The First Argument

Ar Razi’s argument: If bodies were eternal, then they must either be moving or still. If they were moving, then motion would have to be eternal. But motion, he says, cannot be eternal, because motion by its very nature involves one part coming before another. So it is always preceded. Eternity, however, means having no prior state before it. On that basis, he argues that eternal motion is impossible.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He says this argument turns on an unclear phrase, namely that motion is “preceded by something else”. If that means motion must be preceded by something other than motion, then the claim is plainly false. There is no proof for that.

But if it means only that one part of motion comes before another part, then this is true, yet it still does not prove what Ar Razi wants. The opponent can simply say that a thing may consist of successive parts, while the whole chain has no first beginning. So the proof does not settle the issue. It only restates the disputed point in another form.

He also explains that the dispute is not about any one single motion being eternal. Everyone agrees that each particular movement is newly occurring and comes after another.

The real dispute is about the whole class of motion, whether there can always be one movement after another without a first one. Ar Razi’s argument does not break that claim. Ibn Taymiyyah therefore says that the proof fails because it confuses the ruling of each individual motion with the ruling of the whole continuing sequence.

The Second Argument

Ar Razi’s argument: He says that if motions have no beginning, then before every motion there must be a prior non existence. Since each motion is preceded by non existence, and since on the assumption of eternity there is no first motion, then all of those prior non existences would themselves stretch back without beginning.

He then argues that this would require those non existences to be somehow gathered in eternity, which he treats as impossible.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He answers that this is built on another confusion. The non existence of each individual motion ends when that motion begins. So these non existences do not remain together at once. They are not all present in one single state.

At every given moment, some prior non existences have already ended because the corresponding motions have occurred, while others still remain in relation to later events. So it is false to say they are all gathered together in one eternal present.

He then makes a second point. “Eternity” is not a single fixed moment in which all things are measured together. To say that something is eternal only means that it has no beginning.

It does not mean that all the relevant non existences must exist simultaneously in one collected heap. So Ar Razi’s argument again mistakes the ruling of individual cases for the ruling of the whole kind. Each event has a prior non existence, but it does not follow that the totality of those prior non existences exists together in one way.

The Third Argument

Ar Razi’s argument: He argues that movements must have a beginning. He says that if a movement occurs in eternity without being preceded by another movement, then it must have a beginning. But if it is preceded by another movement, then eternity itself would be preceded by something, which he treats as impossible.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He says this argument is also unclear and does not touch the real issue. If Ar Razi means a particular motion, then yes, every particular motion is newly occurring and has a beginning. No one on the other side denies that. But if he means the whole continuing class of motions, then he has not proved that it must have a first member.

He explains that a particular movement, if imagined as not preceded by another movement, is indeed originated. And if imagined as preceded by another, it is still originated.

So no individual motion is eternal in either case. But the opponent never claimed that a single motion is eternal. The claim is only about the continuing class, one motion after another. Therefore the proof does not refute the actual claim of the opponent. It only proves something both sides already accept, namely that no one specific motion is eternal.

The Fourth Argument

Ar Razi’s argument: He gives the famous argument from the rotations of the heavenly bodies. Saturn completes one rotation in a period during which the sun completes thirty, and the moon completes far more than both.

If all these past rotations were without beginning, then the moon’s completed rotations would be more than the sun’s, and the sun’s more than Saturn’s. But, he argues, if one completed infinite total is greater than another by a fixed number, then both must in fact be finite. So the motions of the heavens cannot be eternal.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: Here his treatment is more careful. He first says that some replies given to Ar Razi are weak, especially the reply that compares actual celestial rotations to abstract number sequences.

Numbers, he says, can be imagined endlessly in the mind, but that does not prove the existence of an actual infinite in the external universe. Mental estimation is one thing, real existence is another. So simply saying that one can imagine endless doubling does not answer the proof.

Then he gives the important distinction. Abstract numbers and imagined shapes exist only in thought. Real motions of the heavens, however, are claimed to exist externally and successively. So not every analogy from arithmetic or imagination is sound.

Yet in the end, Ibn Taymiyyah says that this specific proof is strong against those who claim that the celestial bodies themselves are eternal, such as Aristotle, Ibn Sina, and those who followed them. Why?

Because the heavenly motions are distinct real series with fixed proportions. The moon truly completes many more rotations than Saturn, and the sun truly completes more than Saturn as well.

If all of those completed past rotations were beginningless in the same actual sense, then one completed total would exceed another by a fixed ratio, and that points to finitude, not true beginninglessness.

So his position here is precise. He does not reject this proof absolutely. Rather, he limits it. He says it is a strong proof against the eternity of the heavens and their motions.

But it does not prove that every possible series of events must have a first beginning. It works for celestial rotations in particular, not for every category of successive events without exception.

The Fifth Argument

Ar Razi’s argument: The issue is raised through the example of endlessly multiplying numbers, or endlessly speaking and imagining numbers. The point is to compare one growing infinite series with another, and to show that one may be greater than the other.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He says this kind of example only establishes something about mental or verbal existence, not about actual external reality. The mind can imagine endless multiplication, and the tongue can continue naming numbers one after another, but all of that begins from a starting point. So what it really proves is only that something can begin and then continue without end into the future.

It does not prove that a real externally existing series can be beginningless in the past.

He therefore says that examples drawn from thought and speech do not settle the issue. At most, they show the possibility of an endless future continuation. That is why he links this discussion to the well known point about Paradise, its bliss, and the ongoing acts of its people.

A sequence may have a beginning and yet continue forever. So this material does not establish the impossibility of all infinity. It only shows that mental and spoken sequences begin from somewhere.

The Argument About Reaching the Present from an Infinite Past

Ar Razi’s argument: This argument is used by many philosophers of kalam. The claim is that if the past were beginningless, then the present would only be reached after the completion of something that has no beginning.

Since what has no beginning can never be completed or finished, the present could never arrive. But the present has arrived, so the past cannot be beginningless.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He says this proof depends on an ambiguous use of words like “completed”, “finished”, and “ended”. The past certainly has an end in one sense, namely that it terminates at the present moment. But that does not prove it had a first beginning.

The issue under dispute is not whether the past ends at the present. Everyone agrees that it does in that sense. The issue is whether it must also have a first starting point.

He says the argument slides from one meaning to another. If someone says, “What has no end cannot be completed,” that may be true if “no end” means no end in the future. But the dispute here is about no beginning in the past, not no end in the future. So the proof trades on ambiguity and does not establish the conclusion.

