Ar Razi’s Claim

He says in Nihayat al-‘Uqul that this impossibility is not something proven through debate or philosophy, but is known by natural and necessary reason. It is something the human mind instinctively recognises, as clear as knowing that a thing must either exist or not exist.

He then claims that his opponents, especially the Hanbalis and Karramiyyah, are simply describing a kind of being that is unintelligible something beyond all relation to space, and thus beyond comprehension.

His response is that logic does not deny that a being may exist outside of space, and that although logic does deny the possibility of a being being both non-eternal and non-originated, it does not deny the possibility of a being that is neither inside nor outside the world. Therefore, he says, comparing the two is invalid.

He then says if it is said that Allah is in a direction, it still cannot be said that He is equal to, greater than, or smaller than something else that also exists in that direction.

If someone were to affirm that, then they would have to say that His essence is physically divisible, which cannot be accepted. He tries to trap his opponents by forcing them to admit that the essence of Allah is unlike any other essence, but then says that this must mean His essence is beyond imagination and beyond spatial concepts.

So if they affirm something beyond imagination, then they have no right to reject the view that Allah is not in or outside the world, even if the mind cannot imagine it. For Ar-Razi, once you admit imagination cannot grasp Allah’s essence, then you cannot reject claims just because imagination cannot picture them.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Response And More On The Topic

Ibn Taymiyyah begins his response by affirming that the claim that something must be either inside or outside the world is not just a theoretical idea it is something known by natural, instinctive, necessary reason. He compares it directly to the knowledge that something must be either eternal or created, and that something must be either self-subsisting or dependent on something else, and so on. These pairs are part of basic rational structure.

There is no third option between them, and the same rule applies to the spatial relation between a thing and the world. A being must be either inside the world or outside of it. Denying both is as irrational as denying both eternity and origination.

To support this, he refers to a well-known argument from Imam Ahmad against the Jahmiyyah. Ahmad said that if Allah existed alone before the creation, then when He created the world, He must have created it either within Himself or outside Himself there is no third. This kind of argument, Ibn Taymiyyah says, is based on undeniable and necessary reason. Even the Jahmiyyah did not reject it when it was used against them. So ar-Razi’s attempt to reject the spatial distinction is even weaker than the Jahmiyyah’s.

He then points out a contradiction among different Jahmi groups. Some claim that the world is neither touching Allah nor separate from Him. Others claim Allah is neither inside nor outside. Each of these groups accuses the other of contradicting necessary reason. But in reality, both of them do. Each has adopted a position that the human mind naturally and instinctively knows is false.

Concepts Are Broader Than Real Possibilities But That Doesn’t Help

Ibn Taymiyyah then explains the difference between mental conceptualisation and real-world existence. The mind can form concepts that don’t actually exist. It can imagine something as existing while it does not exist, and vice versa.

It can even imagine contradictory things, or things that cannot possibly exist, like a square circle, or a being that is neither inside nor outside. Just because something is conceivable in the mind does not mean it can exist in the real world. Mental divisions go beyond what is logically possible.

He shows that the mind can imagine a being that is neither known nor unknown, neither living nor dead, neither strong nor weak but none of these things actually exist. In the same way, the mind may imagine a being that is neither inside nor outside the world. But this is just imagination it is not something that can really exist.

And necessary reason recognises that such a being is impossible. So ar-Razi’s reliance on the idea that imagination cannot grasp something as proof that it can still be valid is now invalidated…

Ar-Razi Misrepresented the Real Argument And Failed to Respond to It

Ar-Razi never actually restated his opponents’ real argument. The real claim is that: “Every existing thing must be either inside another or outside of it.” But Ar-Razi rephrased the issue by saying: “Reason allows division between spatial and non-spatial beings.” These are not the same thing. The first is a necessary logical law. The second is a vague abstraction. So even if Ar-Razi’s version is true, it does not refute the actual argument made by his opponents.

Had Ar-Razi properly quoted their words, or engaged with the actual formulation, then he would have had to face its full force. Because the statement that two existing beings must either be joined or separate, inside or outside one another, is known by instinctive reason. It needs no analogy or proof. It is the same as knowing something must be either before or after something else. These are self-evident truths.

Saying “Unimaginable” Often Means “Impossible” Not Just Difficult

When people say: “I cannot conceive such a thing,” they usually mean: “This thing cannot possibly exist.” This kind of statement is not about personal ignorance or confusion. It is a way of expressing a truth that is known instinctively. It is like the verse: “Do you inform Allah of something He does not know in the heavens or the earth?” The verse means: if Allah does not know of it, it does not exist.

So when someone says: “I cannot imagine a being that is neither inside nor outside,” they are expressing knowledge of impossibility not just struggling to understand. Ar-Razi’s attempt to treat this as a problem of imagination or illusion is false. The claim is about what is real and possible, not about what is difficult to understand.

Denying That Something Is Impossible Does Not Prove It Is Possible

Ar-Razi does not actually claim that a being that is neither in nor out of the world is possible by necessary reason. He only says that reason does not deny the possibility of dividing beings into spatial and non-spatial. But this is a completely different matter. Even if that were true, it would not answer the claim that a thing must be either in or out.

If two people disagree, and one says: “I know this is impossible by necessity,” while the other says: “I don’t know if it is impossible,” then the second one has no ground to challenge the first. The claim of ignorance is not a rebuttal to the claim of knowledge. At most, it shows disagreement. But it does not disprove the point.

And even if someone claimed the opposite saying, “I know by necessity that this is possible” then the disagreement would have to be resolved some other way. But ar-Razi doesn’t even do that. He simply sidesteps the issue.

Necessary Knowledge Cannot Be Overturned by Theoretical Arguments

Ibn Taymiyyah explains a principle of logic: necessary knowledge is the foundation for all reasoning. It cannot be overruled by theoretical, speculative arguments. If someone tries to do that, then they are destroying the very tool they use to argue. Because all theoretical reasoning depends on necessary knowledge.

