In this article I will be using Dr. Kāmilah Al-Kuwārī’s book ❝Qidam al-‘Ālam wa Tasalsul al-Ḥawādith❞ (The Eternity of the Universe and the Sequence of Events).
In pages 43–61 Dr. Kāmilah explains that Ibn Taymiyyah uses the term eternity in a precise way. He affirms that Allāh has always been acting, creating events one after another, without there being a first act in terms of the generic type.
At the same time, he firmly denies that any specific created thing, act, or effect is eternal. Every individual created thing comes into existence after non existence, while what is without a beginning is only the continuous succession of acts and effects as a type, not any particular member of that series. In this way, everything besides Allah remains created and originated, even though His acting has no beginning in terms of kind.
In pages 184–227 Dr. Kāmilah clarifies that Ibn Taymiyyah’s position is fundamentally different from that of the philosophers. The philosophers hold that Allah is a necessary cause whose effect must accompany Him eternally, which leads them to affirm that the universe is eternal in time and that creation is not truly originated by choice.
Ibn Taymiyyah rejects this entirely, affirming that Allah is an agent who chooses and acts by will and power, that His acts bring things into existence after non existence, and that no created thing is eternal with Him. He allows only an endless succession of created effects, not an eternal created universe, and shows that the philosophers’ principle of temporal accompaniment contradicts both reason and observed reality.
Navigation Menu For The Summary
First Topic: The Generic Eternity of the Universe or the Generic Eternity of Created Things
Two meanings of qidam according to Ibn Taymiyyah
Ambiguity in the term al qadīm
Continuous acting without any eternal created thing
Successive acts in the Necessary Being
Distinguishing attributes from acts
Rational proof and eternity of the generic type
Eternity without beginning is not a bounded time
Other scholars affirming generic eternity
Clarifications by those who came later
Secont Topic: The Difference between the Position of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Position of the Philosophers
Philosophers’ classification of originated and eternal
Their cosmological scheme of intellects and spheres
Three summarised positions
The first objection of the philosophers
Critique of the philosophers’ principle of temporal accompaniment
Ibn Taymiyyah’s middle position on the complete cause
Two types of regress
Necessary cause and the agent by choice
Final clarification of Ibn Taymiyyah’s position
Navigation Menu For The Full Article
First Topic: The Generic Eternity of the Universe or the Generic Eternity of Created Things
Second Topic: The Difference between the Position of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Position of the Philosophers
The Objections of the Philosophers against the Theologians
The Second Objection
Reports from Ibn Taymiyyah Denying That The Universe Is Eternal
Summary
First Topic: The Generic Eternity of the Universe or the Generic Eternity of Created Things
Classical definitions of qidam
Classical scholars defined qidam as existence that is not preceded by non existence, and restricted true qidam to the Creator, such that “the qadīm is that whose existence has no beginning.” This appears in the definitions of al Manāwī, al Rāghib, al Jurjānī, Abū al Baqā al Kafawī and at Tūfī. (at Tawqīf p.576, at Taʿrīfāt p.221, al Kulliyyāt p.727, Sharḥ al Mukhtaṣar 1/64)
From here the difficulty arose: if qidam simply means “no preceding non existence”, then both the generic type and the individual instance would be “eternal”, which is indeed the belief of the philosophers. Ibn Taymiyyah uses the term in a more detailed way.
Two meanings of qidam according to Ibn Taymiyyah
For him, qidam has two usages. The first is the true eternity that is not preceded by non existence at all, such as the Essence of Allah and the attributes that necessarily belong to Him like life (as Safadiyyah 2/146).
The second is qidam in respect of a generic type that continues as “something after something”, where each particular act and each particular created thing is preceded by non existence, yet the type as a whole has no first individual. From this angle the type can be described as “eternal” while none of its instances is eternal. (as Safadiyyah 2/47, 2/87, 2/144)
Ambiguity in the term al qadīm
He explains that the term al qadīm and al azali is ambiguous: sometimes it means a particular existent that has always existed with no first moment, and sometimes it means something that exists as “something after something”, so that “its successive type is eternal, while none of its individual instances is eternal, and nor is their totality eternal.” (as Safadiyyah 2/47)
Continuous acting without any eternal created thing
On this basis Ibn Taymiyyah affirms that Allah has always been an agent who produces events one after another. He denies that any particular trace of His effects is eternal, stating that “none of the particular traces is eternal, neither the sphere nor anything else that they call intellects or souls or anything else.” (as Safadiyyah 2/47) There is no single fixed eternal act and no single fixed eternal created thing; what is without beginning is the continued type of act and effect, not any specific member of that series. (as Safadiyyah 2/144)
Successive acts in the Necessary Being
He links this to the position of the leading imams of hadith, who say that successive acts stand in the Necessary Being, such as His speech and other voluntary actions, and that this is also accepted by groups from the people of kalam and even some philosophers. (as Safadiyyah 1/37).
The root of many confusions, he says, is that people only conceive of two options concerning His act and speech: either an eternal thing in itself that has always existed, which is the saying of the philosophers who affirm the eternity of the universe, or a created generic type that has a beginning, which is the saying of the people of kalam among the Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah.
He shows that there is a third way, namely an eternal generic type with originated individual instances. (as Safadiyyah 1/13, 2/175)
Distinguishing attributes from acts
He insists that the claim of a single act that constantly accompanies Allah without renewal is what led the philosophers to say that the universe is eternal, because if His act is not originated then it becomes like a fixed necessary attribute, and whatever is necessarily concomitant with such an act must also be constant.
He therefore emphasises the distinction between attributes and acts: attributes like life can be necessary to the Essence, either in themselves or in their generic type such as speech and will, whereas acts are only understood as originated things that occur as “something after something”. If an act were not originated, “no difference would be understood between it and the necessary attribute.” (as Safadiyyah 2/146, 2/149)
Rational proof and eternity of the generic type
On this foundation he explains that rational proofs which show that the Lord is always acting do not require that any part of the universe is eternal with Him. At most they show the eternity of the generic type of act, not the eternity of any particular act or particular created thing. (as Safadiyyah 2/167) This removes the supposed conflict between reason and the reports of the Messengers عليهم السلام that Allah created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days, and that everything besides Him is created and preceded by non existence. (Darʾ Taʿāruḍ 8/279)
Eternity without beginning is not a bounded time
He also clarifies that “eternity without beginning is not a bounded time, rather it is an expression for a past continuity that has no beginning, that is not preceded by non existence, that has always been,” and that “there is no bounded thing in eternity without beginning for which He is an agent with respect to all of it.” (as Safadiyyah 1/283, 2/46)
Thus, there is no single eternal created whole alongside Him, even though His acts and their effects continue without a first in terms of generic type.
Other scholars affirming generic eternity
This understanding was not unique to Ibn Taymiyyah. Al Shanqītī explained that there is no impossibility in Allah originating events with no first, as long as each event is created by His power and will, and that to say His act has a beginning implies that before that He was unable to create (Riḥlat al Ḥajj p.51).
Bakhīt al Mutīʿī held that an endless sequence of effects is not impossible in itself, provided that each individual event is still originated after non existence, likening this to the bliss of Paradise which has no end in the future while being originated. (Sullam al Wuṣūl 2/103)
Ad Dawānī preferred the view that there are events without a first in the origination of the universe, saying that no particular part of the universe must be eternal in its specific instance, but that “what is eternal is the generic type, that its individual instance is always existent in a successive manner.” (Sharḥ al ʿAqāʾid al ʿAḍudiyyah p.179)
Muḥammad ʿAbduh commented on the verse in which Allāh refutes the Jews who said that His hand is tied, arguing that it is enough to say that Allāh has always been a Creator and that “there is no first to His giving” while every part of the universe remains originated after non existence. In that case the verse does not prove the eternity of any created thing. (Ḥāshiyah ʿalā Sharḥ ad Dawānī p.179)
Clarifications by those who came later
Murād Shukrī pointed out that none of the careful investigators ever took the eternity of the generic type to mean that anything is eternal with Allāh or that the generic type is a concrete existent.
Muḥammad Khalīl Harrās summarised Ibn Taymiyyah’s view by saying that the generic type of events is eternal, in the sense that Allāh has always been acting in this series whenever He wills and there is no first event with nothing before it, while every individual event from this succession is originated, coming into existence after non existence.
This is just as the philosophers say about the movements of the spheres, that their essential nature is eternal, even though the individual instances of those movements are originated.” (Ibn Taymiyyah as Salafī p.163)
So, when Ibn Taymiyyah speaks of the “generic eternity” of acts or of created things, he means the continuity of successive acts of Allah and successive created things without a first, together with the fact that each particular act and each particular created thing is preceded by non existence. From this perspective the generic type is “eternal”, while no created thing is eternal with Allah.