The Argument from Eternal Rest

Ar Razi’s argument: He says that if an eternal body were at rest in eternity, that too would be impossible. Rest, on his account, is something real and existent. Whatever exists eternally cannot cease. But if the body later moved, then its prior rest would have ceased.

That shows eternal rest is impossible, just as eternal motion was said to be impossible. So an eternal body can be neither moving nor still, and therefore no body can be eternal.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He treats this proof as weak. First, he says the whole issue depends on whether rest is really a positive existent thing, or merely the absence of motion.

This is disputed. Many said that motion is real, but rest is only the absence of motion in a thing capable of moving. If that is so, then the argument collapses at the starting point.

Second, even those who say rest is something real often hold that accidents do not remain for two moments. If so, then rest itself would be successive, part after part, just as motion is successive.

In that case, the argument against eternal rest would become the very same as the argument against eternal motion, and all the earlier objections would return.

Third, Ibn Taymiyyah says that Ar Razi and others create a problem for themselves. If they allow newly occurring things to arise without a new cause in other places, then the opponent can ask, why can a body not move after rest in the same way?

If they insist a new cause is always needed, then other parts of their own doctrine are put in danger. So the proof from rest does not stand firmly. It either depends on a disputed definition, or it leads to consequences that undermine the system using it.

The Final Objection to Ar Razi’s Whole Line of Proof

The objection raised against Ar Razi: If motion is impossible in eternity because of its own nature, then it should be impossible altogether, not just impossible in eternity.

But motion plainly exists. And if it is only impossible because of something else, then that “something else” must either be necessary in itself or depend on something else. In either case, the impossibility would remain, and motion would never occur. So the whole argument seems to make motion impossible forever, which is absurd.

Ar Razi’s reply: He tries to answer by saying that motion may be possible “in eternity”, while still not being possible as something eternal.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He says this answer is not sound. If Ar Razi means that motion itself could exist in eternity, then he has given up his original proof. And if he means only that one may mentally judge motion to be possible while speaking of eternity, then that is irrelevant, because the issue is not about mental judgment. The issue is about real existence.

He then addresses the broader point. Possibility does not suddenly begin. If a thing is possible at one time, its possibility does not arise out of nothing at that moment. So if motion is possible now, then the bare possibility of motion is not something newly produced now.

This means that motion was always possible in itself. Once that is granted, the claim that motion was impossible simply because of “eternity” loses its force.

So Ibn Taymiyyah concludes that Ar Razi’s whole line of argument does not prove what it claims to prove. At most, some parts of it may work against specific theories, especially the eternity of the heavenly bodies and their motions. But it does not establish the universal claim that every series of events must have a first beginning.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Overall Position Through These Replies

Ar Razi’s aim: To prove that bodies cannot be eternal, because an eternal body would have to be either moving or still, and both are impossible in eternity.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s response: He breaks this down point by point and says that most of these proofs do not actually refute the real claim of the opponent. They often confuse the individual instance with the whole class, or they rely on vague expressions like “eternity”, “completion”, or “being preceded”, or they move from conceptual examples in the mind to claims about real existence outside the mind.

He accepts that the proof from the differing celestial rotations is strong against those who claim the heavens themselves are eternal. But he does not accept that these arguments prove the impossibility of every beginningless succession of events.

His core point throughout is that one must distinguish between a particular event and a continuing class of events, between what exists in thought and what exists in reality, and between what is merely asserted and what is actually proved.

Full Passage

The First Argument: If Bodies Were Eternal

Ar-Razi mentioned five arguments. The first: if bodies were eternal, they would either be in motion or at rest. If they are in motion, then that implies an infinite sequence of events with no beginning. (Footnote: there is a manuscript of Lubab al-Arbaʿin by al-Armawi in the Institute of Manuscripts of the Arab League, manuscript no. 201, Tawhid) (Footnote: Ibn Taymiyyah summarised these arguments, citing them from Lubab al-Arbaʿin by al-Armawi, where they appear in al-Arbaʿin fi Usul al-Din, pp. 13 and onwards. Ar-Razi also discussed this issue in many of his books, such as Muhassal Afkar al-Mutaqaddimin wa al-Mutaʾakhkhirin, Maʿalim Usul al-Din, and al-Masaʾil al-Husun fi Usul al-Kalam. See also Fakhr al-Din ar-Razi wa Araʾuhu al-Kalamiyyah wa al-Falsafiyyah by Muhammad Salih az-Zarkan, pp. 358–376, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1963)

He argued that the eternity of motion is impossible in six ways. The first: the very nature of motion implies that it must be preceded by something else, and the nature of eternity negates that. Therefore, eternal motion is impossible.

Abu al-Thana al-Armawi responded: one could say that motion being made up of earlier and later parts does not prevent it from being eternal through an endless succession of individual movements.

I say: the essence of this objection is to say that the original argument claims motion must be preceded by something else. But what is meant by “something else”? Is it that motion is preceded by something that is not motion? Or that one part of the motion comes before another? The first is invalid, and this is what his phrase “the nature of motion implies being preceded by something else” seems to suggest. (Footnote: in the margin of one manuscript, it says: “Al-Abhari said: to object that the nature of motion implies both being preceded and not being preceded is mistaken. The contradiction only arises if one thing is both preceded and not preceded at the same time. But here, what is preceded is motion, and what is not preceded is the body. So there is no contradiction. Ibn Taymiyyah said: this objection is weak, but the earlier objection is stronger: that what is preceded is each individual motion, not the category of motion as a whole. Each part is preceded by something, but the overall category is disputed. Otherwise, if motion is an essential property of the body, then it cannot precede the body. So how can motion be said to be preceded by the body?

It seems al-Abhari misunderstood the argument, thinking it means motion is preceded by the body, when in fact it means motion implies that one part comes before another. Al-Abhari also said: as for the argument that if something is in constant motion, it does not escape newly occurring events, and what does not escape them is itself newly originated, we respond: we deny that conclusion. That would only follow if each newly originated thing becomes eternal, which is not the case. Rather, before each event, there is another with no beginning. So no single event is eternal.”)

So the phrase “motion implies being preceded by something else” might be misunderstood to mean motion must be preceded by something that is not motion. But that would make it impossible for any motion to be eternal. However, the only valid meaning is the second: that motion implies some parts come before others. In that case, the second premise, that eternity negates that, has been denied. They say: we do not accept that something made up of parts like that cannot be eternal. In fact, that is the very point in dispute. Many Muslims and others from various religions accept that something made up of such parts can be everlasting.

