Ar-Razi’s Position on the Quran and Speech
Ar-Razi deviated from the typical Ashʿari position on the Quran. The Ashʿaris claim that Allah cannot have speech that originates within Himself because that would mean He is a locus for newly occurring things (huduth).
Ar-Razi did not adopt this view, as he considered the underlying principle weak and instead tried to establish his view using a kind of constructed consensus.
He affirmed that speech is a distinct attribute from knowledge and will. Based on this, he argued that if such meanings are affirmed, then by consensus they must be eternal, as no one affirms them as originated. This was his argument in Nihayat al-ʿUqul. (An issue to point out is that Asharis cannot tell you the distinguishing factor between Allah’s Knowledge and Kalam nafsi, Us Atharis can differentiate between Allah’s knowledge and his speech which consists of words and letters)
However, this reasoning is as flawed because views on the matter are more diverse than he suggests, not limited to Muʿtazilah and Kullabiyyah. The main Ashʿari-Kullabi argument—that newly originated speech cannot exist in Allah—was abandoned by ar-Razi, which implies that he saw it as insufficient. He tried to replace it with a consensus-based argument, but this too is weak.
Critique of Ar-Razi’s Use of Consensus
The claim that there is consensus on the eternity of Allah’s speech (the capability is eternal but not the act of speaking) is denied by the Shayk. The affirmation of an attribute does not necessitate declaring it eternal.
Many scholars affirm meanings like command and information but do not say they are eternal. The supposed consensus is not real, and ar-Razi’s reliance on it is incorrect. Furthermore, the basis for affirming the existence of attributes is different from the basis for declaring them eternal, so one cannot assume agreement on one implies agreement on the other.
Different Views on the Nature of Speech
There are four views on what “speech” means: the wording, the meaning, one of the two depending on context, or both together with contextual application. The last is the view of the majority, including the Salaf. If speech is affirmed to exist within Allah and is connected to His will and power, then it may be eternal, or it may be originated—neither of which contradicts consensus. Some say the letters are eternal, others that the meanings are eternal but not the letters. But the same reasoning used to deny the letters being eternal could be used against meanings too.
The Real Dispute: Actualised Attributes and Allah’s Will
The deeper issue is whether Allah has actualised attributes like actions that exist within Him and are connected to His will and power. Some try to restrict views to only three groups—Muʿtazilah, Kullabiyyah, and Karramiyyah—but in reality, many Muslims, including scholars of hadith, kalam, fiqh, and tasawwuf, affirm these attributes.
Ashʿari himself reported in Maqalat al-Islamiyyin that many early Shia and others believed Allah’s knowledge and will can be originated and exist within Him. He did not restrict these views to the Karramiyyah. He even quoted Hisham ibn al-Hakam, Abu Muʿadh at-Tumani, and Zuhayr al-Athari, who affirmed originated speech or will within Allah without calling it “created” or “brought into being.” These views existed among Imami Shia, jurists, and others.
The Flaws in Ar-Razi’s Argument Against Originated Speech
Ar-Razi’s argument rests on the idea that lacking a perfection is a deficiency, and that newly occurring speech is such a case. But it is countered by saying that something not existing in eternity does not mean deficiency—it could simply be something that did not exist yet. He also does not prove his claim with reason or scripture, only with a supposed consensus, which does not hold since many scholars disagree.
His claim that the ummah agrees that Allah is above deficiency is not disputed, but the key question is whether this specific case counts as a deficiency. If others disagree that it is a deficiency, then the consensus does not apply to this particular meaning, making it only a verbal consensus, not a meaningful one.
The Issue of Attributes of Perfection
Some claim all of Allah’s attributes are attributes of perfection, but this claim is even weaker than the one about deficiency. Scholars of kalam say action-related attributes are neither perfection nor imperfection. They admit that these are newly occurring and not essential. So even in their view, not all attributes are perfections.
If Allah’s actions and will-based attributes are perfections, then it follows He is more perfect for having them. If they are not perfections, then denying them does not add to His perfection. But since these actions involve will and ability, they are more fittingly described as perfections.
