Admission by leading Ashari imams of weakness in the objections

Al Razi says that the main objections used by those who deny sifaat al ikhtiyaariah (voluntary attributes) are weak and cannot stand as real proofs.

Again in Nihayat al Uqul, al Arbaeen fi Usul al Din and al Matalib al Aliyyah he says that affirming voluntary attributes is something all groups are forced to accept in reality, even if they deny it in words.

Al Amidi also admits in Abkar al Afkar that the people of truth used weak paths to deny temporal events in the essence of Allah. He lists four proofs, shows each one is weak, then replaces them with a fifth proof, and later repeats this in Ghayat al Maram. (Abkar al Afkar, 2/22; Ghayat al Maram, p.191).

Abu al Qasim al Ansari (d.512 AH) says that the best thing they have in this issue is only to show the contradiction of their opponents, meaning the Karramiyyah, which proves they have no solid positive proof against voluntary attributes.

Ibn Taymiyyah says that the Salaf and imams of hadith spoke about these matters long before the Karramiyyah and never relied on them in this way. (Sharh al Irshad; Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 2/188; Majmu al Fatawa, 6/222).

First objection: Having temporal attributes and their opposites

Al Razi and al Amidi say: Whatever can be described with a thing does not remain free of it or its opposite. They apply this to Allah by saying that if He can have voluntary attributes like speech, He must either actually speak or be silent, and silence is also temporal. So His essence would never be free of temporal events and would itself be temporal. (Abkar al Afkar, 2/22; Ghayat al Maram, p.187).

Al Amidi himself calls this argument very weak and the work explains why. First, the premise about “opposites” is unclear.

Sometimes the opposite is a real positive attribute, and sometimes it is just non existence, and a non existent thing cannot be described as temporal. Not every attribute has a real opposite of the same kind. (Ghayat al Maram, p.187).

Second, many scholars of kalam, philosophers and others reject this rule as a general principle, and real experience also shows its falsehood. A body can have many different colours but in reality can be free of both one colour and its opposite at a given time. To insist that everything capable of an attribute must always carry it or its opposite leads to strange and false results, such as saying that every body must have every possible attribute like taste, smell and colour at all times. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/101).

Ibn Taymiyyah answers that, even if the rule is kept, it can be turned into a proof for voluntary attributes when it is limited to Allah. If Allah is capable of an attribute of perfection, like speech or power, He cannot remain free of it or its opposite, and the opposite in this case is an imperfection like muteness or incapacity. So it becomes necessary to affirm for Him speech, power and the other voluntary attributes as perfect attributes that fit His Lordship. (Majmu al Fatawa, 6/294; Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/101).

For the second premise, that anything which is never free of temporal things must itself be temporal, the work explains that this phrase mixes two different meanings. It is true if the temporal events are limited in number. It is not true if the meaning is that the kind of temporal event continues without a first beginning. That second meaning is exactly the point of dispute between Ahl al Sunnah and the people of kalam, so it cannot be used as a proof. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

The work then shows that if this premise were accepted, it would lead to saying that some temporal events begin without any suitable cause, which clashes with the basic rule of causation that the mind knows by necessity.

A temporal effect cannot come from a fully complete eternal cause without a temporal aspect in the cause itself. If voluntary attributes are denied, this is what their principle forces them to accept. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

Ibn Taymiyyah finally uses their own words against them. They say that Allah has been able from pre eternity. If the one who is able is always able to do the thing and its opposite, then Allah has always been able to perform temporal acts. This supports the possibility of continuous temporal events rather than denying it. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/101).

Second objection: Allah’s capacity for temporal events

Al Amidi sets out the second objection. He says that if Allah is capable of temporal events in His essence, this capacity must be either something that originates in His essence or something inseparable from His essence.

If it is emergent, it needs another earlier capacity, which leads to an endless regress. If it is inseparable from His essence, then it must be eternal, and this would make the temporal events themselves eternal, which is impossible, since a thing cannot be both eternal and temporal. (Abkar al Afkar, 2/25).

The work answers that the capacity of Allah to be described with attributes of perfection is indeed inseparable from His essence, because perfection is inseparable from Him, but this only makes the kind of these attributes eternal. The individual acts that belong to this kind can still be occurring, and this is exactly what Ahl al Sunnah affirm. So the objection in fact ends up confirming, not denying, voluntary attributes. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

Then the answer uses analogy with power. The question is put: Was Allah able to create from pre eternity or not? If He was not able and then later became able, that is clear imperfection. If He has always been able, then the act of creating must have been possible for Him from pre eternity, since power does not relate to an impossible thing. In the same way, His capacity to be described with temporal events can be eternal without making those events themselves eternal. (Abkar al Afkar, 2/25; Majmu al Fatawa, 6/248).

Ibn Taymiyyah adds that if they still say the act was impossible and only later became possible, this joins two opposites, because no one is able over what is impossible. If they accept that Allah is able from pre eternity over acts that only become possible later, the same must be accepted for His capacity to have temporal events. (Majmu al Fatawa, 6/248).

He then gives a third answer using analogy of what is more fitting. If Allah is able to bring into existence things separate from His essence among creation, then it is even more fitting that He is able to bring about voluntary attributes in His own essence, since ability over what is inside oneself is more obvious than ability over what is outside. (Majmu al Fatawa, 6/248).

Third objection: occurrence and change in the essence

Al Razi, al Amidi and others put the third objection like this: if voluntary attributes exist in Allah’s essence, that means events occur in His essence and He changes, and occurrence and change are marks of created things, so Allah cannot be described in this way. They connect this in spirit to what is reported from Aristotle, who said that the first principle does not change, and that any change in it would be a move to something less perfect. (Maqalat al Islamiyyin, p.541; reports about Aristotle in the Arabic tradition).

Abu Hasan Al Ashari (d.324 AH) reports a view that “muhdath” means “makhluq”, and “makhluq” means “muhdath”, but the work explains that this objection plays with words, because “occurrence” and “change” can have different meanings. (Maqalat al Islamiyyin, p.541).

The answer explains that the word “change” can mean the simple origination of being described with an attribute that was not there before. If this is what is meant, then the objection is only a circle in argument, because it simply says: if temporal events can occur in Allah, then temporal events can occur in Allah. This proves nothing and does not touch the position of those who affirm voluntary attributes. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

“Change” can also mean moving from one state to another like health to illness or richness to poverty. If this is the meaning, then affirming voluntary attributes does not imply this for Allah, because Ahl al Sunnah say that He has always been speaking when He wills and acting when He wills, so there is no move from a habitual absence of such acts to a originated state.

People do not call repeated actions “change” in language unless they mark a move from a settled habit to another habit. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

Ibn Qutaybah (d.276 AH) shows that “muhdath” is not always the same as “makhluq”. Ibn Qutaybah explains verses where Allah mentions bringing about something emergent without the meaning being creation of a originated entity, such as:

لَعَلَّ اللَّهَ يُحْدِثُ بَعْدَ ذَٰلِكَ أَمْرًا
“Perhaps Allah will bring about after that a matter”
(Quran 65:1)

and

مَا يَأْتِيهِمْ مِنْ ذِكْرٍ مِنْ رَبِّهِمْ مُحْدَثٍ
“No reminder comes to them from their Lord that is muhdath”
(Quran 21:2).

He explains that this means originating for them something that did not exist for them before, like a occuring reminder from the Quran, not that Allah Himself becomes created or similar. (Ikhtilaf al Lafdh wa al Radd ala al Jahmiyyah, p.39).

Ibn Taymiyyah notes that the distinction between “makhluq” and “muhdath” is known in the language of the leading imams of hadith and matches the language of the Quran. A temporal event may be created and may also be a emergent relation or act that is not called “created thing” in this way. This destroys the root of the objection. (al Tasiniyyah, 2/428).

Fourth objection: The proof from Ibrahim saying “I do not love those who set”

The theologians raise a fourth objection based on the story of Ibrahim. They quote the verse:

فَلَمَّا أَفَلَ قَالَ لَا أُحِبُّ الْآفِلِينَ
“When it set, he said, I do not love those who set”
(Quran 6:76).