It is known that the nature of motion implies that some of its parts come after others, but that does not prevent it from having no end. So they argue: just as it can have no end, it can also have no beginning. Just as there can be motion and time with no end that exists alongside the Necessary Eternal Being, there can also be motion and time with no beginning that exist alongside Him. The discussion about the end of motion is like the discussion about its beginning.

The Second Argument: Motion Requires Prior Non-Existence

Ar-Razi said: the second argument is that if the rotations of the celestial spheres occur successively with no beginning, then before each movement there would be a prior non-existence with no beginning. And these non-existences would all exist in eternity, without any existing things alongside them. Otherwise, the thing that came later would be simultaneous with what came before, and the collection of all existents would have a beginning.

Al-Armawi said: one could say, if what you mean by “gathered together” is that they all existed simultaneously at one point in time, then that is false. Because no matter what time you imagine, one of them would be ending at that time due to the continuous sequence of motion with no beginning. But if what you mean is that there is no order in the beginnings of those non-existences, just like there is no order in the beginnings of existences, then having some existents alongside them does not imply the contradiction you are claiming.

I say: the point is that the non-existence of each movement ends with the existence of that movement. So the non-existences are not all equal in their ends, and therefore they do not all exist at the same time. In any given moment, only some of them are true, since some non-existences have ended with the occurrence of events. But none of them have a beginning, because whatever comes into existence must have been non-existent before. This is not like motion itself, which has a beginning for each individual movement.

So it is not impossible for some existences to coincide with some non-existences, just like the existence of one thing at the start continues alongside the non-existence of other things. The original argument says that the non-existence of every event is real in eternity. The objection replies: yes, but the total category of such non-existences is not necessarily real in eternity.

The category itself is not a newly originated thing that would require a prior non-existence. Only the individual instances are. Just like the category can be everlasting in the future. So the total non-existence of all of them is not proven to have existed in eternity. The prior non-existence of each individual movement is like its future non-existence. And no one says that the future non-existences are all gathered together at once. The difference between the non-existence of the category and the non-existence of each individual instance is clear.

The original argument says: the non-existence of each one is eternal, so the total of those non-existences is also eternal. That would be like saying: each individual event is newly originated, so the total is newly originated. Or: each event has an end, so the total has an end. Or: each one is preceded by something else, so the total is preceded by something else.

So if someone responding on behalf of the original argument says: “Your claim that if you mean they all exist simultaneously, that is false because at any moment one of them is ending”, that is not sound. Because they are all present in eternity.

The one responding on behalf of the objection says: eternity is not a defined moment in which existence or non-existence is measured. Just like the future is not a defined time for such measurements. The meaning of something being eternal is that it has always existed or that its existence has no beginning. The meaning of something being everlasting is that it will always exist or has no end. And the meaning of something’s non-existence being eternal is that it remained non-existent until it came into being, even if other things were coming into being during that time.

The one making this argument says: it is impossible for all of these non-existences to be present at the same time. At any imagined point, some are non-existent and others are existent. So saying “they are all gathered together in eternity” assumes that such a gathering is possible, but that very gathering is impossible. More discussion on this will come later.

The Third Argument: Movements Must Have a Beginning

Ar-Razi said: the third argument is that if no movement occurred in eternity, or if some did but were not preceded by anything, then they would all have a beginning. But if they were preceded by something, then eternity itself would be preceded by something.

Al-Armawi said: one could say: none of the individual movements is eternal. Each one is newly originated. What is eternal is the general category of movement by the successive occurrence of particular movements. That category is not preceded by anything else, so there is no need for each individual movement to be eternal.

I say: when the argument says, “if something happened in eternity without being preceded by anything, then it has a beginning,” it means: if one particular movement is not preceded by another movement, then it has a beginning and cannot be eternal. Only the general category can be eternal.

If a particular movement is imagined without being preceded by another, it must be newly originated. And if it is preceded, then it is still newly originated. So he did not mean: not preceded by anything at all. Because if something exists in eternity and is not preceded by anything, then it cannot have a beginning. If he meant: not preceded by something other than motion, then the argument would make no sense. What exists eternally is not preceded by anything. Whether it is a category or a specific instance. But if it is imagined to be eternal and not preceded by anything, how can it have a beginning? It is only if it is preceded by something that it has a beginning.

Even so, we say: to imagine a specific movement as existing in eternity and also being preceded by another movement is to imagine a contradiction. That is impossible in itself, and anything that is impossible in itself leads to impossible conclusions. So the issues do not matter. On the other hand, if we imagine a specific movement occurring in eternity while being preceded by something else, that is also impossible. So it is no problem if it leads to a contradiction. The only thing that could be eternal is the general category, which is not preceded by anything.

Some have objected: then nothing at all happens in eternity. Because if anything did, it would eventually end. And something that ends cannot be eternal.

The answer: no particular movement happens in eternity. Because nothing that has a beginning can be eternal. But the question is about the category, not the individual instances. The other side agrees that no specific movement is eternal. The dispute is about the category. Just like they agree that no specific movement lasts forever, even if they say the category does.

The Fourth Argument: The Rotations of the Celestial Bodies

Ar-Razi said: the fourth argument is that for every one rotation of Saturn, the sun completes thirty rotations. So the number of Saturn’s rotations is fewer than the sun’s. What is fewer than something else is limited. And what is more than something limited is also limited. Therefore, both counts are limited.

Al-Armawi said: one could respond by saying that multiplying one number without limit is still less than multiplying two in the same way, even if both are infinite.

I say: what Al-Armawi said is just a counterpoint, not a refutation of the argument or a solution to it. The one presenting the argument may reply that there is a difference between number sequences and the number of rotations in two ways.

First, sequences of numbers do not exist in reality. They only exist in the mind, just like geometric shapes that are mentally imagined: a circle, a larger circle, and one larger than that, and so on. These imagined shapes do not exist outside the mind. The same goes for abstract numbers, they do not exist outside the mind. Connected or separated quantities, when thought of as detached from anything they describe, exist only in thought.

The same applies to the idealised geometric body, such as an imagined length, width, and depth with no substance. So just because something can be imagined does not mean it can exist in reality. The mind can imagine impossible things, like combining opposites or contradictions: something being both existent and non-existent, moving and still, or being neither existent nor non-existent, neither necessary, possible, nor impossible. These are all examples of mental estimations that do not imply real possibility.

That is why we can mentally imagine an infinite line, an infinite surface, infinite shapes each bigger than the last, and infinite distances. But just because the mind can picture something infinite does not mean it can exist outside the mind. Even those who argue against this agree that an actual infinite in size, distance, causes, or effects cannot exist in reality, even if it can be imagined. So if someone says: “We can imagine an infinite number of things or infinite levels of numbers with varying degrees,” that only proves they can be imagined, not that they can exist. Their objection therefore fails.