He quotes a known saying: “Arguments that fall apart like glass they seem strong, but every one that strikes also breaks.” Any theory that contradicts self-evident truth is invalid by definition. So ar-Razi’s abstract division between spatial and non-spatial beings has no weight against the necessary truth that everything must be either inside or outside the world.

The Words “Space/Spatial” Are Vague

Another part of Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation is ON how vague and confusing the term “space” is.

People use the word “space” to refer to different things sometimes it means a real place separate from the object, other times it means a relation, a direction, or an imaginary construct. If ar-Razi is using “space” in a vague way, then his whole argument loses clarity.

If “space” means a real, external container, then not all beings need that. But if “space” means just the condition of being in a location, then everything in reality is either in something or outside of it. So the use of these philosophical terms creates confusion that clouds the issue.

Saying Allah is “Outside the World” Does Not Mean He is in a Space

Ibn Taymiyyah then shows that affirming that Allah is “outside the world” or “above the Throne” does not mean affirming that He is in a container, or a spatial object, or surrounded by limits. It only means He is not inside the created world. That’s all his opponents meant. And this is completely consistent with rejecting physical dimensions or spatial limitation.

So even if ar-Razi wants to reject the idea that Allah is in space, that does not contradict the statement that He is above or outside the world. The two issues are not the same. Ar-Razi has confused them.

Sound Reasoning Does Not Contradict Revelation

Reason never contradicts what the Prophets taught. True reason, when free of confusion, desire, and blind imitation, leads people to affirm the truths of revelation. This is why the people of the Fire will say: “If only we had used our reason or listened, we would not be among the people of the blazing Fire.”

Sound minds naturally recognise that Allah must be distinct from creation, above the world, and not mixed with it. They reject the idea of a being that is neither in nor out. The problem is not with reason itself, but with people’s misuse of it through vague language, imitation, and confusion.

The Quran says: “Have they not travelled through the land and had hearts by which to reason?” It also says: “It is not the eyes that are blind, but the hearts in the chests.” So the real blindness is not in seeing but in reason that is dead or blocked.

Most Philosophers and Theologians Are Confused and Divided Because They Don’t Follow Revelation

Finally, Ibn Taymiyyah says that the reason philosophers and speculative theologians are so deeply divided is because they have left the guidance of the Prophets. They use big terms like “body,” “substance,” “space,” “accident,” but don’t define them properly or use them consistently. The result is confusion, contradiction, and endless disagreement.

If they had sound reason, they would be united. But Allah says: “Had it been from other than Allah, you would have found much contradiction.” And He also says: “They think they are united, but their hearts are divided because they do not reason.”

Sound reason is rare. But wherever it exists, it will agree with what the Prophets brought. And the consistent testimony of all the messengers and divine books is that Allah is the Most High, above the heavens, above the Throne, distinct from the world, and not part of it.

So this entire argument returns to the guidance of revelation. And the truth is clear: the idea of a being that is neither inside the world nor outside it is not just unimaginable it is impossible.

Then Ar-Razi mentioned the second argument from those who affirm direction, saying: “The second of them is that just as it is not possible to understand a being that is neither pre-eternal nor originated, likewise it is not possible to understand a being that is not in the world, nor outside the world, nor above the world, nor below the world, nor in front of the world, nor behind the world, nor to the right of the world, nor to the left of the world. And if it were permissible to affirm a being not described by these attributes, it would be permissible to affirm a being not described as either pre-eternal or originated, and that is pure sophistry.”

And this argument is similar to what he mentioned in Ta’sis, that those who dispute with him say: the impossibility of a being that is neither inside the world nor outside of it is known with necessary reason. (See Ta’sis, p. 19–21, where ar-Razi presented the objection of his opponents, as he claimed, namely the Hanbalis and the Karramiyyah. The Karramiyyah disputed with him by describing Allah as One who is free of composition and combination.)

Then he said: “And the response to what they held as their second point, that such a thing is unintelligible, is that this is not accepted. For pure reason does not deny that beings can be divided into what is not in space and what is in space. But it does deny that something could lack both pre-eternity and non-pre-eternity. So comparing the one to the other is far-fetched.”

He also said: “Reason denies affirming a being in a direction, while it is impossible to attribute that being to another being in another direction, whether by saying it is equal to it, or smaller than it, or greater than it. Yet you deny that it may be said: the Creator is equal to the Throne, or greater, or smaller than it. If they were to affirm that, it would necessitate that His essence be divisible.”

The Hanbalis disputed with him, saying: the essence of Allah, Most High, is different from the essences of physical things. So ar-Razi forced them to acknowledge that the unique nature of His essence, which makes it different from all other essences, is beyond the reach of imagination and illusion.

Then he said, after mentioning this: “This is an admission that something exists contrary to what illusion judges and imagination concludes. And if that is the case, then what objection is there to a being that is not in the world, nor separated from it by direction, even if imagination and illusion cannot comprehend such a being?”

Then he continued by mentioning the argument of the Hanbalis and their reliance on transmitted reports, and he forced them to admit that affirming the attributes in the way they described them is something neither imagination nor illusion can grasp. Then he said after that: “So how can it be strange to say that He, Most High, exists, while not being inside the world nor outside the world, even if imagination and illusion are unable to understand this being?”

I say: the reply to this has several points.

The first: the claim that a being is either inside the world or outside of it is like the claim that a being is either pre-eternal or originated, either Creator or created, either self-subsisting or subsisting by another, either necessary or contingent, and this is known by natural, instinctive reason.

For this reason, even the Jahmiyyah did not dispute this when the imams argued with them. As Imam Ahmad said in his argument against them: if He was alone and then created the world, then He must have created it either within Himself or outside of Himself. There is no third option, that He created it neither within Himself nor outside of Himself, because this is known to be impossible by necessary reason.