They say Ibrahim used change and movement as proof that the stars and planets are not lords, so Allah cannot be described with attributes that involve change, like voluntary attributes. (Quran 6:76).

The answer begins with the meaning of the word “afl”. Linguists like Ibn Faris (d.395 AH) explain that it means “setting” and “disappearing from sight”, not bare movement. No one says of a walking person that he is “afl”. All the early people of language and tafsir agree that “afl” means setting and disappearing, not simple movement. (Maqayis al Lugha, 1/119).

Then the story itself shows that Ibrahim did not argue from movement, because he did not take the stars and planets as proof from the first rising and movement. He waited until they set and became hidden, then said, “I do not love those who set.” Later, about the sun, Allah says:

فَلَمَّا رَأَى الشَّمْسَ بَازِغَةً قَالَ هَذَا رَبِّي هَذَا أَكْبَرُ فَلَمَّا أَفَلَتْ قَالَ يَا قَوْمِ إِنِّي بَرِيءٌ مِّمَّا تُشْرِكُونَ
إِنِّي وَجَّهْتُ وَجْهِيَ لِلَّذِي فَطَرَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ حَنِيفًا وَمَا أَنَا مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ
“When he saw the sun rising, he said, This is my Lord, this is greater. But when it set, he said, O my people, I am free from what you associate. I have turned my face toward the One who created the heavens and the earth, inclining to the truth, and I am not from those who associate partners with Allah.”
(Quran 6:78–79).

This shows that his argument was tied to their setting and disappearing, not to their rising and moving. (Quran 6:78–79).

Al Izz ibn Abd al Salam (d.660 AH) says that using this story as a proof against voluntary attributes is extremely problematic.

If the sign that the planet is not a lord is change, then that change was already present before setting, so there is no reason to make proof depend on setting. If the sign is absence from sight, then they would have to accept this about Allah, which they reject. If the sign is moving from a higher state to a lower one, then the planet was already away from full perfection even at rising. (Fawaid fi Mushkil al Quran, p.119).

Ibn Taymiyyah concludes that, if their reading were accepted, the story would actually be proof against their aim.

If Ibrahim only used setting in the sense of movement, transition and having temporal events as a sign that something is not the Lord of the universe, then anything that moves, be described with events and is a body in a direction would be proof for him that it is not the Lord. In that case the story would refute their own position instead of supporting it. (Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah, 1/530).

Fifth objection: perfection and imperfection

Al Razi and al Amidi rely heavily on the fifth objection. They say voluntary attributes cannot be free of being either perfection or imperfection. If they are imperfection, they must be removed from Allah. If they are perfection, then Allah was without this perfection before being described with them, and lacking perfection is itself imperfection, so such attributes must be denied. (Ghayat al Maram, p.191).

The answer shows first that the absence of specific acts before their proper time is not imperfection. Some things, if brought before their correct time, would themselves be imperfection.

When Allah spoke to Musa, that call at that time was perfection. If He had called him before he came and before he could understand, that would be against wisdom and would be imperfection. So each voluntary act is perfection at the time when it exists in line with wisdom, not before that. To bring it before its due time would itself be imperfect. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

Second, the work sets a clear mental comparison. If the mind is presented with two essences, one that can speak by choice and act as it wills, and another that can never speak by choice and never act by itself in any way but is like time which does nothing by its own will, the sound mind judges the first as more perfect.

Those who deny voluntary attributes actually describe the Lord in a lower way, by likening Him to something that never acts by its own will, and then blame others for speaking of perfection and imperfection. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

Sixth objection: perfection depending on the acts of the servants

Al Kaylani known as Ibn Qawan (d.889 AH) sets out the sixth objection in his Sharh al Aqaid al Adudiyyah, and al Baydawi (d.685 AH) points to it. They say that if Allah is described with voluntary attributes like love, pleasure and anger, then His perfection depends on the acts of the servants. For example, Allah loves the disbeliever when he enters Islam. In their words this means that His attributes are affected by human actions, and they treat this as severe corruption. (Sharh al Aqaid al Adudiyyah, p.51).

The answer explains that this objection relies on vague phrases like “conditioned” and “affected”. If the meaning is that the perfection of Allah is incomplete until something outside Him comes and completes it, so that created beings influence and perfect His attributes, then this is false and no Muslim says it. The created being and his acts are completely under Allah’s power and creating. (Sharh al Aqaid al Adudiyyah, p.51).

If the meaning is that some individual acts of perfection, like loving, being pleased, being angry, forgiving or answering supplication, are originated when the servant does what fits them, then this is correct and is exactly what Ahl al Sunnah say. Allah decrees affairs, then arranges His acts on those decrees with full wisdom. This is not the servant influencing Allah. Rather Allah acts according to His wisdom, and that is perfection. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66).

Ibn al Qayyim reports that he asked Ibn Taymiyyah about the claim that the temporal influences the eternal when Allah is pleased, loves, rejoices or is angry. Ibn Taymiyyah answered that Allah is the One who creates the causes of His pleasure, anger and joy.

He wills them and creates them. They are from Him and belong to Him. What is impossible is that something other than Him influences Him. What actually happens is that He creates causes and wills them so that they lead to His pleasure, love, joy or anger. It begins from Him and returns to Him. (Madarij al Salikin, 2/433).

The work then notes that the same objection would undermine the attributes that the Asharis themselves affirm. Allah is only actually “forgiver” after the servant sins and seeks forgiveness, only “provider” after the recipient of provision exists, and only “giver of life” and “causer of death” after living beings are there. If they insist on their language of “conditioning”, their own position would mean that Allah’s perfection depends on creation in these attributes as well. (Sharh al Tahawiyyah, p.680).

Ibn Abi al Izz (d.792 AH) says this with dua. If someone says that giving by Allah is caused by the servant’s supplication in the same way that giving by a person is caused by a request, he answers that Allah is the One who moves the servant to supplicate.

All goodness and its completion come from Him. Guidance to supplication and the answer both come from Him. Umar ibn al Khattab said that he only worries about supplication, not about the answer, because when he is guided to supplicate, the answer comes with it. Allah says:

يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ ثُمَّ يَعْرُجُ إِلَيْهِ فِي يَوْمٍ كَانَ مِقْدَارُهُ أَلْفَ سَنَةٍ مِّمَّا تَعُدُّونَ
“He manages the matter from the heaven to the earth, then it ascends to Him in a day whose measure is a thousand years of what you count”
(Quran 32:5).

This shows that every matter begins from Him and returns to Him. He is the One who grants success to repent and then accepts it, grants success to act and then rewards it, grants success to supplicate and then answers it. No created being influences Him. He simply makes the action of the servant a cause for what He Himself does. (Sharh al Tahawiyyah, p.680).

The foundations of the madhhabs that were spoken about in the voluntary attributes

Based on what has already been explained, it can be said that the foundational positions regarding the voluntary attributes return to three main madhhabs:

The first madhhab is those who deny them completely. They are the negators, such as the Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah, and those who were influenced by them from the mixed groups among the Kullabiyyah, the Ashʿaris, the Maturidis and others.

The second madhhab is those who affirm that these attributes exist in the essence of Allah in terms of the kind and in terms of the individual acts. They are the Karramiyyah and those who followed them.

The third madhhab is those who affirm that these attributes exist in the essence of Allah, and who distinguish between the kind and the individual act. The kind of the voluntary attributes is eternal, while their individual acts are originated. This is the position of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaʿah and those who followed them from individuals in the different groups.

Abundance of disagreement on the question of the voluntary attributes

This foundation, namely dividing the attributes of Allah into constant attributes and voluntary attributes, is one of the matters in which the groups in the Ummah differed the most and one of the most subtle and difficult. Many of its implications and consequences have been hidden from a large number of the followers of the fiqh madhhabs and others.