Reason Supports Attributes Like Speech and Action
From a logical perspective, beings that can act and speak by will are more complete than those that cannot. Therefore, Allah having speech and actions by will is more perfect than lacking them. Reason favours a god who hears, sees, and speaks, over one who does not, and this was the approach of the Salaf.
The same argument applies to movement and action. Even if a created being gains perfection after not having it, that does not mean it was deficient before. Rather, the perfection simply did not exist yet. Allah is the Living, All-Powerful, Wise, and does what He wills.
Conclusion
Ar-Razi distanced himself from the traditional Ashʿari-Kullabi view on the Quran’s eternity because he considered its foundation weak. His attempt to prove the eternity of Allah’s speech through a supposed consensus is flawed, both logically and in terms of actual scholarly agreement. The core issue is whether attributes connected to Allah’s will and power can exist within Him. Reason, the practice of the Salaf, and broader Islamic tradition support affirming these attributes, and the attempt to deny them on the basis of consensus or deficiency fails under scrutiny.
Ar-Razi, in most of his books, did not explain the issue of the Quran using the well-known Ashʿari approach. That approach is based on the claim that it is impossible for speech to originate within Allah Himself, because He is not a locus for newly occurring things.
The reason he did not follow this approach is that he considered this principle weak, so he could not base anything on it. Instead, he tried to prove it using a kind of composite consensus. He established that speech has a meaning distinct from knowledge and will, contrary to the view of the Muʿtazilah and others like them. If this is so, then everyone who says that agrees it is one ancient attribute that exists within Allah. If someone did not say that, they would be going against the consensus.
This is the main point he relied on in Nihayat al-ʿUqul, but it is weak, because the views on this issue are many, not limited to the positions of the Muʿtazilah and the Kullabiyyah.
He could have been told: if it is proven that nothing related to Allah’s will and power can exist within Him, then it would be possible to say that His speech is ancient, using the known approach. That is, if it is impossible for it to occur within Him or within any other place, then if it is impossible for it to be newly originated within Him, it must be eternal. But if that is not proven, if it is possible for something related to His will and power to exist within Him, then the view of the Karramiyyah and the view of the People of Hadith who say that this is the saying of the Salaf and the imams becomes possible. So the view of the Kullabiyyah is not the only possibility. In Nihayat al-ʿUqul, he repeated what he and others often repeat: that the meaning of speech is either that it is will and knowledge, or that request is something distinct from will and that a mental judgement is something distinct from knowledge. The first option is false, because humans in our experience can say things they do not know or believe, and they can command something they do not want, like a master who commands his servant just to test him.
He said: if that is true in our experience, it must also be true in the unseen, because there is consensus that the nature of speech does not differ between what we witness and what is unseen.
He said: therefore, Allah’s command, prohibition, and information are real attributes that exist within Him, distinct from His essence and His knowledge, and the words that appear in the divine books point to them. If that is true, then we must declare that they are eternal, because the ummah has two positions on this issue: some deny that Allah is described with command, prohibition, and speech in that sense, and others affirm it. And everyone who says that Allah is described with those attributes claims that those attributes are eternal. So if we say that He is described with those attributes, and then say that they are originated, that would be a third view outside of the consensus, and that is false. (Footnote: see Nihayat al-ʿUqul fi Dirayat al-Usul, manuscript Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, Tawhid 748, p. 217, and Talʿat, 2565)
Critique of the Claim of Consensus on the Eternity of Speech
Then he raised objections against himself. One of them was someone asking: “Why did you say those meanings are eternal?” Your answer is: “Everyone who affirms those meanings also says they are eternal.” We say: the affirmation of those meanings is one issue, and declaring them eternal is another. If one necessarily implied the other, then affirming that Allah knows with eternal knowledge would mean you must say He speaks with eternal speech. Even if we accept that this kind of consensus proves that Allah’s speech is eternal, it is contradicted by another kind of consensus, namely that no one in the ummah affirmed the eternity of Allah’s speech in the way you describe. So relying on what you mentioned goes against the consensus.