(As-Samarqandi said in as-Sahā’if al-Ilāhiyyah, p. 122–123: “Everything that the mind can imagine is, in relation to external existence, either necessary, impossible, or possible.” Then he defined these three categories. About the necessary: “The necessary in itself is what, by its own essence, requires existence externally.” And in al-Mubin fi Sharh Alfaz al-Hukamā’ wa al-Mutakallimīn by al-Amidi, p. 61, he defined the necessary as: “It is that whose nonexistence is impossible, if that is due to its own essence, then it is necessary in itself; and if due to something else, then it is necessary by something else.” See also al-Mu’jam al-Falsafi, 2/541. The possible is what is equally likely to exist or not exist, and it is the opposite of the impossible and the necessary. See al-Mu’jam al-Falsafi, 2/424. Al-Amidi also said in al-Mubin, p. 62: “The possible is that which, if assumed to exist or not exist, neither assumption would entail absurdity from its essence, and preferring one over the other requires an external cause. In general terminology, it is what is not impossible to exist, and this includes both what is necessary in itself and what is possible in itself.”)

Reason, and even the Jahmiyyah, who said about the world that it is neither touching nor separate, did not dispute this. And even if some might claim, like ar-Razi and his ilk, that the invalidity of the Jahmiyyah’s claim is necessarily known, the invalidity of this claim is even more obvious to reason. As mentioned earlier, accidents in substances are neither touching them nor separate from them, yet there is no substance or accident except that it is either separate from another or together with it.

So each of the two Jahmi sects admits that the other’s claim contradicts necessary reason. But in reality, both of their claims contradict necessary reason.

The statement of one side that there is a being distinct from the world but neither inside nor outside the world is the same as the statement of their brothers that He is in the world but neither separate from it nor touching it. So if the first claim is known by necessity to be false, then the second is the same, if not worse. (He means by the first group: the Hululiyyah (those who say Allah is within creation), and by the second: the Naqah (those who negate direction and location)

And likewise the claim of the atheists that there is a being that is neither living nor dead, neither knowing nor ignorant, neither able nor unable, all these claims are known to be necessarily false by reason. So the claim that there is a being outside of these two categories (of in or out, or in contact or separated) contradicts the instinct of reason, and is among the worst forms of sophistry. It must not be accepted from anyone, and when one hears this, one must expect to hear its companions from other kinds of sophistry.

The second point: it is necessary to distinguish between possible divisions in actual external existence and between mental conceptualisations, which do not require correspondence to external reality.

The mind can conceptualise impossible things, though they cannot exist outside. It can imagine the existent as non-existent, and the non-existent as existent, even though that does not reflect reality. So mental divisions are broader than possible actual divisions. (This means that between mental conceptualisations and actual divisions in the external world there is a contrast.The way we judge mental concepts is based on mental entities, and this contrasts with real-world divisions, which are judged based on real entities. See al-Mu’jam al-Falsafi, 1/596, paraphrased. It also says there: the mind is the faculty by which one can distinguish good from bad things… or the faculty prepared to acquire concepts and affirmations.)

So the mind can propose: something either exists or does not, or is neither. Or: it is either known or unknown, or neither. Or: it is necessary, impossible, or possible, or neither.

It can say: something either is pre-eternal or originated, or neither. Either a creator or created, or neither. Two beings: either one is before the other, or after, or simultaneous, or neither. Either they are connected or separated, or neither. Either distinct or joined, or neither.

Two self-subsisting beings: either one is inside the other, or outside it, or neither. Either in a space, or within a spatial thing, or neither. Either living or dead, or neither. Either knowing or ignorant, or neither. Either able or unable, or neither.

And just as we say: the existent is either necessary, possible, or impossible, or either affirmed or denied, or neither. The mind proposes such distinctions not because they are possible in reality, but even while knowing that some of them are impossible outside the mind.

Just as it knows that an existent cannot be impossible, or cannot be nonexistent. Just as the mind knows it is impossible for something to be neither creator nor created, neither pre-eternal nor originated, neither necessary nor possible, and that two beings cannot be neither close nor separate, neither distinct nor joined. (The phrase “neither close nor separate” refers to proximity: when two things are close together. Its opposite is remoteness. See al-Mu’jam al-Falsafi, 1/320, and al-Mu’jam al-Wasit, 2/722. The phrase “neither separated” is from the root of “separation,” meaning detachment, release, and liberation. See Lisan al-Arab, 2/1120, and al-Mu’jam al-Wasit, 2/698.)

So when someone says: “This thing is neither inside nor outside,” it is like saying: “It is neither before nor after,” or “These two things are neither simultaneous nor sequential.”

When this becomes clear, then his statement, “pure reason does not reject dividing beings into those that are in space and those that are not; but it does reject that a thing could lack both pre-eternity and non-pre-eternity, so comparing the two is far-fetched”, is answered as follows:

This is not a fair comparison. For when one says: a being is either in a space or not, this depends on what is meant by “space.” If by “space” he means something real, separate from the spatial being, then it is like saying: a being is either in time or not, if by “time” one means real movements like the motions of the spheres. Both cases mean: the being is either in a real space or real time that is separate from it, or not. This is a sound division. For if every being required a separate real space or time, then those places and times would also require further real places and times, which would lead to infinite regress if they are not the First. And if one says they are the First Cause, then it would lead to circularity. Unless we assume each is time for the other, or call it a “space” for the other, then there is no impossibility.

(He has spoken about infinite regress, causality, and circularity in detail in his reply to ar-Razi and al-Amidi, in their various approaches to affirming the Necessary Being, throughout Dar’ Ta‘arud al-‘Aql wa al-Naql, volume 3, from page 117 to page 356. On infinite regress, see p. 131. He defined circularity on p. 143: “Circularity may mean that neither of two things exists without the other, this is called simultaneous circularity. Or it may mean that each exists only after the other, this is called sequential circularity.” Circularity means: each thing depends on the other. See also al-Mu’jam al-Falsafi, 1/567.)

