Some people take a line in Kitāb al-Nubuwwāt to mean Ibn Taymiyyah tied every new event (ḥudūth) to a prior “something” in a way that would imply Allah needs eternal matter or that his power (qudrah) is somehow limited.

However this is not the case rather he affirms true origination (al-ḥudūth al-ḥaqīqī) and creation from nothing (al-khalq min al-ʿadam), while explaining how new things arise either by relation to the Creator’s power or (in the created world) within a created locus (maḥall) suited for them. Ibn Taymiyyah does not believe in a creation that is eternal.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Teaching

1) True Origination & Creation from Nothing

Ibn Taymiyyah states explicitly that when Allah brings a second thing from a first, the first perishes entirely and the second is originated anew:

“The truth is that the matter from which the second is created perishes, transforms, and vanishes, and Allah brings forth the second, originating and creating it without anything remaining from the first—not matter, nor form, nor substance (jawhar), nor accident (ʿaraḍ).”

He illustrates this with what we observe: a human from nuṭfah (semen), a crop from grain, smoke from fire, etc. Each prior thing ceases entirely; the later thing is newly created by Allah—not a mere reshaping of a surviving substrate.

This stems from the Qur’an:

• Maryam 67:
  أَوَلَمْ يَذْكُرِ الْإِنسَانُ أَنَّا خَلَقْنَاهُ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَلَمْ يَكُ شَيْئًا
  “Does mankind not remember that We created him before, when he was nothing?”
• al-Sajdah 7–8:
  الَّذِي أَحْسَنَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقَهُ وَبَدَأَ خَلْقَ الْإِنسَانِ مِنْ طِينٍ ثُمَّ جَعَلَ نَسْلَهُ مِنْ سُلَالَةٍ مِنْ مَاءٍ مَّهِينٍ
  “He is the One who perfected everything He created, and He began the creation of man from clay, then He made his posterity from a humble fluid.””
• al-Wāqiʿah 58–62:
  أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُمْنُونَ ۝ أَأَنْتُمْ تَخْلُقُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الْخَالِقُونَ ۝ نَحْنُ قَدَّرْنَا بَيْنَكُمُ الْمَوْتَ وَمَا نَحْنُ بِمَسْبُوقِينَ ۝ عَلَى أَنْ نُبَدِّلَ أَمْثَالَكُمْ وَنُنْشِئَكُمْ فِي مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ ۝ وَلَقَدْ عَلِمْتُمُ النَّشْأَةَ الْأُولَى فَلَوْلَا تَذَكَّرُونَ
  ““Have you seen what you emit?
  Is it you who create it, or are We the Creator?
  We have decreed death among you, and We are never outpaced,
  That We may replace you by others and produce you in what you do not know.
  And you have already known the first creation, so will you not remember?”
• al-Raḥmān 26:
  كُلُّ مَنْ عَلَيْهَا فَانٍ
  “Everyone upon the earth will perish.”
• Maryam 9:
  وَقَدْ خَلَقْتُكَ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَلَمْ تَكُ شَيْئًا
  “I created you before, when you were nothing.”

These verses, as he argues, show real beginning-from-nonexistence, not mere swapping of accidents or forms on a persisting substrate.

2) Two Kinds of “Possibility” (Imkān)

He distinguishes:

• Imkān dhihnī (mental possibility): a conceptual allowance or lack of seeing an impossibility; its “locus” is the mind.
• Imkān khārijī (external possibility):
  • Related to the Fāʿil (the Doer)—i.e., Allah’s qudrah and tamakkun (ability) truly subsist with Him; or
  • Related to a maḥall (locus)—e.g., land that can be cultivated; a womb that can carry. This “locus” is created, contingent, and not eternal.

So when he says an event needs a “locus,” he does not mean an eternal co-existent matter. He means either

(a) Allah’s power alone suffices, or

(b) a created setting suited for the new event, which is still under Allah’s will and power.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Refutation Of The Philosophers

• Their first claim: Every change is just a new form on one underlying eternal matter.
• His rebuttal: This denies real creation “from something” because, on that view, nothing truly begins; only forms flip while matter persists. He insists the earlier thing perishes entirely; the later is originated anew.
• Second claim: Indivisible atoms (al-jawāhir al-afrād) remain; only accidents arise and vanish.
• His reply: That also denies real creation. If only accidents come and go, then when Allah “creates man from dust,” no human being is truly originated—only momentary accidents. This reading also breaks their account of annihilation and resurrection, which he shows becomes incoherent on their premises.

