The term Ḥulūl al-Ḥawādith is one of those broad expressions that can have different meanings, some of which are clearly problematic, while others are not objectionable at all. In this discussion, we will examine the Atharī-Taymiyyan understanding of Ḥulūl al-Ḥawādith and refute the misleading claims made against Ibn Taymiyyah regarding his belief on this matter.
Qiyam Al Af’al Wa Al Hawadith.
Allah’s actions are created separated within His Jawhar (essence), and this is heretical and negated. For example, Allah says: “ثم استوى على العرش meaning that He wasn’t a mustawiyy on the ‘arsh then became a mustawiyy, is that action created?
Absolutely not! It’s referring to Allah bidhatihi, unless if you somehow say that they are inextricably tied, which would be heretical as per the ash’ariyyah and kulabiyyah and ahlus sunnah. The person who stated this from the jumhoor of the hanabilah is Qadi Abi Ya’la.
Qiyam Al Hawadith: The fi’l of Allah is mutajadid, Allah does it whenever He wants, and can stop whenever He wants, it does not entail a change within His essence. If by “accidents” you are referring to “contingent attributes”, then Allah has accidents, and whoever denies that Allah has uncreated contingent attributes is denying the Quran/Sunnah (because we know from the Quran/Sunnah that Allah truly possesses real freely-willed actions, and we know that it is impossible for an Uncreated Being’s actions to be created). However, if by “accidents” you mean “non-volitional contingent attributes”, then Allah does not have accidents; Examples of accidents in this sense would be fleshiness, humanity, animality, ruddiness, hairiness, fatherhood, youthfulness, etc. And none of these are befitting of Allah according to the consensus of the Muslims. All of Allah’s contingent attributes are freely-willed (volitional) actions, and freely-willed actions are NOT accidents in this sense.
The view of Ahlus Sunnah is that we affirm qiyam al hawadith, and this does not entail a change within the Jawhar of Allah. Take this for example: A boy talks, his actions are created, his voice is created, he is created, but his speech is not separate from him, the boy did not speak words which are extrinsic from him, but rather intrinsic from him. Apply this to God, God’s actions are uncreated, His voice is uncreated, He is uncreated, and His speech is not separate from Him, as Allah says that He spoke to Musa a.s directly, and how could Allah create a voice if that created voice said “O Musa I am your Lord”, this is putting a sharik beside Allah. A question comes to mind, did Musa a.s think it was truly the uncreated voice of Allah, or was it the created voice of Allah?
What does it mean when we say the fi’l of Allah is Qadeem? Some of the hanabilah after the 4th century, did not use the word ‘haadith’ because they defined it differently, and this is only a semantical difference. They said this is not a haadith because it subsisted within Allah’s knowledge eternally, and it’s a fi’l ikhtiyariyy when Allah does it, but it is not muhdath in the sense that it is created.
يقول شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية: ” وأصحاب هذا القول قد يقولون: إن كلامه قديم، وأنه ليس بحادث ولا محدث، فيريدون نوع الكلام، إذ لم يزل يتكلم إذا شاء، وإن كان الكلام العيني يتكلم به إذا شاء، ومن قال: ليست تحل ذاته الحوادث، فقد يريد به هذا المعنى، بناء على أنه لم يحدث نوع الكلام في كيفية ذاته. وقال أبو عبد الله بن حامد في أصوله ومما يجب الإيمان به والتصديق أن الله يتكلم، وأن كلامه قديم، وأنه لم يزل متكلما في كل أوقاته، بذلك موصوفا، وكلامه قديم غير محدث. كالعلم والقدرة . و مراد ابن تيمية أن بعض أهل الحديث يقول بأن كلام الله قديم، أو لا تحله الحوادث، ولا يريدون نفي الفعل الاختياري بالضرورة، والخلاف معهم لفظي
This semantical difference is minor, and we both generally agree, there’s no issue with this between ahlus sunnah, we just defined it in this fashion due to the mutakalimeen misunderstandings, so we use their own istilahat. Allah speaks, willingly, and ikhtiyari, and His speaking is qadeem, and He is quiet whenever He wants, and He speaks whenever He wants, and this is is not an accident in the non-volitional contingent attributes sense.
Evidence From The Quran That Allah’s Actions Are Emergent
The Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs argue that the Taymiyyan view of Ḥulūl al-Ḥawādith means that new occurrences emerge within Allah’s essence and exist within Him in a temporal manner. In other words, they claim that Ibn Taymiyyah believed that changes occur in Allah’s essence, which would mean that Allah is subject to transformation. According to them, something that is necessary by itself (wājib bidh-dhāt) but undergoes change is no longer truly necessary, since it would be dependent on something else.
