Summary

The Doctrine of Creation, Divine Action, and Temporal Succession

The reason for writing was the discovery of an anonymous book dealing with usul al din (the foundations of religion). Its author had mixed sound matters with confused arguments, transmitted positions without properly understanding them, and failed to follow the recognised principles of any established school. His writing showed both weakness in knowledge and a lack of careful verification.

Al Khalil ibn Ahmad divided people according to their knowledge into four kinds. The first knows and knows that he knows, so he is a scholar from whom knowledge should be taken. The second knows but does not realise that he knows, so he should be reminded. The third does not know but recognises his ignorance, so he should be taught. The fourth does not know and does not realise his ignorance, so he should be left until he becomes willing to learn. (Adab al Dunya wa al Din, page 75, by al Mawardi)

Ignorance is therefore either simple or compound. Simple ignorance is not knowing a matter. Compound ignorance is not knowing while also failing to recognise one’s own ignorance. The anonymous author was described as suffering from this second and more serious form.

The Sanctity of the Scholars

The anonymous author mentioned Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy upon him, but spoke of him in a manner unworthy of fair scholars. His words combined praise with criticism, acknowledgement with denial, and statements that contradicted one another.

Proper conduct must come before advanced study. Imam Abu Bakr Ibn Mujahid once advised a student:

“My son, observe the discipline of the soul before the discipline of study.”

The scholars must not be treated with contempt. Ibn Asakir warned:

“Know that the flesh of the scholars is poisoned, and Allah’s established practice of taking retribution against those who belittle them is known. Whoever releases his tongue against them with abuse will be afflicted by Allah, before his death, with the death of his heart.” (Tabyin Kadhib al Muftari, page 29, by Ibn Asakir)

Recognising the excellence of deserving people is itself a sign of excellence. A person does not remove his own faults by diminishing the virtues of others. The reply was therefore written to examine the anonymous author’s statements, defend Ibn Taymiyyah from false accusations, and explain the difficult principles upon which the dispute was built.

What Is Meant by the World

In the terminology of the mutakallimun (theologians), the world means every existent other than Allah Most High. Allah’s affirmed attributes are not regarded as something separate from Him, while negative attributes are not independently existing things.

In ordinary language, the world refers to a collection of contingent created beings. One may therefore speak of the upper world, the lower world, or the world of animals. Some scholars derived the word from ʿilm (knowledge), while others derived it from ʿalamah (a sign).

The world is muhdath (originated after nonexistence) and makhluq (created). It came into existence after it had not existed. This is the position of all Muslims, the followers of the revealed religions, and the early sages. (Copy B, folio 195; al Umariyyah, page 99)

The Philosophers and the Eternity of the World

Aristotle and those who followed him, including al Farabi, Ibn Sina, al Suhrawardi, and Thabit ibn Qurrah, held that the heavenly bodies were eternal in their essences and attributes. According to them, the heavens had always moved through an uninterrupted circular motion. Each individual motion was originated, but the type of motion had no first beginning.

They also held that the underlying matter of the elemental bodies was eternal, although every particular form and accident within that matter was originated. Every originated form was preceded by another without a beginning.

Although they described the world as contingent in itself, they considered it necessary in existence through its cause. They sometimes called it originated, but only in the sense that it depended upon a cause, not in the accepted sense that its existence was preceded by nonexistence.

Those who maintained the eternity of time were called the Dahriyyah. A pure Dahri denied the existence of the Creator, while another might affirm a Maker but still claim that time and the world had no beginning.

This doctrine is contrary to revelation and sound reason. The Qur’an, the teachings of Muhammad ﷺ, and what has been transmitted from the messengers establish decisively that Allah created the world and brought it into existence after it had not existed.

The Argument from Motion and Rest

The theologians developed several rational arguments for the origination of the world. The best known was based upon motion and rest.

They argued that a body cannot be free from motion or rest. If bodies were eternal, either their motion or their rest would also have to be eternal. Both alternatives were said to be impossible.

Eternal motion was considered impossible because every motion is preceded by another position or motion. Motion contains succession, while eternity without beginning was understood to exclude being preceded by anything.

Eternal rest was also considered impossible because an eternal state could not cease. If a body had always been at rest, it could never later begin moving.

However, Fakhr al Din al Razi, Sayf al Din al Amidi, and others objected that the argument confuses individual motions with the type of motion. Every individual motion may be preceded by another, while the type continues without a first member. There is no direct contradiction between each individual motion being originated and the succession of motions having no first beginning.

They also rejected the claim that a collection must possess every ruling belonging to its individual members. Every single person in a group may be black, so the group may be called black. However, every single unit among ten is not ten, even though the full collection is ten. The ruling of a whole does not always belong to each part.

The argument concerning rest also depended upon whether rest was an existing state or simply the absence of motion. If rest were only nonexistence, its cessation would not be impossible. The nonexistence of every originated thing precedes its existence, yet that nonexistence ends when the thing comes into being. (Copy B, folio 196; al Umariyyah, page 99)

The Argument from Correspondence

Another argument was called tatbiq (correspondence).

Suppose all past events extending backward from the present had no beginning. They would form one collection. All events extending backward from the time of the Flood would form a second collection. The first would be larger because it would contain the additional events between the Flood and the present.

If the two collections were aligned from their nearest ends, either both would continue without end, the smaller would end, or both would end. If both continued without end, the larger collection would appear equal to the smaller despite containing additional members. If the smaller ended, both collections would be finite.

The objectors answered that the two collections were not truly separate. The supposed additional events existed only between the present and the Flood. Beyond the Flood, the two collections referred to the same past events.

They also denied that two infinite collections must contain the same number of members. The multiples of five and the multiples of ten both continue without limit, even though the multiples of five are more numerous.

Al Qarafi added that correspondence cannot actually be completed. Drawing the shorter series into the longer would cause the shorter series to end within the longer. Moving the longer series toward the shorter one would require matching endless members one by one, a process that could never be completed. Placing one collection over the other as a whole would also fail to show where correspondence occurred in eternity without beginning. (Sharh al Arba’in fi Usul al Din, page 50, by al Qarafi)

The argument of correspondence therefore remained disputed, and its premises were not accepted by all people of rational investigation.

Allah Acts through Power, Will, and Choice

The Muslims and the followers of the revealed religions affirm that Allah Most High is Qadir (all powerful) and acts through iradah (will) and ikhtiyar (choice). He creates what He wills, when He wills, and in the manner He wills.

Aristotle and his followers instead maintained that effects proceed necessarily from Allah’s essence, just as light proceeds from the sun and heat proceeds from fire. They claimed that Allah produces effects necessarily, although with awareness.

The scholars declared this doctrine kufr (disbelief), because it denies that Allah acts freely through will and choice and because it necessarily entails the eternity of the world.

From this principle, the philosophers developed the claim that:

“Only one thing can proceed from one.”

They said that the Necessary Existent first produced a single intellect. Multiplicity later arose because that intellect possessed several conceptual relations. This explanation was rejected because mental considerations such as necessity and possibility possess no real causal power by which additional beings could proceed from them.

The Philosophers’ Main Argument

The principal philosophical argument for the eternity of the world was based upon the completeness of the cause.

If everything required for the production of the world existed eternally, they argued, the world must also have existed eternally. Otherwise, the effect would have failed to accompany its complete cause.

If everything required for the world did not exist eternally, an additional condition must have arisen. That condition would either arise without a cause, which would permit contingent things to exist without causes, or arise through another condition. The same question would then continue without end.

They also argued that selecting one particular time for creation rather than another would be tarjih bila murajjih (preference without a determining factor). If Allah’s relation to all times were equal, why would He create at one time rather than another?

The answer is that the necessary accompaniment of an effect applies only to a cause which produces by necessity. It does not apply to a voluntary agent who acts through will and choice.

Several answers were offered concerning the selection of a particular time. Some said that the time was selected because of a wisdom connected to it. Others said that the eternal will was connected to that time and that the nature of will is to specify one possible alternative over another.

The majority held that a voluntary agent may choose between two equal possibilities without requiring an additional external cause. A hungry person may choose one of two equal loaves, and a thirsty person may choose one of two equal cups. The act of choosing does not require an endless chain of additional choices.

Asking why the will selected that particular time ultimately returns to asking why will is will. The function of will is precisely to specify one permissible possibility rather than another. This is different from claiming that a contingent thing came into existence without any cause. (Copy B, folio 197; al Umariyyah, page 99)

Eternal Will and the Claim of an Ancient Soul

Athir al Din al Abhari proposed that Allah possesses an eternal will which requires the choice to create the world to arise at a particular stage. That stage could depend upon an earlier originated relation, followed by another, and so on. According to this view, a succession of preparations could exist without making the bodies of the world eternal.

Fakhr al Din al Razi and Siraj al Din al Urmawi presented another answer. They permitted the existence of an eternal soul within which successive conceptions and wills arose. When the required collection was completed, it became the complete cause for the creation of bodies.

This position affirmed that bodies were originated while the soul remained eternal. Some later theologians therefore said that everything other than Allah was contingent, but avoided saying that everything other than Allah was originated.

They argued that the common proofs of the theologians established only the origination of bodies and accidents. Those proofs did not establish the nonexistence or origination of immaterial intellects and souls.

Al Juwayni answered that necessary knowledge establishes that contingent beings are confined to substances and accidents.

Circular Dependence and Infinite Succession

Dawr (circular dependence) has two forms.

The first is prior circularity, in which one thing depends upon another that in turn depends upon the first as a prior cause. This is impossible because it makes a thing prior to itself.

The second is simultaneous circularity, as with two correlatives that are understood together. This is not necessarily impossible.

Tasalsul (successive occurrence without a first beginning) also has two forms.

The first is a regress among effective causes. This is false by agreement because every effect would depend upon a prior effective cause without ever reaching a true cause.

The second is succession among effects, where every created effect is preceded by another effect, while all depend upon a voluntary Creator. Most theologians considered this impossible, although a group of earlier and later scholars permitted it. (Copy B, folio 198; al Umariyyah, page 99)

There is no disagreement among Ahl al Sunnah concerning endless succession in the future. The pleasures, movements, food, and provision of the people of Paradise will never cease.

The Jahmiyyah opposed this and claimed that these created matters would eventually end, despite the Qur’an verses affirming:

“Its fruit is everlasting, and so is its shade.” (al Ra’d 35)

“They will have their provision therein, morning and evening.” (Maryam 62)

“Neither interrupted nor withheld.” (al Waqi’ah 33)

Abu al Hudhayl al Allaf held that the people of Paradise and Hell would remain but their movements would cease. A report attributed to Chief Judge Abd al Jabbar stated that he later withdrew this doctrine, although no surviving source confirming the retraction was found.

Imam Ahmad on Allah’s Speech

The transmitted position of Imam Ahmad is:

“Allah Most High has never ceased speaking whenever He wills.”

This affirms kalam (divine speech) connected to Allah’s will and choice.

Chief Judge Abu Ya’la interpreted “whenever He wills” as referring only to Allah willing to make His eternal speech heard. He regarded speech as an essential attribute that does not occur through will.

This interpretation was criticised for three reasons.

First, it moved Imam Ahmad’s words away from their apparent meaning without evidence.

Second, if Allah had eternally willed to make His speech heard, an eternal hearer would be required.

Third, Imam Ahmad explained the words:

“Indeed, We have made it an Arabic Qur’an.” (al Zukhruf 3)

He said that Allah rendered it Arabic through an act from among His acts. This shows an act connected to divine will, not an eternally fixed meaning unrelated to choice. (Copy A, folio 199; al Umariyyah, page 99)

The verb ja’ala (to make) has several meanings. When it takes two objects, it commonly means to render something in a particular condition:

“Indeed, We will return him to you and will make him one of the messengers.” (al Qasas 7)

When it takes one object, it may mean to create:

“And He made the darknesses and the light.” (al An’am 1)

It may also refer to a creational decree or a religious institution:

“Allah has not instituted any Bahirah or Sa’ibah.” (al Ma’idah 103)

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Position on Successive Acts

Ibn Taymiyyah reasoned that if Imam Ahmad’s words establish speech occurring through divine will without a first limit, the same principle permits Allah to produce successive created effects without a first created effect.

Every particular created effect is muhdath (originated), makhluq (created), and preceded by its own nonexistence. Nevertheless, the succession of such effects may extend into the past without a first member.

This is not the doctrine of Aristotle, al Farabi, or Ibn Sina. Those philosophers affirmed the eternity of particular things, including the celestial spheres, their matter, and the intellects. Ibn Taymiyyah denied the eternity of every particular created entity and declared the philosophers’ doctrine to be kufr.

Al Ghazali declared the philosophers disbelievers for three principal doctrines: the eternity of the world, the denial of Allah’s knowledge of particulars, and the denial of bodily resurrection. (Tahafut al Falasifah, by al Ghazali)

Ibn Taymiyyah added their denial of the angels as another matter of disbelief because their existence is decisively established by the Qur’an and the teachings of the messengers.

His position was that Allah has never ceased acting, creating, and bringing things into existence through His power, will, and choice, just as He has never ceased speaking whenever He wills. Creating and acting are attributes of perfection:

“Is the One who creates like one who does not create?” (al Nahl 17)

He did not affirm the eternity of any particular material thing. He affirmed only an ongoing succession of individually originated events.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal’s Own Position

Ibn Qadi al Jabal did not fully accept Ibn Taymiyyah’s conclusion. He affirmed that the world as a whole was created after complete nonexistence, that Allah existed while nothing else existed, and that a voluntary agent may specify an act through power and choice.

He composed a poem of more than eighty lines defending this meaning and presented it to Ibn Taymiyyah in 722 AH at the Qassa’in School. Ibn Taymiyyah advised him:

“Expand it in prose, because most people do not understand this poetry.”

The poem was intended to appear at the end of the treatise, but it was not preserved because the surviving manuscript is incomplete.