From both claims we see that they smuggle in a permanent substrate, and so, in practice, deny what the Qur’an teaches about origination, perishing, and re-creation.

What “From Something” Does and Does Not Mean According To Ibn Taymiyyah

It doesn’t mean that

• Allah needs pre-existent māddah (like a potter needing clay).
• Any matter/form/substance/accident of the first persists into the second.
• That there is any co-eternal thing alongside Allah.

Rather he meant

In the created order, Allah brings about new beings in a created setting (a “locus” fit for them), while the prior thing perishes entirely.

Sometimes “locus” is simply the relation to Allah’s power; sometimes it is a created receptacle (soil, womb, etc.). In all cases, no eternal matter is posited.

Three Critical Claims

1. “Allah needs prior matter (māddah) to create.”
   • Rejected. He explicitly says nothing of the first remains—not matter, not form, not substance, not accident. Creation is ibdāʿ (origination) of a truly new entity.
2. “Allah’s power depends on an external ground of possibility.”
   • Rejected. External imkān may relate either to the Fāʿil (i.e., Allah’s qudrah—self-subsisting) or to a created locus. No co-eternal ground is affirmed or required.
3. “Allah can never be without something alongside Him.”
   • Rejected. He approves the sense of “Allah was and nothing was with Him,” and his argumentation denies any eternal matter or co-eternal essences. Everything besides Allah is originated and perishes at His will.

Conclusion

What we conclude from this is that Ibn Taymiyyah did not believe creation is eternal.
From the cited section of Kitāb al-Nubuwwāt, he:

• Affirms al-khalq min al-ʿadam (creation from nothing) and al-ḥudūth al-ḥaqīqī (true origination).
• Stresses that when Allah creates a thing “from” another, the earlier thing perishes entirely; nothing of its matter/form/substance/accidents persists; the later thing is originated anew.
• Rejects both the falsafī claim of a single eternal matter receiving new forms and the kalām claim of eternal atoms receiving new accidents.
• Explains “locus/recipient” in a way that never entails a co-eternal substrate: sometimes it is only the relation to Allah’s power; sometimes a created receptacle (soil, womb, etc.).

For an extensive dive into this issue I would recommend you guys to watch these two videos below, since I used them to put this article together.

The passage that many people use, because they seem to understand it as implying some form of deficiency in Allah’s qudrah (ability) to create.

Ibn Taymiyyah said: The occurrence of something without any material might resemble its occurrence without a Lord and Creator, and it might be thought that it happened from the essence of the Lord Himself.

This is just as it was said about the Messiah and about the angels, that they are daughters of Allah, because they had no father, even though they were created from material. As is established in the authentic hadith, in Sahih Muslim from Aishah, the Prophet ﷺ said: “The angels were created from light, the jinn were created from a smokeless flame of fire, and Adam was created from what has been described to you.” (Riyad As Salihin 1846)

When a group thought that these were not created from material, they thought that they were eternal without beginning.

Also, the proof which many people used, that every haadith (created thing) does not occur except from something or in something, is as follows: if it is an ‘arad (accident), it only occurs in a mahal (locus), and if it is a jawhar (substance) that exists by itself, it does not occur except from matter. Indeed, the haadith only occurs when its occurrence is mumkin (possible), and it can accept both existence and non-existence.

So it is preceded by imkan al-huduth (the possibility of occurring) and by jawazuhu (its allowance). Therefore, it must have a mahal in which this imkan and jawaz exist. They disputed on this matter: Is imkan (possibility) an attribute that exists externally which requires a mahal, or is it a rational thought that does not need anything outside of the mind?

The correct position is that it is of two types.

• The imkan dhihni (mental possibility), which is the allowance of a thing or the lack of knowledge of its impossibility, and its mahal is the mind
• The imkan khariji (external possibility), which is related to the fa‘il (agent) or to the mahal.