Second Topic: The Difference between the Position of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Position of the Philosophers
Many attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah that he affirmed the eternity of the universe and agreed with Ibn Sīnā, al Fārābī and Ibn Rushd in saying that Allah is a necessary cause whose effect accompanies Him.
Philosophers’ classification of originated and eternal
The philosophers divide existents into originated and eternal, but they give these terms technical meanings. They say that what is “originated by essence” is anything that needs a cause for its existence, whether or not non existence preceded it. What is “originated in time” is what non existence preceded, like individual human beings.
What is “eternal by essence” is what does not need a cause at all, which is only the Essence of the Lord. “Eternal in time” includes both what is without beginning and without a cause, like the Essence of the Lord, and what is without beginning but needs a cause, like the spheres in their belief. (Sharḥ al Khurīda with Ḥāshiyat as Sāwī p.30, Sharḥ al Bājūrī ʿalā al Jawharah p.68)
Their cosmological scheme of intellects and spheres
According to them, the Necessary Being is one from every side, with no power, no will and no attribute added to His Essence. From such a one there can only proceed a single effect by way of causation, which they call the First Intellect.
This First Intellect is necessary through its cause and possible in itself, so they say that it is originated in essence and eternal in time. From it, considering one aspect, there proceeds another intellect, and from another aspect proceeds the first sphere, which they identify with the Throne.
From the next intellect likewise proceed a further sphere and a third intellect, and so on until the lowest heaven and the “outpouring intellect” whose effusion reaches the realm beneath the moon. In this way they say that the spheres and the universal kinds of animals, plants and minerals are originated in essence but eternal in time without beginning, while the individual instances beneath the moon are originated in both essence and time. (Ḥāshiyat ad Dusūqī on Sharḥ Umm al Barāhīn p.70, Ḥāshiyat as Sāwī on Sharḥ al Khurīda p.28)
Their doctrine implies that the Lord has no choice in His act, that He does not truly originate things after not having existed, and that His eternity necessitates the eternity of the universe in time. This is disbelief by agreement of the Muslims, and because of such statements they were judged unbelievers for three matters: their denial of His knowledge of particulars, their denial of the origination of the universes and their denial of the resurrection of bodies after death.
Three summarised positions
Ibn Taymiyyah summarises the three main positions by saying: “He was with creation” is the statement of the philosophers. “He has always been acting” is the statement of Ahl al Sunnah. “He was, then He created” is the statement of the mutakallimun.
He himself affirms that Allah has always been acting and that everything besides Him is originated, and he allows only an infinite regress in effects, not in agents and causes.
Muḥammad Khalīl Harrās says that the philosophers say Allah is a complete cause from eternity, so His effect must accompany Him in time, even if He is prior to it in rank as cause. In their view there is never an effect except with a complete cause, and never a complete cause except joined with its effect in time.
Yet they themselves admit that events in the universe occur one after another, and they cannot, upon their principles, show any new cause for this succession. The reality of their view, Harrās notes, is that events occur without any true cause.
The first objection of the philosophers
Groups from the people of kalām replied by saying that the complete cause may, or must, have its effect come after it, and that a capable agent who chooses between possibilities can prefer one of his possible acts without a cause, like a hungry person choosing between two loaves or a fugitive choosing between two paths.
They deny an infinite regress of effects in the past and say that the universe began after not having existed. However, this forces them to allow preference without any cause that gives preference, which contradicts their own principle that a possible thing cannot have one of its two sides preferred without a cause.
Ibn Taymiyyah describes the objection of the philosophers about preferring one of two possible sides without a cause as one of their strongest objections against the mutakallimun, and shows that the mutakallimun did not escape it as long as they held that Allah was idle in pre eternity and then began to act without any new cause. This is what encouraged those who say that the universe is eternal to attack them.
Critique of the philosophers’ principle of temporal accompaniment
At the same time, he refutes the philosophers by showing that their principle that the complete cause and its effect must accompany each other in time leads to absurd consequences. If every effect must accompany a complete cause in time, then no new event would ever occur in the universe, which contradicts what is seen and known by necessity. It would also imply an infinite number of contemporaneous causes in a single moment, which clear reason and the people of intellect reject. (Darʾ Taʿāruḍ 1/341, 1/345, 8/380)
Ibn Taymiyyah’s middle position on the complete cause
The correct position, he says, is that the complete influence of the cause necessitates the effect, so that the effect comes after the completion of the influence, without being joined with it in time and without delay beyond it.
He illustrates this with simple examples: one says, “I broke the vessel so it broke; I cut the rope so it snapped; I divorced the woman so she became divorced.” Likewise, Allah says, “His command when He wills a thing is only that He says to it, Be, and it is.” (Yā Sīn 82) The thing comes into existence after His bringing it into existence, not alongside His act and not delayed beyond His bringing it into existence. (as Safadiyyah 2/49)
According to this, everything besides Allah is originated, coming into existence after not having existed, because it is preceded by His act of bringing it into existence. The complete cause necessitates the existence of its effect after the completion of its influence, not alongside it. Thus the statement of the philosophers that the effect must accompany the complete cause in time is false, and the statement of the mutakallimun that the effect must be delayed after it in time without any new cause is also false.
Two types of regress
Ibn Taymiyyah distinguishes between two types of regress. A regress in causes, where every cause has another cause that exists with it in the same moment, is impossible by clear reason and by the agreement of the people of intellect. A regress in effects, where one effect follows another without a first, is permissible, like the statement that Allah has always been speaking when He wills and that His words have no end, or that the bliss of Paradise has no end in the future. (as Safadiyyah 2/50, 1/281, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ 8/380) In this second sense only, he allows an infinite succession of events.
Necessary cause and the agent by choice
He also clarifies the term “necessary cause”. If it is taken to mean something that produces its effect without will and power, this is an impossibility and cannot exist in reality.
If it is taken to mean that the Essence of Allah is that of a capable agent who chooses, so that when His will is fixed and His power complete the action must occur, then there is no contradiction between being “necessary” in this sense and being an agent by choice. Much of the dispute here, he notes, is a dispute over words. (Minhāj as Sunnah 1/396, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ 1/345)
On this basis he argues that the rational principles upon which the philosophers rely, when examined correctly, do not establish the eternity of any part of the universe. At most they establish that the Lord has always been acting.
When this is combined with the distinction between the generic type and the particular instance, the result is that everything besides Allah is originated, preceded by non existence, and that only Allah is eternal without beginning. (Minhāj as Sunnah 1/148, Majmūʿ al Fatāwā 5/537, 6/231, 9/280, 16/94)
Final clarification of Ibn Taymiyyah’s position
In this way Ibn Taymiyyah affirms that Allah has always been described with attributes of perfection, living, speaking when He wills and doing as He wills, originating events as something after something, while it remains impossible that any created thing is concomitant with Him in eternity. Everything other than Him is originated after not having existed, even though His act as a generic type is from the necessary implications of His perfect Essence.
Full Article
First Topic: The Generic Eternity of the Universe or the Generic Eternity of Created Things
This topic is one of the most important topics in this book. Whoever Allāh guides to understand it, many of the problematic objections that the opponents raise against Shaykh al Islām will fall away. We will quote from the words of Shaykh al Islām what supports our intended point.
Before that, we want to clarify that many of those who criticised Shaykh al Islām understood him to be affirming the eternity of the universe, in the sense that it has always been with Allāh, and that Allāh is a necessary cause by His essence and not One who acts by choice. This is how al Haytamī and others related from him, whose words we will quote in a separate discussion, if Allāh wills.
Now we will clarify the meaning of the generic eternity of the universe, and we say, with the help of Allāh:
The well known definition of qidam (eternity) is: that which is not preceded by non existence. Al Manāwī said in at Tawqīf p.576, and al Rāghib said: The true qidam is that which is not preceded by non existence, and this is what is expressed as essential qidam that is specific to the Exalted Creator.
And he said: The qadīm (the eternal) is that whose existence is not preceded by non existence, and that is the meaning of their saying: that whose existence has no beginning.
Al Jurjānī said the same in at Taʿrīfāt p.221, and Abul Baqā al Kafawī in al Kulliyyāt p.727, and at Tūfī in his commentary on his Mukhtasar 1/64.