This claim is either a deliberate misrepresentation of Ibn Taymiyyah’s belief or a severe misunderstanding of his theology and his view on Allah’s attributes. The belief that Allah acts at certain points of time does not stem from Ibn Taymiyyah, rather we find it all over the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and affirmed in meaning by the salaf. First I will be breaking down the arguments agaisnt hulul al hawadith that Shayk Al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and the responses he gives from Dar at-Ta’arud al-‘Aql wan-Naql and other places where Ibn Taymiyyah delves into hulul al hawadith. From there I will showcase the Qur’an verses, ahadith and statements from the scholars that prove Allah acts temporally.
Al-Āmidī’s argument
The ashari scholar here says if new events were to exist within Allah’s essence, their cause must either be Allah’s essence itself or something external to it.
- If the cause is Allah’s essence, then the events must exist eternally because Allah’s essence is eternal. This contradicts their being new (ḥādith), as they would have to be eternal as well.
- If the cause is external, then this external cause must either be:
- Created by Allah, which leads to circular reasoning (dawr). The external cause would itself be an event requiring a cause, leading to an infinite regress.
- Not created by Allah, which would mean that there exists another independent necessary being that grants Allah His attributes. This would make that external entity more deserving of being God, which is impossible in Islamic theology.
According to al-Āmidī, occuring events subsiting in Allah’s essence results in us believing in logical impossibilities and contradictions.
Al-Āmidī also says If Allah has occurences within himself, then He must intend (qaṣd) where those attributes occur. Since they occur within his own essence, this would mean that he is directing his will towards Himself, implying that He is in a spatial location, which is impossible.
Al Amidi says if some events can occur within Allah, then any event should be possible, which is unacceptable.
Ibn Taymiyyah’s Response
Ibn Taymiyyah says al-Āmidī’s argument comes from philosophers like Ibn Sīnā, who believed that nothing new can come from Allah after an eternity of no change. This principle is used not only to deny events within Allah but also to deny all forms of divine action that result in new things, whether internal or external.
The Logical Circularity of al-Āmidī’s Argument
- Al-Āmidī’s reasoning assumes its own conclusion. He claims that new events cannot exist within Allah because their cause must either be eternal or created. However, this reasoning itself relies on denying new events within Allah, making it a case of circular logic.
Comparison Between Internal and External Events
- Al-Āmidī accepts that Allah creates external events (such as the creation of the universe) but denies that events can occur within Allah’s essence. Ibn Taymiyyah says that this distinction is arbitrary. If Allah’s eternal will and power can bring about events outside of Him, why can they not also bring about events within Him? If one is possible, so is the other.
Refutation of the Philosophical Assumption Against Infinite Events
An infinite sequence of events is impossible. The assumption that all events must have a first cause contradicts the idea of an eternal God who continuously acts. If infinite past events are impossible, then the philosophers’ own belief in the eternity of celestial motions is also invalid.
Alternative Explanation of Causality in Divine Action
- Causality does not work the way Al-Āmidī assumes. If new events are eternally linked to Allah’s will, then they do not need an external cause distinct from Him. Rather, Allah’s continuous will and power can produce new effects without requiring an independent cause.
Al-Āmidī’s Argument Against the Karrāmiyya Also Affects the Philosophers
- Ibn Taymiyyah argues that if Al-Āmidī’s reasoning were correct, it would also refute the philosophers’ own claim that Allah produces eternal celestial motions. Both views rely on continuous divine action, so if one is invalid, the other must be as well.
Ibn Taymiyyah Refuting the Claim That an External Cause Would Be More Deserving of Divinity
Al-Āmidī argues that if the cause of new events within Allah is external and not created by Him, it would imply that this external cause grants Allah His attributes, making it more deserving of divinity. Ibn Taymiyyah responds:
This Argument Is False on Islamic Grounds but Not Necessarily on Philosophical Grounds
While this conclusion is clearly false according to Muslims and adherents of revealed religions, Ibn Taymiyyah points out that within the philosophical framework of al-Āmidī’s argument, it does not necessarily follow. If an entity exists necessarily by itself (wājib al-wujūd bidh-dhāt), it does not mean that nothing can depend on it or that it cannot interact with something else. A being that exists necessarily could still have relationships with other entities without those entities being more fundamental or “more divine.”