For example, when you say, “al-Qadir (the Capable One) can do,” this is related to the fa‘il. Or when you say, “This land can be cultivated, and this woman can become pregnant,” this is related to the mahal. This requires an external mahal. So when it is said about the Rabb that “He can create,” its meaning is that He has qudrah (power) to do so and tamakkun (ability) for it, and this is a sifah (attribute) that exists with Him.

When it is said that a created thing can occur, then if it is said that it can occur without a cause that occurs, this is impossible. Since the occurrence must have a cause that occurs, if that cause exists within the essence of the Lord, then His essence is eternal without beginning.

The specification of that time by the occurrence of will or the completion of ability or the like, does not happen except by a cause that was itself newly brought before that, occurring outside Him. Therefore, no created thing that is separate can occur except preceded by another created thing that is separate from it.

So the occurrence is preceded by its possibility, and its possibility must have a locus. This is why Allah never mentioned that He brought something into existence except from something.

The one who says that the whole genus of created things occurred from nothing is like the one who says that they occurred without a cause that occurred, while also saying that they had been impossible then became possible without the renewal of a cause.

In truth, their saying means that the Lord became able after not being able, without any renewal of something requiring that.

All of these views are from the sayings of the Jahmiyyah, the people of kalam that is newly invented and blameworthy. This is built on their saying that an endless sequence of created things is impossible.

Such people and those like them erred regarding what the Sharia came with and what the messengers informed of, just as they erred in matters of reason. Thus, every part of what is called Sharia, reason, and transmitted report has been mixed up for them.

Kitab An Nubuwwat By Ibn Taymiyyah Pages 327-328

Here is a way to break this quote down

There are three main elements that stand out from this passage:

• The impossibility of any huduth (temporal occurrence) without a preceding sabab dhamani (temporal cause).
• The fact that every mumkin (possible being) requires something that grounds its imkan (possibility) before it comes into existence.
• That this prior sabab (cause or ground) must be something within al-khalq (creation).

These three points form the basis of the criticism often raised against this passage.

The plan for analysis is as follows:

• First, we will examine the siyaq (context), focusing on the section in which this passage appears, its overall themes, and the discussions leading up to it. This step is essential to truly understand what Ibn Taymiyyah is saying.
• Second, we will look at the shubhah (claim or objection) made by critics, clarifying it and phrasing it more precisely. Specifically, we will ask: what exactly is this claim about “dependence on matter” supposed to mean?
• Third, we will analyse the three different possible meanings of that claim and assess whether any of them faithfully represent Ibn Taymiyyah’s kalam (argument).

The critic’s claim can be put into three possible ways, each of which suggests some form of dependency of Allah, exalted is He, on something other than Himself.

That Allah needs a prior thing to serve as the maadah (material substance) for His khalq (creation). According to this reading, Allah cannot bring something entirely new into existence unless He already has some form of raw matter, like a potter needing clay to shape a vessel.

That Allah needs a prior thing to act as the ground of imkan (possibility) for khalq. Here, the argument is not that Allah needs matter, but rather that His creative qudrah (power) is dependent on the wujood (existence) of something external that establishes the possibility of new creation. For example, you would need a stage in order to perform a play. The stage is not part of the play itself, nor the actors, nor the costumes, but it provides the framework that makes the play possible.

That Allah can never exist alone. This combines elements of the first two readings and points out that if Allah requires something external, whether as maadah (material) or as a ground of imkan (possibility), then He must always coexist with that external thing. In that case, He would never be entirely without something alongside Him, since the possibility of khalq would collapse in its absence.

These three points form the foundation of the critic’s interpretation of the passage. Now, with the context of Ibn Taymiyyah’s kalam in mind, we can turn to these claims and address them one by one, beginning with the first: that khalq requires a pre-existent maadah.

Ibn Taymiyyah does not believe that the material substance here means something like clay that Allah would supposedly need in order to shape creation.