The Anonymous Author’s Argument

The anonymous author argued that nothing within the world can be eternal. A voluntary agent must precede the object of His will, and an eternal object cannot come after its agent. Therefore, every part of the world must be originated.

He then presented the argument that divine action must always have been possible. If action had initially been impossible and later became possible, something impossible in itself would have changed into something possible in itself.

If the possibility of action belonged to its essence or depended upon a permanent cause, it would remain possible continuously. If it depended upon an originated cause, the same question would arise concerning that cause, leading to an endless succession of causes or conditions.

The answer was that certain knowledge, the Qur’an, and sound reason establish that the world came into existence after it had not existed. A true act follows its agent in time.

The philosophers’ expression “essential origination” was rejected. They used it to describe a world which eternally accompanied its cause while remaining dependent upon it. This was not true origination. It reduced the Creator to a condition necessarily accompanied by the world rather than a voluntary agent who actually produces an act.

Their examples of sunlight accompanying the sun and a ring moving with a finger were also rejected. The disc of the sun is not a voluntary agent, and the finger is only a condition involved in the ring’s movement. True action and reception of action contain succession, as in:

“I broke it, so it broke.”

The word “so” indicates that the reception of the action follows the act and is not eternally simultaneous with it.

Intellects, Souls, and Immaterial Beings

The anonymous author spoke only of bodies being produced through choice rather than the whole world. This raised the question of whether he affirmed immaterial intellects and souls as the philosophers did.

The philosophers, together with certain theologians, affirmed the First Intellect, Active Intellect, Universal Intellect, and immaterial souls. They claimed that a soul governs the body as a king governs a city, without indwelling within it.

They further claimed that these intellects and souls were neither inside the world nor outside it. Their proofs established, at most, that the soul was different from the visible bodily structure. They did not prove that it existed separately from the body.

According to the philosophers, the First Agent produced one intellect because:

“Only one thing can proceed from one.”

A soul then proceeded from that intellect, followed by further beings. This doctrine was challenged by asking why the intellect came first rather than the soul. If every specification requires a specifying factor, the philosophers must explain what specified the intellect as the first effect. If specification can occur without an additional cause, their argument against voluntary creation collapses.

Fakhr al Din al Razi admitted that the proof from motion establishes only the origination of bodies and accidents. It does not prove the origination of immaterial intellects and souls for someone who already accepts their existence.

Nasir al Din al Tusi likewise stated that no proof establishes the impossibility of intellects, although the proofs presented for their existence are defective. (Copy A, folio 201; al Umariyyah, page 99)

The correct position is that nothing eternal exists alongside Allah Most High and that the claimed immaterial beings have no external reality.

True Origination and the Philosophers’ Terminology

Huduth (origination after nonexistence) means that the existence of a thing is preceded by its nonexistence. This is the meaning recognised in language, revelation, and common usage.

The philosophers called dependence upon another “essential origination,” even when the dependent thing was eternal. This terminology was invented to support their doctrine. A thing is not called originated simply because it depends upon another.

A similar distortion occurred in Ibn Sina’s explanation of aful (setting or disappearance). The Qur’an states:

“When it set.” (al An’am 76)

In language, setting means disappearance and concealment. Ibn Sina instead interpreted it as entering the realm of possibility. This moved the word away from its known meaning.

The philosophers also described the world as both eternal and contingent, even though contingency properly belongs to what can either exist or not exist. Ibn Sina himself used examples showing that possibility concerns something whose continued existence is not necessary, yet he later described the world as both eternally existent and contingent.

Three Forms of Dependence

Dependence has three different meanings.

The first is dependence for existence, as created beings depend upon Allah, their Creator.

The second is dependence through necessary accompaniment, as one correlative accompanies another or as the parts of a whole relate to one another.

The third is dependence through inherence, as an accident depends upon the substance in which it exists.

Many theological arguments fail because they treat every form of dependence as dependence through origination. Their evidence may establish only accompaniment or inherence, not that one thing was temporally produced by another.

Eternity, Prior Matter, and Prior Time

Qidam (eternity without beginning) was explained in two ways.

The first is that a thing was not preceded in time by its nonexistence.

The second is that it does not depend upon another for its existence.

The philosophers claimed that creation after nonexistence requires prior matter and prior duration.

They argued that the possibility of an originated thing must have existed before the thing itself. That possibility, they claimed, required a subject in which it existed, and this subject was matter.

The answer was that possibility is not an independently existing entity requiring a physical subject.

They also argued that the nonexistence of an originated thing precedes its existence. Since this precedence is not one of knowledge, rank, essence, or place, it must be temporal.

The answer was that one thing may precede another without requiring an earlier temporal container, just as today precedes tomorrow without tomorrow already existing within a separate time.

Eternal Possibility and Possible Eternity

A major objection concerned whether an originated thing had always been possible.

If its origination was always possible, it appeared that it could have existed in eternity. Yet if it could have existed eternally, it would no longer be originated.

The response distinguished between two matters:

“The eternity of possibility does not require the possibility of eternity.” (Commentary on al Arba’in, by al Iraqi)

A thing may possess an eternal possibility of being originated without possessing the possibility of being eternal. The world is contingent when considered in itself. When related to eternity without beginning, its existence is impossible. When related to what follows eternity, its existence is possible.

This resembles an accident. Considered without a substance, its existence is impossible. Considered with a substance, its existence is possible. Likewise, a created substance is impossible without an agent but possible when related to an agent.

A thing being contingent in itself does not mean that it is possible under every condition. The world may therefore always have been capable of origination without ever being capable of eternal existence. (Copy B, folio 232; al Umariyyah, page 94)

Ibn Taymiyyah answered that the argument for eternal possibility does not establish the possibility of any particular eternal thing. At most, it establishes the continuous possibility of the genus of action. It does not prove the eternity of the celestial spheres, matter, or any particular being.

Unfair Criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah

The anonymous author claimed that Ibn Taymiyyah appeared at the beginning of the seventh century, manifested the Sunnah, subdued innovation, but treated other groups with excessive harshness, especially the Ash’aris.

The chronological statement was plainly false. Ibn Taymiyyah was born in 661 AH and died on 20 Dhu al Qi’dah 728 AH. He could not have appeared near the beginning of the seventh century before he was born. (Copy B, folio 233; al Umariyyah, page 94)

The author also contradicted himself. He acknowledged that Ibn Taymiyyah manifested the Sunnah and subdued innovation, then later portrayed him as partisan or ignorant. Whoever truly manifests the Sunnah and defeats innovation deserves recognition among the firmly grounded Imams.

The author swore by his own life, although the Prophet ﷺ said:

“Whoever swears must swear by Allah.” (Sahih al Bukhari 2679; Sahih Muslim 1646)

He ﷺ also said:

“Allah has forbidden you from swearing by your fathers.” (Sahih al Bukhari 6647; Sahih Muslim 1646)

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Treatment of Other Scholars

Ibn Taymiyyah did not deliberately belittle the Hanbali scholars. A mujtahid (independent jurist) who follows rational and transmitted evidence cannot be accused of harshness simply because he disagrees with recognised scholars.

He also respected many leading Ash’ari scholars.

He praised Abu al Hasan al Ash’ari for his knowledge, understanding, eloquence, and numerous writings. In public gatherings, he frequently quoted al Ash’ari’s praise of Imam Ahmad:

“He is the perfect Imam and virtuous leader through whom Allah made the truth clear, subdued the innovations of the innovators, repelled those who deviated, and broke the force of those who strayed. May Allah have mercy upon him as a foremost Imam and an understanding leader.”

He honoured Abu Bakr al Baqillani, respected Al Juwayni, and praised Abu Hamid al Ghazali. When al Ghazali’s work al Ta’rifah was read before him, he repeatedly expressed admiration for the beauty of its wording and the strength of its indications. (Copy A, folio 234; al Umariyyah, page 94)

It was therefore unjust to claim that Ibn Taymiyyah deliberately rejected everything said by the Ash’aris, even when it was true.

The Accusation that His Position Was the Same as Ibn Sina’s

The anonymous author argued that Ibn Taymiyyah’s acceptance of temporal events without a first beginning necessarily led to the eternity of the world. He claimed that Ibn Taymiyyah had only replaced Ibn Sina’s specified eternal entity with an unspecified eternal type.

He reasoned that a universal exists only through its particulars. Therefore, if the universal type of events were eternal, at least one particular event would have to be eternal.

This criticism misunderstood both Ibn Sina and Ibn Taymiyyah.

Ibn Sina did not confine eternity to the Active Intellect. He affirmed the eternity of the heavenly bodies, their essences, their attributes, and their continuous circular motions. The anonymous author’s description of Ibn Sina’s doctrine was therefore incomplete.

Ibn Taymiyyah, by contrast, declared every particular created effect originated. He did not affirm the eternity of the celestial spheres, matter, an intellect, a soul, or any other individual created being.

The Type and Its Individual Members

When Ibn Taymiyyah said that the type of temporal events had no first beginning, he did not mean that the universal type existed independently outside the mind. Nor did he mean that one particular event was eternal.

He meant that the collection possesses succession and extension, although every individual member is originated.

A similar distinction exists regarding the future pleasures of Paradise. The type of pleasure continues forever, although every particular item of food is consumed, every particular drink is taken, and every particular movement ends. The endless continuation of the type does not require any one particular pleasure to remain forever.

His answer concerning past succession was therefore the same as the accepted answer concerning future succession. No particular member is eternal in the past, just as no particular created pleasure must remain eternally unchanged in the future.

A universal exists in the mind and is realised through its particulars. It does not exist as an independent universal within external reality. The ruling belonging to the universal consideration does not necessarily belong to every external particular. (Copy B, folio 239; al Umariyyah, page 94)

Ibn Qadi al Jabal’s Direct Question to Ibn Taymiyyah

Ibn Qadi al Jabal personally asked Ibn Taymiyyah what he meant by saying:

“A ruling may be established for a collection that is not established for its individual members.”

Ibn Taymiyyah answered that the collection is distinguished by succession and extension. Every individual member is originated, but the complete collection is considered successive and extended.

This explanation was given nearly forty years before Ibn Qadi al Jabal wrote the surviving account and less than ten years before Ibn Taymiyyah’s death.

Once a speaker has clearly explained his intended meaning, his words cannot fairly be forced into another meaning which he expressly rejected.

The Difference between a Universal and a Whole

A universal and a whole are not identical, but both may possess rulings that do not belong to their particulars or parts.

A whole, such as a house, tree, or human body, exists externally and is constituted by its parts. No single part is itself the whole house, tree, or human being.

A universal, such as humanity, exists as a meaning in the mind and is realised through individual human beings. No individual person is humanity considered as a universal.

The principal differences include the following:

A universal exists in the mind, while a whole exists externally.
A universal is realised through its particulars, while a whole is constituted by its parts.
The particulars of a universal may be unlimited, while the parts forming a particular whole are finite.

The collection of successive events may therefore possess the ruling of succession and extension without any individual event possessing that ruling. No single event is itself a succession.

The anonymous author’s division was incomplete because it presented only two possibilities. Either Ibn Taymiyyah affirmed an eternal universal outside its particulars, or he affirmed an eternal particular. Ibn Taymiyyah intended neither. He affirmed a succession of originated particulars considered collectively.

A Necessary Implication Is Not the Speaker’s Doctrine

Even if a person claims that an unacceptable consequence follows from a scholar’s words, that consequence does not automatically become the scholar’s own doctrine.

A necessary implication of a school is not itself the school.

A person may affirm a statement while denying what another person claims follows from it. He may not recognise the consequence, may reject it, or may hold an inconsistent position. The alleged consequence can therefore be examined and criticised, but it cannot simply be attributed to him as though he expressly affirmed it.

Truth differs from the doctrines of people. Every true consequence of truth is itself true because truth does not contradict itself. A human school, however, may contain inconsistency because its adherents can fail to understand all that others believe follows from their words.

It was therefore false to apply to Ibn Taymiyyah the same ruling applied to Ibn Sina. Ibn Sina expressly affirmed particular eternal created beings. Ibn Taymiyyah expressly affirmed that every individual created being is originated and denied that anything particular is eternal with Allah.

The surviving manuscript ends while continuing this final distinction.

End of Summary

The Treatise of Ibn Qadi al Jabal in Reply to the One Who Replied to His Teacher Ibn Taymiyyah regarding the Question of Hawadith (Temporal Events) with No Beginning

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Opening Invocation, Praise, and the Author’s Purpose

The Shaykh, Imam, learned scholar, eminent authority, Sharaf al Din, the singular master among the independent jurists, the destination of students, Chief Judge Abu al Abbas Ahmad ibn al Hasan ibn Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Qudamah, known as Ibn Qadi al Jabal (d. 771 AH), son of the eminent Chief Judge Sharaf al Din Abu Ali al Hasan (d. 695 AH), son of the Imam and eminent scholar Sharaf al Din Abu Muhammad Abd Allah (d. 643 AH), son of Shaykh al Islam Abu Umar Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Qudamah (d. 607 AH), may Allah sanctify his soul and illuminate his resting place, said:

رَبِّ أَوْزِعْنِي أَنْ أَشْكُرَ نِعْمَتَكَ الَّتِي أَنْعَمْتَ عَلَيَّ وَعَلَى وَالِدَيَّ وَأَنْ أَعْمَلَ صَالِحًا تَرْضَاهُ وَأَدْخِلْنِي بِرَحْمَتِكَ فِي عِبَادِكَ الصَّالِحِينَ

“My Lord, inspire me to be thankful for Your favour which You have bestowed upon me and upon my parents, and to do righteous deeds that please You, and admit me, by Your mercy, among Your righteous servants.” (al Naml 19)

All praise is for Allah, who created and proportioned; who decreed and guided; who brought forth the pasture, then made it dark stubble. He makes the way of ease easy for the one for whom He has decreed happiness, and He makes the way of hardship easy for the one upon whom He has decreed wretchedness. Some people are people of division and disavowal, while others follow desire, fall into ruin, and turn away from the path of those who show loyalty to the truth.