From here the difficulty arose in understanding the words of Shaykh al Islām. Because if qidam means that which is not preceded by non existence, then this includes both the generic type and the individual instance, and that is undoubtedly the saying of the philosophers. Those who said this did not read Shaykh al Islām’s words on qidam, because qidam in his usage has two meanings:
- The eternity which is not preceded by non existence, such as the Essence of Allāh and the attributes that are necessarily attached to Him in themselves, like life, for example. He mentioned that in as Safadiyyah (as Safadiyyah 2/146).
- Qidam in the sense of something that succeeds one thing after another, that is, it is preceded by non existence with respect to the particular act and the particular created thing, but it is successive and continuous. So the successive act and the successive created thing are described as eternal as well, but only in terms of the generic type that continues, while the fact that non existence did not precede that type is clear. Otherwise the necessary result would be that the Lord was idle and then created, as will come in the words of Shaykh al Islām about the people of kalām.
For this reason he said in as Safadiyyah explaining the two previous meanings: “The term al qadīm (the eternal) and al azali (without beginning) contains ambiguity. Sometimes by al qadīm is meant a particular thing that has always existed and whose existence has no first point. Sometimes by al qadīm is meant a thing that occurs as something after something, so its successive type is eternal, while none of its particular instances is eternal, and nor is their totality eternal.
However, it is in itself eternal from this perspective. So the ongoing effect which is something after something, and which is from the necessary consequences of His Essence, is eternal in its generic type, while none of its particular instances is eternal.
So none of the particular traces is eternal, neither the sphere nor anything else that they call intellects or souls or anything else. He is not, in some specific time, an agent who produces one event after another. Rather He is always an agent who produces one event after another. Just as He is not, in any specific time, an agent for the whole collection of events, rather He is an agent of something after something. He is an agent for one event after another, time after time.
So if the created thing necessitates events, then He does not act except that the events which are His created things are with Him. These events, although they are created by Him as something after something, the One who brings them into existence as something after something, if He brought into existence what accompanies them at a specific time, it would follow that He Himself is one of that collection, and that is what is required.
If it is said: He is concomitant with it, eternal with it, such that it exists with Him in every time, it is said: This is not possible except if He is a cause that necessitates it and is not an agent who brings it into existence.” (as Safadiyyah 2/47)
He also said: “It may be said about something that it is eternal, meaning that it has always existed as something after something. And it may be said that it is eternal, meaning that it exists in itself from eternity.” (as Safadiyyah 2/87)
He also said: “But the generic type is without beginning, in the sense that it exists as something after something. So the act that is conditioned by it also exists as something after something, because it is impossible for the conditioned thing to exist without the condition.
If that act exists as something after something, then the created thing will be like that even more so, since it is impossible for the created thing to come before its act. So there is no single fixed eternal act, therefore there is no single fixed eternal created thing.” (as Safadiyyah 2/144)
He also said: “At most, what follows is that successive acts stand in the Necessary Himself, and this is the saying of the leading imāms of the people of hadith and their majority, and groups from the people of kalām and the philosophers.” (as Safadiyyah 1/37)
He said: “It is said: The generic type cannot exist except as successive, so the completion of its instances is successive, not without beginning. That can only be through what stands in Him as something after something. As for the completion of those instances without any act standing in Him, that is impossible.” (as Safadiyyah 1/77)
He said: “If it is said: There is no event until there is an event before it, then this is a continuous succession in the effects, and concerning this, the Muslims have three positions. The dispute over this is not between the people of the revealed religions and others, as many people imagine. Rather the very people of the revealed religions, rather the imāms of the people of the revealed religions, the people of Sunnah and hadith, allow this continuous succession in the words of Allāh and His acts.
They say: The Lord has always been One who speaks whenever He wills, and the words of Allāh are everlasting and eternal in their generic type according to them, they have always been and will always be, without beginning and without end.” (as Safadiyyah 1/13)
From this we know that the generic eternity, in the words of Shaykh al Islām, means succession and continuity, whether in the act of Allāh or in His created things. From this perspective His act is eternal, like His speech, and His created thing is also eternal from this perspective. As for the particular act, it is preceded by non existence, meaning that each separate act from His acts is preceded by non existence, just as each separate created thing is preceded by non existence. As for the generic type, in terms of succession, it is eternal. There is no problem in this, as we say the same in speech.
For this reason he said in as Safadiyyah:
“If it is said: He necessarily causes a particular effect at all times, it is said to him: The necessary causing, by an agent, of a particular created thing in the sense of its being always concomitant with Him in time is impossible, as has been explained in its proper place.
And the necessary causing of events, one after another, without new matters arising in Him is also impossible, as has been detailed in its proper place. The necessary causing of a particular thing without this event and that event is impossible. And the necessary causing of this event as always and that event as always is also impossible.
As for the necessary causing of events as something after something, that entails that He is not a necessary cause for an event except at the occurrence of that event. At that point the conditions for necessary causation are complete. That entails that the necessary causation itself becomes renewed as something after something. In that case, He was not a necessary cause for a particular thing except through a particular act of necessary causation.
What entails events cannot have a fixed single act of necessary causation. As for necessary causation that renews as something after something, it is impossible that anything in itself is eternal by that, because the eternal can only be by a particular eternal act of necessary causation that does not renew as something after something.”
“So the root of the dispute regarding the act of Allāh, is it eternal, or created, or originated, is of the same kind as the root of the dispute regarding the speech of Allāh the Exalted. Many of those who dispute about His speech and His act know only two possibilities: either an eternal thing in itself that has always existed, or an originated generic type that has a beginning. The first is the saying of the philosophers who say that the universe is eternal, and the second is the saying of the people of kalām among the Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah.” (as Safadiyyah 2/175)
Whoever does not examine carefully the words of Shaykh al Islām will think that he affirms qidam in the first sense, which is the absence of non existence both in the generic type and the individual instance. That is the saying of the philosophers which Shaykh al Islām rejected, as he explained that an act which is constant with Allāh without succession is what led the philosophers to the eternity of the universe.
For this reason he said: “If His act is not possible except together with this act, and this one is not eternal, then the other is likewise. It is not possible that any part of the universe is eternal except by an eternal act of His that is particular, and by that act sticking to the Essence of the Lord just as an attribute sticks to the one who is described with it.
It is known by clear reason that there is a difference between an attribute of the one who is described and between the act of the agent. As for the attribute, it is understood that it is necessary to the one described, either in itself like life, or in its generic type like speech and will. It is understood that it can be occasional, but that is only in the created thing.
As for the act, it is only understood as originated, as something after something. Whoever does not originate anything cannot be understood as one who has acted or brought into being, whether he acted by will or whether it is assumed that he acted without will.
If the act were not originated, then no difference would be understood between it and the necessary attribute, since both of them would be a meaning that stands in the Essence and necessarily belongs to it in itself. In that case, it would not be an act of that one who is described, and it would not be understood that the one who is described has performed an act.” (as Safadiyyah 2/146)
He said: “So whoever says that the Lord has always been One who speaks whenever He wills and however He wills and with whatever He wills, then speech to him is an attribute of the Essence that stands in the Essence of Allāh. He speaks by His act, and His act is by His will and power. So the extent of that, if it is said that it is eternal, fulfils the requirement of the proof that indicates the eternity of the generic type, without there being any need to say that anything from the universe is eternal with Allāh the Exalted.” (as Safadiyyah 2/167)
He also said: “Whoever masters this point, the veil over this matter will be removed for him.
The very fact that the agent is an agent entails the origination of the act, either in its generic type or in its particular instance. As for an act that is not originated, not in its generic type and not in its particular instance, but is instead necessary to the Essence of the agent, then this is not an act at all.
This is why the very knowledge of created beings that a thing is created makes them know that it is preceded by non existence, because it is not understood that something created is concomitant with its Creator, necessary to Him, and has always been with Him.
For this reason, the speech of Allāh with which He sent His Messengers agrees with what Allāh has instilled in the creation.” (as Safadiyyah 2/149)
He said: “So if it is said: This is produced by this, and it has always been concomitant with it, then in reason this is combining two opposites. It is as if it is said: It is produced by it and it is not produced by it. Rather, a rational person says: If the matter is like that, then making one of them the agent and the other the product is no more fitting than the reverse.” (as Safadiyyah 2/150)
He also said: “As for this particular thing being a product, created, owned, in need of its Maker, and at the same time being necessary to its agent due to the necessity of the act by which the agent produced it, just as His life is necessary to Him, or without any act standing in Him, then this is all something that the creation cannot understand with their natural disposition upon which they were created.” (as Safadiyyah 2/160)
He said: “On this basis, if it is said: Allāh has always been described with attributes of perfection, living, speaking whenever He wills, doing acts that stand in Him or created things that He produces as something after something, this gives the proof its due result.