This is the easiest claim to rule out, because in the very same section he explicitly rejects this idea. He writes:

“The matter from which the second entity is created undergoes corruption, transformation, and disappearance. Allah brings forth the second entity, originating and creating it without any remainder of the first, neither in matter, form, substance, nor accidents.” [Paraphrased]

Ibn Taymiyyah said: The truth is that the matter from which the second is created perishes, transforms, and vanishes, and Allah brings forth the second and originates it, creating it without anything remaining from the first, neither matter, nor form, nor substance, nor accident. So when Allah created man from semen, the semen transformed and became a clot, then the clot transformed and became a lump, then the lump transformed into bones and other parts. When man was created, he was created entirely, his substances and his accidents, and Allah began him as a new beginning.

As He said:

الذي أحسن كل شيء خلقه وبدأ خلق الإنسان من طين ثم جعل نسله من سلالة من ماء مهين

“He perfected everything He created, and He began the creation of man from clay, then made his offspring from an extract of a weak fluid” (al-Sajda 7–8).

And He said:

أولم يذكر الإنسان أنا خلقناه من قبل ولم يك شيئا

“Does not man remember that We created him before, when he was nothing” (Maryam 67).

Kitab An Nubuwwat Page 317

In simple terms, Ibn Taymiyyah is clear that when a prior thing is destroyed, it ceases to exist entirely. Its matter, form, and attributes are gone. This rejection of the Falasifah’s and Mutakallimeen’s understanding of matter and persistence was central to his critique. Against both, he emphasises that true creation (khalq) means ibdaʿ (origination) of entirely new substances, not merely reshaping or transforming what already exists.

So, to conclude our response to the first formulation: If the claim is that Allah needs matter to create, then Ibn Taymiyyah directly rejects this.

His view is that khalq is genuine origination, entirely new substances coming into existence through Allah’s qudrah, without relying on any remainder of what existed before.

Ibn Taymiyyah said: What we have mentioned from the words of those philosophers and mutakallimeen means something else. It is that whoever says the matter remains itself, and only an accident or a form occurs in it, then this is not created from other than it, but rather something occurred in the remaining matter.

So, according to them, Allah did not create something from something, because the matter in their view was not created. As for the philosophers, they hold that the matter is eternal, without beginning, remaining as it is.

As for the mutakallimeen, they say that the substances (jawahir) exist and have always existed, but those who say they are originated from the people of the religions and others say that their origination is known through evidence, not that their creation is known to people naturally. In their view it is known only through subtle, hidden proofs, even though what they mention ends with the claim that what does not separate from occurrences is itself originated. This is a false proof, so in reality they have no proof for its origination.

And if it was not created when man was created, but remained in man, and the accidents that occur were not created from matter, then when man was created, was he not created from anything? Neither his substances nor his accidents.

According to their view, Allah did not make from water every living thing, nor did He create every animal from water, nor did He create Adam from dust or his offspring from a drop of semen. Rather, the very substances of the dust remain as they are, not created at that time, but instead accidents or a new form occurred in them, and those accidents are not from the dust.

So when Adam was created, nothing was created from dust. And likewise the drop of semen, its substances remain, whether they are individual substances or the matter. The new thing is only an accident or a form in matter.

So this is not creating from semen. And their saying that something was not created from matter does not mean that the Creator brought it forth from nothing, intending thereby to magnify the Creator. Rather, man is without doubt a substance that exists by itself, and according to them that which exists by itself has always existed.

So when man was created, it was not created. And the substance carrying his form has also always existed. So according to these, nothing was created except the accidents, and according to those others nothing was created except a bare form. And both of these are not the human being, but rather a description of him or a form for him. This is what is created according to them, that only the form of man is created.

Allah the Exalted said:

أولم يذكر الإنسان أنا خلقناه من قبل ولم يك شيئا

“Does not man remember that We created him before, when he was nothing” (Maryam 67).

And He said:

وقد خلقتك من قبل ولم تك شيئا

“I created you before, when you were nothing” (Maryam 9).

So He commanded man to remember that Allah created him when he was nothing. And when man remembers, he only remembers that he was created from a drop of semen. But according to them, the substances of man were already something, and that thing remained, and only accidents occurred to those things.

It is known that those accidents alone are not man, because man is commanded, forbidden, living, knowing, able, speaking, hearing, seeing, described with movement and stillness. These are attributes of substances, and the accident is not described with anything, especially since they say that the accident does not remain for two moments.