Philosophers and The Mutakallimūn Have Contradictory Positions
- Al-Āmidī’s argument depends on the assumption that there cannot be two necessarily existing entities. However, philosophers like Aristotle and others already assume multiple eternal entities, such as the celestial spheres. The philosophers often argue that the celestial spheres are eternal and necessarily exist, yet they still accept that these spheres undergo continuous changes and motions. This contradicts their argument that the necessarily existing being (Allah) cannot go through change or new events.
The Problem of Causality in Their Model
If they claim that a necessary being cannot have new events occur within it, how do they explain the constant motion and renewal of events within the celestial spheres, which they claim are eternal? If celestial spheres can undergo change and motion despite being eternal, why can’t Allah initiate new events within Himself?
If they argue that the celestial spheres are created, they must explain what caused them to begin. If they say they were caused by something else, then that cause itself needs another cause, leading to an infinite regress. If they attempt to avoid this by saying the celestial spheres exist by necessity but still change, then their own argument against divine events collapses.
They claim that Allah is an “eternal cause” that does not change, yet at some point, this “unchanging cause” produces effects in time (such as the universe). But if the cause is truly timeless and unchanging, how does it suddenly create something new?
If they admit that a timeless cause can lead to new effects, then there is no reason why Allah cannot have new events within Himself.
Philosophers and some mutakallimūn already admit that relationships (like before and after) and negations (like something ceasing to exist) are not eternal but change over time. If their logic about occruing events were correct, these changes should also be impossible. But since they clearly do happen, their reasoning is flawed.
They argue that if something new happens, it must have a cause, and that cause must be either Allah’s essence or something external. Ibn Taymiyyah points out that this same reasoning would apply to things like time, space, and relationships, all of which change without their essential nature being compromised. If these changes are possible, then so too is the possibility that Allah can bring about new events within Himself without contradiction.
Al-Āmidī argues that if Allah “intends” an event to happen within Himself, He must be in a spatial location relative to Himself. Ibn Taymiyyah responds that this is a misunderstanding of what it means to “intend” something. Humans “intend” actions within themselves, such as thoughts and emotions, yet they do not occupy a physical space relative to themselves…!
This Argument would Also Prove That Allah Is in a direction from creation, if intending something means being in a spatial location relative to it, then when Allah creates new things in the universe, He would have to be in a spatial direction from them. Since they already reject this conclusion, their reasoning must be flawed. If the presence of new events in something means it must be in a spatial location, then humans themselves would have to be in a “direction” from their own thoughts and emotions. Since this is absurd, the same applies to their argument about Allah.
Conclusion of Ibn Taymiyyah’s Refutation of al-Āmidī
One of the biggest flaws in al-Āmidī’s argument is his assumption that every ḥādith (new event) must have a cause that is either within Allah’s essence or external to it. If it is within Allah’s essence, he claims that it must be eternal, contradicting its status as a ḥādith. If it is external, then it either depends on Allah—leading to dawr (circular causation)—or it is independent, making it wājib al-wujūd (necessarily existent) and thus more deserving of divinity. Ibn Taymiyyah exposes the circularity in this reasoning, showing that it falsely assumes its own conclusion and arbitrarily limits Allah’s ability to initiate new events.
Ibn Taymiyyah refutes the falāsifah (philosophers), such as Ibn Sīnā, who argue that an eternal cause can only produce eternal effects. He demonstrates that if this principle were applied consistently, it would invalidate their own belief in the eternity of the universe, since they accept continuous ḥawādith (new events) within it. If the celestial spheres, which they claim are eternal, can undergo motion and change, then why can Allah not bring about new events within Himself? This contradiction undermines their claim that al-wājib al-wujūd (the necessary being) cannot have new occurrences.
Al-Āmidī also argues that if Allah intends (qaṣd) for new events within Himself, this would necessitate Him being in a jihah (spatial direction), which he considers impossible. Ibn Taymiyyah refutes this by clarifying that qaṣd does not require spatial directionality. A person can intend something within themselves without being in a “direction” relative to it, and the same applies to Allah in an even more perfect manner. If al-Āmidī’s claim is true, it would also imply that Allah must be in a direction from creation whenever He creates something, which even al-Āmidī rejects…
Ibn Taymiyyah points out that Al-Āmidī’s argument is built on two contradictory premises: that one can only intend something that exists in a jihah, and that Allah cannot be in a jihah. If the first premise is true, then Allah must be in a jihah, contradicting the second premise. If the first premise is false, then the entire argument collapses. Either way, al-Āmidī’s reasoning is invalid.
Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah challenges the falāsifah who claim that Allah is an ʿillah tammah (a fully sufficient cause) yet argue that He only produces effects through wasā’iṭ (intermediaries). He points out that if an ʿillah tammah necessarily produces its effects eternally, then change within the universe should be impossible. Since change clearly exists, this demonstrates that new events can be initiated without undermining Allah’s perfection.
To put it short Ibn Taymiyyah refutes Al-Āmidī’ and exposes the logical contradictions and inconsistencies in philosophy he falls into, and affirming that Allah’s qudrah (power) and mashī’ah (will) are not subject to the criteria imposed by philosophers and mutakallimūn.
Allah, as al-Fāʿil al-Mukhtār (the free and willing agent), continuously acts without this implying deficiency or imperfection.
Ibn Taymiyyah in Al Radd Ala Al Mantiqiyyīn speaks on ascribing originated attributes and actions to Allah
Likewise the mutakallimūn’s approach of proving the impossibility of ascribing the attributes of time that occur in time to the Creator does is of no use to the philosophers for those mutakallimun (theologians) have denied this on the basis of the impossibility of that which occurs in time to that which is from before endless time; but those philosophers permit adjunction of the in-time occurrence to that which is from before endless time. Moreover, among mutakallimun who permit the ascription of the attributes to the Creator are those who permit ascription of in-time occurrences to Him like many of their leading figures from earlier and later times such as Abu al-Barakat and others. Those two statements of theirs are well known. As for the third statement, ascribing to Allah the attributes without the actions I am not aware of any of them who claim this, and even if some of them have claimed this then discussion with them is like the discussion of those from among the people of kalam who claim this on this basis it does not necessarily entail an endless succession [of occurrences), or if it does necessarily entail this then it is an endless succession with respects to effects that is the existence of one word after another or one action after another and this dispute surrounding this is well known.
Its rejection is known from the Jahmis, the Qadariyya and those from among the Kullaybiyah and Karramiyyah who agree with them and those who agree with them from among the pseudo fuqaha, As for the Imams of the Salaf and the Imams of the Sunnah, they do not prohibit this, indeed they permit it or rather they deem it obligatory and say Allah still speaks if He will; indeed they say: He is still acting actions done by choice [and free will] existing by His will and power. What is meant here is that his being “the acting [agent]” necessarily entails the ascription of the attributes to Him – for “the action” is an existential matter and “that He acts” is one of the divisions of existence and the existence of something created, acted upon without “[the act] of creating” or “action” is impossible; and if it exists by way of “[the act] of creating” then “knowledge” and “power” are concomitant with “[the act] of creating” – and the ascription of both to Him is all the more likely.
If those mutakallimun claim that Allah being the Creator necessarily requires “that which made [or done: which is acted upon]” but not “the attribute” – given that the requisite is dependent upon the prerequisite then this is one of the greatest of contradictions. If they claim that it [the act of creation] does not necessarily require it [the created thing] then this is all the more proof of the invalidity of their claim regarding the attributes and the actions. And the proof indicates the ascription of “the actions” and “the attributes” to Him -and the ascription of the attributes to Him is more likely than the ascription of “the actions” to Him – so the means by which they reject “the attributes” which they “composition” are invalidated. Furthermore as for “the one” about which they say “only one issues from one” – it being the one deprived of all the attributes, indeed it being the existence which is restricted by every [possible] negation, this has no reality to it, existing as it does only in the mind; and if one were to suppose any existent reality which has been created then it would be more perfect than this fanciful thinking which has no reality corresponding to it in the outward. Indeed veneration of the One God emanates from the belief that He is the Lord of the worlds and that He is “Necessary of Existence” and the like of this of His attributes which manifest His perfection
Ar-Radd ‘ala al-Mantiqiyyin, Refutation of the Greek Logicians Pg 199-201
Ibn Taymiyyah says that Allah has always been speaking whenever He wills and that He repeats His speech and that most of Ahl al-Sunnah and the people of Hadith affirm this too like al-Sulamī, Abū ‘Uthmān al-Naysābūrī, Ibn Mandah.
Translation: It is established that Allah, the Exalted, has always been speaking whenever He wills, and that He speaks with the same speech repeatedly. He had followers like Abū ‘Alī al-Thaqafi and others who received the țarīqah of Ibn Kullāb. Some of the Mu’tazilah rose up and revealed to Ibn Khuzaymah the secret of the statement of these individuals, which is that Allah cannot be described as being able to speak whenever He wills, nor does that relate to His mashi’ah (will). Thus, a dispute arose between Ibn Khuzaymah and others regarding this matter until they expressed their agreement with him on what there was no dispute about, and they ordered the authorities to discipline those who opposed him.