It does not follow from the continuity of the generic type that every single one of its instances is continuous, nor that any particular instance is continuous, just as you yourself say about the movements of the spheres and the events on earth.
You say: The generic type of events is continuous, lasting, and has no first instance. Yet among them there is no single event that is eternal. All of them are originated, even though these events have always been.
If you say something like this regarding the act of the Necessary One, then you will have given this proof what it requires and you will not have opposed any of the proofs of reason or revelation.
If you say instead: What is necessary is the continuity of absolute causation, it is said: In that there is nothing that requires that any part of the universe is eternal. Rather, the fact that He is an agent for the created thing requires that the created thing is preceded by non existence, and the continuity of His being an agent does not contradict that. At that point, there is nothing with the philosopher that obliges the eternity of any part of the universe.
As for the saying of the mutakallim: ‘When it is necessary in the act that it be preceded by non existence, it is necessary to say that He brought it into existence after He was not one who brought into existence,’ it is said to him: Did you make it necessary in every particular created thing and every particular act that it be preceded by non existence, or did you make it necessary in the generic type of act?
If you say the first, there is no contradiction between every act and every created thing being preceded by non existence, and the continuity of the generic type of acting and the generic type of effect. In that case, what the proof of reason shows does not contradict what that other rational proof shows.
Whoever is guided in this subject to the difference between the generic type and the particular instance, the distinction between error and correctness will become clear to him in the issue of the acts and in the issue of speech and discourse.
Know that the people of intellect are the early generations of this ummah and its imāms who follow what the Book has brought, not those who dispute regarding the Book and oppose the Book, about whom it was said:
وَإِنَّ الَّذِينَ اخْتَلَفُوا فِي الْكِتَابِ لَفِي شِقَاقٍ بَعِيدٍ
“And indeed those who differ concerning the Book are in far reaching disagreement.” (al Baqarah 176)
In that case, the Lord the Exalted brought every event into existence after He had not brought it into existence. Everything other than Him is an event after it was not. It does not follow from that that His very perfection which He deserves becomes renewed. Rather, He has always been knowing, able, owning, forgiving, speaking whenever He wills, just as Imām Ahmad and other imāms of the early generations spoke with these words and similar words.” (as Safadiyyah 1/63)
He then said: “If it is said: The generic type of the act must be preceded by non existence, it is said to him: From where did you get this, when there is nothing in the Book and Sunnah that indicates it, and nothing in reason that guides to it?
This would entail that the Lord becomes able to perform the generic type of act after He was not able to do so. If He has always been able, then the existence of what is within His power is possible. If what is within His power was impossible and then became possible, then the Lord would be able after He was not able, and the act would move from impossibility to possibility without any new thing occurring and without anything becoming renewed.
That is because eternity is not a specific thing. Rather, it is a term for the absence of a first. Just as eternity without end is a term for the absence of a last. There is no time that is imagined except that eternity without a first is before it without limit.” (as Safadiyyah 1/63)
From all of this we know that the deciding distinction in this issue is the difference between the particular instance and the generic type. Shaykh al Islām intended by this to refute the philosophers who said that the particular act is constant with Allāh and eternal, and then they were forced to say that the universe is eternal.
He said: “It is not possible that any part of the universe is eternal except by an eternal act of His that is particular, and by that act sticking to the Essence of the Lord just as an attribute sticks to the one who is described with it.” (as Safadiyyah 2/146)
He said: “Those who say that the universe is eternal became confused between the generic type of causation and the particular instance of causation. When they saw that the Essence entails that He is an agent, for it is impossible that this comes into existence later, they did not distinguish between the generic type and the particular instance. So they thought that this entails the eternity of the spheres or other particular parts of the universe.
This is certainly an error, because the Essence entails the generic type of causation, not its particular instance. If it is supposed that He has always been acting for something after something, then none of His created things is eternal. Rather, everything other than Him is originated, coming into existence after it was not, even if His act is from the necessary consequences of His Essence.
Those who opposed them, when they wanted to prove that everything other than Allāh is originated, thought that this entails that He was idle and not able to act, and that He only became one who brings into existence on that basis.
So these people affirmed idleness from the generic type of act, while those people affirmed the eternity of the particular act. Neither side has any proof that indicates what they claim. Their proofs, when sound, only show the generic type, not the eternity of the particular act or the particular created thing.
If their sound proof did require the eternity of the particular act and the particular created thing, it would be impossible for any event to ever occur, and that contradicts what is observed.
In that case, what is from the necessary consequences of His Essence is the generic type of act, not a particular act and not a particular created thing. So there is nothing in the universe that is eternal.
There is no eternally complete causation in eternity for any part of the universe. Rather He has always been a complete agent for something after something. Every effect comes into existence when complete causation occurs in relation to it, and the thing that entails that complete causation is the Essence at the time when the conditions are complete and the preventatives are absent.
This only occurs in an Essence in which voluntary matters and chosen acts take place, which acts by power and will, and which is described with what the Messengers informed of, that Allāh loves and hates, is pleased and angered, dislikes and rejoices, and other such matters that have been mentioned in the Book and Sunnah.
As for a single unchanging condition in eternity and without end, if it is supposed that that condition has an effect, then that effect would have to be in a single unchanging state in eternity and without end.” (as Safadiyyah 1/96)
He said: “The difference is established between acting upon events in eternity and between His always acting upon events. The first requires that there is an eternal act together with Him by which He brought the events into existence without anything new occurring. The second requires that He has always been bringing them into existence as something after something. This requires the eternity and continuity of the generic type of act. That requires the eternity of a particular act. It has been made clear that the eternity of a particular act that pertains to events is impossible.” (as Safadiyyah 2/49)
He said: “It has been made clear that along with affirming the possibility of events without a first, rather even along with affirming the necessity of that, it is still impossible that the universe or any part of the universe is eternal.
The difference becomes clear between the continuity of the Necessary in Himself, the Eternal whose existence is not in need of anything, and between the continuity of His act or His created thing and the eternity of that. The first is the One who is Eternal in Himself, Necessary, independent. As for His act, it is something after something.
So if it is said: His generic type is eternal, and its individual instances are originated, then it follows that everything other than Him is originated, and that it is impossible that anything is eternal with Him. It becomes impossible that any of His created things is eternal, since every created thing entails events.
That would lead to events without a cause and to preferring one of two equal things without any preference, because nothing can be eternal except through an eternally existing act of causation, not merely an eternal generic type.
An eternally existing act of causation in its particular instance for an event is impossible. A thing that is necessarily concomitant with an event is impossible. Two eternal acts of causation that are concomitant, one for the event and the other for what is necessarily concomitant with the event, are impossible.
So it becomes clear that the eternity of the act of any part of the universe is impossible in every possible way, because the existence of the created thing without the act upon which it is conditioned is impossible.
It is also known that the existence of the universe with no events, then the creation of events in it, is also impossible. So the impossibility of its eternity is established in every possible way.” (as Safadiyyah 2/50)
Then he said: “It is possible to regard the origination of the entire universe with respect to the very agent who acts upon it, without regard to the universe itself, contrary to what Ibn al Khatīb and a group suppose, that those who say eternity looked at the agent, and those who say origination looked at the effect.
In truth, we say: It has been established that He is described with attributes of perfection, and that the perfection which can exist is necessary for Him and must belong to Him, and that He entails that.
In that case, we say: The agent who can perform something after something and originate events is more perfect than one who cannot originate, and whose created thing cannot be except concomitant with Him. In fact, we say: In reality this is not a created thing for Him, for whatever is necessary to a thing and does not renew is from the category of its necessary attributes, not from the category of its acts.
Whatever is necessary to something and does not come into being and renew is not obtained by His power and choice. Rather it is from the necessary consequences of His Essence. Whatever is from the necessary consequences of His Essence and does not become limited or come into being is part of the very meaning of His Essence, like His necessary attributes. That is not from His acts and not from His created things.
If that is the case, then imagining a Being who is Necessary in Himself, or Eternal, or Self Subsisting, or Rich, who does not perform anything, does not originate anything, and cannot originate anything, is imagining one who lacks attributes of perfection.
The possibility that He acts as something after something is something possible in existence, just as we see it in created beings. So it has been established that it is a form of perfection that can be and that there is no deficiency in it, especially as they concede that generosity is an attribute of perfection. So a Necessary Being who does not act, does not show generosity, and does not originate anything, is less perfect than one who acts, shows generosity, and originates something after something.
If it is a perfection in which there is no deficiency and it is possible in existence, then it must be affirmed for the Necessary Being, for the Eternal, for the One who is Rich beyond all else, and for the Self Sustaining.