All praise is for Allah, the Creator and perfect Governor of the world, the Originator and Teacher of the human being, and the One who extends and distributes provision. He brought created things into existence through power and choice. He established the signs that lead to knowledge for those who reflect, signs which necessarily compel acknowledgement. May Allah send His salah and salam upon the noblest one who clearly set out the sound way and called to the straight path, Muhammad ﷺ, and upon his family and all his Companions. May Allah be pleased with the Imams of Islam who protect the domain of the religion from those who assail it.

I came across a book whose author I do not know. It concerned the foundations of religion, but was confused in many of its sections and chapters. (The word “confused” appears in the copies as “frustrated.” What has been written here is probably the correct reading.) Its author paid no regard to carefully verified reports or recognised proofs.

The Unknown Author’s Confusion and the Four Types of People

Rather, he stumbled through it blindly and filled it with weak matters. (At the beginning of copy B, the scribe repeated the final word of copy A, as was his custom, but added the conjunction “and,” writing “and weak.”) He did not follow the method of the adherents of any well known school, nor did he consistently apply recognised and recorded principles. He transmitted matters whose meaning he did not understand and mentioned schools of thought about which he had no knowledge.

For example, he related that a Bedouin once stopped beside a circle of theologians in the main mosque of Basrah. They were debating the true nature of the human being. Is the human being the body and the soul together, the soul alone because a person speaks about himself while his senses are absent, or a person situated within this body? (Copy B, folio 194. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) They produced a great deal of contentious noise over the question. The Bedouin turned away, reciting:

“Were I to know, then may his body be upon me,
Because of all the confusion about who he really is.” (Sharh al Mufassal, 2/305, by Ibn Ya’ish.)

Chief Judge al Mawardi (d. 450 AH) said that al Khalil ibn Ahmad (d. 170 AH) divided people, with respect to what they know and what they do not know, into four opposing conditions, none of which any person can escape. He said that people are of four kinds:

A man who knows and knows that he knows. He is a scholar, so ask him.

A man who knows but does not know that he knows. He is forgetful, so remind him.

A man who does not know and knows that he does not know. He seeks guidance, so teach him.

A man who does not know and does not know that he does not know. He is ignorant, so leave him.

Then al Mawardi said, “Abu al Qasim recited to me.”

“If you do not know and you are not one who
Asks the one who knows, then how will you ever know?

You were ignorant and did not know that you were ignorant,
So who will make you know that you do not know?

Among the most astonishing things is that you do not know,
And that you do not know that you do not know.

When every matter is obscure to you,
Then remain like ground upon which the one who knows may tread.” (Adab al Dunya wa al Din, page 75, by al Mawardi. In the printed text of Adab al Dunya wa al Din, the third line appears where the fourth line is written in the manuscript.)

I say that ignorance has been divided into two types. The first is simple ignorance, which contains no compound element. The second is compound ignorance, composed of ignorance together with ignorance of one’s own ignorance. His ignorance is therefore compound. Al Mutanabbi (d. 354 AH) mentioned three forms of ignorance when he said:

The Author’s Disrespect toward Ibn Taymiyyah and the Sanctity of Scholars

“One who is ignorant of me, while he is ignorant of himself,
And ignorant that I know that he is ignorant of me.” (The correct wording of al Mutanabbi is: “One who is ignorant of me, while he is ignorant of his own ignorance, and ignorant that I know that he is ignorant of me.” See Kashf an Masawi Shi’r al Mutanabbi, page 70, by al Sahib ibn Abbad.) (Copy A, folio 195. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) (Tabyin Kadhib al Muftari, page 29, by Ibn Asakir.) (The same work, page 425, by Ibn Asakir.)

I then examined the discussion in that book concerning the origination of the world, together with some rational proofs connected to it, the inquiries and methods contained in that discussion, and the author’s account of certain positions held by philosophers and other innovators. During his discussion, the author mentioned Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH), may Allah have mercy upon him. He diminished his standing and lowered his rank in a manner unworthy of fair scholars and refined men of understanding. Everyone who read it regarded this departure from proper conduct as repugnant. They directed their criticisms against the author and saw praise mixed with disparagement, acknowledgement blended with rejection, and contradiction plainly visible in his words, as we shall see, Allah willing.

A student once read before Imam Abu Bakr Ibn Mujahid (d. 324 AH) and committed some fault. Abu Bakr said to him, “My son, observe the discipline of the soul before the discipline of study.”

The Hafiz Abu al Qasim Ibn Asakir (d. 571 AH) said, “Know that the flesh of the scholars is poisoned, and Allah’s established practice of taking retribution against those who belittle them is known. Whoever releases his tongue against them with abuse will be afflicted by Allah, before his death, with the death of his heart.” (Tabyin Kadhib al Muftari, page 29, by Ibn Asakir.) (The same work, page 425, by Ibn Asakir.)

One of the learned men said:

“A person never expresses his own excellence
Like one who acknowledges excellence in every excellent person.

The lowest form of deficiency is that a young man should try
To remove the speck of his own deficiency by diminishing the virtuous.”

Imam Abu al Faraj Ibn al Jawzi (d. 597 AH), may Allah have mercy upon him, said, “Our teacher, Imam Abu al Hasan Ali ibn Abd Allah al Zaghuni (d. 527 AH), may Allah favour him, recited to us.”

The Purpose and Method of the Reply

“Had I been tested by a noble Hashimite,
Whose maternal uncles were the sons of Abd al Madan,
What I endure would have been easy for me.
But rise and look at the one by whom I have been tested.” (Diwan Ibn Abi Husaynah, page 265, by Ibn Abi Husaynah, collected and explained by Abu al Ala al Maarri.) (The term khana means obscene or indecent speech.)

When I saw what he had written, I composed these pages, following his statements through both their refutation and their defence, concerning what he attributed to our Shaykh. I cleared the Shaykh of the obscene speech that this author alleged. I first presented several introductions to explain the matter to those who seek understanding, remind those who already know, make the coming discussion easier to resolve, and make its purpose easier to grasp. Allah, through His generosity, grants success. Through His favours, He guides. He is sufficient for us and the best Trustee.

Introduction: What the Theologians Mean by “the World”

In the terminology of the theologians, “the world” means every existent other than Allah Most High. Negative attributes and affirmed attributes are excluded. Negative attributes are not existents, while affirmed attributes are not things other than Him.

According to the sounder of two positions, two things are described as ghayran (two distinct things) when one may be separate from the other in time or place and neither is contained within the other.

In language, the world is a name for a collection of contingent existents. Thus, one speaks of the upper world, the lower world, and the world of animals. For this reason, the Noble Book uses its plural form. Scholars have disagreed whether the word is derived from ilm (knowledge), in which case it would be more restricted, or from alamah (sign), in which case it would be more general.

Introduction: The World Is Originated and Created

The world is originated and created. It came to be after it had not existed. This is the position of all Muslims, the followers of the revealed religions, and all the early sages. (Copy B, folio 195. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

Aristotle (d. 56 BH) and his followers among the early and later philosophers, such as al Farabi (d. 339 AH), Ibn Sina (d. 428 AH), al Suhrawardi who was executed (d. 587 AH), and Thabit ibn Qurrah (d. 288 AH), held that the heavenly bodies are eternal in their essences and attributes. They said that these bodies move with a single, continuous circular motion from eternity without beginning to eternity without end. (Al Umariyyah, page 99, reads: “moving through a single motion.”) According to them, the type is eternal, while its individual instances are originated.

The Philosophers on Eternal Matter and the Dahriyyah

As for elemental bodies, they held that their matter is eternal, while every particular form and accident found within them is originated. However, every originated form or accident is preceded by another without a beginning. (The final word is written in this manner in the manuscript. The intended wording may be “and beginning.”) All bodies, in themselves, are contingent in existence, but they become necessary in existence through the necessity of their cause.

These philosophers use the word “originated” for the world in the sense that it is contingent and dependent upon the cause that necessarily produces it. The people of truth call them Dahriyyah, because a Dahri is one who maintains the eternity of time, even if he affirms a Maker. Those who deny the Maker are called the pure Dahriyyah.

I say that the word Dahri may be pronounced with an open first vowel or a rounded first vowel. With the open vowel, it is an attribution to the belief in the eternity of time. With the rounded vowel, it refers to someone whose life has been prolonged. Thus one says Dahri just as one says Qinnasri, as al Ajjaj (d. 90 AH) said:

“Do you become delighted when you are already an old man?
Only a youth feels intimate with another youth.” (The manuscript reads: “Strike us while you are an old man, for only a youth comes to a youth.” The correct wording may be what appears in Dhayl Tabaqat al Hanabilah: “Do you become delighted while you are an old man? Only a youth comes to a youth.” See Dhayl Tabaqat al Hanabilah, 2/255, by Ibn Rajab, edited by Abd al Rahman ibn Sulayman al Uthaymin, Maktabat al Ubaykan, Riyadh, first edition, 1425 AH, 2005 CE. Another possible reading is: “Do you become delighted while you are an aged man, when time keeps turning against the human being?” The word Qaysari, also narrated as Qinnasri, means an elderly man, as stated in Lisan al Arab.)

There are other positions held by misguided people on this matter, but we have refrained from mentioning them here. (The phrase “we have refrained from mentioning them here” appears in the Taymuriyyah copy as “we have refrained from mentioning what relates to them here.” In al Umariyyah, page 99, it reads “we have refrained from them here,” then “mentioning them” was written above it.)

Introduction: Revelation Affirms the Creation of the World

The transmitted evidence from the Book of Allah Most High, what our Prophet Muhammad ﷺ informed us of, and what has been transmitted from the prophets is decisive in affirming that this world was created, that Allah brought it into existence, and that it came to be after it had not existed. Sound reason also proves this.

The theologians argued for its origination through several methods. The most famous is the proof based upon motion and rest, which we shall mention. Abu Sulayman al Khattabi (d. 388 AH) and many other scholars did not choose to establish the matter through this method.

People have taken several positions concerning the use of this proof.

The first position is that following this method is recognised and obligatory. This is the position of many of the Mu’tazilah.

Others claimed that the method is sound and that following it establishes the existence of a Maker.

Disagreement over the Proof from Motion and Rest

Another group said that the method is sound, but exhausting because of the scattered and difficult issues involved in following it. (The manuscript reads “among the scattered matters.” The probable wording is “because of the scattered matters.”) It is built upon four premises, and the people of investigation disagree over each one. Among the greatest areas of disagreement is whether rest is an existent state because motion is existent. Is rest the absence of motion, or is it the absence of motion from something whose nature permits it to move? (Copy A, folio 195. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) According to the first explanation, motion and rest stand in opposition as two contraries. According to the second, their opposition is that of privation and possession. The forms of opposition are four, as is well known.

Another group said that the method is false in itself and does not lead to the required conclusion.

Introduction: The Proof from Motion and Rest and the Objection to It

The proof is stated as follows. If bodies were eternal without beginning, they could not be free of motion and rest. Both alternatives are impossible, so it is impossible for bodies to be eternal.

The connection between the premises is clear, because a body must occupy a spatial position. If it remains there, it is at rest. If it does not remain there, it is moving.

It is impossible for bodies to have been moving in eternity without beginning, because if they had been moving eternally, motion itself would have been eternal. Yet the eternity of motion is impossible, since the very nature of motion requires that it be preceded by something else, while eternity without beginning denies such precedence. The two descriptions therefore cannot be combined.

A group of theologians, including Fakhr al Din Ibn al Khatib al Razi (d. 606 AH), Sayf al Din al Amidi (d. 631 AH), and others, objected that what is meant by motion being eternal is that its type is eternal. In other words, every motion is preceded by another motion without any first motion. What necessarily requires precedence is each individual motion, because every individual motion is composed of two positions, one earlier and one later.

Objections to the Proof from Motion and Rest

There is plainly no contradiction between an individual motion being preceded by another and the type of motion having no beginning. Their combination therefore lies within the realm of possibility, not impossibility.

They further said, “It cannot be argued that, because every period within the series of motions is originated, the entire collection must also be originated. We reply that a whole is not required to share every ruling of each part. It sometimes does, as when every individual among a group of Black people is black and the group is therefore black. At other times it does not, as when each individual unit among ten is not ten, although all of them together are described as ten. Many similar examples exist. Why have you treated the matter under discussion as belonging to the first category rather than the second?” (The two words translated as “the matter” appear joined in the manuscript as a single word meaning “only.” The separated reading is probably correct.)

They also said, “We maintain that the bodies could not have been eternally at rest because, had their rest been eternal, it could never have ceased. This argument only works if rest is an existent state. The cessation of an eternal nonexistence is permissible and actually occurs, because the nonexistence of every originated thing is eternal before that thing exists, yet that nonexistence ends when the thing comes into existence.”

They then said, “Motion is an existent state by agreement, so rest must also be an existent state.” (Copy B, folio 196. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) It was answered that the claimed necessary connection is denied.

Introduction: The Proof of Correspondence and the Objection to It

The proof of tatbiq (correspondence) is stated as follows. Suppose that the past events extending from today have no beginning. They would form one collection. The events extending from the time of the Flood with no beginning would form another collection. The first collection is unquestionably greater than the second by the events occurring between today and the time of the Flood.

If we align the two collections from the end nearest to us, then one of three things must occur. Either both extend without end, in which case a thing together with something additional would be equal to itself without that additional thing; or both collections end; or the shorter collection ends. The latter two alternatives require both collections to be finite, because the larger collection exceeds the smaller by a finite quantity. (The manuscript reads “for dust would be.” It may also be read “because it would become more numerous.” The probable correct reading is “it would necessarily follow that.”) (The words “without that additional thing” were added in the margin of the Taymuriyyah copy but are absent from al Umariyyah, page 99.)

The objectors replied from several ways.

Further Objections to the Proof of Correspondence

The first objection is that the use of correspondence here is false. The events extending from the time of the Flood without a beginning are themselves one collection. The additional events occur only between today and the Flood. How, then, can a thing be aligned with itself?