The one who compares infinite degrees of number with infinite rotations has made a weaker argument than one who compares infinite rotations with imagined infinite geometric shapes or differences in those shapes. That would be a more reasonable and accurate analogy.

For example, if someone says: doubling one indefinitely is less than doubling two indefinitely, we say: if we imagine a line as wide as a hand extending endlessly, and another as wide as an arm also endless, the first will still be smaller. Or if we imagine endless spheres, each the size of a person’s head, and others the size of the celestial sphere, the second group would still be bigger, despite both being infinite. So this analogy is more fitting and accurate than comparing infinite rotations to levels of numbers.

The Fifth Argument: Infinite Multiplication and Mental Limitation

The second point is this: if infinite multiplication of numbers, levels, and other quantities only exists in the mind, then everything the mind imagines or estimates has a limit. The mind can only go on doubling until it is exhausted. The same goes for the tongue in naming numbers or speaking words, it continues until it gets tired. Even if we suppose the mind never gets tired and keeps estimating, and the tongue keeps speaking without limit, this all exists in mental, verbal, or internal existence. And everything that exists in one of these ways is limited and has a beginning. It starts from a certain point in the mind or in speech. So everything that exists sequentially like this is limited.

This only shows that endlessness is possible in the future. That is, something can have a beginning but no end. What the mind imagines or the tongue says must have a starting point, but it may go on without end. This is the case with the breathing of the people of Paradise, their words, and their actions. They are inspired to glorify Allah just like they breathe. The angels also constantly glorify Allah. All of this supports the idea that something with a beginning can continue endlessly into the future.

So the example of endless multiplication of numbers, in thought or speech, shows that things can continue endlessly after they begin. But the issue of one being more than another, whether this refers to thought, speech, or both, is as follows: if we say “double one,” then “double the double,” and so on, and likewise “double two,” then “double the double,” and so on, if the claim is that doubling one results in fewer instances of spoken or imagined numbers than doubling two, that cannot be accepted if the starting point and pace are the same. If the two are unequal in speed or beginning, the one that starts earlier or goes faster will have more instances. So it could be that doubling one results in more.

But if what is meant is that the value of each result in the second sequence is higher, like if we double one five times and get thirty-two, and double two five times and get sixty-four, then we say: this sixty-four is not a physically existing or even mentally existing amount. It is just a spoken number. The things being counted are not real in the mind or in the external universe. So if we suppose that the number words for both sequences are imagined or spoken, then even if both are endless, it does not follow that they are unequal, unless one began earlier or moved faster. Otherwise, they would be the same.

Continuation of the Argument Regarding the Infinity of Past Events

If the intended meaning is that one of these two, say, the term representing one quantity, would be greater than the other if they existed, then the response is: yes, but who said the existence of that represented thing is even possible? This is like someone saying: “What is infinite can be imagined in the mind and expressed in speech.” That does not mean it can exist in reality. Just like the mind and tongue can conceive of infinite bodies, distances, or shapes, yet these do not exist in the external universe. So this is the type of response used by the one arguing for the impossibility of infinite rotations when faced with the counterargument about levels of numbers.

And this distinction, though I’ve already mentioned it, was also made by many philosophers who differentiate between number and motion, including scholars of kalam from within Islam and others. These people support the original argument by noting this well-known difference: increasing numbers is a conceptual exercise, not something that actually exists, unlike real motion which actually occurs.

This is similar to how those who distinguish between the past and the future argue: the past has already happened, unlike the future. What is impossible is for something infinite to exist in actual existence, not for something infinite to be imagined or described.

The one siding with the objection might say: the past is also gone, so its instances are no longer present together. The problem is only when what is infinite exists all at once in an organised way, linked together with natural or assigned order.

This is the distinction made by Ibn Sina and his followers among the philosophers. However, Ibn Rushd said that the philosophers distinguish between what is simultaneous and what is not, whether it is ordered or not. Their debate is really about whether disembodied human souls are infinitely many and distinct.

These philosophers would say: we do not concede that if something has ceased to exist, or will exist, and some parts are fewer than others, then it must be finite. The believers among Muslims and People of the Book affirm that the pleasures of Paradise will never end. No one among the scholars of kalam denied this except Jahm and those who followed him in saying that Paradise will end, and Abu al-Hudhayl, who said that movement will end. Both are deviant opinions, and the Salaf and the imams of Islam strongly condemned those who held them. Among the greatest condemnations was what the Salaf said against the Jahmiyyah for claiming that Paradise will vanish.

Abu Hasan Al Ashʿari’s Statement

Ashʿari said in al-Maqalat: they also disagreed on the knowledge and power of Allah, whether these have a total limit or not. Some, like Abu al-Hudhayl, said that Allah’s knowledge and power do have a total and a limit. He also said that the people of Paradise will stop moving and become still forever.

But the majority of Muslims said: Allah’s knowledge and power do not have a limit or end. They also disagreed on whether Allah’s actions have an end. Jahm ibn Safwan said that Allah’s knowledge, power, and actions all have an end, and that Paradise and Hell will end, and the people in them will cease to exist, so that Allah remains alone, just as He was before creation. But the entire Muslim community said: Paradise and Hell have no end, and they will remain forever. The people of Paradise will always be in bliss, and the people of Hell in punishment. There is no end to this. Allah’s knowledge and power have no end or limit.

Difference Between the Past and the Future

Some people tried to distinguish the past from the future with an analogy, as seen in al-Irshad and elsewhere: the future is like saying, “I won’t give you a coin unless I give you another coin after that.” This is a sound statement. But the past is like saying, “I won’t give you a coin unless I gave you another one before it.” This is contradictory.

However, this analogy is not accurate. Saying, “I won’t give you,” is a negation of the present and future, not the past. If someone says, “I won’t give you anything now or after this unless I gave you something before,” it means no action will occur now unless something occurred in the past, which is impossible. It would be like saying, “I won’t do something until I do it,” which is a contradiction. A better example would be: “I did not give you a coin except after giving you another one before it”, both statements refer to the past.

So if someone says, “Nothing happens except that something else happens after it,” that is like saying, “Nothing happened except that something happened before it.” Not: “Nothing will happen in the future unless something happened before it.” Anything with a beginning and an end, like a human lifespan, cannot have infinite giving within it, either at the start or at the end. The discussion is about something that has always existed and will always exist.