But if by “space” he does not mean something real and separate from the spatial being, but rather something negative or a property of the body or a kind of relation, then this is like what is meant by “time” when it refers to something negative, or a trait of the living being, or a relation. Just as we say that “space” is the measure of place, we say that “time” is the measure of motion. And just as the mind imagines, before the world, imaginary spaces which are estimates of places, it imagines imaginary durations before the world which are estimates of time. This is what some philosophers claim is a real thing, as is mentioned about Plato.

(Plato: son of Ariston, not to be confused with Aristotle. He was from Athens and one of the earliest philosophers. Al-Shahrastani considered him the last of the seven wise men. He was a student of Socrates and was known for monotheism and wisdom. It is said he believed in a First Cause who is pre-eternal, necessary by Himself, and knows all knowledge, contrary to what Aristotle said. He was born in 427 BC and died in 347 BC. See al-Milal wa al-Nihal, 2/88, and Falsafah ‘Abr al-Tarikh by al-Ramzi Najjar, p. 23.)

(Platonic forms: Al-Shahrastani said in al-Milal wa al-Nihal, 2/89: “It is said he (Plato) included time among the principles, called it ‘duration’, and affirmed that for every specific physical thing there is an abstract form in the world of intellect.” See also Ma’idat Aflatun by Plato, translated by Muhammad Lutfi Jum‘ah, p. 164–165, and Falsafah ‘Abr al-Tarikh by al-Ramzi Najjar, p. 2625, under the section: “World of Forms.”)

(As for “matter,” it sometimes means “hyle” (prime matter). It can also mean: any subject that can receive perfection by joining with something else. “Matter” is sometimes defined as: that by which a thing is formed. See Risalat al-Hudud by Ibn Sina, p. 56 (within Thalath Rasa’il fi al-Hudud) and al-Mu’jam al-Falsafi, p. 163.

As for “duration,” philosophers describe it as a limited portion of time. See the same source, p. 172.)

And Aristotle, his companion, and most rational people know that these things exist only in the mind, not in reality. In fact, intelligent people know that what Aristotle and his followers said about absolute hyle (prime matter) exists only in the mind, not in actual existence. The same goes for the intellects they posit that are separate from matter.

(Aristotle: Aristotle the son of Nicomachus, a Pythagorean from the town of Istakhar, a Greek philosopher who lived between 384–322 BC. He authored works in philosophy and is regarded by philosophers as the most prominent and the “First Teacher” because he formalised logical teachings and brought them into actual use. He studied under Plato. Al-Shahrastani considered him among the later Greek sages. See: al-Milal wa al-Nihal (2/119) and Akhbar al-‘Ulama bi Akhbar al-Hukama’ by al-Qifti (pp. 21–41)

(Hyle: A Greek word meaning origin and matter. The hyle of every body is what bears its form, like wood is the hyle of a bed. Sometimes it refers to the highest sphere and its contents. “Hyle” is also called matter, element, or clay. When the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, come together, they form a “form” (surah), which is the shape or structure the hyle takes on. Hyle is contrasted with form. See: Mafatih al-‘Ulum by al-Khwarizmi, p. 82; Lubab al-‘Uqul by al-Mikhlati, p. 55; al-Ta‘rifat by al-Jurjani, p. 257; and al-Sahā’if al-Ilāhiyyah, p. 267.)

So dividing existence into what is in space (hayyiz) and what is not, is like dividing existence into what is in the mind and what is not, and it is known that this is a mental division, not a real one. For everything that exists externally also exists in the mind, and based on that understanding, everything that exists externally is also in space.

There is no existent of which it is impossible to say that it is in a non-existent “thing”, even if that non-existent thing is called space or time. Nor is there anything in existence that cannot be linked to something or related to something. If every existent can be accompanied by what determines time, then every existent can be accompanied by what determines place. As for something lacking both pre-eternity and non-pre-eternity, that is just like something lacking both height and lowliness.

So when someone says: “Either something has a beginning, or it was preceded by another, or it has no beginning”, if it has a beginning, then it is the created world; if it has no beginning, then it is the eternal Lord. This is like saying: “Either something has something above it, meaning something else is higher, or it doesn’t.” If something is above it, then it is the created world. If nothing is above it, then it is the Most High Lord, exalted is He. That is why the Prophet said: “You are the First; there is nothing before You. You are the Last; there is nothing after You. You are the Most High; there is nothing above You. You are the Most Near; there is nothing below You.”

Likewise, if “originated” is interpreted to mean: that which was not, then came to be, or: that which is preceded by its own nonexistence, and if “preceded” is defined by the estimation of time, then “low” can be interpreted as: that which can be surpassed from above by something else. So we say: it is defined by the knowledge of what is possible to exist in it.

And if “eternal” is defined as: that which always existed and was preceded by nothing, then “Most High” can be defined as: that which nothing is above, the One who is not above any nonexistence capable of estimating space.

So just as nothing can be before Him, nothing can be above Him. Rather, He is, as the Prophet said in the authentic hadith: “You are the First; there is nothing before You. You are the Last; there is nothing after You. You are the Most High; there is nothing above You. You are the Most Near; there is nothing below You.”

We discussed something like this at the beginning of this fair judgement between him and his opponent, in which we clarified what had become mixed between truth and falsehood in his Ta’sis.

It has become clear from what we said that he resorted to estimating place and time. In one case, he spoke of something being associated with it, dividing beings into those associated and those not. And in the other case, he made both categories associated with it, but completing the comparison would require distinguishing absolute association from conditional. This is not a just comparison, nor a sound analogy. It is a false and unjust measure. Each thing must be compared only to its proper counterpart. Then the types become 4, as we described earlier.

The third point: it should be known that examples and analogies are struck for something either because its judgement is unclear and the analogy reveals it, whether for understanding the concept or for confirming its truth, or because the truth is in itself self-evident with sound nature, but something in the heart, doubt or desire, prevents someone from recognising it.

So the analogy helps remove the obstacle. The point is: analogies are used either to affirm what proves something, or to remove what blocks its acceptance. The goal may be to achieve knowledge, understanding, or to follow the truth and act upon it.

