Summary

Saʿid Foudah’s claim is that Ibn Taymiyyah followed the Jewish philosophers, especially Abu al Barakat ibn Malka al Baghdadi, in affirming active attributes and successive acts. He also casts doubt on Abu al Barakat’s Islam, presenting him as though he remained Jewish in belief and only entered Islam for worldly reasons.

Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār refutes this by saying that Foudah’s accusation is false for two reasons.

• First, there is no proof that Abu al Barakat was a hypocrite or that his Islam was false. The story mentioned about his Islam does not prove that. At most, it reports his public entry into Islam. It does not establish his inner motive, and it cannot be used to accuse a person whose Islam is established.
• Second, even if Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with Abu al Barakat on a particular issue, this would only be agreement with another Muslim, not agreement with a Jewish hypocrite. Agreement in one issue also does not prove that Ibn Taymiyyah took his belief from him. A similarity is not evidence of taking from them.

Al Najjār then explains that Ibn Taymiyyah’s belief in Allah’s active attributes is not taken from Abu al Barakat or from any philosopher. Its foundation is the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the ijmaʿ of the Salaf.

Abu al Barakat only has a few philosophical lines on this matter, while Ibn Taymiyyah builds the issue throughout his works with revealed proofs and the way of Ahl al Hadith.

He then turns the tables on Saʿid Foudah!

The Ashʿaris often claim that the apparent meanings of the Qur’an and Sunnah contain tashbih, and some of their major imams even say that holding to these apparent meanings in belief can be from the foundations of disbelief. So if Ibn Taymiyyah is accused of agreeing with the Jews simply because he affirms what they call tashbih, then the same accusation would fall upon the Qur’an and Sunnah according to their own principles.

Al Najjār also distinguishes between Jewish texts and Jewish philosophers. The Jewish philosophers, especially Musa ibn Maymun, were not close to Ibn Taymiyyah’s way. Rather, they were closer to the Ashʿari mutakallimun, because they interpreted away the attributes, denied movement, rejected real attributes beyond the essence, and claimed that revelation used bodily language only for the common people.

If Foudah accuses Ibn Taymiyyah of following Jewish philosophers because of agreement with Abu al Barakat, then Foudah’s own Ashʿari method is closer to Musa ibn Maymun’s philosophy. Abu al Barakat affirmed attributes, while Musa ibn Maymun negated them in a way much closer to the Ashʿari approach.

To put it very simply, Najjār’s refutation of Foudah is that his claim fails historically, methodologically, and theologically.

Historically, he gives no proof against Abu al Barakat’s Islam.

Methodologically, agreement does not prove borrowing.

Theologically, Ibn Taymiyyah’s position comes from revelation and the Salaf, while the Ashʿari method has far stronger resemblance to the interpretive path of the Jewish philosophers.

Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār’s Refutation of Saʿid Foudah

The Fifth Fabrication: The Claim That Ibn Taymiyyah Agreed with the Jewish Philosophers

This is among the greatest forms of misguidance and fabrication. Foudah accused Abu al Barakat ibn Malka al Baghdadi (d. 560AH) in his book of being Jewish in creed, claiming that he only moved from his creed to Islam for worldly reasons. He cast doubt on his Islam, and he did not mention a single proof for this dangerous fabrication, which is greater than declaring disbelief upon one whose Islam is established. Rather, it is a judgement of hypocrisy upon one whose Islam is established, without proof. (Tanzih al Rahman, p. 178.)

There is nothing in what has been narrated in Siyar Aʿlam al Nubalaʾ in the story of his Islam that proves his hypocrisy. It is a story with no chain of transmission, and there is nothing in it to show that this was the reason for his Islam. It is not reasonable that a philosopher of such well known rank would leave his religion merely because of what is mentioned in the story. Rather, it is the story of his public announcement of Islam, not an explanation of the reason for his Islam. So reflect. (See Siyar Aʿlam al Nubalaʾ, 20/419.)

This vile fabrication is refuted from several ways.

First: Ibn Taymiyyah’s agreement with Ibn Malka on an issue means his agreement with another Muslim, not his agreement with a hypocritical Jew, as he claimed.

Second: The ordinary reader, let alone the verifying students of knowledge, of Ibn Taymiyyah’s writings knows that his statement concerning the active attributes connected to choice, which these people call the indwelling of originated things, has its foundation and proof in the Book and the Sunnah. Ibn Taymiyyah did not take this statement from a philosopher or from any other source besides the Book and the Sunnah. Rather, all of Ibn Malka al Baghdadi’s words on this issue do not go beyond a few lines, and they contain only philosophical argumentation. As for Ibn Taymiyyah, his proofs for that are the Book, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the Salaf of the Ummah, as is well known throughout all his books.