People became divided; the majority of the Ahl al-Sunnah and the people of Hadith were with him, as well as those who agreed with the țarīqah of Ibn Kullab, such that after him, al-Sulami, Abū ‘Uthman al-Naysābūrī, and others were with him, as well as Yahyā ibn ‘Ammār al-Sijistānī (d. 422 AH), Abū ‘Abdillah Ibn Mandah (d. 395 АН), Abū Nasr al-Sijzī (d. 444 AH), Shaykh al-Islām Abū Ismā’īl al-Anṣārī (d. 481 AH), Abū al-Qāsim Sa’d ibn ‘Alī al-Zanjānī (d. 471 AH), Abū Dharr al-Harawi (d. 434 AH), and Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458 AH) and another group, they are with Ibn Kullāb.
Dar at-Ta’arud al-‘Aql wan-Naql – Ibn Taymiyyah (2/9-10)
The famous ḥadīth in the Ṣaḥīḥayn mentions that Allāh descends in the latter part of the night and says, “Who is invoking Me so that I may answer him?” It is clear that Allāh’s act of descent is temporal as well as His speaking, since both are done in a specific time period.
Translation: In Sahih Al Bukhari and Sahih Muslim there is the hadith of al-nuzul: “Our Lord descends every night when the last third of the night remains, and He says: ‘Who is calling upon Me so that I may respond to him? Who is asking Me so that I may give him? Who is seeking My forgiveness so that I may forgive him?” This is a statement and an action that occurs at a specific time The salaf unanimously agreed that al-nuzul is an action (fi’l) performed by the Lord as stated by al-Awza’i (d. 157 AH), Hammad ibn Zayd (d. 179 AH), al-Fudayl ibn ‘lyad (d. 187 AH), Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241 AH), and others.
Majmu Al Fatawa by Ibn Taymiyyah (6/234-235)
Quran Verses That Prove Occuring Events For Allah
And when Mūsā came at Our appointed time, and his Lord spoke to him…” (Al-A‘rāf 7:143)
- “كَلَّمَهُ رَبُّهُ” (his Lord spoke to him) uses the past tense, indicating that Allah spoke at that moment, not eternally. If Allah’s speech were eternal and unchanging, it would not be linked to Mūsā’s arrival.
And when My servants ask you concerning Me, indeed I am near. I respond to the supplication of the caller when he calls upon Me.” (Al-Baqarah 2:186)
The verb “أُجِيبُ” (I respond) is in the present tense, showing that Allah responds at the moment of the supplication, not that His response was eternally fixed. This also proves that Allah acts when people pray, affirming ḥulūl al-ḥawādith.
“All it takes, when He wills something ˹to be˺, is simply to say to it: “Be!” And it is!..” (Ya-Sin 36:82)
- “إِذَا” (idhā) is a conditional particle that also proves occurence of events.
- إِذَ اتَقْتَضِي الْحُدُوثَ فِي الزَّمَانِ (Idhā necessitates the occurrence of something in time.)
This also proves that Allah wills something at a particular moment, proving that His will is executed in time. For those that argue against ḥulūl al-ḥawādith, would have to concede to Allah either constantly saying Be, or an infinite regress of Allah creating the word be and using it to command, or they can concede to Allah acting temporally.
“Every day He is engaged in a matter.” (Ar-Raḥmān 55:29)
- “كُلَّ يَوْمٍ” (kulla yawmin) – Adverb of time (ẓarf dhamān), means the action occurs repeatedly at different times, not eternally.
- “هُوَ” (huwa) – Is a subject pronoun that shows Allah himself is engaging in occuring matters. This one is key because Imam Al Bukhari used this to prove Allah acts temporally, and his occuring acts are not like ours.
Translation: Every day He is in a matter.” (Qur’an, Surah Ar-Rahman 55:29) And no reminder from their Lord comes to them, newly revealed…” (Qur’an, Surah Al-Anbiya 21:2) It may be that Allah will bring about after that a matter.” (Surah At-Talaq 65:1) And His hadath (occurrence) does not resemble the hadath of makhluqeen (created beings), as His saying, Ta’ala: ‘There is nothing like Him, and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing.” (Surah Ash-Shura 42:11) Ibn Mas’ud radiyallahu ‘anhu, narrated from the Prophet: Indeed, Allah yuhdith (brings about) from His amr (matter) whatever He wills, and indeed among what He ahdatha (brought about) is that you no longer speak in salah.