Ibn Taymiyyah explains this subtlety and disagreement regarding this foundation. He says that affirming the voluntary attributes was an issue in which there was dispute between the followers of Malik, between the followers of al Shafiʿi, between the followers of Abu Hanifah, and between the people of literalism as well. All of these groups differed in this foundation. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql by Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/19).

He also says, showing how widespread the disagreement is in this question, that the leading imams of the people of hadith and Sunnah are almost all agreed on affirming the voluntary attributes. As for the later people of hadith, they have two sayings about them, and the followers of Ahmad have two sayings, the followers of al Shafiʿi have two sayings, the followers of Malik have two sayings, the followers of Abu Hanifah have two sayings, and the Sufis have two sayings, while the majority of the people of tafsir affirm them. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql by Ibn Taymiyyah, 2/330).

So the followers of the fiqh madhhabs are all divided in this foundation, and this shows how much confusion and difficulty there is in it.

The concern of Ibn Taymiyyah with the question of the voluntary attributes

Ibn Taymiyyah gave special attention to this foundation. Most of his discussion in the chapter of the names and attributes is centred on this very question. He went so far in this that he wrote independent treatises devoted to these issues.

The effort of Ibn Taymiyyah in this question is one of the best paths that lead to understanding the depth of the problems contained in it. In our view, any student of knowledge who enters this question without entering through the work of Ibn Taymiyyah will not have a good understanding of it. It is his thorough treatment that uncovered its hidden aspects, laid out its general pathways and clarified its difficulties and the answers to them.

We suggest the following path for a student of knowledge who wants to reach a level of understanding of this question:

That the student carries out a systematic summary of the treatise “al Sifat al Ikhtiyariyyah” by Ibn Taymiyyah. It is found in the second volume of the collection of treatises gathered by Muhammad Rashad Salim and also in volume six of Majmuʿ al Fatawa. (This reference is what is meant by the note: it is found in the second volume of the collection of treatises gathered by Muhammad Rashad Salim and in volume six of Majmuʿ al Fatawa.)

The summary should be based on the following main points:

First: the concept of the voluntary attributes.

Second: the stance of the opposing groups regarding the voluntary attributes. The student should try, in his summary, to answer the following questions:

What is the true position of each group regarding these voluntary attributes?

How did Ibn Taymiyyah gather and verify the sayings of the groups in this question?

What are the methodological foundations from which the groups started when they formed their positions on the voluntary attributes?

Third: Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation of the deviant views in the question of the voluntary attributes. Here the student should answer the following questions:

What are the methodological paths that Ibn Taymiyyah used to refute those views?

What are the detailed points he relied upon in refuting their proofs and objections?

Once the student has finished this treatise, he moves to volume two of Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, starting from the beginning of the volume, and summarises Ibn Taymiyyah’s words in this part. He should try to uncover the additions that are found in this part and not found in the treatise on the voluntary attributes. After finishing volume two, he moves directly to volume four of the same book, because Ibn Taymiyyah raises this question there with al Amidi (d.631 AH) and has many additional points.

In reality, whoever combines these three works, tries to understand them and summarises them in a systematic way, this question will be among the clearest of all questions for him.

The objections raised against this foundation

The opponents raised many objections against this foundation. Al Razi (d.606 AH) collected the main ones in several of his books. He reduced them to four basic objections, then judged them all to be invalid and came with a new proof in their place, so the objections became five. Al Amidi (d.631 AH) did the same. He mentioned four objections, declared them invalid, and brought the same extra objection that al Razi had added. Then some later Ashʿaris invented a sixth objection, so the objections became six basic objections.

What follows is a discussion of the six objections to the voluntary attributes. These are not all the objections, but they are the main ones present in the books of the opponents. Mentioning them here in this explanation has two important benefits.

The first benefit is that the need for building and grounding requires this. A student of knowledge must know the truth and know what contradicts it, so that he can refute it and show its falsehood. It is not correct to leave the objections aside on the excuse that they are long or difficult. The aim is to build the knowledge of the student so that he is able to answer such doubts. Along with this, these objections have been forced upon the student from the side of the opponents, so he should count them among the types of trials that he must deal with in a positive way.

The second benefit is that this foundation, as has already been mentioned, is one of the distinguishing marks of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaʿah, and the people of the true path must have a stronger grasp of their distinct markers than others. These are what separate them from other groups. It is not correct that the understanding of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaʿah of their special markers should be incomplete. Rather they must have deep realisation of these distinguishing marks, more than their knowledge of the other issues.

Admission by leading Ashʿari imams of the weakness of the objection against the voluntary attributes

The objections that we will mention are unsound and contain many serious problems. In reality they are not suitable as a reliable basis for denying that the voluntary attributes exist in the essence of Allah. A number of scholars of kalam among the opponents of Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaʿah have admitted this.

The most famous of those who admitted this is Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Umar al Razi (d.606 AH), and his admission that they are not firm is not a casual admission but a settled one. He repeated it in several of his major works.

He first mentioned in his book Nihayat al Uqul that the objections which the opponents put forward against the voluntary attributes are unsound, and he clearly said that accepting that Allah is described with voluntary attributes is something that all groups are compelled to admit. He even says that everyone admits this.

Then in another book he wrote after Nihayat al Uqul, which is al Arbaʿin fi Usul al Din, he affirmed the same point and mentioned that affirming the voluntary attributes is admitted by all groups, even if they deny it in words. He explained that in detail. Then he also came to the same conclusion in one of his last works, which is al Matali b al Aliyyah min al Ilm al Ilahi. (The note indicates that al Arbaʿin was written after Nihayat al Uqul because al Razi mentions the earlier book inside al Arbaʿin, and that al Matalib al Aliyyah is one of his final works, completed in 605 AH, the year before his death in 606 AH.)

Here we will restrict ourselves to what is in al Matalib al Aliyyah. In this book he mentions that affirming the voluntary attributes is something which all groups are forced to affirm. He says: “The first research is whether it is conceivable that anything can be a place for temporal events. They said that this is a view that none held except the Karramiyyah. I say that this is a view held by most of the people of the madhhabs.”

Then he began to explain how the people of the madhhabs actually speak in this way. He mentioned the Ashʿaris, the Muʿtazilah and the philosophers, and proved that all these groups admit that voluntary attributes exist in the essence of Allah. Then he said: “So this research that we have laid out proves that the statement that attributes arise in the essence of Allah is a statement that all the groups have said.” (This is the meaning of the two notes which refer to al Matalib al Aliyyah by al Razi, 2/106–107.)

In this statement of al Razi there is a very important point that must be noted when we define the exact point of dispute about the voluntary attributes. The point of dispute is not whether emergent things occur in relation to Allah at all. The point is whether emergent real positive things arise which exist in the essence of Allah. So we must restrict the research to whether the emergent thing is a real existent that is in the essence of Allah.

Many of the later theologians and others do not deny that things become originated for Allah. For example, some of them say that Allah creates created things that are originated and performs acts that are originated. But they say that this creation and these acts do not exist in the essence of Allah. Rather, they are attached to His essence with a kind of non existent attachment.

This kind of affirmation does not suffice as affirmation of the voluntary attributes, because the voluntary attributes are not just about saying that emergence related to Allah is affirmed even if that emergence is non existent in itself. The question is about affirming originated attributes that actually exist in the essence of Allah.

To point out the difference between the meaning of originated and the meaning of happening, and that emergence is affirmed for the essence of Allah without happening in the sense of being created, al Armawi, Safi al Din al Hindi (d.715 AH), says: “What is meant by a hadith is an existent that came into existence after non existence, whether a substance or an attribute.

As for what is not described with existence, such as originated non existence, and the ahwal for those who affirm them, and the relations for those who do not regard them as existent, it is not correct to call these hadith, even if they may be called originated. So it does not follow from originated relations and ahwal in the essence of the Creator that He is a place for hadith things.” (al Tasʿiniyyah ascribed to al Armawi, p.109.)

Al Armawi then tried to answer what al Razi had admitted. He said: “What the imam has said in this place, that most rational people actually affirmed this even though they denied it in words and explained it in some forms, is not so.