Just like when the two angels came to Dawud and said: “Judge between us with truth, and do not be unjust, and guide us to the right path. This is my brother. He has 99 ewes and I have 1 ewe. He said: Entrust it to me, and he overpowered me in speech.” (Sad: 22–24).

When Dawud ruled, he realised this was a parable struck for him, and he saw his own situation. It is known that rational proof can give knowledge of general truths, but when no barrier exists to knowing the truth and following it, a parable in which the obstacle is removed will achieve the goal. What we are dealing with here, estimating place in terms of time, falls into this category. The objector already holds a belief that may block his understanding of the truth. Otherwise, the two matters are actually self-evident and natural.

If that is so, we turn to the example he used.

His opponent says: “I do not comprehend a being existing alongside others while being free of both being preceded and being originated.” This is the analogy he made, the base example, that is: a being free from both descriptions, even though every being must have one of the two. That which is preceded is originated; that which precedes all is pre-eternal. Likewise, he says: “I do not comprehend a being alongside others that is neither above nor below, neither inside nor outside.” So again, he is describing a being free of 2 necessary attributes, where everything that has them is related to something else.

Pre-eternity and the pre-eternal are related to origination and the originated, and vice versa. Height and the high are related to lowness and the low. The pre-eternal precedes the originated, and nothing precedes it. The originated is preceded by the pre-eternal, or by nonexistence. Meaning: it came after not being.

There was a time in which it did not exist; something else did. Likewise, the high is above the low, and nothing is higher than the Most High. The low is what has something above it, or what has above it an absence that could be a space in which something could exist, but in which it did not exist. This is a correct analogy.

And you mentioned in your reply that: “Pure reason does not reject dividing existents into what is in space and what is not. But it does reject a thing being free of both pre-eternity and its opposite.” And that something is either in space or not, and entering or exiting it are both descriptions of things that have space, as is claimed. This is like saying: “Reason does not reject dividing beings into those within time and those not.”

So you should have mentioned the actual example your opponent claimed was known by necessary reason, either using his wording or something equivalent, then presented it to reason to see if it accepts or rejects it. For your opponent said: “The mind judges, with basic clarity, that anything existing with something else must be either inside it or outside it.” And likewise: “It must be either originated with it, or preceded by it.”

Yet you did not mention this formulation, nor did you use it as your argument, even though this claim is more compelling, in fact, both are equally known by innate and necessary reason. The knowledge of one is not dependent on the other, each is independently known.

The mind, by its natural disposition, knows that 2 existing things must be such that either 1 is inside the other or outside it; either above it or not; either joined in the same space or not, but if not joined, then in separate spaces. All of this is innate knowledge.

So the statement of the speaker, “Reason does not reject dividing existents into what is spatially located and what is not,” is not similar to the above, neither in wording nor in meaning. It does not negate what is known by basic intuition. Therefore, there is no need for analogies or comparisons. This is known by:

The fourth point: which is to say, when someone says, “I do not comprehend a being that is free of pre-eternity and origination,” or, “I do not comprehend a being that is neither inside another being nor outside it, nor separate from it nor joined to it,” this does not mean: “I do not know or understand it,” or, “I am incapable of grasping or knowing it.” Because someone’s inability to understand or know something does not mean that the thing does not exist or is impossible. There are countless things in existence that many people cannot know or comprehend, only Allah encompasses them.

What the speaker means by saying “it is not comprehensible” is: it is not something that can even be conceived as knowable or existent. its existence cannot be conceived or known. And whatever cannot even be conceived or known to exist is impossible in itself. This is like Allah’s statement: “Say: Do you inform Allah of what He does not know in the heavens or in the earth?” (Yunus: 18), meaning: do you inform Him of something that does not exist? For if it existed, He would know it.

So likewise, if a person knows, by reason, that a certain thing is impossible and cannot exist, and knows this as a necessity, he says: “This is not conceivable,” or, “This cannot be grasped by the mind.” Although these phrases can be used for someone’s lack of understanding, people may be confused by this kind of language unless the intended meaning is known.

So when these objectors say: “We know by necessary, innate reason, or we have necessary, innate knowledge, that the existence of a being which is neither inside the world nor outside it is impossible,” and, “Whoever affirms such a being is affirming what cannot even be conceived to exist,” then this is the same as someone saying: “Such a thing would be neither existent nor non-existent, neither pre-eternal nor originated, neither knowing nor not knowing, neither powerful nor not powerful.” But a being cannot be free of both of 2 opposites. Whoever affirms or denies both has described something impossible, and even described the necessary being (wajib al-wujud) in terms that make its existence impossible. So he ends up both affirming and denying the necessary being, combining affirmation with negation.

This is the condition of those atheistic Jahmiyyah and their likes. They are hypocrites, swinging between affirming the Creator as necessarily existent and denying Him. They do not fully deny Him, nor fully affirm Him.

They describe Him in ways that require Him to be necessarily existent, then describe Him in ways that make His existence impossible. And sometimes 1 of these tendencies dominates in their speech more than the other. So for some of them, clear disbelief is dominant, such as the outright atheists who deny both sides. Their denial and description of God as impossible far outweighs their affirmation of Him. Others may be more affirming, acknowledging most of His names and attributes, while denying only a few, such as is often found among some of the ṣifātiyyah (those who affirm some attributes).

These people believe in some of Allah’s names and disbelieve in others. They believe in part of the book and disbelieve in part of it. Because of this, scholars have differed over whether they are believers or disbelievers, though this is not the place to discuss that in full. There is no doubt that among them are ignorant people with mistaken interpretations who cannot be ruled disbelievers, even though what they say is the same as what the disbelievers say. And among them are the hypocrites and heretical disbelievers, whose hypocrisy and disbelief is beyond doubt.

So if your opponent has said: “We know, and we grasp by innate reason, that the existence of something that is neither inside the world nor outside it is impossible,” and you reply: “Pure reason does not reject dividing beings into spatial and non-spatial,” then this is no answer to his claim at all.

You have not said that pure reason affirms the possibility of a being that is neither inside nor outside the world.