If that is so, then whoever has this description, it is impossible that any created thing is concomitant with Him, because if it existed with Him, that would necessarily remove this perfection, which is originating something after something and a constant act of creating things as something after something.
If the very perfection which He deserves by His Essence requires that He acts as something after something, and it is impossible that any of His created things is concomitant with Him and necessary to Him, then it becomes established that everything other than Him is originated, and that is what was required.” (as Safadiyyah 2/50)
He said: “For this reason, those who prohibited this only prohibited it because they believed that an act in eternity is impossible, either because they believed that events without a first are impossible, or because they believed that an act contradicts eternity, or for some other reason. In every case, the eternity of any particular thing from the universe is impossible.
Likewise, if it is supposed that the act is continuous, it is continuous by His choice and power. So the second act does not occur except after the first. He is not one who necessarily causes by His Essence in eternity any act or any act that is eternal without beginning.
Acts are of two types: those that remain attached to the Essence and those that pass beyond the Essence to another. The act that remains attached to the Essence does not require a created thing. The act that passes beyond the Essence to another requires a created thing.
If what is continuous is only the acts attached to the Essence, and as for the acts that pass beyond the Essence then they were after they were not, then there is no necessity that any of the created things be in eternity.
If it is supposed that what is continuous is also the act that passes beyond the Essence and that entails a created thing, then when the act produces something after something, the created thing that is conditioned upon it is also produced as something after something, because it is impossible for the conditioned thing to exist without the condition.
It becomes clear that in every case there is no necessity that in eternity there is any particular act or any particular created thing that is concomitant with Him. So there is nothing in the universe that is concomitant with Him in eternity, even if it is supposed that He has always been acting.
In this way, the existence of the Eternal who originates events and the origination of everything other than Him is established, without needing to appeal to the path of necessity and possibility, or to the path of substances and accidents.” (as Safadiyyah 2/23)
After all this explanation it becomes clear that the generic eternity of the universe means the possibility of the continuation of created things without interruption, because this is the result of the continuity of the act of Allāh the Exalted. For this reason he said: “Even if His acts are continuous as something after something, there is no single one of them that is eternal. Likewise His created things are like that even more so, because the created thing follows the act. So there is nothing in His acts or in His created things that is eternal, even if they are continuous and have always been. The continuity of the generic type and its eternity does not entail the eternity of any individual thing.” (as Safadiyyah 1/281)
He said:
“If that act exists as something after something, then the created thing will also exist as something after something even more so, because it is impossible for the created thing to precede its act. So there is no single fixed eternal act, and so there is no single fixed eternal created thing.” (as Safadiyyah 2/144)
The created thing is the mafʿūl (the object of the act), as he said:
“The second category is that which is created and separate from Allāh. These are the created things.” (as Safadiyyah 2/88)
On this basis, Shaykh al Islām did not depart from the technical meaning of qidam in respect of the generic type of act and the generic type of created thing. Because if the generic type is continuous, then that type is not preceded by non existence, as we have already explained.
Here there is an important matter that must be added: eternity without beginning is not a bounded thing. He said:
“There is no bounded thing in eternity without beginning for which He is an agent with respect to all of it.” (as Safadiyyah 2/46)
He said:
“Eternity without beginning is not a bounded time. Rather it is an expression for a past continuity that has no beginning, that is not preceded by non existence, that has always been.” (as Safadiyyah 1/283)
It remains for us to mention that what Shaykh al Islām said about the generic eternity of the universe was said by many others besides him, such as Fakhr ar Rāzī, as Sirāj al Armavī, and before both of them Abū al Thanā al Abharī, the teacher of al Isfahānī, and ad Dawānī, and Bakhīt al Mutīʿī, and Muhammad ʿAbduh, and Muhammad al Amīn ash Shanqītī, and many of the mutakallimīn before and after.
Ash Shanqītī said in his book Riḥlat al Ḥajj ilā Baytillāh al Ḥarām p.51: “All of this discussion is about the impossibility of an endless chain of causation between some individual parts of prime matter in relation to others.
As for the existence of events that have no first, which Allāh brings into existence, there is no impossibility in that and no problematic consequence, because these events exist by the power and will of the One who has no first, Glorified is He. At every moment of His existence He originates whatever He wills, however He wills. To rule that His originating of events has a beginning suggests that before that beginning He was unable to bring things into existence. Exalted is He above that.
Clarifying the matter: If you imagine dividing the time of the existence of Allāh in the past up to eternity without beginning into separate time instants that are less than the blinking of an eye, and you imagine that the beginning of His originating of events is connected to one of those instants, then if you say that it is connected to the first instant, we say: There is no first instant at all.
If you suppose that it is connected to some other instant, then Allāh existed before that instant with all attributes of perfection and majesty for an endless number of instants, and at every instant He originates whatever He wills, however He wills. So to rule that His act has a beginning, and that before that act He did not act at all, suggests that there was something that prevented Him from acting before that beginning.
The result is that His existence, Glorified is He, has no first, and at every moment of His existence He acts as He wills, however He wills. Everything other than Allāh is created, originated after non existence, but no span of time preceded Allāh during which He was prevented from acting. Exalted is He above that.”
Bakhīt al Mutīʿī, the Muftī of the Egyptian lands, said in Sullam al Wuṣūl li Sharḥ Nihāyat as Sūl 2/103: “Al Asnawī said: ‘The second point is that what is impossible in an endless chain is an endless chain in causes and agents. As for an endless chain in effects, we do not concede that this is impossible,’ up to the end of his words. This is good speech.
As for the words of al Isfahānī, ‘And in this there is some problem, because it entails allowing that there are events without a first, and that is false according to our view,’ we say: The fact that it is false according to his view does not mean that it is false in reality and in truth. Up to now no proof has been established for the impossibility of an endless chain in effects that exist in external reality, even if it is famous that an endless chain in them is impossible.
The result that there are events without a first does not harm the creed unless we say that they have no first in the sense that their existence has no first. No one has said that. Rather all are agreed that everything other than Allāh the Exalted, whatever it was and whatever it will be, is originated, that is, existing after non existence, regardless of whether its individual instances do or do not stop at some limit from the side of the past and the future, or from one of the two, or neither.
Do you not see that there is consensus that the bliss of Paradise does not end and does not stop at a limit in the future? After we say that it is originated in the sense that it exists after non existence, it does not harm us to say that it has no last in the sense that its individual instances do not end and do not stop at a limit. If we said that it has no last in the sense that its remaining is necessary for it by itself, that would be disbelief.
Likewise from the side of the past, we say: There are events without a first in the sense that their individual instances do not stop at a limit to which they return. Each single one of them exists after non existence, but they do not end in the circle of what will always be. If we said that their existence has no first and has no starting point, that would be a statement of their eternity, and that is disbelief.Refer to our book al Qawl al Mufīd and the marginal notes on al Kharīdah.”
Ad Dawānī preferred the view that there are events without a first in the origination of the universe. He said: “You know from what has preceded that the issuing of the universe can occur along with its being originated. On this basis, no particular part of the universe must be eternal in its specific instance. Rather, what is eternal is the generic type, that its individual instance is always existent in a successive manner.”
(Sharḥ al ʿAqāʾid al ʿAḍudiyyah p.179)
Shaykh Muhammad ʿAbduh said in his marginal notes on the Sharḥ ad Dawānī lil ʿAqāʾid al ʿAḍudiyyah p.179: “The sages used a revealed proof to support the eternity of what is possible, and this is the statement in which Allāh condemned the Jews:
وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ يَدُ اللَّهِ مَغْلُولَةٌ غُلَّتْ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَلُعِنُوا بِمَا قَالُوا بَلْ يَدَاهُ مَبْسُوطَتَانِ
‘The Jews said: “The hand of Allāh is tied.” Their hands are tied and they are cursed for what they said. Rather, both His hands are outspread.’ (Al-Ma’idah 64)
The explanation of this is that if the universe were originated, then it would necessarily be the case that the Truth in His eternity would have always been withholding the effusion and bounty for endless times without beginning, and then He began to give existence. It is known that even if He has always been the Creator without end, then everything that He has created is finite.
The relation of what is finite to what is endless is like nothing, and that is obvious to the mind. So the relation of the giving of the Truth to existence to His withholding from all existing things is nothing. This is nothing other than a tied hand, because giving in relation to withholding is nothing that is mentioned.
This is extremely repugnant.
The answer is that to avoid this repugnance it is not necessary to say that any part of the universe is eternal. Rather it is enough to say that Allāh has always been a Creator. Although every part of the universe is originated, there is no first to His giving.