Sahih Al Bukhari (9/406)
These three ahadith clearly prove Allah acts temporally. On the day of Judgement he becomes angrier than he ever has been, he calls Jibreel whenever he loves a servant and tells him he loves so and so, Allah also responds to each ayah of Surah Fatiha we recite in salah. The Prophet explicitly quotes Allah saying “On this morning some of my slaves remained as true believers and some became non-believers”. The evidences for ḥulūl al-ḥawādith cannot be any clearer here.
Imam Al Bukhari says that an action (fi’l) is the initiation of something, while that which is acted upon (maf’ul) is the occurrence of the act. He supports this with the verse about the creation of the heavens and the earth, showing that they are the maf’ul, meaning everything besides Allah, along with its attributes, is maf’ul. The heavens exist only because of Allah’s act of creation, as nothing can come into being without his action. His action is from His rubūbiyyah, as seen in his command “Be, and it is.”
Translation: Abū ‘Abdillah (Imam Al Bukhari) said: As for the fi’l (action) in relation to the maf’ul (that which is acted upon), the fi’l is merely the initiation of something, and the maf’ul is the occurrence (hadath). This is based on His saying: “Khalq al-Samawat wa al-Ard” (the creation of the heavens and the earth) [Al-Kahf: 51]; thus, the heavens and the earth are the maf ül. Everything besides Allah, with its attributes, is maf ül. The creation of the heavens is His fi’l, because it is not possible for a heaven to exist on its own without the compelling act of the fa’il (doer). The heavens are attributed to Him due to the state of His action, and His action is from His rubūbiyyah (lordship) when He says: “Kun fa-yakūn” (Be, and it is). The “kun” (be) from Him is His attribute, and He is described by it; therefore, He said: “Rabbu al-Samawāt” (Lord of the heavens) and “Rabbu al-Ashyā” (Lord of all things). The Prophet said: “Rabbu Kull Shay’in wa Malikuhu” (The Lord of all things and its King).
Khalq Afaal Al Ibaad by Imam Al Bukhari Pg 297
Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani’s words show that he affirms real actions and attributes of Allah that involve change, such as speaking to Musa, coming on the Day of Judgement, taking and giving, being pleased and angry, and unfolding events by His will. Since these actions and attributes happen after not happening before, this proves ḥulūl al-ḥawādith. His speech, coming, taking, and giving are not eternal actions rather they happen according to His will.
Translation: What the ummah has agreed upon in matters of religion and in the sunnan, which going against is bidah and dalalah, is that Allah, blessed is His name, has the best names and the highest attributes. He has always had all His attributes and names.
He knows everything He created before it came to be, and He brought things into existence by His will. His saying: “His command, when He wills something, is only to say to it, ‘Be,’ and it is.” His speech is one of His attributes; it is not created so that it ends, and it is not an attribute of something created so that it ends. Allah, mighty and great, spoke to Musa by Himself and made him hear His speech, not speech that was in something else.
He hears and sees, takes and gives, and His two hands are outstretched. On the Day of Judgement, all the earth will be in His grip, and the heavens will be folded in His right hand. He will come on the Day of Judgement after He was not coming, and the angels will be in rows to present the nations, judge them, punish them, and reward them. He forgives whoever He wills from the sinners and punishes whoever He wills from them. He is pleased with those who obey Him and loves those who repent. He is angry with those who disbelieve in Him, and when He is angry, nothing can stand before His anger.
He is above His heavens on His throne, not on His earth. He is in every place with His knowledge. Allah, glorified and exalted, has a kursi, as He said, “His kursi extends over the heavens and the earth.”
Jami’ fi al-sunan wa-al-adab wa-al-maghazi by Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (d.386AH) Pg 107-108
Ibn Abī Ḥātim records in his tafsir that Qatadah ibn Di‘amah al-Sadusi (d. 117 AH) the well known mufassir and a muhaddith from Basrah whom frequenlty narrated from Anas Ibn Malik the sahabi, and Ikrimah Mawla Ibn Abbas (d. 105 AH) the freed slave of the great sahabi, Ibn Abbas said that Allah did the action of istawa on the seventh day, if it is the case that Allah’s acts are eternal then saying he did the act on the seventh day specifially refutes those who argue agaisnt occuring events.
Translation: 8576 – My father narrated to us, saying: Hisham bin Khalid narrated to us, Shu’ayb bin Ishaq narrated to us, from Ibn Abi ‘Urubah, from Qatadah regarding the saying of Allah, the Exalted: “Then He rose (istawā) over the Throne (al-‘Arsh).” He said: “On the seventh day.”