For most of the matters he mentioned are emergent matters, not originated, and the emergent is more general than the hadith, so the existence of the general does not require the existence of the specific.” (al Tasʿiniyyah, p.109.)

However, this answer of al Armawi has no weight, because he did not present any actual proof for what he said, and he did not claim that his interpretation includes everything that al Razi mentioned. He only said “most” of what al Razi mentioned, which means that some of what al Razi mentioned remains as it is. That is enough to support the original claim.

Among those who admitted the weakness of these objections is Abu al Hasan al Amidi. His admission of their weakness is not casual either.

He mentions it in his large work Abkar al Afkar. When he discusses this question, he says: “The people of truth have argued for the impossibility of temporal events existing in the essence of Allah with weak arguments.” (Abkar al Afkar, 2/22.)

He then lays out four arguments and shows that each of them is weak, and then he brings a fifth proof that we will explain later.

He then addresses this question in another of his books, Ghayat al Maram fi Ilm al Kalam, which is really a summary of Abkar al Afkar.

There he says that his peers have relied on four paths in denying the voluntary attributes and he judges all of them to be weak, then he says after that: “Other paths have also been mentioned in this chapter, but their invalidity is clearer than to be hidden, so we preferred not to mention them.” (Ghayat al Maram, p.191.)

Another person who admitted the weakness of these objections is Abu al Qasim al Ansari (d.512 AH), the teacher of al Shahristani (d.548 AH) and a student of al Juwayni. He says in his Sharh al Irshad: “The best thing that can be held on to in this question is the contradiction of the opponents.” (This is how Ibn Taymiyyah transmits his words in Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 2/188.)

The meaning of this statement is that there are actually no proofs which can really be relied upon to deny the voluntary attributes. Everything they have in their arguments and objections against affirming the voluntary attributes is the contradiction of their opponents.

By “opponents” he means the Karramiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah points out the mistake in this path. He says: “Likewise those before them such as Abu al Maʿali and those like him, their main reliance is that the Karramiyyah said this and then contradicted themselves, so they show the contradiction of the Karramiyyah and they think that once they have shown the contradiction of the Karramiyyah, who are their opponents, they have won.

They do not realise that the Salaf and the leading imams of Sunnah and hadith, and even earlier groups than the Karramiyyah, never paid attention to the Karramiyyah and their likes.

Rather they spoke about these matters before the Karramiyyah even existed, because Ibn Karram came later, after Ahmad ibn Hanbal, in the time of Muslim ibn al Hajjaj and his generation. The imams of Sunnah and the theologians spoke about these things before them, and the Salaf never stopped speaking based on these meanings before such people existed.” (Majmuʿ al Fatawa by Ibn Taymiyyah, 6/222.)

The objections that Abu al Hasan al Amidi  and al Razi declared to be invalid, and others with them, are the main large objections, not secondary points.

Details of the objections

The first objection

The first objection is that whatever can have a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite. If we say that Allah can be described with voluntary attributes, then He does not remain free of them or of their opposite. The opposite of a temporal attribute is also temporal, and whatever does not remain free of temporal things is itself temporal. It would then follow that Allah is temporal, which contradicts His eternity.

This objection rests upon several premises, of which the most important are two:

The first premise is that whatever can have a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite.

The second premise is that whatever does not remain free of temporal things is itself temporal.

This argument is the most famous of all the arguments that the theologians have used to attack the voluntary attributes. It is their main pillar. Yet in spite of that, it is a weak argument. Al Amidi (d.631 AH) says: “Know that this is a very weak path.” (Ghayat al Maram by al Amidi, p.187.)

The invalidity and weakness of this argument becomes clear when we say that the premises it rests on are unsound.

As for the first premise, which is that whatever can have a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite, they sometimes express it in a different wording. They say that whatever can be described with temporal events does not remain free of them.

The meaning of this premise is that the thing which can be described with some attribute must either actually be described with that attribute or be described with the opposite attribute. So if Muhammad, for example, is capable of lifting a rock, then he must either be described as able or described with the opposite, which is inability.

And if Salih is able to sleep, then he must either be described as sleeping or with the opposite, which is wakefulness. The same is said in all sets of opposing attributes.

When they apply this to Allah, they say: If Allah could be described with the attribute of voluntary speech, that would mean that He could be described with the attribute of silence or inability to speak.

Voluntary speech is temporal, and its opposite, which is silence, is temporal, because the opposite of a temporal thing is also temporal. This means that the essence of Allah does not remain free of temporal things in any state.

Relying on this premise to negate that the voluntary attributes exist in Allah is not correct. This becomes clear through several points.

The first point is that this premise is built upon a kind of vagueness in the concepts. We must ask: What exactly do you mean by “opposite” here? Do you mean the general opposite, which is simple non existence of the attribute, or do you mean a specific positive opposite, which is being described with the direct contrary of the attribute? With sight, its opposite may mean simple lack of seeing, and it may mean the positive attribute of blindness. With speech, its opposite may mean simple lack of speaking, and it may mean the positive attribute of muteness.

If what is meant is the general opposite, then there is no proof that this opposite is temporal, because the general opposite is non existence, and non existence is not described as temporal. If what is meant is the positive opposite, then there is no proof that every attribute always has such a specific opposite.

Al Amidi says: “One can say to them: Your statement that every temporal attribute must have an opposite, either you mean by opposite a positive meaning that cannot exist together with that attribute due to their very natures, or you mean by opposite something more general than that, namely anything that cannot exist together with that attribute due to their very natures, even if it is mere non existence, so that the non existence of an attribute would be counted as the opposite of its existence.

“If the first meaning is intended, that opposite is a positive meaning, then we do not accept that every attribute must have such a positive opposite, and the argument for what is denied is very hard to provide. If the second meaning is intended, that opposite is non existent, then we do not accept that the non existent opposite must be temporal.

Otherwise the non existence of the universe before it came into being would have to be temporal, and if its non existence were temporal, that would mean that its existence was earlier than its non existence, which is impossible.” (Abkar al Afkar by al Amidi, 2/22.)

The summary of al Amidi’s words is that the meaning of “opposite” in this premise is vague. So it is said to those who rely on it: What do you intend by the opposite of the temporal attribute? Do you intend a positive opposite, so that the meaning is that every temporal attribute has a positive temporal opposite?

This is not accepted, and there is no proof for such a sweeping claim. Or do you intend a non existent opposite, so that the meaning is that every temporal attribute has an opposite, even if it is non existent? If this is what you intend, then we do not accept that this non existent opposite is itself described as temporal, because it is non existent in the first place. How can you say about something non existent that it is temporal?

The universe is temporal, but its non existent opposite, which is the non existence of the universe before it was created, is not described as temporal or eternal, because it is non existent. This is a strong point which breaks the general rule contained in that premise.

The second point is that this premise is itself disputed among people. Most rational people reject it, and there is dispute about it among the groups of jurists and thinkers, including many of the followers of the four madhhabs, such as followers of Ahmad, Malik, al Shafiʿi and Abu Hanifah and others. (See Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 2/178 and 4/40.)

If that is the case, it is not right to use it as a premise in a proof, because one cannot argue from a matter that is itself in dispute and part of the very question under debate.

The third point is that this premise contradicts what we actually observe in existence. A thing may be capable of having a certain attribute, yet it is not described with that attribute nor with its opposite.

A chair, for example, is capable of having the colour black, but it may actually be described with the colour blue, and so it is neither described as white nor with the opposite of white, which is black. (See Majmuʿ al Fatawa by Ibn Taymiyyah, 5/537; this point is based on understanding “opposite” here in the broader sense that includes contradictories and contraries.)

The fourth point is that this premise leads to consequences which are clearly false. On the basis of their statement that whatever can have a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite, it would follow that every body must have taste, colour and smell, no matter what that body is, whether a human body, a wall or anything else.

Since the existent that can have a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite, and since a body can be described with all types of attributes and they say that all bodies are alike, that would mean that every body must be described with every type of attribute, taste, colour and smell, because the existent thing does not remain free of the attribute and its opposite.