If you had said that, it would have been returning to your first claim and would be a direct rebuttal of his claim of necessary knowledge of impossibility, by a counter-claim of necessary knowledge of possibility. And if 1 of the debaters claims: “I know necessarily that this is impossible,” and the other says: “I know necessarily that it is possible,” the matter can only be settled by other ways, as we explained elsewhere. And even then, neither party would be definitively refuted.

So if you had claimed necessary knowledge of possibility, it would only equal his claim, but you did not even do that. You merely claimed to know something else, outside the very issue your opponent said is necessarily known, and it is known that no one on earth can truly claim necessary knowledge of the possibility of a being that is neither inside nor outside the world.

At most, someone might mention a theoretical argument, and that too would only amount to claiming that your opponent’s knowledge is not necessary. And even if you do manage to deny that his knowledge is necessary, by saying it is not known necessarily, that does not invalidate it for him, since necessary knowledge can differ between people.

(Some said: necessary knowledge is that which attaches itself to the soul in a way that it cannot be removed, doubted, or denied. See: al-Tamhid by Ibn al-Baqillani, p. 35. He also said about theoretical knowledge, p. 36: “It is what follows thinking and deliberation about the object in question, or remembering past reasoning. Any knowledge that requires deliberation and consideration is called theoretical knowledge.” See also: al-Mawāqif by al-Iji, p. 11, for further definitions.)

So if someone says: “I necessarily know that this is impossible,” and another says: “I do not know that,” then even if one allows that necessary knowledge can differ between people, like theoretical knowledge, like reports and subtle matters, this is the stronger view. In that case, the other’s ignorance of it doesn’t harm the one who knows it.

But if one holds that all necessary knowledge must be shared by everyone, as some mutakallimūn say, and if one group says: “We are compelled to know this,” and another says: “We are not,” then neither claim is preferred unless there is a separate, conclusive reason.

And in that case, your denial of necessary knowledge does not negate your opponent’s claim about the actual issue, especially since you did not even claim that necessity for this particular issue.

The fifth point: is that the formulation you presented, that “pure reason does not reject dividing existence into beings that are spatial and beings that are not”, either entails the possibility of what your opponent declared impossible, or it does not.

If it does not entail that, then it is irrelevant and not an answer. But if it does entail it, then your claim amounts to challenging a necessary knowledge with a theoretical one, and that is invalid. Because necessary knowledge is the foundation for all theoretical reasoning.

(See: Sharh al-Maqāṣid by al-Taftazani, 1/210–222, where he explains that theoretical knowledge ends at necessary knowledge. He then listed the types of necessary affirmations: innate principles, observations, natural instincts, repeated experience, widely transmitted reports, and intuition, and explained them in detail.)

So if theoretical reasoning could undermine necessary knowledge, it would undermine all theoretical reasoning itself, and that would lead to undermining both necessary and theoretical knowledge. And if that happens, there is no knowledge at all, no truth or certainty, and nothing would be valid.

This kind of argument is unanimously condemned by the Salaf and the imams. As the saying goes:

“Arguments that fall apart like glass, they seem strong,
But every one that strikes also breaks.”

(He mentioned this line in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ, 7/314; Ibn al-Qayyim quoted it in as-Sawāʿiq al-Mursala, 4/1277, ed. Dr. Ali al-Dakhil Allah; and al-Suyuti in Ṣawn al-Manṭiq wa al-Kalām, p. 99. The word tahāwut, falling apart, means breaking into pieces, like snow crumbling. See Tahdhīb al-Lughah, 6/238.)

So the speech of someone who undermines necessary knowledge with theoretical arguments is not knowledge, it is not proven truth, and thus not acceptable. It follows that in either case, your argument is invalid and not real knowledge, so your opponent’s claim remains untouched.

The sixth point: is that this idea you presented, that “pure reason does not reject dividing existence into beings that are spatial and beings that are not”, needs to be clarified. When you say that “reason does not reject this,” do you mean that reason does not know that it is impossible? Or do you mean that reason knows it is possible in reality?

If you mean that pure reason knows it is possible in reality, then you are saying that reason necessarily knows that it is possible for a spatial being to exist, and also for a non-spatial being to exist, like it knows that bodies and their properties exist. But “pure reason” here means necessary knowledge, otherwise, your point is lost.

And clearly, neither you nor your allies have ever claimed to know by necessary knowledge that a being can exist outside the world without being in it or outside it. That claim is something you only try to prove by theoretical reasoning. If you were able to claim necessary knowledge of such a possibility, you would say: “We know, by necessity, that a being can exist without being inside or outside the world.”

But even if someone were to claim that, it would not invalidate the opposing claim of necessary knowledge of impossibility, both claims would need a judge. And in that case, all parties must submit to the judgement of Allah’s books and His sent prophets.

And there is no disagreement among creation that the texts of revelation, the divine books and prophetic reports, indicate that He is above the world more strongly than they indicate that His modality and measure are unknown.

So that proves preference for the affirmation of height, even if there were a textual argument for negating how-ness. How much more so, when all of their scholars, from the earliest to the latest, admit that the revealed texts contain no statement, neither explicitly nor implicitly, denying that Allah is above the world.

But they do contain many statements, both explicit and implicit, affirming that He is above the world. None knows how many except the Lord of creation.

And since Allah knew that people would reach this point in their debates, where each side claims to have found something and to possess necessary knowledge, whether truthfully or in error, He sent messengers, revealed books, and commanded them to judge between people in what they disputed.

That is why no dispute among mankind can ever be finally settled except by a prophet and a messenger. Their need for that is absolute and essential. As Allah says: “Mankind was (once) one nation, then Allah sent prophets bringing good news and warning, and He sent down with them the Book in truth to judge between people regarding what they differed about” (al-Baqarah: 213). And He says: “If you dispute about something, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day” (al-Nisa: 59).

Here is the continuation and conclusion of the translation, preserving the accuracy and the footnotes in round brackets next to their respective parts:

All of this applies even if someone were to claim necessary, rational knowledge of the opposite of what the others claimed.