8577 – Yazid bin Sinan al-Basri, a resident of Egypt, narrated to us, Yazid bin Abi Hakim narrated to us, and al-Hakam bin A’ban narrated to me. He said: I heard ‘Ikrimah say: “Indeed, Allah began the creation (khalq) of the heavens (as-samāwāt) and the earth (al-ard) and what is between them on Sunday, and then He rose (istawā) over the Throne (al-‘Arsh) on Friday in three hours. In one of those hours, He created the suns (ash-shumus) so that people may turn to their Lord (Rabb) in dua, and in one of the hours He created the decay that befalls the children of Adam when they die, so they may be buried.”
Tafsir Ibn Abi Hatim (1/1497)
Ibn Jarir al-Tabari explains that Allah’s command “Be” (kun) is general for everything He decrees and creates. The creation of a thing happens at the exact moment He wills and commands it—neither before nor after. Nothing can exist unless He commands and wills it, and when He does, it must come into being.
Translation: The most correct opinion regarding the interpretation of His words: “And when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, ‘Be,’ and it is” is that it should be said: it is general in everything that Allah has decreed and managed, because the apparent meaning indicates generality. It is not permissible to turn the apparent meaning into ta’weel without proof, as we have explained in the book Kitab al-Bayan ‘an Usul al-Ahkam Since this is the case, Allah’s command to a thing, when He wills its creation, is for it to come into existence by His saying “Be” (kun) at the moment He, wills it to be created.
The existence of what He wills to create does not precede His will for it, nor His command for it to come into being, nor does it follow after. Thus, it is not possible for a thing to be commanded to exist, willed as such, except that it exists. Nor can it exist without being commanded and willed in that way. A similar example of His words: “And when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, ‘Be,’ and it is” is His saying: “And among His signs is that the heavens and the earth stand by His command. Then, when He calls you with a single call from the earth, behold, you will emerge” (Qur’an 30:25). Just as the people’s emergence from their graves neither precedes nor follows Allah’s call to them.
Tafsir At Tabari 2:117 (2/469-470)
I will now be extracting sources from brother Mahmud’s PDF on ḥulūl al-ḥawādith being proved from other scholars – https://ia600204.us.archive.org/8/items/ibn-taymiyyah-and-hulul-al-hawadith/Ibn%20Taymiyyah%20and%20%E1%B8%A4ul%C5%ABl%20al-%E1%B8%A4aw%C4%81dith.pdf
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Kinānī (Imām al-Shāfiʿī’s student) argued against interpreting al-istiwāʾ (rising) as al-istīlāʾ (subjugating) on the basis that Allāh’s rising over the Throne was done after the creation of the heavens. His subjugation of the Throne, however, was always present.
Translation: Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Yahya al-Kinani (d. 240 AH), the companion of Imam al-Shafi’i (d. 204 AH), may Allah have mercy on them both, authored a book refuting the Jahmiyyah. In it, he said: Chapter: The statement of the Jahmi regarding the verse: Ar-Rahman ‘ala al-‘arsh istawa” [Surah Taha 20:5]. The Jahmiyyah claimed that the meaning of istawa is istawla (to conquer), citing the expression of the Arabs: “So-and-so istawa over Misr” (he conquered it). He said: “It is said to him: Can there be a creation of Allah upon which you remain for a period, yet you are not sovereign over it?
If he says, ‘No,’ it is said to him: Whoever claims this is a kafir It is said to him: Then it is necessary for you to claim that there was a period during which the throne (al-‘arsh) was not under Allah’s sovereignty (istila’). This is because He informed us that He created the throne before the heavens and the earth, and then He istawa (rose) over it after creating them. Therefore, it is obligatory for you to claim that during the time before the creation of the heavens and the earth, when the throne was already there, Allah ta’ala was not sovereign over it.” Then he mentioned extensive speech affirming Allah’s elevation (al-‘uluww) and presenting proofs for it.
Ijtima’ al-juyūsh al-Islāmīyah by Ibn Al Qayyum Pg 219- 220
Imām Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī said, “If one asks, ‘Inform us of the istiwāʾ of Allāh above the heaven; was it before or after the heaven was created?’ It is said, ‘[…] Al-isitwāʾ was [enacted by Allāh] after He created the heaven as smoke but before He made them as seven heavens.’”
Shaykh al-Shāfiʿiyyah al-Zanjānī and Shaykh al-Islām Abū al-Qāsim al-Aṣbahānī both described the view of Ahl al-Sunnah in this regard as being that al-istiwāʾ was performed by Allāh after He created the heavens and the earth.