There is no power that coerces Him, Glorified is He, and He is the true Giver who expends as He wills. None of the universe is eternal. Rather every event is preceded by non existence.
So the verse does not indicate the eternity of anything.” End of his words.
So reflect on his words: “There is no first to His giving,” and his words: “Every part of the universe is originated,” and his words: “He has always been a Creator.”
Ustādh Murād Shukrī said: “Reflect, my brother, that none of the investigating thinkers would ever imagine that the eternity of the generic type means that something is eternal with Allāh, or that the generic type is something tangible that has existence.”
Muḥammad Khalīl Harrās said in his book Ibn Taymiyyah as Salafī p.163: “What is the meaning of this pleading and following up, and does it necessitate the eternity of the universe or its origination? In the judgement of reason, the matter does not go beyond one of these two possibilities, because whatever is not eternal is originated and whatever is not originated is eternal.
Ibn Taymiyyah answers that we must distinguish between two matters: the generic type of events and their kinds, and their individual instances and particular cases. As for the generic type or the kind, it is eternal. As for the individual instances of events or their particular cases, they are originated.
The meaning of the eternity of the generic type or kind is that Allāh has always been acting in this generic type whenever He wills. There is no event except that there is an event before it, without that reaching an event which is counted as the first among the events, in the sense that there is no event before it.
The meaning of the origination of the particular instance or case is that every single event from these events which follow one after another without end is originated, coming into existence after non existence. This is just as the philosophers say about the movements of the spheres, that their essential nature is eternal, even though the individual instances of those movements are originated.”
He then said: “Ibn Taymiyyah sees that what led the philosophers and the mutakallimūn into error in this matter, to the point that they clung to impossibilities, is that they did not find guidance to this difference between the generic types of events and their individual instances.”
Shaykh al Islām said in Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al ʿAql wa an Naql 8/279: “What is intended here is that these mutakallimūn who combined truth and falsehood in their speech, and confronted falsehood with falsehood, and refuted innovation with innovation, when they debated the philosophers and disputed with them about the origination of the universe and other such matters, the philosophers gained the upper hand over them.
They saw that these mutakallimūn had taken that path which is corrupt according to the imāms of the Sharīʿah and reason. The most skilled of the dialecticians admitted its corruption.
So these heretical philosophers assumed that when they refuted the claim of these mutakallimūn that events without a first are impossible, and they brought a proof for the continuity of the act, that would entail the eternity of this universe and opposition to the texts of the Messengers.
This is a grave ignorance, because neither the philosophers nor anyone else has a single correct rational proof that contradicts anything from the texts of the Messengers.
In this matter of the origination or eternity of the universe, no child of Ādam can produce a proof for the eternity of the spheres at all. Everything that they have mentioned contains nothing that shows that any particular part of the universe is eternal at all.
At most they can try to show the eternity of the generic type of act and that the agent has always been acting and that events have no first, and so on. That does not show that any particular thing in the universe is eternal, and it does not contradict anything from the texts of the Messengers. Rather it agrees with them.
As for the texts that are mass transmitted from the Messengers that Allāh created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days, and that Allāh is the Creator of everything, so everything other than Him is created, coming into existence after non existence, no one can ever produce a rational proof that contradicts this. This has been detailed in other places.”
He said in Majmūʿ al Fatāwā 9/280:“The place of consideration and discussion is the generic type of events: is it possible that the generic type is continuous, so that the Lord has always been speaking or acting by His will and power, or is that impossible?”
Second Topic: The Difference between the Position of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Position of the Philosophers
Many people have attributed to Shaikh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah that he affirms the eternity of the universe and that in this he agreed with Ibn Sina, al Farabi and Ibn Rushd the grandson.
The answer to this is that there is a difference between the saying of the philosophers and the saying of Ibn Taymiyyah. The philosophers say that everything besides Allah is originated, but they mean by that only that it is in need of another, not that non existence preceded it.
What they mean by being in need of another is that the eternity of this universe rests upon His eternity, meaning that His eternity, exalted is He, necessitated the eternity of this universe.
This is what they claimed, may Allah disgrace them, and it is disbelief by the agreement of the Muslims. Because of this saying they were judged unbelievers for three matters, all of the philosophers without exception, because they denied them even though they are truly established: His knowledge of particulars, the origination of the universes, and the resurrection of bodies after they had been dead.
According to the philosophers, what is originated is of two types and what is eternal is of two types.
First: the originated is of two types
- Originated by essence. That is what is in need of a cause for its existence, whether non existence preceded it, as in the case of individual human beings who are in need of a cause for their existence and non existence preceded them, or whether non existence did not precede it, as the spheres according to them, for they are in need of a cause for their existence and non existence did not precede them.
- Originated in time. That is what non existence preceded in its existence, like individual human beings.
(See Sharh al Khurida with Hashiyat as Sawi p 30, and Sharh al Bajuri ala al Jawhara p 68.)
Second: the eternal is of two types
- Eternal by essence. That is what does not need a cause for its existence, like the Essence of the Lord.
- Eternal in time, and it is of two kinds:a. That which non existence did not precede, like the Essence of the Lord.b. That which is in need of a cause for its existence, like the spheres according to them, for non existence did not precede them because they arise from the intellects by way of causation.
They say that the One whose existence is necessary, exalted is He, is one from every side, so He has no power, no will and no attribute added to His Essence. The one who is one from every side only produces one thing by way of causation.
That one thing which proceeds from Him is what they call the First Intellect. Then they say that this intellect is characterised by possibility because something other than it effected it, and by necessity on account of its cause, so it is eternal due to its cause and originated in respect of its essence.
From it there proceeds, with regard to the first aspect, a second intellect, and from it with respect to the second aspect the First Sphere, which in the language of the Sharia is called the Throne.
Then this second intellect is characterised by possibility because something other than it, namely the first intellect, effected it, and by necessity on account of its cause, so it is originated in respect of itself and eternal in respect of its cause. From it there proceeds, with respect to the first aspect, a second sphere which is called in the speech of the Sharia the Footstool, and with respect to the second aspect a third intellect, which directs that second sphere.
Then this third intellect is characterised by possibility because something other than it effected it, and by necessity on account of its cause. From it there proceeds from the first aspect a third sphere which is called the seventh heaven, and from the second aspect a fourth intellect which manages that third sphere.
And so on until the lowest heaven. The spheres become complete, nine in number, and the intellects ten. They call the intellect that manages the sphere of the moon, which is the lowest heaven, the outpouring intellect, whose effusion reaches what lies beneath the sphere of the moon of the types of animals, plants and minerals.
With this the meaning of their statement becomes clear, that the spheres are originated by essence and eternal in time, and that they have no beginning, following their causes, because the effect accompanies its cause. The same in their view applies to the intellects and to the types of animals, plants and minerals. As for the individual instances of these, they are originated in essence and in time. (See Hashiyat ad Dusuki on Sharh Umm al Barahin of as Sanusi p 70, and Hashiyat as Sawi on Sharh al Khurida of ad Dardir p 28.)
The statement of the philosophers that the Lord has no choice is disbelief.
On the basis of what has preceded, it becomes clear that
- Individual human beings are originated in both essence and time.
- The spheres are originated in essence and eternal in time.
In summary, their positions can be presented through this table of statements:
He was with creation. This is the statement of the philosophers.
He has always been acting. This is the statement of Ahl al Sunnah.
He was, then He created. This is the statement of the mutakallimun.
Shaikh Muhammad Khaleel Harras explained what has preceded in his book “Ibn Taymiyyah as Salafi” p 162 as follows:
“They say that He is a complete cause from eternity, so it is necessary that His effect accompany Him in eternity in respect of time, even if He is prior to it in respect of causation and not in respect of time. They say that the complete cause and its effect are joined in time and accompany each other, so there is never an effect except with a complete cause, and there is no complete cause except that it is joined with its effect in time.
Then they themselves acknowledge that the events of the universe occurred one after another without there being determined, from the First Originator, anything which would make Him a cause for these successive events.
Rather the reality of their view is that these events occurred without any cause, and likewise they ceased after occurring without any cause that required their cessation, according to their principles.
Groups from Ahl al Kalam confronted them. They imagined that the complete cause may be followed by its effect after a delay, and that the capable agent who chooses between possibilities prefers one of his two possible acts over the other without a cause, and that the events have a beginning and occurred after not having existed, without any new cause. Neither of the two parties was guided to the middle position, which is that the complete cause necessitates that its effect comes after its complete influence, not joined with it and not delayed beyond it, as the Most High said:
إنما امره اذا اراد شيئا ان يقول له كن فيكون
“When He wills a thing, His command is only that He says to it, Be, and it is.” (Ya-Sin 82)
So He, exalted is He, brings every thing into existence, and it comes to be after His bringing it into existence, not alongside His bringing it into existence in time and not delayed beyond His bringing it into existence, just as the breaking comes after the act of breaking, the cutting after the act of cutting, and the divorce after the pronouncement of divorce, not delayed beyond it and not joined to it in time.