The second objection is that the principle, “A thing together with something additional cannot be equal to itself without that additional thing,” is denied in this context. It would follow only if the individual members of the two collections were equal in number. That is denied. The individual members of the larger collection may be more numerous even while both collections are infinite, just as the multiples of five and the multiples of ten may be extended without limit. Their statement that any difference would require finitude is denied. They compared this to the unlimited objects of divine power and divine knowledge. (In al Umariyyah, page 99, the word “objects of knowledge” contains a scribal error.) (The manuscript word is difficult to read. It may be read as “compared,” “supported,” or “will.”)

The third objection was stated by al Qarafi (d. 684 AH) in his criticism of al Arba’in:

“I say that if the correspondence is made by drawing the shorter series into the longer one, the necessary result is that the shorter series ends somewhere in the middle of the longer one, which prevents correspondence throughout the whole of it. If the longer series is moved back toward the shorter one, and every numerical rank in one series is matched in detail with the corresponding rank in the other, that process will continue forever and will never reach eternity without beginning, because it is impossible to complete, one by one, what has no end. If the intended correspondence is to place the longer collection over the shorter collection as a whole, without examining the parts of either series, the longer series remains curved in its middle. Its far end does not reach eternity without beginning, and it does not become clear where the correspondence occurs in eternity. Therefore, under none of these possible arrangements is the intended conclusion obtained.” (Copy A, folio 197. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) (Sharh al Arba’in fi Usul al Din, page 50, by al Qarafi.) (The wording in al Qarafi’s original text differs in ways that do not affect the meaning. His original wording is: “We reply that if correspondence is carried out by drawing the shorter series into the longer one, the necessary result is that the shorter series ends somewhere in its middle, so correspondence through all of it becomes impossible. If it is carried out by moving the longer series back toward the shorter one, while committing to matching every numerical rank in detail with the corresponding rank in the other series, that will continue forever and will never reach eternity without beginning, because it is impossible to complete in detail what has no end. If correspondence means placing the longer collection over the shorter collection as a whole, without examining the parts of either series, the longer series remains curved in its middle. Its far end does not reach eternity without beginning, and no effect of correspondence appears in eternity. The intended conclusion therefore fails under every possible arrangement.”)

Introduction: The Creator Is Powerful and Acts by Choice

The Muslims and all followers of the revealed religions hold that the Creator Most High is powerful and acts by choice. The early philosophers also held this position. Later philosophers, including Aristotle and his followers, held that He necessarily produces effects by His essence. They compared the issuing of effects from Him by essential necessity to light issuing from the sun and heat issuing from fire. In the case of the Necessary Existent, however, they said that this occurs together with awareness, whereas awareness is not required in other causes. This is the position of those who followed Aristotle in affirming the eternity of the world, such as Ibn Sina and others.

The scholars said, “This position is kufr (disbelief), because it contradicts what is necessarily known from the religion and what has been transmitted from the messengers. It also necessarily entails the eternity of the world.” (The position meant here is that Allah necessarily produces effects by His essence and does not act by will and choice.)

From this corrupt foundation, they built another of their false principles, namely, “Only one thing can proceed from one.” They said that multiplicity arises from the first intellect because it has two aspects: necessity derived from the Necessary Existent, and possibility considered in itself. (The word “aspects” appears in the singular form in the manuscript. The plural reading is required by the context.) Multiplicity therefore appeared within it, and the multiplicity of existing things proceeded from the multiplicity found in it. This is among the most corrupt and repugnant positions. The intellect’s possibility in itself has no role in any aspect of causation, much less can multiple intellects proceed from it. (The manuscript word is uncertain. It may read “causation.”)

Introduction: The Main Proof Used by the Philosophers for the Eternity of the World

The philosophers’ principal argument for their false doctrine of the eternity of the world is as follows. Everything required for the complete causation of the world either existed in eternity without beginning or did not.

The Philosophers’ Argument from Complete Causation

If everything required was present in eternity, the effect must also have issued in eternity. Otherwise, the effect would have failed to follow from a complete cause, which is impossible. If the effect did not necessarily issue, it would either have been impossible, which is false because it later existed, or possible. The latter is also false, they argued, because selecting one time for its existence rather than another, when the relation of the fixed cause to all those times is equal, would be preference without a determining factor. (Copy B, folio 197. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

If everything required for causation was not present in eternity, then the issuing of the effect depended upon an additional condition. Otherwise, it would be possible for the effect to occur without something required for complete causation, which is impossible. If that additional condition came into existence without a cause, a contingent thing would have existed without a cause. If it came into existence because of another cause, the same question applies to that cause, and an infinite regress follows. (The manuscript reads “the same discussion applies to eternity.” The probable wording is “the same discussion applies to the first matter.”)

If that regress were impossible, the argument would end. If it were not the type of regress that is impossible, such as a regress in conditions and preparations, it would follow that before every originated thing there was another originated thing without any beginning, which is itself the doctrine of eternity.

The answer is that the failure of an effect to accompany its complete cause is impossible only in relation to a cause that necessarily produces by its essence, not in relation to a voluntary agent who acts by choice.

One group then said, “The specific time was selected because of a wisdom connected to it.”

Another group said, “It was selected because the will was connected to that time, and the nature of will is to specify.”

Another group said, “Eternity without beginning prevented the act.”

Another group said, “The act was assigned to that time because there was no time before it.”

The majority said, “A powerful voluntary agent may prefer one of two possible objects of power over the other without an external determining factor.” The meaning is that a voluntary agent may will an act at a particular time and in a particular manner, despite that time being equal to another time in itself, (The Taymuriyyah copy has an unclear expression here, while al Umariyyah, page 99, reads “while another time is equal to it.”) because the nature of will is to specify one of two possible alternatives over the other.

Asking, “Why did the will become connected to that time?” is like asking, “Why is the will a will?” Such a question is not valid. There is an evident difference between specification without an external cause and the existence of a contingent thing without a cause. This does not close the path to knowing the Maker. (The final word is uncertain in the copies. It may read “specification” rather than “specifying factor.”)

They compared specification without an external determining factor to a fugitive who is presented with two roads, a hungry person who is presented with two loaves, and a thirsty person who is presented with two cups. In each case, the person chooses one of two possible alternatives without an additional determining factor.

Answers Based upon Eternal Will and the Ancient Soul

Athir al Din al Abhari (d. 663 AH) said, “Why may it not be said that the Creator Most High possesses an eternal will, and that this will, by its very nature, requires that the choice to bring the world into existence arise at a particular state? The arising of that preference from the eternal will would depend upon a relation that occurs to the will. That relation would depend upon another originated matter, and so on until the time when the series reaches its end. (Copy A, folio 198. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99. The manuscript wording “until the end” may be a scribal error for “without an end.”) This would not require bodies to have no beginning, nor would it require the world to be eternal.”

Fakhr al Din al Razi answered in al Matalib al Aliyah with a response approved by Siraj al Din al Urmawi (d. 682 AH), which they called “the shining lamp.” Some later scholars followed their method. They permitted the soul to be eternal without beginning while successive conceptions and wills arise within it, one after another. When the required collection of them came together, a complete cause for the origination of bodies was formed, and this became the cause of their origination.

This position included the claim that bodies are originated while that soul is eternal. For this reason, one later scholar stated in his creed that bodies are originated and that everything other than the Lord is contingent, but he did not say that everything other than the Lord is originated. They supported this position by arguing that the theologians’ proof establishes only the origination of bodies, not the origination of everything besides them. They said that the theologians produced no proof that intellects and souls do not exist and no proof that they are originated.

Al Juwayni (d. 478 AH) and others said that necessary knowledge establishes that contingent things are confined to substances and accidents.

Introduction: Circular Dependence and Infinite Regress

Dawr (circular dependence) has two forms, just as tasalsul (infinite regress or succession) also has two forms. The two forms of circular dependence are simultaneous circularity and prior circularity.

Prior circularity is false by the agreement of all rational people, because it necessarily makes a thing prior to itself by two ranks. Simultaneous circularity is sound, as occurs between correlatives and similar matters. Some theologians confuse these two forms, as Fakhr al Din al Razi did in al Mahsul when discussing whether a general expression remains evidence after specification. (Copy B, folio 198. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

Infinite regress also has two forms. The first is regress among effective causes, which is false by the agreement of all rational people. The second is succession among effects, meaning that before every effect there is another effect, each depending upon a voluntary agent. Most theologians consider this impossible, while a group among both the earlier and later scholars permitted it.

As for endless succession toward the future, such as motions without end, contingent things without a final limit in the future, the movements of the people of Paradise, and endlessly recurring created objects such as the food of the people of Paradise, there is no disagreement about this among the people of truth. Jahm ibn Safwan (d. 128 AH) and those who followed him said that it would come to an end.

Al Khallal (d. 311 AH) said that the following was read to Abu Abd Allah Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241 AH): “The Jahmiyyah opposed verses from the Book of Allah Most High.”

أُكُلُهَا دَائِمٌ وَظِلُّهَا

“Its fruit is everlasting, and so is its shade.” (al Ra’d 35)

The Jahmiyyah said that it would come to an end.

وَلَهُمْ رِزْقُهُمْ فِيهَا بُكْرَةً وَعَشِيًّا

“They will have their provision therein, morning and evening.” (Maryam 62)

The Jahmiyyah said that it would come to an end.

لَا مَقْطُوعَةٍ وَلَا مَمْنُوعَةٍ

“Neither interrupted nor withheld.” (al Waqi’ah 33)

The Jahmiyyah said that it would come to an end. (In al Sunnah, 2/10, published by Dar Ibn al Jawzi, al Khallal reports: Harb informed me, saying that Muhammad ibn Idris narrated to us, saying that Ali ibn Maysarah narrated to us, saying that Ali ibn al Hasan ibn Shaqiq narrated to us, saying: I heard Kharijah ibn Mus’ab say, “The Jahmiyyah disbelieved in verses from the Book of Allah, Mighty and Majestic.” Allah Most High said:)

أُكُلُهَا دَائِمٌ وَظِلُّهَا

(“Its fruit is everlasting, and so is its shade.”) (al Ra’d 35) (They said, “It will end.” Allah, Mighty and Majestic, said:)

وُجُوهٌ يَوْمَئِذٍ نَاضِرَةٌ ۝ إِلَىٰ رَبِّهَا نَاظِرَةٌ

(“Faces on that Day will be radiant, looking at their Lord.”) (al Qiyamah 22–23) (They said, “They will not look.”)

(In al Sunnah by Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal, he said: Muhammad ibn Ishaq narrated to me, saying that Ali ibn al Hasan ibn Shaqiq narrated to us, saying: I heard Kharijah say, “The Jahmiyyah disbelieved in several places in the Book of Allah, Mighty and Majestic, through their statement that Paradise will cease.” Allah, Mighty and Majestic, said:)

إِنَّ هَٰذَا لَرِزْقُنَا مَا لَهُ مِنْ نَفَادٍ

(“Indeed, this is Our provision, which will never be exhausted.”) (Sad 54) (Whoever says that it will be exhausted has disbelieved. Allah, Mighty and Majestic, said:)

أُكُلُهَا دَائِمٌ وَظِلُّهَا

(“Its fruit is everlasting, and so is its shade.”) (al Ra’d 35) (Whoever says that it will not endure has disbelieved. Allah, Mighty and Majestic, said:)

عَطَاءً غَيْرَ مَجْذُوذٍ

(“A gift that will never be cut off.”) (Hud 108) (Whoever says that it will cease has disbelieved. Allah, Mighty and Majestic, said:)

لَا مَقْطُوعَةٍ وَلَا مَمْنُوعَةٍ

(“Neither interrupted nor withheld.”) (al Waqi’ah 33) (Whoever says that it will be cut off has disbelieved.”)

Abu al Hudhayl al Allaf Retracted His Position that the Movements of the People of Paradise and Hell Will End

Abu al Hudhayl al Allaf (d. 235 AH), the leading Mu’tazili, said that the persons of the people of Paradise and Hell would remain while their movements would cease. If one of them extended his hand toward food and that final state arrived, he would be unable to take it. I read in a book containing biographies of the Mu’tazilah by Chief Judge Abd al Jabbar ibn Ahmad al Hamadhani (d. 415 AH) that Abu al Hudhayl retracted this doctrine. (The manuscript reads “if he extended,” although it may read “or he extended.”) (I have not found a source confirming this retraction. The book by Chief Judge Abd al Jabbar may be lost.)

Introduction: The Position of Ibn Taymiyyah and His Derivation of Its Foundation from Imam Ahmad

(The word “Ibn” is absent from both surviving copies in the heading.)

The transmitted position of Imam Ahmad is that Allah Most High has never ceased speaking whenever He wills. This was reported from him by a number of his companions.

The Error of Chief Judge Abu Ya’la in Interpreting the Attribute of Speech

Chief Judge Abu Ya’la (d. 458 AH) interpreted the reference to will in the statement, “Whenever He wills,” as the will to make His speech heard. He based this upon the view that speech is an internal attribute that does not depend upon will, but is an essential attribute like life and knowledge.

This interpretation was criticised from three ways.

First, returning the will to the will to make speech heard is an interpretation that moves the wording away from its apparent meaning without evidence.

Second, it requires the hearer to be eternal, because the phrase “He has never ceased” includes all of eternity without beginning.

Third, Imam Ahmad said in his reply to the Jahmiyyah concerning the statement of Allah Most High:

إِنَّا جَعَلْنَاهُ قُرْآنًا عَرَبِيًّا

“Indeed, We have made it an Arabic Qur’an.” (al Zukhruf 3)

He said that “We made it” means, “We rendered it through an act from among Our acts.” (Copy A, folio 199. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) This contradicts the interpretation of those who explain “making” as naming, continuing, or changing, as Ibn Aqil (d. 513 AH) chose in al Irshad.