Because of this strong consequence, some of those who affirm this principle were forced to say that every body has taste, colour and smell and every other kind of attribute that bodies can have. This sweeping judgement has no proof and contradicts what we see in reality.

Ibn Taymiyyah comments on the fact that some of the Sifatiyyah committed themselves to saying that every body has taste, colour and smell and other attributes. He says: “Many of the people of kalam and hadith denied the first premise, such as the Hashimiyyah, the Karramiyyah, Abu Muʿadh, Zuhayr al Ibri, as well as al Razi, al Amidi and others among the Ashʿaris.

They denied the first premise and showed its corruption and that there is no proof for the one who claims it. They said that a thing may be capable of a thing and yet be free of it and of its opposite, as is the case with what we see.

Those who affirmed this principle committed themselves to saying that every body has taste, colour and smell and other types of attributes that bodies can have. Most rational people said that this is open stubbornness against what is obvious, and a claim with no proof. The Kullabiyyah only committed themselves to this because of this principle.” (Sharh Hadith al Nuzul by Ibn Taymiyyah, p.158.)

The fifth point is that their statement that whatever can be described with a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite does not actually prevent affirming that Allah is described with voluntary attributes. The most that it could show, if it were sound, is that Allah has always had temporal events in His essence, and Ahl al Sunnah accept this.

Their principle only contradicts the Karramiyyah who deny that the kind of actions of Allah is eternal, but it does not contradict Ahl al Sunnah who say that Allah has always been described with the kind of voluntary actions.

Ibn Taymiyyah says, explaining this: “Those who said that whatever can be described with a thing does not remain free of it and its opposite, we say to them that the most this would imply is that temporal things have always existed in His essence, and we accept that.” (Majmuʿ al Fatawa, 6/281.).

He then explains that the real problem for the later theologians who relied on this principle is that they made a general rule for all existents. If they had restricted it to Allah, it would have been a sound judgement, because the attributes of Allah must be eternal. If He were not described with attributes of perfection, He would be described with their opposites in pre eternity, which is impossible.

He says that it is better to phrase the argument as follows: If Allah is capable of being described with an attribute of perfection, then that attribute must exist for Him.

He then comments: “If you put the argument in this way, there is no need to say that every subject that can be described with a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite, because this general statement is false. Rather we claim this specifically regarding Allah, because of the proof we mentioned and the difference between Him and others.

For other beings, when they are capable of a thing, the existence of this capacity in them is not from themselves but from another, namely Allah. The occurrence of this capacity does not have to be concurrent with the subject itself. It may depend on further conditions which Allah creates and on barriers which He removes. So the existence of this capacity is not from the essence of that being but from another. The essence is therefore not enough for it.

“As for the Lord, glorified is He, none of His attributes or actions depend on another. Rather He is the One, the Eternal Refuge, free of need of all else, and everything else depends on Him and is made by Him. So it is impossible that the Lord should depend on what depends on Him, because that would be circular dependence, which is clearly impossible according to reason and the agreement of rational people.” (Majmuʿ al Fatawa, 6/294.)

So this premise does not negate the voluntary attributes. In fact it can be used to prove and confirm them. We can say: Yes, whatever can be described with a thing does not remain free of it or its opposite, and Allah is capable of being described with the attribute of speech. So He does not remain free of speech or its opposite, which is muteness.

Muteness is an imperfection which Allah is exalted above. Therefore it is necessary to affirm for Him the attribute of speech. We can also say that Allah is capable of being described with the attribute of power, so He does not remain free of power or of its opposite, which is incapacity. Incapacity is an imperfection which Allah is exalted above, so He must be described with the attribute of power. The same can be said about all the voluntary attributes.

Ibn Taymiyyah points to this meaning when he says: “As for the one who says that it is possible for temporal events to continue, he shows that their distinction between the two cases is wrong.

He says that if the living being does not remain free of what he can be described with and of its opposite, and the Lord is capable of being described with will and speech, then it must be that He does not remain free of these attributes or their opposites. But their opposites are attributes of imperfection just like the opposites of hearing and sight, so it follows that He has always been described with will and speech, and that being described with the kind of these attributes is possible.” (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/101.)

The sixth point is that this premise actually turns back against the one who uses it. They say that whatever can be described with a thing does not remain free of it or its opposite and at the same time they say that Allah has been able from eternity. We say to them: The meaning of His being eternally able is that He has always been able to do the thing and its opposite. This means that Allah has always been able to perform temporal acts. This contradicts their claim that it is impossible for temporal events to have no beginning.

Ibn Taymiyyah explains this: “If the subject that can be described with a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite, then the one who is able for a thing does not remain free of it or of its opposite, because the one who is able can be described with doing the thing.

If the ability of the subject to temporal things implies the possibility of their existence in pre eternity, then the eternal power of the one who is able to perform temporal acts implies the possibility of their existence in pre eternity. If it is possible for him to be able while the thing he is able to do is impossible, then it is possible for him to be capable while the thing he can have is impossible.” (Majmuʿ al Fatawa, 6/282.)

The meaning is that if whatever can be described with a thing does not remain free of it and its opposite, then Allah, who has always been described with power according to them, must always be capable of creating or not creating. This means that the eternal power of Allah is able to bring temporal events into existence from pre eternity, so the existence of an eternal kind of temporal events is possible. They themselves deny this. They insist that an eternal kind of temporal events is impossible.

If they say that Allah has been described with power from pre eternity and that His power can in principle perform temporal acts, yet those temporal acts are impossible and never existed from eternity, then this means that something can be capable of a thing without the thing itself or its opposite being realised. So the subject can be capable of a thing without remaining free neither of it nor of its opposite. This breaks the premise they rely upon.

This last line of argument is one of the strongest ways of showing the contradiction of those who rely on this premise. The strength of the point comes from the fact that it is impossible to keep together three claims which they all hold.

The three claims are that whatever can be described with a thing does not remain free of it and its opposite, that Allah has been eternally able, and that it is impossible for temporal events to have no first beginning.

If the existent can be described with an attribute and its opposite, and Allah has been described with power from pre eternity, this means that Allah can create or not create. The necessary conclusion of this is that His eternal power can perform temporal acts that have no first beginning. How then can you say that temporal events definitely have a first beginning and that it is impossible for them to be eternal in kind?

From the points mentioned, it becomes clear that this premise is not false in every possible sense. Rather, the mistake of the theologians lies in the vagueness in the meaning of “opposite,” in their making it a general statement, in the false consequences which follow when they mix it with other foundational principles, and in their lack of consistency between their acceptance of it and their other principles.

As for the second premise, which is that whatever does not remain free of temporal things is itself temporal, this is not a sound premise either. Its invalidity can be made clear through several points.

The first point is that the way this premise is expressed is vague and mixes different meanings together. This statement can have two possible meanings.

The first meaning is that whatever does not remain free of temporal events that are limited in number is temporal. That meaning is sound. Anything that does not remain free of temporal events that are limited in number must itself be temporal.

The second meaning is that whatever does not remain free of the kind of temporal events is temporal. So the meaning would be that whatever does not remain free of temporal events that have no first beginning, so that every temporal event has another one before it without end in the past, is temporal.

This meaning is not sound. In fact, this is the very point of dispute between Ahl al Sunnah wa al Jamaʿah and the people of kalam. Ahl al Sunnah do not accept this meaning. They say that it is valid to say that every temporal event has another temporal event before it without any end in the past, just as every temporal event has another event after it without end in the future.

If this is the case, they are not allowed to use the very point in dispute as a proof for their claim. That would be the logical mistake called “begging the question,” which means that someone tries to use the disputed claim itself as a proof for the same claim.

The second point is that if we accept this premise as true, it leads to false consequences. Anyone who denies the possibility of temporal events without a first beginning is then forced to accept the possibility that temporal events can occur without any cause that gives preference. The explanation is that the occurrence of a specific temporal event cannot take place by a fully complete cause that already existed from eternity.