Positions on the Possibility of an Actual Infinite

People have different views on whether infinite existence is possible:

One view says it is absolutely impossible, whether in the past, present, or future, in anything. This was the view of Jahm and Abu al-Hudhayl.

The second view allows it, even in infinite physical dimensions. This is the position of some Indian philosophers, as well as some Muslim theologians and others. They say that Allah has an attribute that is infinite. Some of them say He is infinite in all directions, others say only from beyond the Throne, while in other directions, He is not infinite.

Ashʿari mentioned in al-Maqalat that various groups, including the Karramiyyah and some followers of the imams like Qadi Abu Yaʿla, held these views. Some said that past events are finite, but present dimensions can be infinite. People like Muʿammar and his followers said there are infinite meanings existing at once, even though they denied an infinite series of past events. So some accepted infinite dimensions and finite past events, and others accepted infinite past events and denied infinite dimensions, making three views.

The fourth view says: nothing infinite can exist in what is already created, neither in the past nor present, but it can exist in the future. Many philosophers held this.

The fifth view says: it is possible in the past and future, but not in things that exist all at once, not in dimensions, not in souls, not in meanings. This was Ibn Rushd’s view, which he attributed to the philosophers. He claimed that disembodied human souls are one and the same after separation from the body, just as they were before.

The sixth view says: whatever is joined and ordered must be finite, like causes and physical bodies, because they have a natural or conventional order, and all exist at the same time. But what is not ordered, like souls, or what is ordered but occurs in sequence, like movements, can be infinite. This was Ibn Sina’s position, which he said came from Aristotle and his followers. But Ibn Rushd said that no philosopher actually said this except Ibn Sina.

As for infinite causes or infinite knowledge: no intelligent person ever accepted such a thing.

Returning to the Argument about the Rotations

So with this in mind, let us return to the argument based on the differing rates of celestial rotations. The sun completes a full orbit of the sky once a year, the moon twelve times, Jupiter once every twelve years, and Saturn once every thirty years. This means the moon rotates 360 times for every rotation of Saturn, and the sun 30 times. So the rotations of the moon far outnumber those of Saturn, and both are said to be infinite by those who believe in the eternity of motion. But something less than something infinite must itself be finite. And something more than something finite is also finite. So both must be finite.

One might object: this is like comparing events up to today with events up to yesterday. Both are infinite, but there is still a difference. This is similar to the fifth argument that will come later. But there are important differences:

For one, those events are the same ones, with more added today. So we are only imagining an infinite past being added to one day at a time. But here, these rotations are not the same.

Second, the imagined alignment of events today with those of yesterday assumes they are identical and different at the same time, which is a contradiction. It assumes both sequences are equally infinite and equally bounded, yet they differ. This is impossible. But the celestial rotations are not imagined in this way. They are already said to be equally infinite in one direction, and their difference in number does not need to be imagined, it is simply a reality. So the contradiction does not apply in the same way.

Moreover, both comparisons share some similarities. Both assume that past events have ceased, and both imagine that events have ended on one side of time. So they are similar in those two respects, and different in the others.

So we say: those who say that celestial motions are eternal in both directions cannot rely on the idea that they are finite on one side. They must admit that Saturn’s rotations have always existed, as have those of the sun and moon. But the moon rotates twelve times for every sun rotation, and the sun thirty times for every Saturn rotation. So both are infinite in past and future, yet one is greater than the other by a finite amount. This implies that each of them is finite.

This argument does not apply to the imams of Islam and other religious believers who allow for an infinite sequence of past events. They believe the celestial bodies had a beginning and will have an end. They were created after not existing, and will cease when the universe is torn apart. So every celestial body, its sun, moon, and rotation, has a beginning and an end.

This proof only shows that the motion of the celestial spheres cannot be infinite. It does not prove that all categories of events must be finite, unless the same argument used here applies to other categories, which it does not. This only applies to the celestial bodies, and it is a proof of their created nature and the impossibility of their motion being without beginning or end.

It refutes the views of Aristotle, Ibn Sina, and others who claimed the heavens are eternal. This is a true argument accepted by the people of religion and by most philosophers. Only a small minority of philosophers disagreed. That is why the proof for their creation is strong, and the counterarguments weak. But the arguments used to claim that no events can be eternal are weak, and the objections to them are strong.

This shows that what the messengers brought is the truth. Clear reason agrees with revelation. Clear intellect never contradicts sound transmitted knowledge. The contradiction only arises when people bring in ideas they think are from scripture but are not, or claim things as reason which are not really reason.

Some people said that revelation teaches that Allah never spoke or acted by will, that He does not speak or act by choice, and that He cannot even be described as doing so eternally. They claimed this was the message of the prophets, but it is not.

Others claimed, based on reason, that it is impossible for Allah to eternally have the power to act or speak by will. Others responded by claiming that one of Allah’s creations, the heavens, is eternal like Him, and that its infinite events have no beginning. But then they say the moon rotates a certain number of times more than the sun, and the sun more than Saturn, all of which are supposed to be infinite.

This means one infinite thing is equal to another a specific number of times, despite both being created effects. They made them equal to their Creator in time. This is their innovation. As for affirming that Allah eternally acts and speaks by will, that is what this argument supports.

Someone might say: wouldn’t this also apply to Allah’s words and will, which are also infinite and have no beginning or end, even if some are more than others? It might be said: the moon is smaller than the sun, so even if its rotations are more, their overall scope is less. But that only helps if we know that the overall size of all these infinite movements is equal. Otherwise, there would still be inequality among infinite things. And if that kind of equality is false, then this objection fails.

The Argument about the Past Being Infinite

This argument was relied upon by most of the mutakallimun, like Abu al-Maʿali and those before and after him from the Muʿtazilah and the Ashʿariyyah. They mentioned that it was used by Yahya an-Nahwi and others from the earlier generations. They assumed that what has no limit cannot be something that ends or is finished, because if something ends and is finished, then it has a limit. So how can one say it has no end? What confused them was the word “end,” because it has ambiguity and multiple meanings. (“Abu al-Barakat al-Abhari in his book Tahrir al-Dala’il fi Taqrir al-Masa’il said regarding the statement: ‘If the universe were moving, then today’s events would be dependent on the completion of something that has no end’ , he said: We do not accept this. It could simply be that today’s event is preceded by events with no beginning. Why claim that this is impossible when that is the actual point of debate?”)

Everyone agrees that the past has an end point that it reached, so it is limited in this sense. That is why it is said to have ended, finished, come to a close, and so on. But in the sense that is actually being debated, the claim is that it has no beginning, that its instances have been occurring successively without ever starting.