But how is it, when no one even claims this, and no one would dare to claim it unless they opposed their own companions and fell into blatant sophistry, denial, and falsehood? (Sophistry was defined earlier on p. 38.) Undoubtedly, the door to lies and fabrications is not closed, so it is possible that some people may let their belief, assumption, desire, or aim, or all of them, drive them to claim such knowledge.

If he says, “What I meant by ‘pure reason does not reject it’ is that it does not know its impossibility,” then this, even if true, does not harm the opponent. Because if the opponent says: “I know by necessity that the existence of a being that is neither inside nor outside the world is impossible,” and you do not know the impossibility of a case that would entail the possibility of such a being, then your lack of knowledge about the impossibility of that case does not undermine the knowledge that the thing itself is impossible.

For if we know that something is impossible, and something else would entail its possibility, and we do not know whether that entailment is itself impossible, then our ignorance of the impossibility of what entails the impossible does not prove that the impossible is possible, nor does it prevent knowledge of its impossibility. And it was already mentioned earlier that even if someone says, “I do not know that it is impossible,” this would still not count as a refutation.

How much worse, then, if he says, in what he claims to prove possibility, “I know this division is impossible.” In that case, not knowing the impossibility of that division does not imply not knowing the impossibility of being free of both categories, for 1 is not the other, even if they are logically connected.

The seventh point: One may say: “I do not accept that pure reason does not reject this division, once its meaning is clarified and the confusion is removed.” This is because “space” (al-hayyiz) may refer to something existent and separate from the being that is in it, or to something not separate from the being and not requiring another existent.

The spatiality of the world and other bodies does not require the existence of something other than the body. In general: if by “spatial” you mean something that requires the existence of something else, then we do not dispute your division, for reason knows that some beings can be in a space separate from them, and some cannot. But this does not affect the issue. The opponent only claimed necessary knowledge that a being cannot be neither inside nor outside the world. He did not mention spatiality.

And if by “spatial” (al-mutaḥayyiz) you mean only physical bodies and not accidents, then we know that existents include bodies and the attributes that exist in them, though this is disputed. Some people say: “There is nothing that exists except for bodies.” That is part of the dispute. So they say: “I do not accept that pure reason does not reject dividing beings into spatial and non-spatial.”

But the point is not just about these people. Rather, we speak in general terms, since there is no need to rely on those positions. So if someone means by “being in space” that a being is either spatial by itself or by something else (as an attribute), and does not define space as something existent and separate from it, then the opponent will not accept that pure reason does not reject dividing beings into those that are in space and those that are not, not in the sense that reason knows such division is possible in reality (as explained earlier), nor that reason is unaware of its impossibility.

Rather, we say: pure reason knows that it is impossible. This is what the people of sound reason from among the imams of Islam and their scholars explicitly said, that reason rules this out. And no one of sound reason is ever presented with this claim except that he rejects and denies it, once he understands what is meant.

But as for those who do not reject it, their minds have not properly evaluated it using sound reason. For what is meant by sound reason is reason that is pure and free from desire or ignorance. Many people hear these common philosophical terms, such as space, spatiality, body, substance, accident, attributes, and so on, which contain ambiguities and multiple meanings that lead to disputes even among rational people. So much of the reflection on the meaning of these terms does not involve sound, pure reason that is free of confusion and ambiguity. (Ibn Taymiyyah discusses these ambiguous and vague terms at length in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ, vol. 1, pp. 208–310, and shows the view of Ahl al-Sunnah and how these terms cause confusion by mixing truth with falsehood.)

And some people have become so used to saying something, and have adopted it from someone they revere in their heart, like saying that Allah is not in a direction, or that He is not spatial, or not a body or a substance, or that He is a body or a substance, that this blind following prevents their minds from being truly sound. (This is the path followed by most mutakallimūn in denying these things about Allah, it is rooted in blind imitation and habits, as is clear from their books. Sometimes it comes from dispute with their opponents, as they claim, and is driven by desire or partisanship. Their opponents might be Ahl al-Sunnah themselves.)

As Allah said: “When it is said to them, ‘Follow what Allah has revealed,’ they say, ‘Rather, we follow what we found our fathers doing.’ Even if their fathers understood nothing and were not guided?” (al-Baqarah: 170).

And He said: “If you obey most of those on the earth, they will lead you astray from the way of Allah. They follow only assumption, and they do nothing but guess” (al-An‘am: 116). And He said: “Do you think that most of them hear or understand? They are only like cattle, no, they are even further astray from the path” (al-Furqan: 44). So sound reason is rare among humanity. But its sign is that it follows what the messengers brought from Allah, for sound reason never contradicts revelation.

If someone were to be alone with his sound reason, he would find faith. That is why the people of the Fire say: “If only we had listened or used our reason, we would not have been among the people of the blazing Fire” (al-Mulk: 10).

So they said that either of those 2, listening or using reason, would have protected them from punishment. And Allah said: “Have they not travelled in the land so that they might have hearts by which to reason, or ears with which to hear? For indeed, it is not the eyes that go blind, but the hearts in the chests that go blind” (al-Hajj: 46).

(Ahl al-Sunnah’s affirmation: The issue of body, substance, and so on was discussed by many mutakallimūn, like ar-Razi, whom the author is refuting. In Asas al-Taqdis, pp. 46–47, ar-Razi has sections: “Third issue: It is impossible for God to be a body,” “Fourth: It is impossible for Him to be a substance,” “Fifth: It is impossible for Him to be in a place…” In al-Muḥaṣṣal, p. 155: “He is not spatial.” P. 157: “He is not in any direction.” Also see al-Irshad by al-Juwayni, pp. 42–46, and al-Ghunyah fi Usul al-Din by al-Naysaburi, p. 85–86.)

Those with the most sound reason have the strongest faith and certainty in what the messengers brought. They are also the most knowledgeable. Allah said: “Those who were given knowledge see that what has been revealed to you from your Lord is the truth, and it guides to the path of the Exalted in Might, the Praiseworthy” (Saba: 6). And sound reason leads to unity, for truth does not contradict itself.