So according to their view, the created thing does not remain for two moments, but perishes immediately after it is created. For this reason they became confused regarding the resurrection, because knowing the resurrection is built upon knowing the first creation, and the return is built upon the beginning.

So some of them said: it is only the separation of those parts, then their being gathered again while they remain themselves.

Some of them said: rather they are annihilated, and the accidents existing in them are annihilated, then they are brought back again. When they are brought back, what is brought back is those very substances that remained until they came to exist in this man.

For this reason they became confused when it was said to them: if a man is eaten by another animal, then if those substances are restored to the first, the second loses, and if restored to the second, the first loses.

As for the one who says they are annihilated and then restored themselves, it was said to him: are they annihilated after the eater has eaten them, or before he eats them? If after he eats them, then they are restored in the eater, so the eaten loses. And if before he eats them, then the eater has only eaten accidents, not substances. This is clear falsehood.

It is well known that man decays and becomes dust, just as he was created from dust. This is what Allah informed of.

So if it is said: when he becomes dust, those substances are annihilated, then when he was created from dust, those substances were annihilated as well. So their claim that the substances remain through all transformations, except when they become dust, is a clear contradiction, and it obligates for them the same problem with eaten animals and other things.

This misguidance was the root of their misguidance in conceiving of the first creation and the first bringing forth, which the Lord commanded them to remember and to use as proof of His ability to create the second.

Allah said:

أفرأيتم ما تمنون أأنتم تخلقونه أم نحن الخالقون نحن قدرنا بينكم الموت وما نحن بمسبوقين على أن نبدل أمثالكم وننشئكم في ما لا تعلمون ولقد علمتم النشأة الأولى فلولا تذكرون

“Have you seen that which you emit? Is it you who create it, or are We the Creator? We have decreed death among you, and We are not to be overcome from changing your forms and creating you in forms that you do not know. And you already know the first creation, so why then do you not remember” (al-Waqia 58–62).

The philosophers had a better conception in this point, when they said that the first form perishes, which is a substance, and another form comes into existence.

This is better than saying that an accident disappears and another accident occurs. But the philosophers erred when they imagined that there is a matter that remains itself, and only its form perishes.

The truth is that the matter from which the second is created perishes, transforms, and vanishes, and Allah brings forth the second, originating and creating it without anything remaining from the first, neither matter, nor form, nor substance, nor accident.

So when Allah creates man from semen, the semen transforms and becomes a clot, and the clot transforms and becomes a lump, and the lump transforms into bones and other parts. Then when man is created, all of him is created, his substances and his accidents, and Allah began him anew.

As He said:

الذي أحسن كل شيء خلقه وبدأ خلق الإنسان من طين ثم جعل نسله من سلالة من ماء مهين

“He perfected everything He created, and He began the creation of man from clay, then made his offspring from an extract of a weak fluid” (al-Sajda 7–8).

And He said: أولم يذكر الإنسان أنا خلقناه من قبل ولم يك شيئا

“Does not man remember that We created him before, when he was nothing” (Maryam 67).

So man is created, Allah created his substances and his accidents all from the semen, from a matter that transformed and is no longer remaining after his creation. This is unlike what the philosophers claim, that there is a matter that remains.

And the word “matter” is a shared term. The majority intend by it that from which something is created, which is its origin and its element. But those people intend by “matter” a substance that remains and is a receptacle for the essential form.

So according to them man was not created from matter, but the matter remained and his form was brought into it, just like the forms of crafts, like the form of the ring, the bed, the clothes, and the houses.

The maker only made its accidental form in a matter that always existed and did not perish, but was only turned from one state to another. In this way the Jahmiyyah mutakallimeen said that Allah made an accidental form in a matter that remained and did not perish. So they make the creation of man like the work of the ring, the bed, and the clothes.

And the philosophers also say that his matter remains and does not perish, like the matter of the crafts, but they say that He brought into it an essential form. And they sometimes confuse and do not distinguish between accidental forms and essential forms.

They call the form of man a form in matter and the form of the ring a form in matter. So the creation of man, according to both of these groups, is like what people do when they make forms in existing matters, and his creation is like building a wall from clay.

For this reason some of them said that the Creator is no longer needed after creation, just like the wall no longer needs the builder.