He answered that by saying: “If affirming that attribute necessarily means it is eternal, because everyone who says the first also says the second, then affirming eternal knowledge would necessitate affirming eternal speech, because everyone who says the first also says the second.” We say: the difference between the two has been mentioned in al-Mahsul, because the Muʿtazilah agree with us on the difference between the two issues. (Footnote: his statement: affirming the eternity of Allah’s speech in this way goes against consensus. We say: we have explained in al-Mahsul that bringing a new argument not mentioned by those who claimed consensus does not invalidate the consensus.)
I say: what matters here is to recognise that he abandoned the famous approach, which is that if Allah originated speech in Himself, He would be a locus for newly occurring things, even though that is the main argument of Ibn Kullab, al-Ashʿari, and those who followed them. He abandoned it because he saw that this foundation is weak. If he believed it was valid, it would have been enough for him, and he would not have needed to invent this new approach.
The goal here is not to discuss the issue of the Quran itself, that is discussed in other places, but only to point out that the respected scholars admitted that this foundation is weak. As for the weakness of what ar-Razi relied upon in the question of the Quran, that is explained elsewhere, because proving the first premise depends on issues that are not discussed here, like the master who tests his servant and the liar who gives false information. The opponent would say: this is just showing the form of a command or a report, but the statement does not actually show any meaning within the self. That is why Allah says about the liars: “They say with their mouths what is not in their hearts” (al-Fath: 11). So the dispute is about whether a false statement indicates a meaning in the self or not. They say that it only appears to indicate a meaning in the self, and it is a lie.
As for the second premise, it is also weak. It can be said: let us suppose this is proven, why can’t Allah speak with letters and meanings that exist within Him and are newly originated? That is what groups of Muslims say, so it is not against the consensus. If he tries to refute that by saying that Allah is not a locus for new things, then, if that is a sound argument, it would be enough, just as others have relied on it. But if it is not sound, then the proof fails. So it becomes clear that proving that Allah’s speech is eternal depends on this premise.
As for the claim that everyone who affirms that Allah has these meanings also says they are eternal, that is not true. Many of the People of Hadith and scholars of kalam affirm them but do not say they are eternal.
The Error in Using Consensus as a Proof
As for the difference mentioned in al-Mahsul, it is this: if the ummah has two views about two issues, and both views are based on the same foundational reason, like their disagreement about inheritance of distant relatives and return of excess shares, then later people cannot mix the two positions, taking one from one group and the other from the other. But if the foundational reasons differ, like their disagreement about pre-emption and inheritance of distant relatives, then it is allowed to mix the views, taking one from one group and one from the other.
So ar-Razi thought that affirming the eternity of speech along with affirming these meanings is one of those cases, but that is not true. The basis for affirming these meanings is not the same as the basis for declaring them eternal. The question of eternity is based on the issue of attributes and on whether things connected to Allah’s will and power can exist within Him. But affirming those meanings is a different issue altogether.
Different Views About the Meaning of Speech
People have four views about what speech means. One view is that it is the wording that points to a meaning. Another is that it is the meaning that the wording points to. A third is that the word “speech” is used for both, depending on the context. A fourth is that the word includes both together, and that one of them is meant depending on the context. This is the view of the imams and most people. So if someone affirms these meanings and says that the word “speech” includes them by generality or shared usage, then they can say that the wording and the meaning both exist within Allah.
Then, if someone believes those things can be connected to Allah’s will and power, they can either say that this speech is eternal, or they can say that a specific instance of speech is not eternal while the general kind is. And those who reject that idea, some of them say the letters are eternal, and some say the meanings are eternal but not the letters. And the things used to prove the createdness of the letters, like sequence and being in a place, are used by the other side against the meanings too, because they are also sequential for us, and they also require a place that does not befit Allah.
If it is possible for them to be multiple in us but one with Allah, and their place in Allah is not like our place, then the same can be said for the letters. Even though they are multiple in us, they can be one with Allah, and their place is not like our place. If someone says: they are in order for us, we say: so are the meanings. If someone says: claiming they are one goes against plain reason, we say: so does claiming the meanings are one. So their argument is the same as that of their opponents.