The Meanings of “Making” and Imam Ahmad’s Evidence

The verb ja’ala (to make) is used in seven ways. Imam Ahmad mentioned four of them. Ibn Qutaybah (d. 276 AH) said that when it takes two objects, it means “to render,” while when it takes one object, it means “to create.” The first is found in the statement of Allah Most High:

إِنَّا رَادُّوهُ إِلَيْكِ وَجَاعِلُوهُ مِنَ الْمُرْسَلِينَ

“Indeed, We will return him to you and will make him one of the messengers.” (al Qasas 7)

The second is found in His statement:

وَجَعَلَ الظُّلُمَاتِ وَالنُّورَ

“And He made the darknesses and the light.” (al An’am 1)

I say that “making” may also mean a creational decree or a religious decree. An example of the second is His statement:

مَا جَعَلَ اللَّهُ مِنْ بَحِيرَةٍ وَلَا سَائِبَةٍ

“Allah has not instituted any Bahirah or Sa’ibah.” (al Ma’idah 103) (Ibn Qutaybah said in al Ikhtilaf fi al Lafz wa al Radd ala al Jahmiyyah, page 39: “As for their use of the word ‘making’ as evidence that the Qur’an is created, in the statement of Allah, ‘Indeed, We have made it an Arabic Qur’an’) (al Zukhruf 3) (the word ‘making’ has two meanings. One is creation, and the other is not creation. It means creation when it takes one object and does not pass beyond it, as in the statement of Allah, ‘He created the heavens and the earth and made the darknesses and the light’) (al An’am 1) (Here, it means ‘created.’ The same applies to His statement, ‘And He made from it its mate,’ meaning that He created its mate from it. It means something other than creation when it takes two objects, as in His statement, ‘You have made Allah your guarantor’) (al Nahl 91) (meaning ‘you have rendered Him.’ Likewise, ‘We made it an exemplary punishment for those before it and those after it’) (al Baqarah 66) (and the statement of a person, ‘So and so placed the matter of his wife in her own hand.’ If they find in the entire Qur’an any use of ‘making’ that takes two objects yet means creation, apart from their claim regarding the Qur’an alone, then we shall follow them. The same applies to the word ‘newly occurring.’ It does not mean ‘created’ in any of these passages. If they deny this, let them say concerning the statement of Allah, ‘Perhaps Allah will bring about after that a matter’) (al Talaq 1) (that He creates it. Likewise, His statement, ‘Perhaps they will become mindful, or it will produce for them remembrance’) (Ta Ha 113) (meaning that the Qur’an will renew within them a remembrance that was not present before. The same applies to His statement, ‘No renewed reminder comes to them from their Lord’) (al Anbiya 2) (meaning a reminder that newly reaches them and had not reached them before.”) (The word “as in His statement” was written in both copies without the curve of the letter that distinguishes “as,” so it appears as “because of His statement.”)

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Analogy between Divine Speech and Created Effects

Shaykh Taqi al Din Ibn Taymiyyah said that if the words of Imam Ahmad establish an endless succession in speech that occurs through will and choice, (The word “will” is written with an added preposition in both copies.) then it is permissible for Allah to bring about created effects, all of which are originated, without any first limit. (A word meaning “limit” appears to have dropped from the manuscript at this point.) Every created effect may be preceded by another created effect without any beginning, just as the succession of speech may have no beginning. (A second occurrence of the word “limit” in the manuscript appears to be an accidental repetition.) He derived this conclusion from that principle and maintained tasalsul (successive occurrence) among effects.

Aristotle, al Farabi, Ibn Sina, and those who held their position affirmed the eternity of a particular matter and of the heavens, as previously explained. The Shaykh did not affirm that. Rather, he declared as disbelievers those who held it.

Abu Hamid al Ghazali (d. 505 AH) said in Tahafut al Falasifah, “The philosophers disbelieved through three matters. The first is their doctrine of the eternity of the world. The second is their denial that Allah knows particulars. The third is their denial of the bodily resurrection proclaimed by the revealed religions.”

Shaykh Taqi al Din said, “They also disbelieve through denying the existence of the angels of Allah Most High, because the Qur’an decisively affirms their existence, as do the transmitted teachings of the messengers, peace be upon them.”

Al Ghazali said that their ruling concerning the divine attributes is the ruling of the Mu’tazilah. One scholar said that Ibn Sina and those who hold his position also disbelieve through claiming that the existence of the Creator Most High is an absolute universal qualified by absoluteness.

Shaykh Taqi al Din said that every individual member of these successive events is created, originated, and came to be after it had not existed. (Both copies read “for indeed” at the beginning of this sentence. The reading translated here is probably correct.) Yet the series continues without a first limit. (Copy B, folio 199. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) He adopted this position to avoid the claim of specification without a specifying factor, because he held that specification requires a specifying factor. Rather, he said that Allah Most High has never ceased acting, creating, and bringing things into existence through His power, will, and choice, just as, according to him, Allah has never ceased speaking through His will and choice. He said that bringing into existence and originating are attributes of perfection, as Allah Most High said:

أَفَمَنْ يَخْلُقُ كَمَنْ لَا يَخْلُقُ

“Is the One who creates like one who does not create?” (al Nahl 17)

I say that the philosophers affirm the eternity of particular matter and a particular duration, whereas Ibn Taymiyyah did not affirm the eternity of any particular material thing. Rather, he affirmed succession extending into the past. He supported this by future succession, in the sense that every future event comes after another event.

An objector said to him, “Those past matters have already entered existence, whereas future matters have not yet entered existence. Furthermore, describing them as originated events requires them to have a beginning.”

I say that we affirm that the world is originated and created, that it came to be after it had not existed, and that a voluntary agent may prefer according to power and choice. Allah existed and nothing existed with Him. I composed a poem on this meaning containing more than eighty lines. I presented it to him in the year 722 AH at his home in the Qassa’in School, seeking his view on successive events. He said to me, “Expand it in prose, because most people do not understand this poetry.”

I shall mention the poem, Allah willing, at the end of this work. (Unfortunately, the surviving manuscript is incomplete, so I did not find this poem.) We shall now present what this author wrote, explain what may be said in response, and state the questions that may be directed against him. Success comes from Allah.

The Author’s Argument that Nothing in the World Is Eternal

The author said, (meaning the objector who replied to Ibn Taymiyyah) “Know that the clear light and evident truth brought by the Qur’an and transmitted reports is that bodies are produced through choice, because intending to bring into existence something that already exists continuously is impossible.

“Furthermore, the world, or something within it, must fall under one of the following possibilities. It either has no agent, or its agent necessarily produces it by essence, or its agent is powerful and acts by choice while the object of His will occurs after Him. (Copy A, folio 200. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

“The first is false because of what will be established when proving knowledge of the Maker. The second and third are likewise false because of what will be established when proving that Allah Most High acts by choice. The fourth therefore becomes necessary, namely, that the agent acts by choice and that the object of His will comes after Him. Nothing in the world can therefore be eternal. Everything must be originated because it must come after its agent, while an eternal thing cannot come after Him because it exists continuously.

“Those who affirmed the continuous existence of bodies advanced several arguments. One was mentioned earlier under the category of action. Their second argument is that action was possible in eternity without beginning for several reasons.

“The first reason is that, had action not been possible in eternity, it would initially have been impossible and then become possible. Something impossible in itself would therefore have changed into something possible in itself, (The words “in itself” are written as “like itself” in both copies.) which destroys confidence in rational propositions. (The word “rational” contains a scribal error in both copies.)” (The author intended the first alternative, namely, that the world has no agent.) (The manuscript’s wording appears confused. The author probably mistakenly wrote “the third” when he meant “the second,” because the third position, that Allah Most High acts by choice and His intended effect occurs after Him, is the position that he accepts and later calls the fourth.) (This is an argument used to establish the possibility of temporal events with no beginning. It was discussed in the examination of the claims made against Risalat Mas’alat Huduth al Alam. Al Razi mentioned it in al Matalib al Aliyah min al Ilm al Ilahi, 1/143. Ibn Taymiyyah and then his students also used it.)

The author continued, “The second reason is that action is possible in what follows eternity. If its possibility belongs to its essence or rests upon a permanent cause, the possibility must be permanent. If it depends upon an originated cause, this is false, because the discussion about the possibility of that cause is the same as the discussion about the possibility of any other originated cause. This requires that the possibility of action remain continuously possible.

The Author’s Argument for Eternal Possibility

“The third reason is that if the impossibility of action belonged to its essence or arose from a cause necessary in itself, the impossibility would remain permanently. This is false by sensory experience, necessary knowledge, and the agreement of all rational people, because contingent things exist. If the impossibility arose from a cause that was not necessary, that cause could not be eternal and subsisting, because if its eternity became necessary, its nonexistence would be impossible. The same discussion would then apply to the impossibility of that cause as applied to the first. It is plainly false that action was impossible in eternity because of an originated cause, since what is eternal cannot depend upon an originated cause.

“It is therefore established that one cannot claim that contingent things could not exist in eternity. (A short word meaning “in” appears to have dropped from the copies.) It is also impossible to say that an agent was once unable to act and later became able, because the discussion concerning the impossibility and possibility of causation is the same as the discussion concerning the impossibility and possibility of the effect. Thus, they said, the dependence of contingent things upon an agent does not require their nonexistence to precede them.” (Copy B, folio 200. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) (Meaning that the contingency of a thing and its dependence upon the Necessary Existent do not, by themselves, prove that the thing is temporally originated.)

It is answered that certain knowledge establishes that this world came into existence after it had not existed. The Qur’an informs us of this, its transmission is necessarily known, and sound reason requires it. An act comes after its agent.

The philosophers said, “Its origination is essential, not temporal.” This is corrupt speech. Whenever something is produced by an agent, it is temporally originated. As for what they call essential origination, meaning that the agent accompanies His act and is simultaneous with His effect, while His precedence over it is not temporal, this is false, because an effect cannot be eternal.

The true content of their statement is that the agent is only a rational condition in the sense of necessary accompaniment, not an agent who actually brings about an act. They make the world dependent upon an agent only through conditional and inseparable dependence.

Their usual examples are the accompaniment of sunlight to the disc of the sun and the statement, “I moved my finger, so the ring moved.” These are corrupt examples and false comparisons. The finger is not itself the true mover of the ring. Rather, it is a condition in the motion. Their example therefore returns to conditional accompaniment, not to a true cause and effect where the connecting particle “so” enters, as in the statements, “I wounded him, so he was wounded,” and, “I broke it, so it broke.” The word “so” indicates succession, not simultaneity. Its use shows that the receiving of the action occurred after the act, not together with it.

The Necessary Succession between an Agent and Its Effect

Their statement that the agent’s precedence is not temporal is therefore certainly false. Likewise, the disc of the sun is not the agent that produces its light in the manner that a voluntary agent produces an act. Rather, the disc and the light are inseparably connected.

Whenever the philosophers admit that the world is an effect or an originated thing, their own acknowledgement defeats them. An effect comes after its agent, and an originated thing can exist only in time. An essential origination entirely free from time is a form of falsehood.

It is astonishing that they establish in logic the two distinct categories of action and being acted upon. They state that a thing cannot truly be described as receiving an action unless it has begun receiving it. Thus one says, “I broke it, so it began to break.” The description of breaking does not apply until the moment the thing begins receiving that action. Before that beginning, the description is not true. The same applies to, “I heated the water, so it became hot.” (Copy A, folio 201. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

A further condition is that there must be something capable of receiving the action. One does not say, “I made it nonexistent, so it received nonexistence.” The particle “so” enters the category of being acted upon and requires succession. How, then, can the receiving of an action be simultaneous with the action itself?

The jurists were quick to arrange the legal effect of contractual declarations in transactions. One group said that the legal effect occurs together with the final consonant in the statement, “I sold to you,” and together with the final consonant in the statement, “I purchased,” or, “I accepted.” This is the view of many jurists and the choice of al Juwayni. Others said that the effect occurs immediately after the final consonant or final vowel, without any intervening gap. The same principle applies to statements of information.

Bodies, Intellects, Souls, and the Claimed Immaterial Beings

When this is understood, the author’s statement, “Bodies are produced through choice,” should have been, “The entire world is produced through choice.” His departure from the general expression “the world” to the narrower expression “bodies” may be because he does not affirm intellects and souls as the philosophers do, calling them immaterial beings.

The philosophers, together with some theologians such as al Halimi (d. 403 AH), al Raghib al Isfahani (d. c. 502 AH), al Ghazali, and al Mufid the Shi’i (d. 413 AH), affirm intellects such as the First Intellect, the Active Intellect, and the Universal Intellect. Some of them distinguish the Universal Intellect from the First Intellect. (The word translated as “distinguish” is unclear in both copies.)

They also affirm that souls are immaterial and not imprinted within their bodies. According to them, a soul influences the body as a king influences his city, not through indwelling and physical settlement, but through command and prohibition. They present more than ten rational proofs for this claim. All of them are defective and false. The most that may be concluded from many of them is that souls are distinct from this particular sensible and visible structure, not that they are separate from it.

They say that intellects and souls are immaterial beings that are neither inside the world nor outside it. According to their claim, they share this negation with the Necessary Existent. (The word “Necessary” contains a scribal error in the manuscript.) They argue that sharing in negations does not require resemblance. Fakhr al Din al Razi went further and said that even sharing in affirmed descriptions does not prove resemblance. We say, “An existent and an existent, a knower and a knower, a powerful being and a powerful being, a hearing being and a hearing being,” yet one is not the same as the other.

Among those who affirmed the immateriality of souls were al Raghib, al Halimi, al Ghazali, and al Mufid the Shi’i. (Copy B, folio 201. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) Al Razi objected to this position.

As for the intellects they claim to exist, those intellects are not composed of the four elements and, according to them, are neither inside the world nor outside it.

The First Intellect and the Limits of the Philosophers’ Proof

They say that the First Agent initially produced one intellect, because, according to their principle, only one can proceed from one. A soul then proceeded from the intellect. They call the First Intellect “the preceding one” and the soul “the following one.” Thereafter, the produced things became numerous. (The manuscript appears to read “recurred” rather than “became numerous.”)