And the Asharis, in their view, the builder, the tailor, and all craftsmen did not actually produce anything in those matters, because in their view the created power only relates to what is in its locus, not what is outside its locus. They say that all those manufactured things are the creation of Allah, and that man has no action in them.

The creation of Allah according to their principle is only the occurrence of accidents in them, as mentioned before. So they deny what man makes, and in reality they make it like what they consider created by Allah. But they do not bear witness to Allah creating and annihilating, but only to the occurrence of accidents in them, which according to them perish by themselves, not by Allah causing them to perish, and they perish immediately after their occurrence.

This is unintelligible. They are left bewildered, asking if He wishes to annihilate bodies, how does He annihilate them. The common view among them is that they perish by themselves if no accident is created for them.

So the accident perishes by itself, and the substance perishes by itself if no accident after another accident is created for it. This is in terms of annihilation.

As for origination, they used a false proof for its origination. If that proof was correct, it would lead to the origination of everything without a cause.

The reality of the doctrine of the mutakallimeen who follow the Jahmiyyah is that nothing creates anything and nothing annihilates anything, but rather everything creates itself and annihilates itself, and according to them it would be permissible for the Lord Himself to be originated without an originator.

These foundations are their rational principles with which they oppose the Book, the Sunnah, and clear reason. In reality they are neither reason nor revelation.

As Allah narrated about those who said:

لو كنا نسمع أو نعقل ما كنا في أصحاب السعير

“If we had listened or reasoned, we would not be among the people of the blazing fire” (al-Mulk 10).

Creation testifies to Allah bringing into being what He brings into being, and His annihilating what He annihilates. The semen transforms, perishes, vanishes, and from it Allah brings forth man. The grain perishes, transforms, and from it Allah brings forth the crop. The air transforms, perishes, and from it Allah brings forth fire or water.

The fire transforms, and from it Allah brings forth smoke. He, glorified is He, is always bringing into being what He brings into being, and annihilating what He annihilates and causes to cease. When man dies and becomes dust, he perishes and ceases, and likewise everything upon the earth. Allah said: كل من عليها فان “Everything upon it will perish” (al-Rahman 26).

Then He brings it back from dust just as He created it the first time from dust, and He creates it again anew.

But the second creation has rulings and attributes that the first did not.

So man’s knowledge of the first creation, and what Allah creates of mankind and other animals, and what He creates of trees, plants, and fruits, and what He creates of clouds and rain and other things, is a foundation for his knowledge of creation and resurrection, the beginning and the return.

If he does not know that Allah created him entirely from the semen, his substances and his accidents, then he has not known that Allah created him.

And whoever thought that his substances were not created when he was created, but rather the substances of the semen and the substances of what he eats and drinks remained themselves in him and were not created, or that his matter, which bears his form, was not created when he was created but is eternal and everlasting, then such a person has not truly known that he is a created being that was brought into existence.

Kitab An Nubuwwat Pages 314-320

For us to understand Ibn Taymiyyah’s position on this issue we must compare it with Ibn Sina’s position. Ibn Sina had a specific position which the mutakallimeen opposed, both the Asharis and others.

Later, Ibn Taymiyyah took up their arguments against Ibn Sina and used them against him. Then in al-Nubuwwat, Ibn Taymiyyah wrote words that apparently align with Ibn Sina, which made some readers think he adopted Ibn Sina’s position, but this is not correct. He agreed with Ibn Sina on one part of the matter and disagreed with him on another.

Ibn Sina said in summary that every temporal event must be preceded by matter without exception, and that nothing can occur without the existence of a recipient, which is matter. His reasoning is that any thing to occur must have its possibility tied to matter. For example, for a chair to exist, wood must precede it as its matter. If every event must be preceded by matter, then matter itself must be eternal, and creation would not be from nothing. This was Ibn Sina’s view.

The proof of Ibn Sina rests on these premises: first, that the possible is distinct from the impossible. Second, that the impossible does not fall under power. Third, that for the possible to be distinguished from the impossible it must be tied to a subject, which is matter. From these he concluded that every event must be preceded by matter, and therefore matter has no beginning.