Translation: And the people of Ahl al-Sunnah say: Allah ta’ala created the heavens and His thronewas upon the water created before the creation of the heavens and the earth. Then He istawa over the throne after the creation of the heavens and the earth, as the text indicates. And its meaning is not mimasa (touching), but rather He is istawa over the throne in a manner that befits His Majesty (bila kayf), as He has informed us about Himself.
Ijtima’ al-juyūsh al-Islāmīyah by Ibn Al Qayyim Pg 181
Imām Abū Aḥmad al-Karjī al-Qaṣṣāb also clearly stated that Allāh spoke to Mūsā, peace and blessings be upon him, after having not spoken to Him. Imām al-Qaṣṣāb maintains nonetheless that Allāh’s speaking was uncreated.
Translation: And we do not deny that Allah ta’ala before calling Prophet Musa was not calling him, but when He called him with His speech and speech is one of His attributes, it is not permissible for it to be created.
Nukat Al Quran by Al Qaasab (d.360AH (2/521)
Ibn Taymiyyah talks about the distinction between the concepts of muhdath and mukhluq.
He talks about how the term muhdath wasn’t accepted in relation to the Qur’an by Ahl al-Sunnah. Imam Ahmad and other scholars rejected the use of the term muhdath for Allah’s speech because it may imply creation, and this was the argument of the Jahmiyyah as to why the Quran is created.
So whenever you may see quotes of the imams saying whoever says the quran is muhdath is a kaffir this is always in the context of meaning it’s created, they’re not denying that the quran was spoken by allah ﷻ at a point in time.
If this wasn’t the case then how do those who argue against allah’s speech being emergent explain Imam Al Bukhari affirming the Quran is muhdath explicitly?? Did he commit kufr?? Or do we have to understand why the imams said what they said and why they said it in regards to denying muhdath for Allah ﷻ.
Imām Yaḥyā al-Qayrawānī (Imām Mālik’s student) said that Allāh’s command “Be” precedes the creation which He creates by it. Such a comment would be senseless to make unless one is clarifying that Allāh speaks this command before—and not after—the intended creation.
Imām al-Ṭabarī said, “When He wills to create, the command of Allāh ‘Be’ is [said] in the moment of His will for it to exist. It doesn’t precede His will or command for it nor is it delayed [from His will or command].” This entails that Allāh’s command “Be” is issued temporally.
Imām al-Dārimī said the command “Be” is preceded by Allāh’s will (irādah), and Ibn Baṭṭah asserted the same. Something similar (although perhaps ambiguous) is even attributed to Imām Abū Ḥanīfah. These statements amount to affirming Allāh’s command has a temporal beginning.
Al-Ḥākim transmitted authentically that Ibn Khuzaymah said, “Some of these ignorants (the Kullābiyyah) claimed that Allāh does not repeat His Speech—they do not understand the Kalām of Allāh!” This demonstrates that Ibn Khuzaymah believed Allāh speaks sequentially.
Shaykh al-Islām Abū Ismāʿīl al-Harawī (d. 481) commented regarding Ibn Khuzaymah’s disputes with the Kullābiyyah, “So Imām Abu Bakr [Ibn Khuzaymah] entered into this dispute and did not cease exclaiming in its rebuttal; he wrote in its refutation like the warner of an army.”
“He [Ibn Khuzaymah] inscribed in the books, established in private, taught in the schools, and defended in the maḥārīb that Allāh is a Speaker [who] speaks if He wills and is silent if He wills.” He then asked Allāh to reward Ibn Khuzaymah, may Allāh have mercy on them both.
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned that scholars such as Abū ʿAbdillāh al-Ḥākim, Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī, Abū ʿUthmān al-Ṣābūnī, Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAmmār, Abū Naṣr al-Sijzī, Ibn Mandah, al-Zanjānī, and others agreed with Ibn Khuzaymah on this issue.
Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal famously said, “Allāh never ceases to be one who speaks whenever He so wills.”
Bukhari affirming hulul al hawadith.
When we say that Allah ﷻ descends, it does not mean that Allah’s act of descent is created. Imam Ad Daarimi used this line of training when it came to Allah’s speech, just because he speaks at certain points in time it doesn’t mean that his attribute of speech or the words he spoke are created. His words are uncreated because they come from his essence, his act of descending and ascending is not created because it’s an act with his essence.
Ibn Qutaydah (d.276 AH) distinguished between muhdath and makhluq.