They said that multiplicity occurred only after the production of the soul because the relevant aspects became numerous through an agent, an intellect, and a soul. It was answered that these conceptual considerations possess no causal force by which they could produce multiple things.

The philosophers were then asked, “If every specification requires a specifying factor, why was the intellect specifically produced first rather than the soul? Why did the soul follow the intellect? (The word translated as “why” may instead be read as “and because.”) What required the intellect to precede? If specification without a cause is possible, your proof collapses. If it is not possible, your doctrine collapses because you cannot explain why the intellect preceded the soul.” They have no way out of this question.

If the author believes in the existence of immaterial beings, his statement proves only the origination of bodies, while those claimed immaterial beings are not bodies.

Fakhr al Din al Razi said, “The proof based upon motion and negations establishes only the origination of bodies and accidents. It has no general force proving the origination of anything besides intellects and souls.”

Al Juwayni said, “Necessary knowledge establishes that contingent things are confined to bodies and accidents.”

Thus, if the author acknowledges the existence of immaterial intellects and souls, the evidence to which he referred accepts the origination of only part of the world, namely, substances and accidents.

Nasir al Din al Tusi (d. 672 AH) said, “No proof has established that intellects are impossible, while the proofs offered for their existence are defective.” (Copy A, folio 201. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.) (The meaning of the preceding discussion is that a proof for the origination of the world based only upon the origination of bodies and accidents does not establish the conclusion for anyone who affirms immaterial intellects and souls. Their proof would establish the origination of bodies but not the origination of those immaterial beings. This is a problem affecting what may be described as the idealism of theologians and philosophers such as Ibn Sina and those who followed him, because they affirm as externally existing certain immaterial matters that, upon careful examination, exist only in the mind.)

Revelation Establishes that Nothing Eternal Exists with Allah, and the Claimed Immaterial Beings Have No Reality

I say, (meaning Ibn Qadi al Jabal) that rational demonstrations and transmitted proofs establish that nothing eternal exists alongside Allah Most High, as has been explained in its proper place. The claimed immaterial beings have no reality.

When this is understood, the author’s statement, “Intending to bring an existing thing into existence is impossible,” is beyond doubt. An agent’s influence upon a thing must be preceded by that thing’s nonexistence. The thing cannot be eternal, because nothing precedes what is eternal. Therefore, the true meaning of huduth (origination), as understood by all people, is that the existence of a thing is preceded by its nonexistence. (Copy B, folio 202. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

Explaining Origination as Contingency Is Unknown in Language, Revelation, and Common Usage

The philosophers who affirm eternity sometimes explain origination as dependence upon another and call this “essential origination.” (The word “essential” appears in both copies as “second.” The reading translated here is probably correct.)

Your explanation of origination in this way is unknown in language, revelation, and customary usage. It is only a technical convention that you invented to agree with your doctrine of eternity, although it opposes reason and revelation. In no language is a thing called originated simply because it depends upon another. (The words translated as “a thing” appear joined in the manuscript as a single word meaning “only.” The separated reading is probably correct. The wording around “depends upon another” contains a scribal disturbance. The manuscript reads “originated,” although the editor thought that “eternal” may have been intended.)

This resembles Ibn Sina’s departure from all rational people in explaining aful. In language, aful means setting, disappearance, and concealment. An object that sets is concealed by intervening things. Thus, the statement of Allah Most High means:

فَلَمَّا أَفَلَ

“When it set.” (al An’am 76)

That is, when it disappeared and became concealed.

Mus’ab ibn al Zubayr (d. 72 AH), when meeting the army of Abd al Malik ibn Marwan (d. 86 AH) on the day Mus’ab was killed, recited:

“Why should I say that the sword’s sheath weighs upon my shoulder,
If I do not ride with it into the most difficult danger?

I shall defend them until I die, and whoever dies
As a noble debtor of honour bears neither blame nor reproach.”

The two lines were composed by another person, and Mus’ab only used them. (Tarikh al Islam wa Wafayat al Mashahir wa al A’lam, 5/305, by al Dhahabi.) The phrase concerning the sword means its sheath, the thing that conceals it.

The Philosophers’ Misinterpretation of Setting and the Forms of Dependence

Ibn Sina, however, explained the statement, “When it set,” as, “It entered the realm of possibility, because entering the realm of possibility is a type of setting.” Fakhr al Din al Razi mentioned this in his large Tafsir. He said, in meaning, that the star is a body occupying space and undergoing motion, then divided the evidence for its origination into three types: (The word “three” is written unclearly in the manuscript.) evidence from its bodily nature and occupation of space, evidence from its motion, and evidence from its setting. The critical philosophers said that setting meant entering the realm of possibility. (Copy B, folio 202. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

I say that this belongs to the same type of falsehood and impossibility as the preceding matter. In two matters, the philosophers departed from the understanding of all rational people.

The first is their treatment of a contingent thing as eternal, although contingency belongs only to an originated thing. According to them, the world is contingent while also eternal. Ibn Sina contradicted himself, because he explicitly stated that contingency is incompatible with eternity. He explained a contingent thing by saying, “This earth may remain,” and similar examples, then contradicted that foundation in his metaphysical principles.

The second is their treatment of dependence as origination. Know that dependence has three meanings.

The first is the dependence of one thing upon another for its existence, such as the dependence of contingent things upon their Creator, glorified is He.

The second is dependence through necessary accompaniment, such as the dependence of the parts of a whole upon one another and the dependence of one correlative upon the other.

The third is dependence through inherence, such as the dependence of a human attribute upon the person in whom it inheres and the dependence of an accident upon a substance.

Whoever carefully understands this distinction will resolve many theological discussions. The theologians build many arguments upon the invalidity of dependence, thinking that it is always dependence through origination, whereas their evidence often establishes only necessary accompaniment. (The word “evidence” contains a scribal error in the Taymuriyyah copy.) In that case, their evidence does not produce the conclusion they claim.

Two Meanings of Eternity and the Claim of Prior Matter and Duration

They explain qidam (eternity without beginning), opposite to origination, in two ways.

The first is that a thing exists in a manner such that its nonexistence did not occur in a time before its existence.

The second is that the thing does not need another for its existence.

The Reply to the Philosophers’ Argument for the Eternity of Matter

The philosophers said that origination in the first meaning requires prior matter and prior duration.

They argued for prior matter by saying that the possibility of the originated thing exists before it. That possibility must have a subject that is not itself originated, and this subject is matter.

They argued for prior duration by saying that the thing’s nonexistence precedes its existence. This precedence is not precedence in knowledge, essence, honour, or place, so it must be temporal precedence.

The first claim was answered by saying that possibility is nonexistence and does not require an external subject. The second was answered by saying that precedence may exist without a prior temporal container, just as today precedes tomorrow.

The author said, (meaning the objector who replied to Ibn Taymiyyah) “Those who affirmed the continuous existence of bodies advanced several arguments. One was mentioned earlier under the category of action. Another is that action was possible in eternity without beginning for several reasons.

“The first reason is that if action had not been possible then, it would initially have been impossible and later become possible. Something impossible in itself would therefore have changed into something possible in itself, which destroys confidence in rational propositions.

“The second reason is that action is possible in what follows eternity. If its possibility belongs to its essence or rests upon a permanent cause, its possibility must be permanent. If it depends upon an originated cause, this is false because the continuing discussion concerning that cause is the same as the discussion concerning the possibility of any other originated cause. This requires the continuing possibility of action.

The Repeated Argument for Eternal Possibility

“The third reason is that if the impossibility of action belongs to its essence or arises from a cause necessary in itself, the impossibility must remain permanently. This is false by sensory experience, necessary knowledge, and the agreement of all rational people, because contingent things exist. If the impossibility arises from a cause that is not necessary, that cause cannot be eternal and subsisting, because if its eternity became necessary, its nonexistence would be impossible. The same discussion about its impossibility then applies as in the first case. It is plainly false that action was impossible in eternity because of an originated cause, since an eternal thing cannot arise from an originated cause.

“It is therefore established that existence in eternity cannot be denied. It also cannot be said that the agent was once unable to cause an effect and later became able, because the discussion concerning the impossibility and possibility of receiving an effect is the same as the discussion concerning the impossibility and possibility of the effect itself.

“They said, ‘It is therefore established that the dependence of contingent things upon an agent does not require their nonexistence to precede them.’” This is the end of his statement. (Copy A, folio 203. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 99.)

The Meaning of Eternity without Beginning

I say, (meaning Ibn Qadi al Jabal) that the scholars said that al azal (eternity without beginning) refers to times conceived in the mind that have no limit.

According to philosophers who affirm eternity, it refers to actual times, within every one of which there was motion. On the opponents’ own position, it is therefore true that one motion existed in eternity. This is because that totality of limitless times contains motions without limit. If it is true that limitless motions existed, then it is also true that a motion existed. It is therefore true that a motion existed in eternity and that it was preceded by another motion. This does not contradict eternity, because that individual motion does not occupy the whole collection of limitless times.

The contradiction alleged by the theologians would follow only if eternity were a single particular time. (The word “if” is written as “mention” in both copies. The reading translated here is probably correct.) If eternity means times with no beginning and no finite limit, their intended conclusion does not follow.

The Word “Azal” Is Not Originally Arabic

I say that the word azal is not originally an Arabic word. Abu Hilal al Askari (d. 395 AH) rejected it and said, “Their expressions ‘azal’ and ‘azali’ are not known in the language.”

I say that they took the expression from la yazal, meaning, “He does not cease,” even though, in their terminology, azal means the absence of being preceded, while la yazal refers to what continues after that.

The same applies to qidam and qadim. In language, qadim means something that preceded another thing. I asked a number of specialists in language whether they knew any different meaning in Arabic, and they denied it. In the terminology of the theologians, however, qadim means that whose existence has no beginning.

As for the Noble Book, this word is mentioned in four places. One of them is… (There is a missing passage here in both surviving copies.)

The Objection Based upon the Eternity of Possibility

Fakhr al Din al Razi and Afdal al Din al Khunaji (d. 646 AH) then said in support of the argument, (Copy A, folio 231. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.) “If an originated thing is considered together with the condition that it is preceded by nonexistence, the possibility of its existence is eternal, as you have stated, although its own eternity is not possible. The originated thing, precisely because it is originated, cannot itself be eternal.”

It was answered, “Your statement that an originated thing, together with the condition that it is preceded by nonexistence, has always been possible, is contradictory. Something preceded by nonexistence cannot be eternal. It must have a beginning. What must have a beginning cannot be described as having always been possible.

“If you intend a particular originated thing and say that its origination has always been possible, then that particular thing came into existence only when the causes requiring its origination came together and its origination became possible. As for the genus of events, all of which you describe as preceded by nonexistence and existing after they had not existed, it is impossible for that genus, while preceded by nonexistence, to be eternal and without beginning.

The Difference between Eternal Possibility and Possible Eternity

“To combine the claim that a thing is preceded by nonexistence with the claim that it is eternal without beginning is to combine two contradictions. (The word “combine” appears in the Taymuriyyah copy as “all.”) If its eternity is impossible, its eternity is not possible. It is therefore impossible to say that its possibility is eternal or that the possibility of it is eternal, whether one says, ‘the possibility of its eternity,’ or, ‘the eternity of its possibility.’” (Copy A, folio 232. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

I say that one later theologian said that their objection may be stated in another way. It may be said, “If the world is originated, then the possibility of its origination either has a beginning or has no beginning. Both alternatives are false.

“The first is false because of what has already been explained. The second is false because, if the possibility of its origination has no beginning, its origination must be possible in eternity. This combines its being originated with its being eternal, which combines two contradictions.

“It cannot be answered that its origination is possible at every time without its becoming eternal through origination at any of those times.”

Although this would require the possibility of its origination to have a beginning, we do not accept that this is false because of the proof you mentioned. It does not follow that a thing changed from essential impossibility to essential possibility. Its impossibility was caused by eternity, which is a matter external to the essence of an originated thing. A change from impossibility caused by an external matter to essential possibility does not count as an impossible change. (The word “possibility” appears in the manuscript as “security.”)

We say that no matter which time is proposed, the thing could have originated one hundred or one thousand years earlier, because such an earlier existence would not make it eternal. There is therefore no proposed time at which its origination was not possible. The original objection thus returns.

He said, “The answer is that this abolishes origination altogether, because the same statement can be made about every time. That conclusion is certainly false.”

He said, “This is a dialectical answer.”

The Clarifying Answer to the Objection

He continued, “The answer that uncovers the source of the problem requires careful examination. The objection denies eternity but also seems to require the combination of contradictions. Their statement, ‘The origination of the originated thing is not possible in eternity, even though the possibility of its origination has no beginning,’ appears to combine two contradictions.”

Al Iraqi said in his commentary on al Arba’in, “The eternity of possibility does not require the possibility of eternity.”

Through this distinction, the true nature of the question and its answer becomes clear. The reality of their statement, if established, (The wording translated as “the reality of their statement” is unclear. The intended wording may be “their statement requires.”) is that the thing possesses eternal possibility but not the possibility of being eternal.

The world, considered in itself, is contingent. (Copy B, folio 232. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.) Yet a contingent thing may be related to something that takes it out of that description and into another. If the world is related to eternity without beginning, its existence becomes impossible. If it is related to what follows eternity, its existence is possible.

This resembles an accident. If considered apart from any substance, its existence is impossible. If considered together with the existence of a substance, its existence is possible. Likewise, if a substance is considered together with the absence of an agent, its existence is impossible. If considered together with the existence of an agent, its existence is possible. If considered apart from both opposing conditions, it remains possible because it is contingent in itself.

A thing being contingent in itself does not require it to be possible in every condition. The world is therefore contingent in itself when eternity and what follows it are disregarded. When related to eternity, it is impossible. When related to what follows eternity, it is possible. The relation of eternity and what follows it to the world is like the relation of the existence and nonexistence of a substance to an accident, and like the relation of the existence and nonexistence of an agent to a substance.