A cause that is fully complete and eternal must have its effect also eternal. Every temporal event that begins after not existing must have a temporal cause that suits it. If we say that the kind of temporal events only began after it had not existed, and then we deny that voluntary attributes exist in Allah, the necessary conclusion is that temporal events occurred without any suitable acting cause.

Some of the theologians actually committed themselves to this consequence. It is, however, a necessary falsehood, because it contradicts the natural basic principle of causation which the mind knows by necessity.

If both of these premises which make up this objection are invalid, then the whole objection itself is invalid.

The second objection

The second objection is that if we say that Allah is capable of having temporal events in His essence, this must fall into one of two impossible states.

The first state is that His capacity to be described with voluntary attributes is itself something that occurs in His essence. This is impossible, because a occurring capacity would itself require another earlier capacity for it, and that leads to an endless regress which is impossible.

The second state is that His capacity to be described with voluntary attributes is inseparable from His essence. This is also impossible, because whatever is necessary to His essence must be eternal with it. This would require that temporal events exist from pre eternity, and temporal events existing from pre eternity would contradict the judgement that they are temporal. It is impossible for something to be both eternal and temporal at the same time.

From these two impossible states, they conclude that it is not valid for Allah to be capable of being described with voluntary attributes. (Abkar al Afkar by al Amidi, 2/25.)

This argument is unsound, and the main points which destroy it can be summarised as follows.

The first point is that we say that there is no doubt that the capacity of Allah to be described with voluntary attributes is inseparable from His essence, because it is an attribute of perfection, and perfection is inseparable from His essence. But this does not require that the individual acts of those attributes are eternal.

The most it requires is that the kind of attributes of perfection is eternal, and we affirm that. We affirm that the attributes of perfection of Allah are eternal in kind, while their individual acts are  occurring in many cases. So, in truth, this objection does not negate Allah being described with voluntary attributes. In fact, it confirms this description. (Dar Taarrud al Aql wa al Naql, 4/66.)

The second point is to respond by analogy with power. We say to them: Was Allah able to create from pre eternity or not? If you say that He was not able and then later became able, you have described Allah with imperfection, because that means that He was lacking power and then acquired it.

If you say that He has been able to create from pre eternity, and this is the correct answer, then we say to you: Was the act of creating possible for Allah, along with His being able from pre eternity, or not? If you say that it was not possible, then you contradict reason, because to be described with power over an act means that the act itself is possible. Power does not relate to the impossible, and one who is able is not able over what is impossible.

If you say that the act was possible for Him from pre eternity because He has been described with power from pre eternity, then the same must be said about His capacity to have temporal events. He has been capable of them from pre eternity, and that does not require that they themselves be eternal.

The statement about His capacity to have them is the same as the statement about His power over them. Affirming the possibility connected to His power requires affirming His capacity to have temporal events.

Al Amidi points to this line of argument. He says, refuting this objection: “According to our principle, the Creator has been described in pre eternity as able to create the universe, and this does not require that it be possible for the universe to exist from pre eternity.” (Abkar al Afkar, 2/25.)

Ibn Taymiyyah says in explanation: “There is no doubt that the Lord is able. Either it is said that He has always been able, or it is said that He only became able after not being able.

If it is said that He has always been able, and that is the correct view, then we say that if He has always been able, then if the thing He is able to do has always been possible, it is possible for the continuous existence of possible things, so it is possible for temporal events to exist continuously. If that is possible, then there is no reason to deny that He has been capable of them in pre eternity.

“If they say that the act was impossible and only later became possible, then they have joined two opposites. The one who is able is not able over the impossible, so how can He be able while the thing He is able to do is impossible?

Even if, for argument, we accepted that, and we agreed that He is able in pre eternity over what only becomes possible later on, we would say the same about capacity. We would say that He is capable in pre eternity of what only becomes possible later on.” (Majmuʿ al Fatawa, 6/248.)

The third point is to use the argument of “analogy of what is more fitting”. It can be put as follows: Is Allah able to bring into existence what is separate from His essence among created things or not? It is unavoidable that you answer that He is able, because this is what His perfect power requires. We then say that His ability to bring about such separate things proves, in an even stronger way, that He is able to bring about the voluntary attributes that exist in His own essence. If one is able over something that is outside himself, then his ability over what is in himself is even more obvious.

Ibn Taymiyyah points to this when he says: “We can say that He is able to make exist what is separate from Him among created things. It is known that the ability of the one who is able over the act that exists in himself is more fitting and more appropriate than his ability over what exists outside himself.

If His act has no barrier except what would also make impossible the existence of the created thing that is separate from Him, and it is established that the created thing that is separate from Him is possible and that He is able over it, then His own act is even more deserving of being possible and being within His power.” (Majmuʿ al Fatawa, 6/248.)

The third objection

The third objection is that if voluntary attributes existed in the essence of Allah, this would require that occurrence and change take place in His essence. Occurrence and change are among the characteristics of created things. So being described with voluntary attributes is impossible for Allah.

This objection is unsound. Al Razi (d.606 AH), al Amidi (d.631 AH) and others mention it. At its root it is found in the words of Aristotle. He is one of the first to say it. He says: “The first principle does not change. Change in it would be a move towards what is less perfect.” (This is the meaning of what is transmitted from Aristotle in the Arabic sources on his theology.)

Al Ashʿari (d.324 AH) reports that “occurrence” means “creating”. He says: “The people of affirmation are agreed that the meaning of makhluq is the meaning of muhdath, and the meaning of muhdath is the meaning of makhluq. This is the true view in my opinion and the one I follow.” (Maqalat al Islamiyyin by al Ashʿari, p.541.)

This objection rests on playing with words and mixing meanings that do not fit together.

We say that the word “change” has two possible meanings.

The first meaning is that it refers to the emergence of being described with attributes that did not exist before. If this is what is meant, then this entire objection is actually guilty of circular reasoning and begging the question, because the meaning of the objection would then be that the one who can be described with temporal events is capable of having temporal events.

This has no content. For example, if we say that if the sun can move then it is changing, and if we then define change as movement, then the statement would mean: if the sun can move then it is moving. This has no content and no proof value, and it does not at all refute those who affirm voluntary attributes.

The second meaning is that “change” refers to a move from one state to another, such as a move from health to illness and other such changes. If this is what is meant, then it does not follow from affirming that Allah is described with voluntary attributes that He is changing in that sense.

Calling the description of Allah with voluntary attributes a “change” is not correct, and it goes against the language of the Arabs. People do not say about the sun, the moon and the stars when they are moving in the sky that this is “change” or that they have “changed”.

They do not say about a person whose habit is to read the Quran and pray the five daily prayers that he has changed every time he reads or prays.

They only say this about someone whose habit was not to do these acts and then his habit changed. In that case they say that he has changed. So whoever says that Allah has always been speaking when He wills and acting as He wills does not call His actions “change”. Al Razi, al Amidi, Ibn Taymiyyah and others all repeated this criticism.

Even if we assume that it is valid to use the word “change” for this, that still does not allow us to deny what the revealed texts clearly affirm. Even if it is granted that it is linguistically possible to call the originated acts of Allah “change”, this does not mean that we can deny the attributes which the revealed texts clearly and explicitly affirm for Him.

All of this shows that “occurrence” and “change” are not identical with the meaning of “creating”. A temporal event may be created and may not be created. Ibn Taymiyyah says: “The distinction between makhluq and muhdath is the technical language of the leading imams of hadith, and it matches the language in which the Quran was revealed.” (al Tasʿiniyyah, 2/428.)

Ibn Qutaybah says:

“Muhdath is not always in the position of having the same meaning as makhluq. If they deny that, let them explain the words of Allah:

لَعَلَّ اللَّهَ يُحْدِثُ بَعْدَ ذَٰلِكَ أَمْرًا
Perhaps Allah will bring about after that a matter
(Quran 65:1)

Does this mean that He creates?

And also His words:

لَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَّقُونَ أَوْ يُحْدِثُ لَهُمْ ذِكْرًا
So that they may fear Allah or that He brings about for them a reminder
(Quran 20:113)

That is, He causes the Quran to bring them a originated reminder. The meaning is that He brings for them something that had not existed before.