The Real Issue Is the Actualised Attributes Like Actions
What is meant here is to discuss this foundational issue, which is the question of actualised attributes like actions and others that exist within Allah and are connected to His will and power.
As for the claim that the majority is against that and that only the Karramiyyah disagree, that comes from those who assume the Muslim groups are just Muʿtazilah, Kullabiyyah, and Karramiyyah. In fact, most Muslims allow for this view, including scholars of kalam, hadith, fiqh, Sufism, and others. As for the imams of hadith and the Sunnah, they are all agreed on it. The words of those whose words are known clearly show this. The rest honour those who say it and consider them imams of the Sunnah and hadith. They do not accuse them of innovation.
As for the later People of Hadith, there are two views. Among the companions of Ahmad, there are two views. Among the companions of al-Shafiʿi, there are two views. Among the companions of Malik, there are two views. Among the companions of Abu Hanifah, there are two views. Among the Sufis, there are two views. And the majority of the scholars of tafsir affirm it.
As for the scholars of kalam, al-Ashʿari mentioned this in Maqalat al-Islamiyyin from more than one of the leading scholars of kalam besides the Karramiyyah. He did not say that the Karramiyyah had anything unique except their view about iman. He even mentioned that Hisham ibn al-Hakam and others from the Shia describe Allah with movement, stillness, and similar things, and that most of the early Shia were more extreme in saying Allah had a body than the Karramiyyah.
The later Shia are the ones who took the view of the Muʿtazilah in tawhid. He even mentioned that they say Allah’s knowledge, hearing, and sight newly come into existence. People have said that both Hisham and Jahm say that Allah’s knowledge is newly originated. Jahm says it is originated but not in Allah’s essence, and Hisham says it is originated within His essence.
Abu Hasan Al-Ashʿari mentioned that the majority of the Imamis say knowledge comes into being, and that they affirm motion for Allah, and that all of them say that except for a small minority. He mentioned that Hisham ibn al-Hakam, Hisham al-Jawaliqi, Abu Malik al-Hadrami, and Ali ibn Maytham all said that. He said some of them say: Allah knows everything before it happens except for the actions of the servants, He only knows those when they happen. That is the view of the extreme Qadariyyah like Maʿbad al-Juhani and others, and it is one of the views of Amr ibn Ubayd.
He said that Zuhayr al-Athari said: Allah is not a body or limited, and He cannot be subject to indwelling or contact. He claimed that Allah will come on the Day of Judgment as He said: “And your Lord will come with the angels in rows” (al-Fajr: 22). He claimed the Quran is Allah’s speech, originated but not created.
He said: Abu Muʿadh at-Tumani agreed with Zuhayr in most of what he said but disagreed with him on the Quran. He claimed that Allah’s speech is originated but not created and not brought into being. It exists within Allah and is not in a place. He said the same about Allah’s love and will.
Zuhayr said: Allah’s speech is an occurrence, but not originated. It is an act, but not something brought into existence. He refused to say it was created. He said it is not created or a creation, but it exists within Allah, and it is impossible that Allah speaks with speech that exists in something else. Just like it is impossible for Him to move with movement that exists in something else. He said the same about Allah’s will, love, and hate: that they all exist within Him.
Al-Ashʿari said: I heard that one of the jurists said: “Allah has always been speaking”, meaning He has always been capable of speech. He said: “Allah’s speech is originated but not created.” He said: this is the view of Dawud al-Asbahani. He said: all those who say the Quran is not created, like Abd Allah ibn Kullab, and those who say it is originated, like Zuhayr, and those who say it came into being, like Abu Muʿadh at-Tumani, they all say that the Quran is not a body and not an attribute that belongs to bodies.
The Weakness of Ar-Razi’s Argument Against the Opposing View
As for the argument ar-Razi used in support of those who deny it, that too is weak from many angles.
One: his main premise is that anything that lacks a perfection that it could have had is deficient. But it should be said: it is known that newly occurring events that happen one after another cannot be described as existing eternally, just as they cannot exist eternally. Anything whose existence depends on something else that has not yet happened cannot exist before that thing. So being without it in eternity does not mean being without something that could be had. Being without something impossible is not a deficiency.