For this reason, one finds Foudah filling his book with padding and quotation about the philosophers opposing Ibn Malka on the issue, as though this is the foundation upon which Ibn Taymiyyah built his statement, without any regard for the Book and the Sunnah.

Third: What you claim to be disbelief based likening, according to you, is not specific to the Jews. Rather, according to you, all the revealed texts in the Book and the Sunnah also contain disbelief based likening.

The Ashʿaris affirm that the apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah contain nothing but these statements which they grade as disbelief, as I mentioned just before. Thus, al Sanusi (d. 895AH) says in Sharh al Muqaddimat: “The foundations of disbelief and innovations are seven…” until he said: “Holding, in the beliefs of faith, merely to the apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah, without distinguishing between what has an impossible apparent meaning and what does not.” (Sharh al Muqaddimat, p. 47, by al Sanusi.)

Al Taftazani (d. 793AH), answering the occurrence in transmitted proof of countless matters which they claim have the apparent meaning of likening and disbelief, says: “The answer is that they are probable transmitted evidences opposing certain rational evidences!…

If it is said: if the true religion is negating location and direction, then why do the heavenly books and Prophetic hadiths, in countless places, suggest the establishment of that, without any place in them clearly stating its negation?… It is answered that since declaring Him free of direction is something the minds of the general public fall short of, to the point that they almost certainly negate whatever is not in a direction, the most fitting thing in addressing them, the closest thing to their terminology, and the most suitable thing in calling them to the truth, is what is apparent in likening and in the Maker being in the noblest of directions.” (Sharh al Maqasid, 3/36.)

So, according to the people, holding to the apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah is from the foundations of disbelief. According to them, revelation has come with likening in places that can hardly be counted. It is therefore not strange that they declare Ibn Taymiyyah to be a disbeliever, or stop short regarding his Islam, because he held to the apparent meanings of what came in the Book and the Sunnah.

If Ibn Taymiyyah is, according to you, agreeing with the Jews because he affirms beliefs that you describe as involving likening, then this is not specific to the Jews. Rather, according to you, the Noble Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunnah are all likening, and holding to their apparent meanings is from the foundations of disbelief according to you. What poor understanding.

Fourth: If Ibn Taymiyyah was one who likens, as Foudah claims, and the Jews were also likeners, then even if his statements were assumed to agree with their statements, that would not prove that he took his statements from them. Mere agreement is not proof of taking from someone. Rather, proof must be established that he took from them, and he and those like him have no proof at all.

For this reason, when we say that the Ashʿaris agree with Aristotle (d. 322BCE) in many of their foundations, we do not prove merely by that that they took those beliefs from Aristotle. Rather, we establish the proofs for this route, such as many of their imams, like al Razi (d. 606AH), establishing some beliefs by relying on the books of Ibn Sina (d. 428AH) and others, which are taken from the philosophy of Aristotle, and such as their imams using the statements of Aristotle himself and other philosophers in their books when verifying their beliefs.

Unless he says that Ibn Taymiyyah, in some places in his books, uses as a supporting proof for some beliefs the fact that they are mass transmitted among the people of religions from the Jews and Christians. So what? Do you not use the natural disposition of reasonable people, Muslims and disbelievers, as proof?

This is nothing but a repetition of the claim of al Razi when he said: “Know that most of the Jews are likeners, and the beginning of the appearance of likening in Islam was from the Rafidah, such as Banan ibn Samʿan, who affirmed organs and limbs for Allah, Most High, and Hisham ibn al Hakam, Hisham ibn Salim al Jawaliqi, Yunus ibn Abd al Rahman al Qummi, and Abu Jaʿfar al Ahwal, who was called Shaytan al Taq. These were the heads of the ulama of the Rafidah. Then the hadith folk, those who had no share of the science of intelligible matters, fell into that.” (Iʿtiqadat Firaq al Muslimin wa al Mushrikin, p. 63, by Fakhr al Razi.)

It is a claim that the philosophers received and then used to accuse Ahl al Hadith (the people of hadith), without establishing any real proof for it.

If merely using the agreement of the people of religions from the Jews and Christians as supporting proof for something found in the Book and the Sunnah is proof that the statement was taken from the Jews and Christians, then let al Razi be one who took his idealist creed, which exalts abstractions and intelligible matters above what is material, from animals such as beasts and cattle, since he says in al Matalib al ʿAliyah: “This shows that all creation is united in looking down upon bodily things and in honouring spiritual things.