The meaning of this, plainly, is that Ibn Taymiyyah does not say that the universe accompanies Allah so that it would be eternal with Him as the philosophers say, nor does he say that it is delayed from Him in time so that it is subsequent to Him in time as the mutakallimun say. Rather he holds that it is connected to Him in the sense that it comes to be after His willing it, and that He, exalted is He, is followed by it, the following of the cause by its effect.” (This was transmitted from al Fatawa 9/282.)
From this it becomes clear that Ibn Taymiyyah only allows an infinite regress with respect to effects, and this type of regress is permissible according to most of the people of intellect, from the imams of the people of the revealed ways and from the imams of the philosophers and others.
Nothing of this implies that the created things exist eternally with Allah. There is no created thing except that it is originated, coming into existence after not having existed.
“There is nothing with Allah in pre eternity from the created things, for each of them is originated after not having existed, and what is originated after not having existed cannot be joined with the One who is eternal who has always been.”
The Salaf, may Allah have mercy on them, regarded this type of regress as permissible and held that affirming it is necessary in order to establish the voluntary actions of Allah, exalted is He.
Upon this type of regress the statement of the Salaf is based: that Allah has always been doing as He wills by His will and His power, or that He has always been speaking as He wills by His will and His power and that His words have no end, as the Most High said:
قل لو كان البحر مدادا لكلمات ربي لنفد البحر قبل ان تنفد كلمات ربي ولو جئنا بمثله مددا
“Say: If the sea were ink for the words of my Lord, the sea would run dry before the words of my Lord ran dry, even if We brought another like it as a supplement.”
So the Salaf, may Allah have mercy on them, say concerning the actions of Allah which relate to His choice: He has always been doing such and such. They intend by that the eternity of the kind and the renewal of the individual instances, not that the created things exist with Him, exalted is He, from pre eternity. For the statement that created things exist with Allah, exalted is He, from pre eternity is not from the sayings of the Muslims.
The Objections of the Philosophers against the Theologians
The philosophers who say that the universe is eternal objected to the mutakallimun who say that it is originated and who prevent an infinite regress of effects in the past with two objections.
- Their statement that it is impossible to prefer one of two equal possibilities without a cause that gives preference.
- Their statement that the complete cause necessitates its effect.
The First Objection
The philosophers said to the mutakallimun:
In your saying about Allah that He was not capable and then became capable, there is the preference of one of the two sides of a possible thing without a cause that gives preference, and preference must have a complete cause which makes it necessary. Then they said: affirming a cause which gives preference itself needs another cause, and so on without end, so an infinite regress follows, which you hold to be impossible.
This is the first objection, and it is the first of the two premises upon which the philosophers build their proof for the eternity of the universe. The summary of this objection is their statement that preference must have a complete cause that makes it necessary.
Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, mentioned that this objection is the most difficult of the places of discussion upon the mutakallimun in their debate with the philosophers concerning the origination of the universe, and that this doubt is the strongest doubt of the philosophers.
For when they saw that occurrence is impossible except because of a new cause, they said: the same must be said about that new cause as is said about the first, and so on.
So what is the answer of the mutakallimun to this objection
The answers of the mutakallimun to this objection have taken different forms. Some of them answered that the cause which gives preference is the power, or the eternal will, or the eternal knowledge, or the possibility of occurrence and similar things.
However the philosophers did not accept these answers. They said: all of these are without benefit, because if no new cause arises through them then preference without a cause follows, and if a new cause arises through the eternal power, or the eternal will, or the eternal knowledge, or the possibility of occurrence, then the discussion about its occurrence is like the discussion about the occurrence of what was caused by it.
If there is no new cause because of the eternal power, or the eternal will, or the eternal knowledge, or the possibility of occurrence, the matter is preference without a cause.
Many mutakallimun permitted the preference of one of the two sides of a possible thing without any cause that gives preference. Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said concerning them:
“Many of the people of kalam choose preference without a cause that gives preference, based upon the claim that the capable one who wills gives preference by his power, or by the power together with the motive, or that the will itself gives preference to one of two equals over the other. With this answer most of the Mu’tazilah, the Ash’ariyyah and the Karramiyyah, and those who follow them from the companions of the four imams, answered, and it is one of the two answers of al Ghazali in Tahafut al Falasifah and it is the answer of al Amidi and others.”
And their practice, as is known, is agreed upon to be impossible among most intelligent people, since the impossibility of preference of one of the two sides of a possible thing without a cause that gives preference and its invalidity is agreed upon among rational people.
Another group of mutakallimun chose the path of argument by forcing the opponent. They said:
“This would necessitate that nothing ever occurs in the universe, and sense perception contradicts this.”
The philosophers replied to them that what they mentioned only follows if infinite regress is impossible, and that they themselves hold it to be impossible, but as for the philosophers they do not say that it is impossible. If the occurrence of something is dependent upon new occurrences, the objection disappears.
So the philosophers informed them that this answer would force the philosophers, if the philosophers also prevented infinite regress, but since the philosophers allow infinite regress this answer does not force them.
This doubt, as Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned, is the strongest doubt of the philosophers, and the mutakallimun were not able to answer it with satisfactory answers. They were therefore unable to escape the difficulty which the philosophers placed them in.
Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, explained the position of the mutakallimun as follows:
“This is the saying of most of the Mu’tazilah, the Ash’ariyyah and others. They affirm a Creator who brings things into existence without determining a new cause, and for this reason they were faced with severe criticism at this point, and people said to them: this undermines the very basis by which you proved the Creator, which is that a possible thing cannot have one of its two sides preferred over the other except by a cause that gives preference.
If the times are the same, and the agent is upon a single state with nothing new arising in Him from eternity to eternity, and then one of the times is chosen for the occurrence of the created thing, without anything occurring to give preference to that time, this is preference without a cause that gives preference.”
This shows the contradiction of the people of this proof in their proof and in its premises. In proving the Creator, exalted is He, they argued that a possible thing cannot have one of its two sides preferred over the other except by a cause that gives preference, so it needs a cause outside itself which is the One whose existence is necessary by itself, glorious is He, who prefers its existence over its non existence and brings it out from non existence into existence. So they made it obligatory to accept a cause that gives preference to one of the two sides of a possible thing over the other.
Here they permitted the preference of one of the two sides of a possible thing without any cause that gives preference, so they contradicted themselves and undermined with their own practice the proof by which they had proved the Creator, exalted is He.
As for the position of Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, on the first objection of the philosophers and the answer of the mutakallimun to it, he directed criticism at the philosophers and counselled the mutakallimun.
His criticism of the philosophers is that he said about them:
“These philosophers criticised the mutakallimun who deny that actions stand with Allah. They themselves affirmed the occurrence of events without any new cause, while they describe the agent as being characterised by attributes of perfection.
They affirmed the occurrence of all the events without any new cause and without an Essence described with attributes of perfection. In reality their statement is that the events occur without any agent who acts, since they state openly that the complete eternal cause must have its effect accompany it. In that case none of the events have an agent at all, neither they nor other than they.
Thus it is clear that their statement is more contradictory than the statement of the Mu’tazilah and others, and that what they have mentioned as a proof for the eternity of the universe is, when its premises are examined, a better proof for the origination of the universe than it is for its eternity.”
So it becomes clear that the philosophers are more contradictory than the mutakallimun and that they did not force the mutakallimun to anything except that there is in the doctrine of the philosophers what forces the philosophers to an even greater degree.
As for the counsel which Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, directed to the mutakallimun, he directed it upon the tongue of those who affirm that voluntary actions stand with Allah, and it contains an implicit criticism, as though he is saying to them through this: if you had affirmed the voluntary actions of Allah standing with Him, exalted is He, what has happened to you would not have happened, and you would have escaped from the difficulty which you placed yourselves in by denying that these actions stand with Allah, exalted is He.
He said:
“Those who affirm that voluntary actions stand with Allah, exalted is He, said: upon our basis the speech of the philosophers is invalid. It is said to them: you allow events to stand with the Eternal Being, since the sphere is eternal in your view and movements stand with it, and you allow events with no beginning and the succession of movements upon a thing does not necessitate that it be originated.
If this is the case, then why do you not allow that the Creator of the universe has voluntary actions which stand with Him, by which He brings events into existence, and that the infinite continuation and succession of these actions does not indicate that He in whom they stand is originated.”