Two: it can be said: he did not prove that what he called a deficiency is actually impossible using reason, or by a verse from the Quran, or a hadith. He only claimed it was known by consensus. This is his approach and that of Abu al-Maʿali before him and others who agree with them. They say: “We only know that imperfection is impossible for Allah because of consensus, not because of reason or revelation.” If that is true, then we know that the people who dispute this issue are part of the ummah. So how can he use consensus as proof in a matter where people differ?
Response to the Argument from Consensus on the Incompatibility of Deficiency with Allah
If someone were to say, “These scholars agreed with us that deficiency cannot apply to Allah, they only disagreed with us on whether this specific case counts as deficiency,” the answer would be: either they agreed with the use of the term, or they agreed with the meanings behind it.
If they only agreed with the use of the term that Allah is free from deficiency, but they did not consider this specific case to be a form of deficiency, then the matter in dispute is not included in what they meant by the word ‘deficiency.’ In that case, the supposed consensus would only be over the word, not over the meaning that is being debated. Such a consensus is not valid evidence for the meaning in question, but only a verbal agreement.
At most, if there were proof that the language defines this case as ‘deficiency,’ then one might say they failed to use the correct linguistic term. That would be a linguistic mistake, assuming the definition itself is not disputed. But here, even the language-based premises are not agreed upon. So such a claim does not serve as proof regarding the actual meaning being debated. It would at most be a verbal argument, and even that only if the premises were sound. So the intended conclusion would not be reached.
If, on the other hand, they agreed to reject the meanings expressed by the word ‘deficiency,’ then it is clear that they did not agree with you on the specific meaning being debated. Therefore, it becomes obvious that there is no consensus at all on the rejection of the matter in dispute, and you cannot use consensus as proof for that.
Third Point: The General Consensus Against Deficiency
Another way to respond: the claim that “the ummah is agreed that Allah is free from deficiency and imperfection” is not a claim that each and every member of the ummah has explicitly stated these words. Rather, we know that every Muslim affirms that Allah is far above deficiency and flaws. In fact, all philosophers agree on this. No one who honours the Creator describes Him with an attribute they believe to be a flaw or a deficiency. Some atheists may describe Him in ways they themselves consider to be deficient, but that is just like denying His existence altogether.
This is why those who deny Allah’s attributes only deny them because they think affirming them implies deficiency, like newly originated attributes, possibility, or resemblance to living beings. Those who affirm the attributes only affirm them because they believe that affirming them leads to perfection, and denying them leads to deficiency, non-existence, and similarity to inanimate objects. The same is true of those who affirm or deny Allah’s decree. Some who deny prophethood claim they are doing so out of reverence for Allah, so that His messenger would not be a human. And the idolaters committed shirk out of their belief that Allah should not be worshipped without an intermediary between Him and His creation.
So it is clear that if someone were to argue using the consensus of the Muslims on Allah being free from deficiency or imperfection as a way to deny His attributes, claiming that affirming them is a flaw or imperfection, then those who affirm the attributes would say: we do not agree with you that this meaning is deficiency or imperfection, so do not use our agreement on the word as a proof for a meaning we did not agree to. They would say: we dispute the meaning itself, even if you call it deficiency. Therefore, this is not a valid proof unless another kind of proof is given for rejecting that meaning, one that does not depend on a consensus that we do not share.
Fourth Point: The Claim that All of Allah’s Attributes Are Attributes of Perfection
Another response: if you say that “the ummah is agreed that all of Allah’s attributes are attributes of perfection,” then if you mean the attributes that are always with Him, this would not support your argument. But if you mean the attributes that happen by His will and power, then this is not a consensus. You and others among the scholars of kalam say that attributes of action are neither perfection nor imperfection, and that Allah is described with them only after not being described with them.
So, for you, things like creating, originating, acting justly, and doing good are newly occurring matters, not attributes of praise or perfection. If you then say: “The effects of His actions are not part of Him, unlike what exists within Him,” then we say: let that be the case. Still, what He causes to happen by His will and power, are these things attributed to Him or not? If you say He is not described with them, then He is not described with anything, neither this nor that. And if you say He is described with them, then He is described with both this and that.