The first premise, that the possible is distinct from the impossible, is correct. Things are divided into the necessary, the possible, and the impossible. The necessary is either necessary in itself or necessary through another.

The impossible is either impossible in itself or impossible through another. So the first premise is correct. The second premise, that the impossible does not fall under power, is also correct, and it is the view of Ibn Taymiyyah.

The only one who opposed it was Ibn Hazm (d. 456 AH), who said that the impossible does fall under power. The correct view is that it does not. For example, to say “Can Allah create another deity” is a self-contradiction, because if it were a deity it could not be created. Or to ask “Who created Allah” is a contradiction, because Allah is necessarily existent and uncreated. Such impossibilities are contradictions and therefore do not fall under divine power, and this is not a deficiency in power.

The third premise, that the possible must be tied to a subject which is its matter, this requires detail. Does the possible require a subject that is a receptacle for it, or does it require that its matter must itself be the matter of the possible?

For example, the human is created from a drop of semen. Does this mean that the semen must exist so that it becomes the matter of the human, or does it mean that the semen exists only as the receptacle for the creation of the human? Ibn Sina intended the first meaning, but Ibn Taymiyyah rejected this and held the second meaning.

Thus Ibn Taymiyyah in al-Nubuwwat affirms two things: creation from nothing, and that creation must be preceded by a receptacle, not by matter. Creation from nothing means that the second created thing does not contain any matter or form from the first.

So when the human is created from semen, there is nothing of the semen’s matter or form that remains in the human. This differs from the philosophers who said that the same matter continues, and from the Asharis who said that the atoms (jawahir fardah) remain and only their accidents change. Ibn Taymiyyah rejected both and said that Allah creates a new existent with its own matter and form, though it occurs in the receptacle of the previous.

This is why he in al-Nubuwwat emphasises that what we observe is the origination of entities themselves, not merely changes of accidents or forms.

He criticised the mutakallimeen and the philosophers alike, since both say that what we observe is merely the continuation of the same matter with new accidents or new forms. Ibn Taymiyyah insisted that what we observe is actual origination from nothing.

In conclusion, Ibn Taymiyyah held that creation is from nothing, and that the new created thing is not made from the matter of the previous thing, but that it does occur in the receptacle of the previous.

This is distinct from the view of the philosophers, who said that only new forms occur on the same eternal matter, and from the view of the mutakallimeen, who said that only new accidents occur on the same atoms.

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, when Allah creates a fruit from a tree or a human from semen, He does not merely rearrange existing matter or atoms, but He brings into existence a new entity from nothing, though in the receptacle of the previous thing.

They thought that this only happens with the persistence of the essence of that matter. Meaning, the mutakallimeen and the philosophers thought that the coming to be of a thing from another thing cannot occur and is not sound except with the persistence of matter from the first thing within the second thing.

Ibn Taymiyyah says this is not correct. He says, as for the atoms according to a group, meaning the Asharis, and as for the shared matter according to a group, meaning the philosophers, they in truth deny that Allah creates something from something. For according to them nothing has come to be except the form, which is an accident according to some or an intelligible substance according to others, and neither of them is created from matter, while the matter according to them remains the same in itself and nothing of it has been created nor will be created.

I say, notice his statement, they thought that this only happens with the persistence of the essence of that matter. That is, the philosophers thought that creating a thing from a thing means the occurrence of a form while the matter of the first thing remains within the second thing.

The mutakallimeen thought that creating a thing from a thing means the separation of the matter of the first thing and its reassembly in the second thing. He sees that this and that are wrong without doubt.

So he opposes this doctrine that affirms the persistence of matter in created things, that is, the persistence of indivisible atoms, and that the events are nothing but forms that follow one another upon the same matter. He sees that the meaning of this is that in truth they deny that Allah creates something from something.

Thus, creating a thing from a thing according to Ibn Taymiyyah does not stand with the persistence of any matter in its very identity. Reflect on this. This is what I want to reach in the end, that creating a thing from a thing according to Ibn Taymiyyah is creation from nothing, the creation of the matter and the creation of the form, but only in a receptacle that is locative.

So when Ibn Taymiyyah says that Allah does not create a thing except from a thing, this does not mean that the matter remains as it is, nor that the matter was not created, nor that some of the matter remains.

