, and nothing of this entails deficiency or imperfection.
Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql (2/147-188)