It is well-known that the scholars of kalam, across different sects, divide the attributes into action-related and non-action-related. Even those who say actions do not exist within Him still describe Him as the Creator and Provider. For them, these are things that came into being after they previously did not exist. When they were challenged by philosophers and others who believe in an infinite sequence of events, and were told: “If action is a perfection, then He must have it eternally; if it is a flaw, then He cannot have it ever,” they responded by saying: “Action is neither a perfection nor a flaw.”
Fifth Point: The Weakness of the Claim about Perfection
The argument that “the ummah is agreed that Allah’s attributes are only attributes of perfection” is even weaker than the claim that they are agreed that He is free from deficiency. The claim that He is free from deficiency is widely known in people’s speech, but the claim that His attributes are only ever attributes of perfection is not a well-known phrase from the imams. Those among them who did say that only said it in a general sense, based on what is well established in people’s hearts: that Allah is described with perfection, not deficiency. But such general statements do not resolve precise issues. If you asked someone who said this: “Is the fact that He acts by His own will and ability a perfection or a flaw?”, they would be more likely to include it among the perfections, or hesitate to answer, than to call it a flaw.
Sixth Point: The Argument of Perfection and Deficiency Works Against Them
This consensus they claim actually works against them. If we imagine two beings and present them to reason, one of whom can speak and act by His will, and the other cannot do so, but rather speaks without power or will, or something just proceeds from Him, reason would judge that the first is more complete. Similarly, if we present two beings, created or not, and one can move, go, come, and act on its own, while the other cannot do so, reason would judge the first to be more complete. Just like if we presented two beings, and one is living, knowing, and capable, while the other has no life, knowledge, or power, reason would clearly judge the first to be more perfect than the second. So the very same thing that makes us recognise that life, knowledge, and power are perfections is also what makes us recognise that acts and speech by will and choice that exist within the being are perfections too, especially when through them external effects are brought into being.
All philosophers agree that things that move or are capable of movement are more perfect than things that cannot move. Just like they agree that things described with knowledge, power, hearing, and sight, or at least capable of having those, are more perfect than things that cannot have them at all.
This is one of the greatest ways to prove the attributes. The Salaf used it, and they would say: anyone who worships a god who cannot hear, see, or speak is worshipping a deficient, flawed, defective lord. They would affirm that these are attributes of perfection, and anyone who lacks them is deficient.
It is well known that any perfection that has no aspect of deficiency and can belong to a created being, then the Creator is more deserving of it. And any deficiency that a created being is above, then the Creator is even more deserving of being above it.
When some of the atheists who denied the attributes said: “The absence of these attributes is only a deficiency if the being is capable of having them. Blindness is only a defect if one can see, and being mute is only a defect if one can speak, and deafness is only a defect if one can hear, these are only deficiencies in animals, not in stones,” the answer given was: “Something that cannot have any of these attributes is more deficient than something that can, even if it only has the defective version.” A rock that cannot live, hear, see, or speak is more deficient than a living creature that can, even if it is blind, deaf, and mute. So those who deny the attributes have made Allah like a blind, deaf, mute creature. And those who say He cannot have any of those attributes at all have made Him like a rock, which is even lower than a blind, deaf, mute creature.
The same thing applies to actions. Movement by essence implies life, unlike accidental movement, like forced movement caused by an external force, or natural movement of things returning to their centre. Those are movements by accident. All philosophers agree that if something gains perfection after lacking it, that does not mean it was deficient before. The most that can be said is that the perfection did not exist before it existed, which just means it was nonexistent before it existed. So how do you know that the existence of this perfection after non-existence is impossible? It does not mean Allah needed anything, nor that He became more complete by acting. Rather, He is the Living One, who does whatever He wills, the Wise and All-Knowing.
Things that can move are better than things that cannot. And things that move by their own will are better than things that only move by something else. A thing that moves by itself is more complete than something lifeless that only moves because of something else. This has been explained in more detail in other places.
Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql (2/324-344)