So the real issue is whether something that has no beginning and never started can then come to an end or be finished. There’s no doubt that the one using this argument hasn’t actually provided a proof that it’s impossible for such a thing to end. Instead, the confusion lies in the term “what has no end,” which is vague. It could mean “what has no end in the future,” so when someone says “it ends,” they’re combining opposites. Or it could mean “what has no beginning,” and that’s where the real debate lies, because then it would be something that ends but had no beginning.

It’s as if the person is saying, “Whatever ends must have a beginning.” But their opponent agrees that this is true for individual instances: every individual that ends must have had a beginning. If it didn’t, it would be eternal, and what is necessarily eternal cannot cease to exist, as will be explained. But they disagree when it comes to the entire kind or species. They say: it’s possible that Allah has always been creating, one thing after another.

Ar-Razi’s Argument That Rest Cannot Be Eternal

al-Razi said: “And if the body was in a state of rest in pre-eternity, then that is impossible, because rest is something existent, and anything existent in pre-eternity must be eternal and unchanging.”

His opponent disagreed with him on whether rest is something existent, but did not dispute the principle that something eternal must be unchanging. al-Razi had explained that the eternal must be either necessary in itself, or something possible that was caused by something necessary in itself, whether that cause acts directly or with a necessary condition. But we don’t need all of this. Rather, we say: if something is eternal and necessary in itself, it cannot cease to exist. And if it’s not necessary in itself, then the thing that caused it, whether you call it a “necessary cause” or a “volitional actor”, either depends on something new to bring about its effect, or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t depend on anything new, then it must have caused the effect from pre-eternity. And if the full cause existed in pre-eternity, the effect must have as well, and must continue existing as long as the cause remains.

As for whether the cause acts by choice or not, that’s a separate debate. The point here is that the opponent’s disagreement with al-Razi is over whether rest is something existent or not.

al-Razi argued that if a body switches between movement and rest, that proves one of them is something existent. If removing one of them means the other appears, then that one must be something existent. Movement is defined as being in one space after being in another. Rest is defined as being in the same space after already being in it. The only difference between them is this succession, which is accidental and doesn’t change the essence. Therefore, both must be real, existent attributes. ( al-Razi adds in Lubab al-Arbaʿin: “And this means that the universe did not exist eternally, so its existence must have had a beginning. That is why we had to prove that rest is something existent. The philosophers said that rest is just the absence of movement in something that is capable of movement.”*)

Ar-Razi and the Response of al-Armawi

al-Armawi said: “Someone might say that movement and rest are opposites, either in the sense of two opposing real attributes or in the sense of one being a real attribute and the other its absence. It’s clear that opposites must differ in their essence. Also, the idea of succession, being preceded by something else, is just an external description. And external descriptions don’t change the essence of something. Rather, they can be essential to a definition that combines both shared and unique traits.”

So, the point is that al-Razi’s argument rests on the idea that movement and rest are the same in essence, and only differ in that one is preceded by another. al-Armawi challenged this with two points. He rejected the first by arguing that opposites, like black and white, sweet and bitter, are fundamentally different in essence. The same applies if they are opposites in the sense of one being present and the other absent, like sight and blindness, or knowledge and ignorance. Movement and rest fall into one of these two categories. So how can someone say they are identical in essence and only differ by something external?

To make it even clearer: movement is not just about being in a place, which it shares with rest. Being in a place, whether here or there, is understandable without it implying movement. If something stays still in the second place, then its presence there is the same kind of thing as its presence in the first. But the movement itself is something additional to just being present. As for the second point: if someone says that succession is just an external description of something they both share, that doesn’t prove it’s not part of the essence. Something that appears to be external might still be essential to the full concept, like being logical is external to being an animal, but essential to being human.

al-Razi might respond that being preceded by something else is a relative concept, it just means being later than something. This type of concept isn’t essential. For example, if two identical movements happen one after the other, the second one being later than the first doesn’t make it essentially different. So it’s not an essential difference.

But then someone might argue: this whole debate is based on the assumption, common in logic, that necessary attributes are either essential or accidental. But dividing necessary attributes into those that are “essential” (part of the thing’s essence) and those that are “accidental” (not part of it) has no real proof behind it. In fact, the evidence supports the opposite. That’s why the logicians themselves couldn’t clearly define how to tell the difference. All their rules are full of contradictions, as shown in many works. If two things always exist or cease to exist together, how can we say one is essential and the other isn’t?

Moreover, if someone says that a “thing” is made up of its essential attributes, then you can’t know the thing without those attributes, and you can’t know the attributes without knowing the thing. Some say that what exists in the real universe is more than just the concept. But that’s also false and weak.

Also, if a real, self-standing thing like a human being is said to be made up of two accidental attributes, then you’d be saying that a substance is made up of accidents that existed before it, and that’s obviously false. And if you say it’s made up of two substances, like saying a human is made of “animal” and “logic”, then it would mean the human is two separate beings, which contradicts both sense and reason. He’s one being who is both an animal and logical.

So if that’s the case, and being in one place after another is always part of a thing, then it’s one of its necessary attributes. And if two things differ in their necessary attributes, they can’t be the same in essence.

The rule is: two things are only truly the same if everything about them that must or can or cannot be true is the same. If one has something the other doesn’t, they’re not the same.

So al-Armawi can say: both of al-Razi’s premises are false, whether you go by the approache of the logicians or by other scholars who have criticised them. Many scholars in kalam, fiqh, and philosophy, whether Muʿtazilah, Ashʿariyyah, Karramiyyah, or from the madhhahib, have pointed out the many problems in the logicians’ approaches, especially in how they define things.

Continuation of the Argument on the Nature of Motion and Stillness

As for the claim that the difference between motion and stillness is only due to precedence by something else, this is not accepted. The opposition between them is understood even without thinking about what came before. Just as the opposition between knowledge and ignorance, ability and inability, blackness and whiteness is clear without considering what preceded it, so is the case with motion and stillness.

And as for the claim that saying stillness is simply the absence of motion is no more valid than saying motion is the absence of stillness, that is a baseless claim. We do not accept that there is no greater priority in saying one is the absence of the other. This is like someone saying that blindness is not more accurately described as the absence of sight than sight being the absence of blindness, or that deafness is not more accurately described as the absence of hearing than the other way around, or that ignorance is not more accurately described as the absence of knowledge.

It is known clearly by experience that motion is something real, just like life, knowledge, ability, and sight are real attributes. As for what is opposed to these, whether it is a contrary attribute or simply the absence of them from a subject, that is a matter of discussion. Often, these disagreements are only about words. For example, the absence of a thing may necessarily entail something real, like life: the absence of life from a body entails certain real conditions.