This is why what comes from Allah is all consistent: “A book whose verses resemble each other, repeated often” (al-Zumar: 23). And He said about anything not from Him: “Had it been from other than Allah, they would have found in it much contradiction” (al-Nisa: 82). And He said: “You think they are united, but their hearts are divided, because they are a people who do not reason” (al-Hashr: 14).

So He made it clear that their division comes from a lack of reason. And it is well known that these mutakallimūn, philosophers, and others are among the most divided of all people. Regarding the meanings of body, substance, spatiality, accidents, and their rulings, affirming or denying, they have such confusion that only Allah knows its extent. So where is the sound reason among them?

What they have is a claim to reason. But between the claim to possess perfect attributes and actually having them is a wide gulf. How many have falsely claimed to be sons of God or saints, while being among the worst of liars! And anyone who leaves the Sharia must lie and fabricate in his claim.

Among them are those who claimed prophethood, like Musaylima (Musaylima ibn Thumama ibn Kabir, of the tribe of Hanifa, born in al-Yamamah. He came to the Prophet with his tribe’s delegation after the conquest of Makkah. The delegation converted but he remained outside. He later wrote claiming prophethood. Killed in 12 AH. See: Tarikh al-Tabari, 3/137–147; Shadharat al-Dhahab, 1/23; al-Kamil by Ibn al-Athir, 2/243ff), al-‘Ansi (Aswad al-‘Ansi of Yemen, a magician and one of the first apostates. Killed in 11 AH by Fayruz. See Tarikh al-Tabari, 2/273–240; al-A‘lam, 5/111), and al-Thaqafi (al-Mukhtar ibn Abi ‘Ubayd al-Thaqafi, claimed prophethood and divine inspiration. Killed in 67 AH. See Tarikh al-Tabari, 5/569–582 and 6/1169–1193; al-A‘lam, 7/192)).

And others who claimed sainthood and that they were Allah’s chosen, like the atheists among the Qaramita, the Batiniyya (Batiniyya: named because they say that every text has an outer and an inner meaning, and every revelation has an interpretation. See al-Shahrastani in al-Milal, 1/192), the Rafidah, the Ittihadiyyah (pantheists, definition was given earlier), and their likes. Some of them are hypocrites, some are open sinners, and some are major innovators.

The same goes for those who claim sound reason, understanding of rational matters, proper reasoning, conclusive proofs, and perfectly balanced logic, but in many of their matters, they are the farthest people from reason and rationality. All of this is just giving names to things that are not what the names imply. As Allah said: “These are nothing but names you have named, you and your forefathers, for which Allah has sent down no authority” (al-Najm: 23).

Since this is the case, the objectors say: sound reason prevents a being from existing alongside other things, while being neither inside them nor outside, or neither separate nor joined, or being self-subsisting yet not separated by direction. These concepts can be expressed in many ways. And the imams of Islam have always affirmed that reason prevents the existence of such a thing.

Here is the continuation of the translation from the eighth point as requested:

The eighth point: If one says that Allah is “outside the world,” then this must mean 1 of 2 things: either that this entails He exists within space (ḥayyiz), or it does not entail that.

If it does not entail that He is within space, then it is possible to say: “He is outside the world and not spatial (mutaḥayyiz).” In that case, knowing that every existent must be either inside the world or outside it does not contradict knowing that a being may or may not be in space. So the claim that every existent must be either in space or not, if it does not contradict the other claim, is not a refutation of the first.

Rather, the statement of the earlier group, that every being must be either inside another or outside it, remains valid. And that entails that the Creator must be either inside the world or outside it, which is exactly what they were aiming for. And even if He is not “within space,” that still does not negate their intended conclusion. This is what is said by those who affirm that He is “above the Throne” (fawq al-ʿarsh), distinct (mubāyin) from the world, but not a body (jism).

This is the meaning of their saying: “Space (al-hayyiz) is the estimation of place” (Meaning: some theologians define ‘space’ not as something real that exists externally, but as a conceptual estimation the mind uses to imagine where things are placed), and likewise, the mind imagines that these times (azmān) are surrounded by an eternal duration (dahr) that encompasses them, and imagines within it succession (ta‘āqub) like the succession of times. This estimation of eternal duration is made even in the absence of these temporal things.

The point here is not to discuss whether this eternal duration and this space (hayyiz) are real existents (as some people say), or whether they are only mental constructs that have no real existence outside the mind (which is the view of the majority) (That is: the majority of scholars say that hayyiz and dahr are not ontologically real things outside the mind, they are abstractions or mental concepts, not substances or beings). The point is only to compare 1 of them to the other.

And it is already known that there must exist a necessary being (wājib al-wujūd), and this cannot be disputed. That is Allah, there is no god but Him, the Creator of all things. And there is no doubt that He has always existed, and that it is impossible for Him not to exist. For necessary existence negates the possibility of nonexistence, let alone the occurrence of nonexistence.

There is no disagreement, even among those who say that the world was created in time, or those who say it is eternal and necessarily proceeds from God, that the world is dependent upon Him, in need of Him, and that He is prior to it in rank, superiority, and essence (This includes the philosophers who claim that the world is eternal in its dependence on God. Even they affirm that the world depends on God and follows from Him by necessity, and thus He is prior to it in status, causality, and being).

These people also say: “The world is created (muḥdath),” and by this they mean that it exists through the Creator, that it is necessary because of Him, and that it depends on Him. They do not require that the created thing be preceded by nonexistence and then brought into being.

However, in the usage of language, as is recognised both among theologians and others, “created” (muḥdath) usually refers to something that was not and then came to be. In fact, this linguistic usage is more specific than the technical usage of “created” among the theologians. For in language, “created” and “originated” (muḥdath and ḥadath) are opposites of “eternal” and “pre-existent” (qadīm and mutaqaddim).

Bayan Talbis Al Jahmiyyah (5/132-170)