“Rather, we say that the rough people among the Turks, Indians, and Zanj acknowledge these states… All of that shows that lowering bodily things and honouring spiritual things is something planted in minds, embedded in souls, acknowledged by the people of religions and sects, and affirmed by all groups of the people of the world…

Rather, we add and say: strong beasts and powerful cattle, when they see a human being, fear him and show reverence to him, even though the human being, compared to them, is extremely weak. That is only because spiritual qualities are naturally awe inspiring and honoured. Strong beasts and powerful cattle fear the human being, respect him, honour him, and flee from him for this reason.

“So it is established through these notes that honouring the side of spiritual things over bodily things is like a matter agreed upon among all animals.” (al Matalib al ʿAliyah, 1/256.)

Fifth: This assumption contains confusion between the Jewish philosophers and the Jewish texts. In their claim, the Islamic texts from the Book and the Sunnah contain countless texts of likening as well. But are the Jewish philosophers likeners?

Whoever has looked into something of the writings of the Jewish philosophers, such as Musa ibn Maymun (d. 603AH), realises that they, like the Ashʿari mutakallimun, interpret away their texts whose apparent meanings, according to them, are disbelief. So the Jewish philosophers are, upon verification, closer to the Ashʿari mutakallimun.

For example, Musa ibn Maymun held that the apparent meanings of the texts came with likening, representation, and embodiment, because the general public, meaning the natural disposition of the common people, do not understand anything abstracted from bodily nature. For this reason, he held that Allah, Most High, is not moving, so He is not described with movement and is not described with stillness, since none is described with stillness except one who may move. (Dalalat al Haʾirin, p. 57, Musa ibn Maymun al Qurtubi al Andalusi, edited by Husayn Atay, Maktabat al Thaqafah al Diniyyah.)

So, in one page of his book Dalalat al Haʾirin, he agreed with the Ashʿaris in three matters:

First: Revelation came with likening, representation, and embodiment in order to make the general public understand, not the elite.

Second: Negating movement from Allah, Most High.

Third: The statement of opposition between non existence and possession, in order to negate attributes from Allah, Most High.

Ibn Malka al Baghdadi strongly opposes Musa ibn Maymun in the topic of the attributes of Allah. Dr Muhammad Abd al Rahman al Masumi gathered these differences in his master’s thesis into eight matters. They are:

First: Ibn Malka affirms the attributes of Allah for Him, Glorified is He, while Ibn Maymun negates them from Him.

Second: Ibn Maymun counts affirming attributes additional to the essence as a kind of embodiment, while Ibn Malka does not count any of that as embodiment.

Third: Ibn Maymun counts the attributes reported about Allah in the Books of the prophets as the very same as His essence, not anything additional to it, while Ibn Malka says that they are meanings other than the essence, subsisting in it, and that acts proceed from them.

Fourth: Ibn Maymun does not differentiate between one who acts by nature and one who acts by will, while Ibn Malka differentiates between them. Ibn Maymun, in reality, agrees here with the Ashʿari madhhab.

Fifth: According to Ibn Maymun, attributes such as knowing, life, hearing, sight, and will all have one meaning, which is the essence. As for Ibn Malka, he differentiates between them, and each attribute has its own specific connections.

Sixth: Ibn Maymun negates any resemblance between the attributes of the Creator and those of created things, except in shared naming. Ibn Malka affirms that resemblance in the root meaning. According to him, the difference that negates similarity between them is the difference in perfection. Ibn Maymun here agrees with the Ashʿari madhhab.

Seventh: Ibn Maymun counts negations as attributes, because they are a kind of specification. According to Ibn Malka, negations are pure non existences and are not attributes.

Eighth: According to Ibn Maymun, the attributes are restricted to transmitted wording because he does not affirm greater perfection. According to Ibn Malka, they are not restricted to transmitted wording because he affirms greater perfection. (Mabḥath al Sifat al Ilahiyyah bayn Fakhr al Din al Razi wa Ibn Maymun al Yahudi, p. 246, Muhammad Abd al Rahman al Masumi, Maktabat al Thaqafah, Doha, Qatar, first edition, 1430AH – 2009CE.)

The intended point here is this: if you say Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with the Jewish philosophers, and by that you mean his agreement with Ibn Malka al Baghdadi, then he was a Muslim. As for you, you agreed with Musa ibn Maymun, who admitted that he had been a hypocrite, outwardly pretending Islam, and memorising the Noble Qur’an as an increase in concealment. (The Story of Civilization, 14/121.)

Masʾalat Ḥudūth al ʿĀlam Bayna Ibn Taymiyyah wa al Falāsifah wa al Ittiḥādiyyah al Muʿāṣirah by Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār 2/128–134