People have disagreed about whether death is something real or not. Some said it is real because Allah said, “He created death and life” (al-Mulk: 2), and so He mentioned the creation of death just as He mentioned the creation of life. Those who disagreed responded by saying that the created thing is the new absence just as real things are created, or they said: the death that is created is the real conditions that result from the absence of life. In that case, the disagreement becomes a matter of words.

Debate About Darkness, Stillness, and the Nature of Motion

They also disagreed about darkness: is it something real or not? It is the absence of light from that which can receive it. Those who said it is real used as evidence the verse: “He made the darkness and the light” (al-An‘am: 1). Others responded: everything new that happens, whether real or not, is created by Allah. Or they said: the absence of light leads to real conditions, and those real conditions are the created darkness. Saying stillness is something real is even more far-fetched than saying death or darkness or things like them are real.

Stillness may sometimes mean a force within the body that prevents it from moving, like the natural property in a stone that makes it rest upon the ground. This is something real. But those who say stillness is not real do not consider that natural property to be stillness. They may call it “dependence,” and they make a distinction between stillness and dependence.

But it can be said: when the body is still, either stillness is something real, or it leads to something real. In that case, the cause behind that real thing is either something that necessitates it by itself, or the argument continues accordingly.

Still, those who say that the first body was still in eternity and then moved, say in this case what the proponents of the origination of bodies say. If they say the body and its movement came into existence without any cause requiring it, their opponent says: rather, what is assumed to have been eternal from among bodies was still, and then its motion began without any cause for that motion. This is what is said by those who say that the first is a body and that actions newly arise from it after it was not acting. They say the discussion about new action existing in it is the same as the discussion about the newly created action that is separate from it.

Views on the Eternal Body and Its Motion

Scholars of theology, including those within the religion and those outside it, disagreed about the existence of an eternal body. One group said that an eternal body is impossible, and that every body is originated. They then debated: was the body brought into existence without any new cause at all, or must there be a new cause? Can new things like intention, perception, and even action exist within it? They had two views.

Another group said that there is an eternal body. Some of them said it has always been acting and moving, while others said that its action and motion only came about later.

If the first group tries to argue against these people by saying: if the body were eternal, it would not be free from motion or stillness, and motion cannot be eternal because that would mean unending events, which is impossible, and stillness cannot be eternal because it is something real, and if it were eternal, it could not cease, since what is eternal cannot end, and anything that necessitates something eternal either does so by itself or is tied to something that does, then we say:

Stillness is something that can end, so it cannot be eternal.

But the second group responded to this by using their well-known answers about the possibility of continuous events, as has been discussed before. As for the claim about stillness, they say: what you said contradicts what you say about the origination of bodies.

The Problem of Infinite Regression and Cause

If you claim the bodies are originated, then either you accept an infinite sequence of events, or you do not. If you allow an infinite sequence of events and say the bodies came to be through a series of sequential events, as some of those who say the bodies are originated, like ar-Ramawi and al-Abhari, have said, then your argument against an infinite chain of effects falls apart. In that case, the eternal body could have always been in motion, and your argument for the origination of the body falls apart.

If, however, you say that an infinite sequence of events is not possible, and that bodies were originated without any new cause, then the action of creating new things does not rely on a new cause. That is what some of the Mu‘tazilah and others say.

So then, the opponents, like the Hashimiyyah, the Karramiyyah, and others, can say: it is possible for an eternal body to move after being still without any cause forcing it to do so, but simply by the will and power of the one who is able. A being with free will can choose between possibilities without a specific reason: sometimes preferring stillness, sometimes preferring motion.

Refutation of the Argument Based on Stillness

If their opponents say: “We say that the actor performs an act after not performing it. But if you say stillness is something real, then you are saying that in eternity there was an action that involved creating something real, and that is impossible.”

They are answered: we do not insist on calling stillness something real, nor do we say it was acting in eternity by producing something real. Rather, we agree with you that He acts by creating something after not having acted, and without any new cause. But our disagreement is about whether the action exists within Him, and whether the actor is a body. If you demand from us a reason for the action of movement after stillness, we respond: it is like His action of creating anything new after not having created. The difference lies in where the action happens, not in the reason or cause of it.

This is a separate matter discussed elsewhere. But as for demanding a cause for a new action, there is no difference between us. In fact, our view is closer to reason than yours. For creating something without any change in the actor is not logical, whereas the opposite is more understandable.

So if they say: “Stillness is something real. If it were eternal, it must have a prior eternal cause, and it could never cease.”

They are answered: if new things that arise depend on new causes, then your claim that bodies are originated falls apart. But if they do not depend on new causes, then the change from stillness to motion can also occur without a new cause, simply through the will of the actor.

The same way Allah can create bodies that are still or in motion without a new cause, He can also cause the change from stillness to motion without a new cause. Creating bodies that can be still or in motion is a greater act than just creating the motions themselves. So if He can do the greater without a new cause, He can certainly do the lesser.

If He creates a body that is still and then wills to move it without any new cause, is that possible or not?

If they say it is impossible, their view and argument collapse. If they say it is possible, then the change from stillness to motion is the same as any other change.

Then comes the question: is the removal of one opposite caused by creating its opposite, or by creating its absence, or by creating non-existence, or do accidents simply not remain?

We say about this what is said in that other issue. Some say stillness does not remain for two moments, but ends little by little. If so, then eternal stillness would not remain for two moments either, it would also change little by little. And in that case, each part of stillness is not eternal by itself, just like they say about each part of motion.

So those who say stillness is something real also say it arises little by little, just like they say about motion.

They are then told: your argument that eternal things cannot be still is the same as your argument that they cannot be in motion, that is, the issue of infinite regress in events, and this has already been discussed.

If they say: “Stillness is something real. If it is eternal, it cannot end. Because whatever is eternal must exist necessarily and cannot end.”

We reply: this is like saying that the absence of action is in itself a real kind of abstention, and that abstaining from action is something real. And if that abstention were eternal, then it could never end, just as they said about stillness.

If they deny that abstaining from action is real, then we can say: the absence of movement is not a real stillness.

Critique of the Argument That Stillness Must Be Eternal

The argument about movement and stillness was weakened by al-Amidi and others. It is flawed based on the views of those who say that attributes cannot last for two moments, this is one of the reasons. The argument itself originally comes from the Mu‘tazilah who allow attributes to remain. But those who disagreed with them, like the Hashimiyyah, the Karramiyyah, and others, who say that there is an eternal body, and that new actions arose within it that were not there before, whether they called this action ‘movement’ as some of them did, or avoided using that word as others did, the point here is the actual meaning, not the names.