Also His words:

مَا يَأْتِيهِمْ مِنْ ذِكْرٍ مِنْ رَبِّهِمْ مُحْدَثٍ إِلَّا اسْتَمَعُوهُ وَهُمْ يَلْعَبُونَ
No reminder comes to them from their Lord that is muhdath, except that they listen to it while they are at play
(Quran 21:2)

That is, a reminder that occurred for them that had not been before.”

(Ikhtilaf al Lafdh wa al Radd ʿala al Jahmiyyah by Ibn Qutaybah, p.39.)

The fourth objection

The fourth objection is based on the words of Allah about Ibrahim.

فَلَمَّا أَفَلَ قَالَ لَا أُحِبُّ الْآفِلِينَ
When it set, he said, I do not love those who set
(Quran 6:76)

They say that the way this verse proves their point is that Ibrahim used change and movement as a proof that the sun and the moon are not lords. This, they say, shows that Allah cannot be described with attributes that imply change, such as voluntary attributes, because that would contradict His Lordship.

Using this verse to deny the voluntary attributes is not correct, for several reasons.

The first reason is that “afl” does not mean “movement” as they claim. It means “setting” and “disappearing from sight”. Not every moving thing is described as “afl”. One does not say about someone who is walking or about someone who is praying that he is “afl”. This is not part of the Arabic language.

In fact interpreting “afl” as movement goes against the consensus of the people of language. None of them interpreted it that way. They are agreed that it means “setting” and “disappearing from sight”.

Ibn Faris (d.395 AH) says: “Afl means that the sun sets, and the stars set. Everything that disappears is said to be afl.” (Maqayis al Lugha by Ibn Faris, 1/119.)

Ibrahim only said “I do not love those that set” when the stars and the planets had set and become hidden. The people of language have all stated this meaning and none of them differed.

This interpretation also goes against the consensus of the mufassirin among the Sahabah, the Tabiʿin and the early imams. None of them explained “afl” as movement. They are unanimous in explaining it as setting and disappearing.

The second reason is that explaining “afl” as movement goes against the actual argument used in the story. If Ibrahim had wanted to rely on movement to prove that the planets are not lords, he would have argued with their first rising and movement.

He did not start using them as a proof from the beginning of their appearance. Instead, he waited until they set. This shows that his argument was not based on movement or transition.

Allah says:

فَلَمَّا رَأَى الشَّمْسَ بَازِغَةً قَالَ هَذَا رَبِّي هَذَا أَكْبَرُ فَلَمَّا أَفَلَتْ قَالَ يَا قَوْمِ إِنِّي بَرِيءٌ مِّمَّا تُشْرِكُونَ
إِنِّي وَجَّهْتُ وَجْهِيَ لِلَّذِي فَطَرَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ حَنِيفًا وَمَا أَنَا مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ

When he saw the sun rising, he said, This is my Lord, this is greater. But when it set, he said, O my people, I am free from what you associate. I have turned my face toward the One who created the heavens and the earth, inclining to the truth, and I am not from those who associate partners with Allah.
(Quran 6:78–79)

So Ibrahim did not make movement and transition his basis for argument. If he had, he would have said from the first appearance, Look at how it rises and moves. He also did not say, I do not love those who move.

Because of this, al Izz ibn Abd al Salam (d.660 AH) admitted that their use of this story as a proof is very problematic. He said about their reliance on it: “It is extremely problematic, because if what shows that the planet is not a lord is change, then that change was present before the setting, so there is no sense in restricting the proof to the time of setting.

If what shows it is its absence from the sight of the eye, then that would be required regarding Allah. If the proof is its moving from perfection, which is being high above, to something less, then it was already lacking perfection at the time of rising.” (Fawa id fi Mushkil al Quran by al Izz ibn Abd al Salam, p.119.)

If we look carefully at the method which Ibrahim used, we can draw two important conclusions.

The first conclusion is that “afl” does not mean bare movement, because he clearly distinguished between the rising, which certainly includes movement, and the setting.

The second conclusion is that the method of argument in the story shows the opposite of what the theologians want to prove. Ibn Taymiyyah explains this: “If Ibrahim had only used the setting as proof that it is not the Lord of the universe, as they claim, it would then follow that everything in which setting occurs, in the sense of being moving and transitioning and having temporal events, and everything that is a body in a direction, would not be for him a proof that it is not the Lord of the universe.

In that case, the story of Ibrahim would be proof against the very conclusion they seek, not proof for it.” (Bayan Talbis al Jahmiyyah by Ibn Taymiyyah, 1/530.)

The fifth objection

The fifth objection is the doubt of perfection and imperfection. It is that the voluntary attributes cannot be free of being either imperfection or perfection. If they are imperfection, then it is necessary to declare Allah free of them. If they are perfection, then it would follow that Allah was lacking in perfection before He became described with them. Lacking perfection is imperfection, so Allah must be declared free of this type of attributes.

This is the objection which al Razi and al Amidi relied on and considered it a sufficient replacement for the earlier weak proofs.

This objection is also wrong. The errors in it can be shown through several points.

The first point is that we do not accept that the absence of these specific acts before they occur is imperfection. Rather some things, if they were brought before their proper time, would themselves become imperfection. For example, when Allah spoke to Musa and called him, this call at the time Allah called him was an attribute of perfection.

If He had called him before he came, this would have been imperfection, because addressing what is not yet present and has no understanding contradicts wisdom. So each of these acts is perfection at the time when it exists. It is not perfection before it exists. In fact, its existence before the time in which wisdom requires it to exist would itself be imperfection.

The second point is that we say that if the clear mind is presented with two essences, one of which can speak by its own choice and act as it wills by itself, and another which can never speak by its own choice and never act by itself in any way, rather it is like time, which cannot do any act that exists in itself by its own will, then the clear mind will judge that the first essence is more perfect.

You are therefore the ones who have described the Lord with perfection and imperfection in relation to His being described with these attributes, not in relation to denying them.

The sixth objection

The sixth objection is that describing Allah with voluntary attributes would mean that the perfection of Allah depends on the acts of His servants. For example, Allah loves the disbeliever when he enters Islam.

This, they say, means that the attributes of Allah are affected by the acts of the servants, and this is corruption of a very high degree. This objection is mentioned by a number of later writers. It is clearly set out by al Kaylani known as Ibn Qawan (d.889 AH), and al Baydawi (d.685 AH) points to it. Some contemporary writers have also adopted it. (Sharh al Aqa id al ʿAdudiyyah by al Kaylani known as Ibn Qawan, p.51.)

This objection is weak. Its errors can be shown through several points.

The first point is that it is built on vague expressions. Saying that the perfection of Allah is “conditioned” on the acts of the servants, or “affected” by them, can have two meanings.

The first meaning is that the perfection of Allah is incomplete until the act of the servant comes and completes it and influences it. So the perfection of Allah does not fully exist until that condition from outside influences it. This is a false meaning. No Muslim says it. It is impossible for a created being to influence and complete the acts of Allah. The created being and all his acts are under the power, creating and greatness of Allah.

The second meaning is that some individual acts of the perfection of Allah are originated when the human being performs acts that fit them.

Allah decrees decrees and then arranges His acts upon them. This meaning is correct and it is exactly what Ahl al Sunnah say. This is not called “influence” in the wrong sense. It is rather that Allah acts according to wisdom, and acting according to wisdom is perfection, not imperfection.

Ibn al Qayyim (d.751 AH) says: “One day I asked Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah about this. I said to him: If the Lord is pleased with the obedience of the servant, and rejoices at his repentance, and is angry at his disobedience, can we say that the temporal being influences the eternal in terms of love, hatred, joy and the like?

He said to me: The Lord is the one who creates the causes of His pleasure, anger and joy. He is the one who wills them and creates them.

So they are not influences from other than Him. Rather they are from Him Himself and belong to Him. What is impossible is that something other than Him influences Him. That is impossible. As for His creating causes and willing them and determining them in a way that they lead to His pleasure, love, joy and anger, this is not impossible. It is from Him that it began and to Him that it returns.” (Madarij al Salikin by Ibn al Qayyim, 2/433.)