Rather he says that the essence of the matter does not remain. When Allah creates a thing from a thing, the first thing perishes completely in matter and form, and the second thing comes to be at the start in matter and form, but it comes to be from the nonexistence of the first thing. Meaning, the first thing is annihilated, and in its locative nonexistence He creates, meaning in its place. Of course, when the thing is annihilated there remains a nonexistence in that place, so in this locative nonexistence the second thing is created.

Ibn Taymiyyah does not affirm any eternity for created essences or for matter itself. Rather, Ibn Taymiyyah insists on al-huduth al-haqiqi (true origination) and al-khalq min al-ʿadam (creation from nothing).

The philosophers (falasifah) and the mutakallimeen held two erroneous doctrines. The falasifah maintained that creation “from something” only means the occurrence of a new form while the underlying matter remains, unchanged and uncreated.

The mutakallimeen, on the other hand, claimed that creation “from something” means separation and recomposition of atoms (al-jawahir al-fardiyyah). Both affirm the persistence of matter, whether as atoms or as hyle, and thus in reality deny that Allah creates a new entity in its entirety.

Ibn Taymiyyah rejects both positions. He states explicitly that when Allah creates one thing from another, the first perishes completely, in both matter and form. The second then comes into existence, fresh in both matter and form.  Ibn Taymiyyah’s words in al-Nubuwwat:

“الحق أن المادة التي منها يُخلق الثاني تفسد وتستحيل وتتلاشى، ويُنشئ الله الثاني ويبتديه، ويخلق من غير أن يبقى من الأول شيء، لا مادة، ولا صورة، ولا جوهر، ولا عرض.”

This is a definitive statement that creation is not eternal. No matter, no form, no substance (jawhar), no accident (ʿarad) persists.

When Allah creates man from semen, the semen is destroyed in essence and form, transforming step by step until the human is originated anew. Nothing of the semen subsists in the human being. This annihilation (fanaʾ) of the first and origination (ibdaʿ) of the second is true khalq min al-ʿadam.

Ibn Taymiyyah affirms the principle of al-huduth, and denies the falsafī notion of eternal matter and the kalāmī notion of atomic permanence. Thus, according to him, Ibn Taymiyyah views every makhluq (created entity) as fully originated by Allah in both matter and form.

The supposed problematic statement where Ibn Taymiyyah appears to require a “ receptacle” (maḥall, ẓarf).

Ibn Taymiyyah distinguished between al-imkan al-dhihni (mental possibility) and al-imkan al-khāriji (external possibility).

The latter, he explains, can relate either to the Qudrah of al-Fāʿil (the power of the Creator) or to an external receptacle such as land for planting or a womb for pregnancy. Ibn Taymiyyah uses the conjunction “or,” not “and.” Thus, possibility may relate only to Allah’s power, without requiring any co-eternal matter.

Where Ibn Taymiyyah states that “every event must have a receptacle,” This is reconciled by the following:

• Sometimes this means only the Qudrah of Allah.
• Sometimes it means a non-existent measure, like the “space beneath the seventh heaven,” which is not an existent substance.
• At other times, in the realm of al-ʿālam al-shahāda (the visible universe), it refers to preparatory possibility (al-imkan al-iʿdādī), such as land for crops or a womb for a child.

In all these readings, Ibn Taymiyyah does not posit an eternal co-existent matter. On the contrary, he affirms that the essence of the first created thing perishes entirely before the second is originated.

The testimony of Ibn Qāḍī al-Jabal (d. 771 AH), where he composed verses affirming “Allāh was and there was nothing with Him” and presented them to Ibn Taymiyyah, who approved and instructed him to expand the point, shows that Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledged Allah’s existence without any eternal creation beside Him.

In conclusion Ibn Taymiyyah’s creed is that creation is muḥdath, originated from non-existence, and that no essence of matter is eternal.

His insistence on the fanaʾ of the first thing in both matter and form, and his repeated refutations of both the mutakallimīn and the falāsifah, leave no doubt.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s words in al-Nubuwwat are to be understood as affirming khalq min al-ʿadam, not as implying qidam al-ʿālam (eternity of the universe).