So when some of the Mu‘tazilah of Basra said: “The annihilation of bodies happens through the creation of nonexistence that has no place, just like their creation happens through a will that has no place,” and they accepted the existence of created attributes without a place, and the occurrence of events without any new will, and they said that one opposite cannot cease except by the appearance of its opposite,

Then those others replied: In the same way, if we assume an eternal body that moved after being still, then the removal of stillness would be caused by the arrival of its opposite, movement, and that the movement would occur just as a separate created effect does.

And those who said that attributes disappear by creating something to end them, as is one of the two views among the scholars of theology like the Ash‘ariyyah, Karramiyyah, and others, they said that the stillness also disappears by the creation of something to end it. And the discussion about the cause for this removal is the same as the discussion about the cause for new creation.

And those who said: “Stillness ends little by little, just like movement ends little by little”, as is one of the views among the Ash‘ariyyah and others, then for them, stillness is like movement. Just as movement consists of successive parts, so too does stillness.

There is no doubt that these things necessarily follow from those who argue using the movement-stillness proof. These conclusions cannot be escaped. The confusion comes because one of them builds an argument on a premise in one place, but accepts something that contradicts it in another place. This reveals the contradiction in their views and shows their weakness. Still, some of what they affirm in one place is true and widely accepted, so people do not challenge them about it or its premises. Other premises may be weak, but because the conclusion is correct, people are lenient and accept the premise. The real analysis of premises and disputes about them only arises when the conclusion itself is in question.

The Oldest Being, The Eternal, and the Issue of Createdness

Muslims all agree that Allah, and His attributes that belong to His essence, cannot cease to exist. In the terminology of theologians, He is often called ‘the Eternal’. Most of the Mu‘tazilah and those like them call Him ‘the Eternal’, even though some of them do not use that term and instead use ‘the Everlasting’. Most of them consider ‘eternal’ to be His most specific description, just as the later philosophers who believed in God mostly called Him ‘the Necessary Being’, and the earlier ones mostly called Him ‘the First Cause’ or ‘the First Principle’.

So if someone says: “Whatever is eternal must exist forever,” it is clear that the eternal Lord, the Necessary Being, cannot not exist, exalted is He. And there is no other being that is eternal in itself, according to the Muslims, such that it would be said it must exist forever. The philosophers who claim the heavenly bodies are eternal say that they must always exist. So while that statement, that whatever is eternal cannot cease, is true in itself, it cannot be used by someone whose own beliefs contradict it or require something that contradicts it. Because the very proof they use to support it is contradicted by their other claims. So their opponent can undermine their argument by showing that it contradicts itself, especially if the contradiction shows their entire position fails either way.

The Issues of Believing in an Eternal, Willing Body

Whoever believes that a being with free will can choose between two possibilities without any reason, just by being able, or by an eternal will, and then imagines that there is an eternal, willing body that can either move or stay still, must accept that its movement after stillness is just like its ability to move something else. If it can move something else just by being able, or by its eternal will, then it can also change from stillness to movement in the same way. The only way to deny this is to prove either that a body cannot be eternal, or that what is eternal cannot move. But if they cannot prove the origination of the body or the impossibility of movement for something eternal without using this argument, then they are assuming the very thing they are trying to prove, just changing the words and going in circles, while never actually moving from their position. Whoever follows them and understands their words ends up confused and gains nothing. And whoever does not understand and just imitates them remains ignorant, blindly following others who are ignorant and lost, though they present themselves as among the most knowledgeable people in matters of belief and logic.

Closing with a Response to the Final Argument

Then ar-Razi mentioned a counter-argument given by his opponents about the six proofs he gave for why an eternal body cannot be in motion, arguments we discussed above, along with the replies of ar-Ramawi. The counter-argument was this:

“If motion is impossible in eternity, is that because of something in its own nature? Then it should never exist at all. Or is it because of something else? If that other thing necessarily exists on its own, then motion should always be impossible. If that other thing depends on something else, then the same question applies to it, and so on forever, unless we eventually reach something that necessarily exists in itself. But in that case, motion should still be impossible forever.”

If someone then says: “What prevents motion in eternity is what we call ‘eternity’ itself, because it contradicts being preceded by something else, which is what motion requires. And since eternity has ended, what was always preventing motion is gone.”

We reply: “The same question now applies to the meaning of ‘eternity’. Is it something that necessarily exists by itself, or because of something else?”

Then ar-Razi answered this objection by saying: “Even if motion is allowed in eternity, that does not mean motion itself is allowed to be eternal.”

But someone could reply: What do you mean by saying that motion is allowed in eternity? Do you mean it is possible for motion to exist in eternity? Or do you mean it is possible to judge in eternity that motion is allowed?

If the first, then you are agreeing to the very thing you just denied. If the second, then you are talking about a mental judgment, and that is not the issue. Because it is always possible to judge something mentally in eternity, just as we can mentally judge that impossible things are impossible, and possible things are possible. So the real question is whether motion itself was possible in eternity.

If you say it was impossible in eternity, that is false, as shown earlier. If you say it was possible, then the argument you used to deny motion in eternity collapses, and all your arguments fall apart.

Even al-Amidi did not accept ar-Razi’s answer here. Instead, he gave a different reply: “We only say motion is impossible in eternity because eternal existence is what is impossible, not motion itself. So what is impossible stays impossible, and what is possible remains possible.”

But someone could reply: This would mean something changes from being impossible to possible without any new cause, which cannot be accepted either logically or in experience. Possibility is a constant truth accepted by everyone. Whenever you imagine a time in which something is possible, it was also possible before that, endlessly. There is no beginning for possibility.

This shows that possibility itself has no beginning, and that motion has always been something possible.

So if someone says: “Motion was impossible in eternity,” that means they are claiming it was impossible for there to be an endless series of motions with no beginning. But the end of eternity is not something that happened. The new event is not eternity ending, it is just one of the events.

So if someone says: “There must be a new event in order for a new thing to become possible,” that would mean you are requiring the thing to already exist before it is allowed to exist, which makes no sense.

So when someone says: “Everything that happens must either have been possible in eternity or not,” if it was possible, then it cannot have been impossible. And if it was impossible and then became possible, that would mean possibility itself changes, which makes no sense.

If you say: “Events cannot begin unless they are first possible,” then that possibility must have existed before, without any beginning. So motion was always possible, and denying that is false.

Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql by Ibn Taymiyyah (2/344-399)