Al Razi’s Objection and Ibn Taymiyyah’s Reply

The author said, (meaning the objector who replied to Ibn Taymiyyah) reporting from the Imam, meaning Fakhr al Din al Razi, “There is an objection to this method. We say that if an originated thing is considered precisely as something preceded by nonexistence, then, with this condition, its possibility cannot be confined to one time rather than another, because of the proofs you have mentioned. Its possibility is continuously established.

“The permanence of its possibility does not remove it from origination, because we have considered it specifically as something preceded by nonexistence. Being preceded by nonexistence is therefore part of its very meaning, and the essential parts of a thing do not cease. If the occurrence of an originated thing does not remove it from being originated, this proof is invalid.” (The word “invalid” appears in the Taymuriyyah copy as “sought.”)

I say, (meaning Ibn Qadi al Jabal) that the answer to this objection has already been given in the preceding discussion.

The author said, (meaning the objector who replied to Ibn Taymiyyah) “Ibn Taymiyyah said, ‘This doubt is the objection upon which Ibn al Khatib relied (The word translated as “doubt” is unclear in al Umariyyah, and the Taymuriyyah copy supplies this reading conjecturally.) in his theological works, including al Arba’in, (The Taymuriyyah copy reads “and al Arba’in” rather than “including al Arba’in.”) and upon which al Amidi relied in Daqa’iq al Haqa’iq and elsewhere.’ (Copy A, folio 233. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.) He then said, ‘It is false. The answer to this proof is that it does not establish the possibility of any particular thing.’”

I say, (meaning Ibn Qadi al Jabal) that our Shaykh considered this objection false for two reasons.

The first is that it is a dialectical objection that does not resolve the underlying doubt.

The second is that it considers an originated thing together with the condition that it is preceded by nonexistence, and the problem with that formulation has already been explained.

His statement that the proof does not establish the possibility of any particular thing means that even if it established the eternity of possibility, it would show only the possibility of the genus of action. It would not prove the eternity of any particular thing, unlike the philosophers’ belief in the eternity of the celestial spheres, elements, and similar particular entities.

The Anonymous Author’s Criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah

The author said, “This man, meaning Ibn Taymiyyah, appeared at the beginning of the seventh century. He claimed to be one who manifested the Sunnah, supported its people, destroyed innovation, and subdued its adherents. By my life, he was indeed so. Yet he was never free of harshness toward all other groups, including many followers of Ahmad ibn Hanbal.

“The soul certainly commands evil except for those upon whom my Lord has mercy. His greatest harshness was directed against the Ash’aris, such as al Ghazali, his followers, and his teachers. He deliberately sought to refute them in everything they said or introduced by way of proof, even when it was true in itself, as will become clear to you. This was among the reasons hearts turned against him, (The manuscript reads “changed the hearts” rather than “turned the hearts.”) because people thought him partisan or ignorant.” This is the end of his statement.

The answer is given from several ways.

The first is that his statement, “He appeared at the beginning of the seventh century,” is plainly mistaken. (A word following “plainly” is unclear in both copies.) His appearance could have been at the beginning of the seventh century only if it occurred shortly after the year 600 AH. This author was ignorant of a matter from the recent past. Ibn Taymiyyah died on 20 Dhu al Qi’dah 728 AH and was born in 661 AH. How could his appearance have been at the beginning of the seventh century? According to the author’s statement, he appeared several decades before his own birth. (Copy B, folio 233. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

Replies concerning Chronology, Contradiction, and Swearing

The second is that the author claimed that the Shaykh manifested the Sunnah and subdued innovation, (The word “manifested” contains a scribal error in al Umariyyah.) then swore by his own life that this was true. If he spoke truthfully, then whoever manifests the Sunnah and subdues innovation is among the firmly grounded Imams. (The pronoun “he” is repeated at the end of one folio and the beginning of the next.) If the author later alleged something contrary to this acknowledgement, his later allegation is false because he contradicted himself and withdrew what he had already acknowledged.

The third is that he swore by his own life, which is not permissible in the revealed law. The Prophet ﷺ said in the two Sahih collections, “Whoever swears must swear by Allah.” (Sahih al Bukhari 2679) (Sahih Muslim 1646)

He ﷺ also said in the two Sahih collections, “Allah has forbidden you from swearing by your fathers.” (Sahih al Bukhari 6647) (Sahih Muslim 1646)

Al Shafi’i (d. 204 AH) said, “I dislike swearing by other than Allah, and I fear that it may be prohibited.”

As for the report in Sahih Muslim, attributed to the Prophet ﷺ, “He will succeed, by his father, if he speaks the truth,” the recognised answers concerning it are well known. (Sahih Muslim 11)

The fourth is his statement, “He was never free of harshness toward all other groups.” He used the word sa’ir to mean “all,” which is rejected in careful Arabic usage.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Respect for the Hanbalis and the Ash’ari Scholars

His statement, “including many followers of Imam Ahmad,” is untrue. (The word “untrue” is absent from the Taymuriyyah copy because it is unclear in al Umariyyah.) We do not know that Ibn Taymiyyah deliberately disparaged or belittled any of them. (The manuscript word translated as “deliberately” is uncertain. It may mean “undertook.”) Rather, he honoured their scholars.

A person who discusses foundational and subsidiary questions according to the method of independent jurists, following the evidence and the demonstration wherever they lead, (The word “evidence” is corrupt in the Taymuriyyah copy.) and who speaks with rational and transmitted proof, cannot be called harsh or prejudiced. (Copy A, folio 234. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

His statement, “His greatest harshness was directed against the Ash’aris,” is false, as anyone familiar with the Shaykh’s life and writings knows.

He greatly honoured Abu al Hasan Ali ibn Isma’il al Ash’ari (d. 324 AH). (Two nearby references to “the Imam” have minor prepositional differences between the copies.) He mentioned the breadth of knowledge, sharp understanding, abundance of writings, and eloquence that Allah granted him. In public gatherings, as I personally heard him do on more occasions than I can count, he would recite from memory al Ash’ari’s words in al Ibanah, his praise of Imam Ahmad, and his concluding statement about Ahmad:

He also greatly honoured Imam Abu Bakr al Baqillani (d. 403 AH), who followed Abu al Hasan in the science of kalam. He showed profound respect for Imam Abu al Ma’ali al Juwayni and mentioned his virtues and writings, including that he wrote one thousand pages concerning the soul.

He praised Imam Abu Hamid al Ghazali. I read before him al Ta’rifah by Abu Hamid, and he repeatedly expressed amazement at the beauty of its wording and the strength of its indications. (The title appears in the Taymuriyyah copy as al Ta’rifah. The probable reading may be al Ma’rifah, but no work of al Ghazali with this title has been identified.)

As for the author’s statement that Ibn Taymiyyah intended to refute what they introduced even when it was true, it is said that this contradicts his own earlier testimony. No fair person thinks that the well known Imams of Muslim knowledge and religion deliberately seek to invalidate truth or establish falsehood. Allah Most High has protected the scholarly Imams from such conduct. (Copy B, folio 234. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

The Claim that Ibn Taymiyyah’s Position Leads to Ibn Sina’s Doctrine

The author said, “Among the proofs upon which the theologians built their position that the Creator Most High acts by choice and does not necessarily produce effects by His essence was the impossibility of temporal events with no beginning.

“This man deliberately adopted the doctrine of temporal events with no beginning. He therefore became subject to what follows against Ibn Sina and his followers, namely, the eternity of the world. He denied that consequence and tried to support his denial. His example is like prey caught in a net. Every time it moves to free itself, it becomes more entangled.

“He mentioned things which, if you wish, you may call entirely senseless. If you wish, you may say that their substance returns to two matters.

“The first is his claim that what must be eternal through temporal events with no beginning is only the type. He said, (meaning Ibn Taymiyyah) ‘The eternity of the type of events does not require the eternity of any individual event.’

“The second is that he compared the type to a whole composed of parts. He meant that attributing a description to a whole does not require attributing the same description to any one of its parts. This is like a human being, a house, and a tree. No single part is itself a house, a human being, or a tree. The same applies to length and width.

“This comparison is confused. A type is a kulli (universal), while a composite collection is a kull (whole). What connection is there between a universal and a whole? It is known that a universal exists only in a particular. Therefore, if the universal were eternal, one of its particulars would necessarily be eternal.

“Through all this, he tried to distinguish his position from that of Ibn Sina and his followers, who affirmed the eternity of the intellect. You and everyone worthy of being addressed knows that if he intended the type to be eternal while entirely separate from every individual temporal event, (The word “that” is absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.) he affirmed the external existence of a universal precisely as a universal. This is impossible and no rational person holds it, as he himself stated clearly elsewhere.

“If he intended the type to be eternal in one of its individuals, then there is no difference between his position and Ibn Sina’s except that Ibn Sina specified which eternal individual it was, namely, the Active Intellect, while this man did not specify it.

“If disbelief necessarily follows against Ibn Sina in this question, it apparently follows against this man as well. Ibn Sina was not declared a disbeliever because he specified which thing other than Allah was eternal. Rather, he was declared a disbeliever because he believed that something other than Allah was eternal. If this man’s statement does not make him a disbeliever despite his belief in something eternal other than Allah, then Ibn Sina should not be declared a disbeliever for believing in a specified eternal thing other than Allah Most High.”

The Reply to One Who Attributes the Philosophers’ Doctrines to Ibn Taymiyyah

The answer is given from several ways. (What follows is the reply of Ibn Qadi al Jabal to the author’s preceding words.)

The first is that the author departed from proper conduct in his wording (The manuscript writes “one of them” rather than “the first.”) and from fairness in his manner of expression. (Copy A, folio 235. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.) Scholars are not addressed in such a way.

The second is that his statement, “Ibn Sina specified the eternal thing as the Active Intellect,” requires that Ibn Sina confined eternity to the Active Intellect. This is certainly false, as we have already related concerning his doctrine. Ibn Sina held that the heavenly bodies are eternal in their essences and attributes and move with a single circular motion from eternity without beginning to eternity without end. According to him, their type is eternal while their individual motions are originated.

The author’s restriction of Ibn Sina’s doctrine to the Active Intellect proves that he did not understand the doctrine of Ibn Sina and those before and after him who adopted it.

The third is that we have transmitted from Imam Ahmad his position that Allah Most High has never ceased speaking whenever He wills. Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah sanctify his soul, understood Imam Ahmad’s words according to their apparent meaning, as did many of Ahmad’s followers and many others.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Position on Successive Divine Acts and Created Effects

He said that this requires succession without a first limit in the past. The Mu’tazilah and Karramiyyah both affirm speech connected to choice. The Mu’tazilah hold that it occurs separately from Allah, while the Karramiyyah hold that it occurs connected to Him. Yet the Karramiyyah gave it a beginning by saying that it came into existence after it had not existed. (A phrase at this point is partly erased in the Taymuriyyah copy. Its probable meaning is the wording translated here.)

As for the existence of created effects without a beginning in the past, we do not know this to have been explicitly transmitted from Imam Ahmad. Some of his words may even indicate the contrary. In his book al Radd ala al Jahmiyyah, he transmitted from Ibn Abbas (d. 68 AH) that the first created thing was the Pen.

Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned in his own book that an endless past succession of created effects is possible. I also heard that he affirmed its actual occurrence. He said that Allah Most High acts by choice. Just as, according to him, there is no first limit to Allah’s speech, it is likewise possible that there is no beginning to His acting. He therefore affirmed the possibility of temporal events with no beginning. (Copy B, folio 235. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

(A distinction must be made between succession in divine acts and succession in created things. Many Ash’aris do not distinguish between these two matters when describing Ibn Taymiyyah’s doctrine. Succession in divine acts follows from the affirmation that Allah Most High has never ceased speaking whenever He wills. This is an act subsisting in Him, Most High, and its continuity is necessary. Succession in created things may refer to two different meanings. The first is that every created individual belonging to a particular type or class is preceded by another individual of the same type or class. Ibn Taymiyyah’s position is that this is possible, such as the possibility that the type of a world has no beginning. He did not treat this as necessary. The second is that every created thing is preceded by another created thing from Allah Most High without any beginning, without restricting the series to one particular type, such as a world, human beings, or animals. This follows necessarily from His being eternally described with the attribute of creating. Every divine act is preceded by another because Allah Most High is eternal in His essence and attributes. This does not require any particular type of created thing, such as the type of worlds or animals, to continue without a first limit. Nor does it require that Allah be unable to annihilate all created things and exist alone at some time without any created thing, because creation after complete nonexistence remains possible.)

Ibn Sina and those who hold his position say that the celestial spheres, though eternal in their essences and attributes, move through motions that have no first limit, while also affirming the specified eternity of those spheres, as we have explained.

Most theologians and people of rational investigation hold that temporal events with no beginning are impossible. Ibn Taymiyyah’s earlier discussion with the author concerns those who agree that speech succeeds without a first limit. Ibn Sina and his followers similarly affirm succession without a first limit in the motions of the celestial spheres. (Copy A, folio 239. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

If a proof establishes that succession among effects is impossible, then whoever permits it must answer that proof. We have already mentioned the proof of correspondence and the objections directed against it.

There is no doubt that created effects with no final limit will occur in the future, as in the bliss of the people of Paradise. Only the Jahmiyyah disagreed with this. Abu al Hudhayl held that future motions would end, and we transmitted the report that he retracted that position.

The Type, Its Individuals, and Endless Succession

The next response is that if Ibn Taymiyyah says, (The source labels this “the second response,” although it is probably the fifth response.) “What is eternal in a succession of temporal events with no beginning is only the type,” he does not mean that any individual event or any one instance is eternal. Rather, he assigns to the collection a ruling not assigned to any individual member. What belongs to the collection is the succession and extension conceived through it.

This type is a universal whose place is the mind, not external reality. The same applies to the individual pleasures of Paradise. The ruling of endless duration belongs to their universal type, even though every particular item of food and drink is consumed and every individual motion passes away. The continuing universal type does not cease, yet this does not require any particular individual pleasure to be everlasting.