The second point is that the same objection can be directed at the attributes which the Ashʿaris themselves affirm. It can be said that describing Allah with the attribute of forgiveness only occurs after the servant falls into sin and then seeks forgiveness.

Describing Allah with the attribute of provision only occurs after the existence of the created beings who get provision. Before the existence of created beings Allah was not described as “forgiver” or “provider” in the actual sense of the act. The same can be said regarding giving life and causing death and other attributes of perfection. In their language this would mean that His perfection is conditioned by the created beings, according to their way of speaking.

The third point is that this objection would also require abolishing the whole subject of supplication. The reality of supplication is that a servant asks Allah to bring some benefit to him or to remove some harm from him. If Allah answers his supplication, then, according to this objection, it would be valid to say that the perfection of Allah is affected by the act of the servant.

The correct statement is that Allah is the one who moves the servant to make supplication and to ask Him. Allah is the one who influences the servant, not the other way round.

Ibn Abi al Izz (d.792 AH) says: “If someone says that if giving by Allah is caused by the act of the servant in the way that giving by one who is asked is caused by the question of the asker, then that would mean that the asker influences the one who is asked so that he gives. We answer: The Lord is the one who moves the servant to supplicate Him.

This meaning can be organised and presented more clearly in the following way.

All goodness comes from Him, and its completion also comes from Him. The servant’s role is to be guided to the right action, and Allah completes it with His favour.

This is why Umar ibn al Khattab said: I do not worry about being answered. I only worry about supplication. When I am guided to supplicate, the answer comes with it. His meaning is that guidance to supplication itself is a sign that acceptance will follow, because Allah is the One who places supplication in the heart and then brings about its result.

Allah points to this same meaning when He speaks about His control and management of all affairs.

يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ ثُمَّ يَعْرُجُ إِلَيْهِ فِي يَوْمٍ كَانَ مِقْدَارُهُ أَلْفَ سَنَةٍ مِمَّا تَعُدُّونَ
He manages the matter from the heaven to the earth, then it ascends to Him in a day whose measure is a thousand years of what you count
(Quran 32:5)

Here Allah tells us that He begins the management of every affair. The matter starts from Him, unfolds according to His command, and then returns and ascends back to Him. This shows that both the beginning and the end are in His hand, just as guidance to supplication is from Him and the answering of it is also from Him.

Allah is the one who casts into the heart of the servant the movement of supplication and makes it a cause for the good which He gives to him, just as He does in the case of actions and reward. He is the one who granted the servant success to repent and then accepted it.

He is the one who granted him success to act and then rewarded him. He is the one who granted him success to supplicate and then answered him. No created thing influences Him in anything. Rather He has made what the servant does a cause for what He does.” (Sharh al Tahawiyyah by Ibn Abi al Izz, p.680.)

An objection and its answer

The position of Ahl al Sunnah regarding the voluntary attributes rests upon the rule of distinguishing between the eternity of the kind and the temporality of the individual acts. There is, however, a well known objection to this rule. It is that if the kind is made up of individual acts, and all the individuals are temporal, then the kind must take the same ruling as the individuals, because the kind is nothing more than all the individuals together. The kind must therefore itself be temporal.

The answer to this objection is that we say that the ruling of the whole is not necessarily identical with the ruling of the individuals in every case and in every form. Sometimes the whole has a different ruling from the individuals. Because of this, one does not always judge that a kind is finite and perishing just because its individuals are temporal.

One does not judge that Paradise will perish even though the individual delights in it are temporal. The same applies to the past. If this can be conceived in future events, then it can also be conceived in past events.

What proves that the ruling of the kind does not have to be the same as the ruling of the individuals from which it is formed is that the length of a cubit is greater than the length of one part of the cubit.

If the ruling of the whole always had to be exactly the same as the ruling of the part, the length of the cubit would have to be exactly equal to the length of each of its parts. The same is true of weight. A measure of wheat is made of parts whose weights are less than the weight of the whole. If the ruling of the whole always had to be the same as the ruling of the part, we would have to say that the weight of the whole measure is equal to the weight of each of its parts. This is impossible.

All of this shows that the premise on which that objection rests is false. That premise is that whatever is composed of temporal individual parts is itself temporal. This premise rests on the claim that the ruling of the whole always follows the ruling of the parts of which it is composed. The examples above show that this is not a universal rule.

A number of scholars of kalam have admitted that the ruling of the whole does not have to be the same as the ruling of the individuals.

Safi al Din al Hindi (d.715 AH) says: “The ruling of a composite whole formed from individuals can be different from the ruling of those individuals. Knowledge of this is certain after examining the cases.” (Nihayat al Wusul fi Dirayat al Usul by Safi al Din al Hindi, 7/2724.)

Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728 AH) gave a lot of attention to this rule, explained its reality and the evidences for it in some detail and showed the effects which follow from it. One of the most comprehensive places where he speaks about this rule is when he says:

“It does not follow from the temporality of each individual temporal event, even though these events come one after another, that the kind itself is temporal. It does not therefore follow that the one who acts and speaks has always been deprived of action and speech and then began to act and speak without any cause.

This point can be set out more clearly and in a more ordered way as follows.

The same rule applies to future events. Every single event that comes into existence and then ends is perishing. What does not perish is the kind itself. The kind continues, even though each individual instance within it comes to an end.

This is the same as in the future. Every individual event in the future which comes and then ends is perishing. The kind is not perishing.

Allah says:

أُكُلُهَا دَائِمٌ وَظِلُّهَا
Its fruit is lasting and its shade is lasting
(Quran 13:35)

And He says:

إِنَّ هَذَا لَرِزْقُنَا مَا لَهُ مِن نَّفَادٍ
Indeed, this is Our provision, it has no end
(Quran 38:54)

The thing which is constant and does not come to an end is the kind, not any one individual. Every individual is perishing and passing away and is not constant.

“The reason is that the ruling which is given to individuals because of a meaning existing in the whole will also be given to the whole, such as when each individual is described as existing, possible or non existent. In that case the whole will also be described as existing, possible or non existent, because the nature of the whole is the nature of each of the individual parts. The whole is nothing but all the individuals together which are possible or existing or non existent.

“As for those rulings given to the individuals which are not in fact attributes of the whole, it does not follow that the whole shares that ruling. This is the case with the parts of a house, a human being or a tree. Each part is not itself a house, a human being or a tree. The parts of something long, wide, lasting or extended do not have to be themselves long, wide, lasting or extended.

“In the same way, if each individual among temporal events is described as perishing or having a beginning, it does not follow that the kind itself must come to an end or have a beginning after not existing. Being temporal means that the thing came into existence after not being. Being perishing means that it ceases after existing.

The fact that a thing ceases after existing or that it enters into existence after non existence is a matter that returns to that specific existent and its non existence, not to the general nature that is fixed for the whole, as in the case of existents, non existents and possible things.

From the fact that this particular thing does not last, it does not follow that the kind does not last. Lasting means that the individuals of the kind continue one after another. This is something that belongs to the whole and cannot be said of just one individual.

“If the whole has a ruling because all the parts are together, and that ruling is different from the rulings of the individual parts, then the whole does not have to have the same ruling as the parts. In short, whatever is true of individuals may be true of the whole and may not be true of the whole.

So it does not follow from the temporality of each individual temporal event that the kind is temporal, unless it is first proved that the whole itself is described with the same attribute as the individuals.

“The rule in this is that whenever the addition of one individual to another changes the very nature of the attribute that the first individual had, then the ruling of the whole will not be the same as the ruling of the individuals. When the addition of one individual to another does not change that attribute in the first, then the ruling of the whole will be the same as the ruling of the parts.” (Minhaj al Sunnah al Nabawiyyah by Ibn Taymiyyah, 1/428.)

Al-‘Uqūd al-Dhahabīyah By Sultan Al Umayri page (1/130-156)