The Shaykh therefore says to you concerning attributing endless future duration to the type of created effects, “Your answer concerning future succession is also my answer concerning past succession, because no individual member is specified as eternal. I have not affirmed the eternity of any member, any individual, or any part of an individual. Rather, the origination found in eternity without beginning is like the origination found in eternity without end.”

When the discussion concerns a type, the type is a universal and its existence is mental. (The word “was” is absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.) Its individuals exist externally and it is realised through them. (The word “that” is absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.) In the same way, the collection is described through a mentally considered proof as successive, while each individual externally existing member is described as originated. (Copy B, folio 239. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

Ibn Qadi al Jabal’s Question to Ibn Taymiyyah concerning the Collection and Its Individual Members

I asked the Shaykh what he meant by his statement, “A ruling may be established for a collection that is not established for its individual members.” I asked, “What is the particular ruling established for the collection here?”

He answered, “What distinguishes the collection from the individual members, even though every individual member is originated, is its succession and extension.”

He explained this to us nearly forty years ago, less than ten years before his death. When a speaker explains his own intended meaning, his words may not be carried upon another meaning contrary to what he expressly stated in a question of this kind.

If you say to Ibn Taymiyyah, “A universal exists only in a particular. If the universal is eternal, one of its particulars must be eternal,” he may answer you from several ways.

The first is the example already given of the endlessly continuing created effects of Paradise. Their type is universal, yet the everlasting existence of any particular member does not follow.

The second is that our statement, “The universal exists in its particulars,” (The words “its particulars” are restored from al Umariyyah, page 94, and are absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.) means that it exists as particulars, not that it exists as a universal within external reality. It therefore does not follow that the ruling established for the universal is established for the particular. No one has ever transmitted that a universal exists within its particular as a universal. (The corresponding phrase is difficult to read in both copies.) Universals exist in minds, not in external entities.

If the ruling established for the collection belongs to the universal considered by the mind, (A phrase in this sentence is absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.) and that ruling does not belong to an external individual, then the consequence you claimed has been avoided. Your mistake arose from failing to distinguish these matters.

The third is that if every ruling established for a universal had to be established for its particulars, then, according to your own reasoning, all the particulars would have to be eternal. No rational person holds this.

The fourth is that all future particulars would likewise have to be everlasting, which is certainly false. (Copy A, folio 237. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

The Reply to the Claim that Ibn Taymiyyah Did Not Distinguish between a Universal and a Whole

The author’s second statement remains. (Al Umariyyah, page 94, adds the words “and this comparison.”) He said that Ibn Taymiyyah compared a type to a whole composed of parts and argued that attributing a ruling to a whole does not require attributing it to any part, as with a human being, a house, and a tree. No single part is itself a house, a human being, or a tree. The same applies to length and width. The author then said that this comparison is false because a type is a universal while a collection is a whole, and asked, “What connection is there between a universal and a whole?” He further claimed that a universal exists only in a particular, so if the universal were eternal, one of its particulars would have to be eternal.

It is answered that Ibn Taymiyyah does not need to compare a universal to a whole. When he says that the series continues while each member is originated, he means that a ruling may be established for the collection that is not established for any individual member. The collection is distinguished by the description of succession and extension. The collection as a whole is successive and extended, while no single individual member is successive and extended. A ruling has therefore been established for the collection that is not established for its individual members.

Furthermore, the collection is universal in consideration while the individual members are particulars. The author says, “That is a universal, while this is a whole. What connection is there between a universal and a whole?” Ibn Taymiyyah answers that a ruling may be established for a collection that is not established for any individual member, whether that collection is considered as a whole or as a universal.

An example involving a whole is what the author himself mentioned concerning a tree, a house, and a human being. An example involving a universal is the universal human being (The word “universal” may be read as “whole” in the Taymuriyyah copy.) in relation to individual human beings. The individuals are particulars while the universal is not a particular. The same applies to the universal animal in relation to its individuals, which is more general than the universal human being.

The same principle applies to mass transmitted reports. Each individual report is particular while their type is universal. It also applies to the bodies of a group of Black people, to every individual in relation to its universal, and to every part in relation to its whole.

It does not follow that every ruling established for an individual is established for its universal, nor that every ruling established for a part is established for its whole. The implication fails both directly and in reverse. (A short phrase in the source is absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.)

It is known that a universal differs from a whole in eight ways.

One difference is that the universal exists in minds, while the whole exists externally. (A universal does not exist as such among external entities. It exists in the mind, while the existence of a particular realises the universal in consideration.)

Another difference is that a universal is realised through its particulars, while a whole is constituted by its parts. (The Taymuriyyah wording is corrupt. Al Umariyyah, page 94, supports the reading translated here.)

Further Differences between a Universal and a Whole

The third difference is that the parts of a whole are finite, while the particulars falling under a universal may be unlimited.

The distinction between the universal and the expression “every one” is that every single unit among ten is not ten, while the whole is ten. (Copy B, folio 237. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.) Every one of the parts of a whole is not the whole, while the collection of them is the whole. What answer can the author give to this?

If Ibn Taymiyyah says to him, “Your claim that what followed against Ibn Sina also follows against me is error and false accusation. Ibn Sina openly affirms the eternity of the celestial spheres and intellects, while I openly affirm the origination of everything other than Allah Most High. How, then, can what followed against Ibn Sina follow against me?”

The author’s statement, “If he intended that the type is eternal in one of its individuals,” (The word “his statement” appears in the Taymuriyyah copy as “your statement.”) imposes upon Ibn Taymiyyah a meaning he neither stated nor intended. The intended meaning has already been explained. The author attributed to him what he did not say and imposed upon him a consequence that did not follow. His division was therefore incomplete, his construction unsound, and his conclusion invalid.

Ibn Taymiyyah then says to him, “How could I affirm the eternity of one individual member while explicitly declaring every individual member originated? Your claim that this necessarily follows rests upon your own understanding and division. Your understanding cannot serve as evidence for declaring scholars disbelievers or imposing such consequences upon them.

“Give careful investigation its proper right if you are qualified for it. Otherwise, every setting has its proper speech, and every discipline has its qualified people.”

As it has been said:

“O you who tries to carve a bow without mastering its craft,
Leave this burden and give the bow to the one who knows how to carve it.

You transmit reports with every reckless claim,
While one such as I understands their meanings.” (Majma al Amthal, 2/19, by al Maydani.) (Nafh al Tib min Ghusn al Andalus al Ratib, 2/84, edited by Ihsan Abbas, states: “Abu Bakr Ibn Mufawwaz composed a short work replying to Abu Muhammad Ibn Hazm. In it, he said by way of indirect criticism: ‘O you who takes on matters that you cannot properly undertake, leave this undertaking and give the bow to the one who knows how to carve it. You transmit reports with every careless concession, while those like me know their meanings.’ It is also said that he addressed these lines to one of Ibn Hazm’s followers.)

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Answer to Misrepresentation

Ibn Taymiyyah may further say, “You misunderstood me, (The word “that” is absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.) attributed to me a statement I never intended, and made what followed against Ibn Sina follow against me. This arose from your weak understanding.

“You said that I either intended the eternity of the individuals in external reality, which I do not affirm, or intended the eternity of one individual, in which case what followed against Ibn Sina would follow against me, except that Ibn Sina specified the individual while I did not. I intended neither of these two meanings, as has already been explained.” (Copy A, folio 238. The same passage appears in al Umariyyah, page 94.)

A Necessary Implication of a School Is Not Itself the School

The author’s division is either exhaustive or not exhaustive. (The words explaining that an incomplete division invalidates the conclusion, and that an exhaustive division would establish only a claimed consequence, are absent from the Taymuriyyah copy.) If it is not exhaustive, his conclusion is invalid. If it is exhaustive, then what he claims is at most a necessary implication of Ibn Taymiyyah’s statement, not Ibn Taymiyyah’s actual statement. Ibn Taymiyyah expressly declares the successive events to be originated.

If a consequence is claimed to follow from his statement, a necessary implication of a statement is not itself the speaker’s statement, just as a necessary implication of a school is not itself the school.

If every consequence of a statement were treated as the speaker’s own statement, many adherents of doctrines would be assigned the final consequences of their positions and subjected to rulings they neither recognised nor intended. This is well known from books on sects, debates, and disputations.

Two groups may oppose one another, such as the Qadariyyah and Jabriyyah, or the affirmers and negators. Each group says to the other, “You have said such and such, and disbelief necessarily follows from it.” The opposing group answers with the same accusation.

It may be asked, “Why is every necessary implication of truth itself true, while a necessary implication of a statement is not necessarily the speaker’s statement, and a necessary implication of a school is not necessarily the school?”

The answer is that truth is true in itself, so everything that truly follows from it is also true. A school held by people, however, is not necessarily true. Its adherents may contradict themselves or fail to understand all its implications.

A rational person may adopt a statement while denying what another person claims necessarily follows from it. If he accepts those consequences, he consistently carries his position through. If he rejects them, his position may contain contradiction. Yet it still does not follow that the consequence is his actual statement, because his own position may be inconsistent, whereas truth never contradicts itself.

The Final Surviving Passage

Once this is understood, it becomes known that applying to Ibn Taymiyyah the ruling applied to Ibn Sina, or treating what followed against Ibn Sina as necessarily following against Ibn Taymiyyah, is false. Ibn Sina expressly affirmed the eternity of the first intellects, as already explained. He therefore affirmed…

The surviving part of the treatise ends here.

Author

ISHAQ. K

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Summary

The Doctrine of Creation, Divine Action, and Temporal Succession

The Sanctity of the Scholars

What Is Meant by the World

The Philosophers and the Eternity of the World

The Argument from Motion and Rest

The Argument from Correspondence

Allah Acts through Power, Will, and Choice

The Philosophers’ Main Argument

Eternal Will and the Claim of an Ancient Soul

Circular Dependence and Infinite Succession

Imam Ahmad on Allah’s Speech

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Position on Successive Acts

Ibn Qadi al Jabal’s Own Position

The Anonymous Author’s Argument

Intellects, Souls, and Immaterial Beings

True Origination and the Philosophers’ Terminology

Three Forms of Dependence

Eternity, Prior Matter, and Prior Time

Eternal Possibility and Possible Eternity

Unfair Criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Treatment of Other Scholars

The Accusation that His Position Was the Same as Ibn Sina’s

The Type and Its Individual Members

Ibn Qadi al Jabal’s Direct Question to Ibn Taymiyyah

The Difference between a Universal and a Whole

A Necessary Implication Is Not the Speaker’s Doctrine

End of Summary

The Treatise of Ibn Qadi al Jabal in Reply to the One Who Replied to His Teacher Ibn Taymiyyah regarding the Question of Hawadith (Temporal Events) with No Beginning

Opening Invocation, Praise, and the Author’s Purpose

The Unknown Author’s Confusion and the Four Types of People

The Author’s Disrespect toward Ibn Taymiyyah and the Sanctity of Scholars

The Purpose and Method of the Reply

Introduction: What the Theologians Mean by “the World”

Introduction: The World Is Originated and Created

The Philosophers on Eternal Matter and the Dahriyyah

Introduction: Revelation Affirms the Creation of the World

Disagreement over the Proof from Motion and Rest

Introduction: The Proof from Motion and Rest and the Objection to It

Objections to the Proof from Motion and Rest

Introduction: The Proof of Correspondence and the Objection to It

Further Objections to the Proof of Correspondence

Introduction: The Creator Is Powerful and Acts by Choice

Introduction: The Main Proof Used by the Philosophers for the Eternity of the World

The Philosophers’ Argument from Complete Causation

Answers Based upon Eternal Will and the Ancient Soul

Introduction: Circular Dependence and Infinite Regress

Abu al Hudhayl al Allaf Retracted His Position that the Movements of the People of Paradise and Hell Will End

Introduction: The Position of Ibn Taymiyyah and His Derivation of Its Foundation from Imam Ahmad

The Error of Chief Judge Abu Ya’la in Interpreting the Attribute of Speech

The Meanings of “Making” and Imam Ahmad’s Evidence

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Analogy between Divine Speech and Created Effects

The Author’s Argument that Nothing in the World Is Eternal

The Author’s Argument for Eternal Possibility

The Necessary Succession between an Agent and Its Effect

Bodies, Intellects, Souls, and the Claimed Immaterial Beings

The First Intellect and the Limits of the Philosophers’ Proof

Revelation Establishes that Nothing Eternal Exists with Allah, and the Claimed Immaterial Beings Have No Reality

Explaining Origination as Contingency Is Unknown in Language, Revelation, and Common Usage

The Philosophers’ Misinterpretation of Setting and the Forms of Dependence

Two Meanings of Eternity and the Claim of Prior Matter and Duration

The Reply to the Philosophers’ Argument for the Eternity of Matter

The Repeated Argument for Eternal Possibility

The Meaning of Eternity without Beginning

The Word “Azal” Is Not Originally Arabic

The Objection Based upon the Eternity of Possibility

The Difference between Eternal Possibility and Possible Eternity

The Clarifying Answer to the Objection

Al Razi’s Objection and Ibn Taymiyyah’s Reply

The Anonymous Author’s Criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah

Replies concerning Chronology, Contradiction, and Swearing

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Respect for the Hanbalis and the Ash’ari Scholars

The Claim that Ibn Taymiyyah’s Position Leads to Ibn Sina’s Doctrine

The Reply to One Who Attributes the Philosophers’ Doctrines to Ibn Taymiyyah

Ibn Taymiyyah’s Position on Successive Divine Acts and Created Effects

The Type, Its Individuals, and Endless Succession

Ibn Qadi al Jabal’s Question to Ibn Taymiyyah concerning the Collection and Its Individual Members

The Reply to the Claim that Ibn Taymiyyah Did Not Distinguish between a Universal and a Whole

Further Differences between a Universal and a Whole