Ibn Taymiyyah clarified that the statement of the mutakallimun that one side of a possible thing can be preferred over the other without a cause that gives preference is the reason why the philosophers and the heretics looked down upon them. He said addressing the mutakallimun:
“You say that the Lord was idle in pre eternity, not speaking and not doing anything at all. Then speech and action occurred, without any new cause at all. This necessitates preference of one of two equals without any cause that gives preference.
For this reason the philosophers used this against you, and you opposed the imams of the people of the revealed ways and the imams of the philosophers in this, while you imagined that you had established a proof for the origination of the universe by this, since you imagined that whatever does not lack events must itself be originated, and that it is impossible for there to be events with no beginning.
You have no Book, no Sunnah and no report from the companions and the successors to support this principle of yours, rather the Book and the Sunnah and the reports from the companions and their followers are contrary to it.”
The point is that when the mutakallimun said that Allah had always been idle of action and speech until He brought the universe into existence without any cause at all, and that the very capable one who chooses between possibilities prefers one of two equal things without any cause at all, like a hungry person to whom two loaves of bread are presented, or a fugitive who is presented with two paths, they encouraged those who say that the universe is eternal against them.
Those who say that the universe is eternal imagined that if they showed the impossibility of the occurrence of the universe after everlasting idle absence of action, they would have defeated these mutakallimun and established the eternity of the universe and the eternity of the spheres.
The Second Objection
The philosophers said to the mutakallimun:
“The complete cause necessitates its effect, and the complete cause necessitates its effect.”
This objection is the second premise of the proof of the philosophers for the eternity of the universe, since they say that the complete eternal cause must have its effect accompany it, and that therefore the universe, with what it contains of spheres, is eternal. This would mean that nothing in the universe is originated, but that everything is eternal, and this is contrary to what is sensed.
This is the second objection.
The mutakallimun answered it by saying: “The complete cause may, in fact must, have its effect come after it, so they said: the Creator was in pre eternity a complete cause and yet the effect came after it.”
It was said to them that this is false, for it would necessitate that the cause becomes a complete cause after not having been a complete cause, without any new cause, or that events occur without a complete cause, and that a possible thing should have its existence preferred over its non existence without a complete cause that gives preference, and all of that is false.
Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, mentioned that the answer to the doubt of the complete cause and the statement of the mutakallimun that its effect must come after it is not sound, just as the statement of the philosophers that its effect must accompany it in time is also false.
The correct answer is a third saying, which is that the complete influence of the cause necessitates the effect, so that it comes after it, not joined with it and not delayed beyond it, as when one says: I broke the vessel so it broke, I cut the rope so it snapped, I divorced the woman so she became divorced, I freed the slave so he became free.
The Most High said:
إنما امره اذا اراد شيئا ان يقول له كن فيكون
“His command when He wills a thing is only that He says to it, Be, and it is.”
So when He brings something into existence, it is after His bringing it into existence, not alongside His bringing it into existence and not delayed beyond His bringing it into existence.
According to this, everything besides Allah, exalted is He, is originated after not having existed, since it must be after His bringing it into existence. It is therefore preceded by something else in respect of time, and whatever is preceded by something else in respect of time can only be originated. The complete cause necessitates the existence of its effect after the completion of its influence.
The saying of the philosophers that the effect must accompany the cause is therefore not correct, and the saying of the mutakallimun that the effect must come after it with delay is not correct either.
The statement of the philosophers that the effect accompanies the complete cause would require that nothing new ever occur in the universe, and this is contrary to what is seen. They have therefore asserted something contrary to sense perception, intellect and the report of the prophets عليهم السلام. It is among the greatest of falsehoods, contrary to the religion brought by the messengers عليهم السلام.
Ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
“So it is clear that the statement that the effect of the complete cause must accompany it in time is a cause that nothing ever occurs in the universe, which contradicts sense perception. Their statement about the complete cause is therefore false, and their statement that the universe or some part of it is eternal is also false.
The correct view is that the effect of the complete cause comes after it without delay or accompaniment in time. This proves that everything besides Allah is originated, that it is preceded by non existence and that the Creator, exalted is He, is the only One Who is eternal, whose existence has no beginning.”
Reports from Ibn Taymiyyah Denying That The Universe Is Eternal
The best one to defend someone accused is the one accused himself.
For this reason this section is devoted to quotations from Ibn Taymiyyah in which he denies what has been ascribed to him, namely that he says that the universe is eternal and that Allah is a necessary cause by His Essence and not an agent by choice.
He mentions the saying of the mutakallimun, the people of delay, the saying of the philosophers, the people of accompaniment, and the saying of Ahl al Hadith, which is that Allah has always been acting. In the course of this he mentions matters connected to the subject, such as the origination of the universe, the speech of Allah and other matters.
These quotations have been taken from al Fatawa, Dar al Ta’arud and Minhaj as Sunnah. He has similar material in as Safadiyyah but it has been left to avoid excessive length.
Ibn Taymiyyah said in volume 5 of al Fatawa p 537:
“As for the second premise, namely the prevention of the eternity of the kind of the originated, this is denied by the imams of Ahl al Sunnah and al Hadith who say that Allah speaks by His will and His power and that His words have no end, and by those who say that He has always been acting, as al Bukhari and others state. It is also denied by most of the philosophers, but the Jahmiyyah, the Mu’tazilah, the Kullabiyyah and the Karramiyyah say that it is impossible. It is one of the great principles upon which the discussion of the speech of Allah and His creation is based.
This saying is the basis of the newly invented kalam in Islam which the Salaf and the imams criticised. The people of this kalam, from the Jahmiyyah, the Mu’tazilah and those who follow them, imagined that because Allah is different from creation in every respect, as the Book and the Sunnah indicate and as the people of the revealed ways from the Muslims, Jews and Christians and others agree, He, exalted is He, must have always been idle, not doing anything and not speaking, and that He then brought into existence what He brought into existence of His speech and His created things separate from Him, so He brought the universe into existence.
They imagined that what the messengers brought and what the people of the revealed ways, the Muslims, the Jews and the Christians, agreed upon, that everything besides Allah is created and that Allah is the Creator of everything, had this meaning. They held that the opposite of this is the saying of those who say that the universe is eternal or that its matter is eternal.
In their books of kalam they mention only two sayings. The first is the saying of the Muslims and others from the people of the revealed ways that the universe is originated, and they understand from that what has preceded. The second is the saying of the dahriyyah that the universe is eternal.
The popular view of those who say that the universe is eternal was that there is no Maker for it, so they denied the Maker, glorious is He.
The authors of the books of sects have mentioned that the first to say that the universe is eternal from among the philosophers was Aristotle, the author of the philosophical works in logic, physics and metaphysics. Aristotle and his early followers affirm, in their books, the First Cause, and say that the sphere moves in order to resemble it, so it is a cause for the sphere from this aspect, since if there were no one for the sphere to resemble it would not move, and its movement is one of its necessary attributes, so if its movement ceased it would be corrupted.
Aristotle did not say that the First Cause brought the spheres into existence, nor did he say that it is a necessary cause by His Essence, as is said by some of the later philosophers such as Ibn Sina and others, nor did he say that the sphere is eternal and possible by its essence.
Rather his position is the position of other intelligent people, that what is possible is what can exist and not exist, and that nothing can be like that except what is originated. According to them the sphere is not possible, rather it is eternal and has always existed. The reality of their view is that it is necessary and has always existed.
For this reason in most of the early books of kalam one does not find the saying of the eternity of the universe except ascribed to those who deny the Maker. When some of the philosophers such as Ibn Sina and others made public the statement that the universe is eternal because of an eternal cause which is a necessary cause by His Essence, this became another saying among those who say that the universe is eternal.
By this they removed some of the ugliness of their earlier saying that denied the Maker of the universe, and they began to use the words of the Muslims, such as “made” and “originated” and similar words, but they meant by them that the universe is an effect that is eternal.
They did not mean by these words that Allah brought anything into existence after it had not existed. When they say that Allah is the Creator of everything, this is what they mean.
The later mutakallimun mentioned this saying and the known saying of the people of kalam about the meaning of the origination of the universe which they ascribe to the people of the revealed ways, as has preceded, as is mentioned by ash Shahrastani, ar Razi, al Amidi and others.
This principle, which the Jahmiyyah and those who followed them from the people of kalam invented, that the actions of Allah cannot be everlasting, is what they built their principles upon and made it the basis of the religion of the Muslims. They said: bodies do not lack events, and whatever does not lack events is originated, or whatever does not precede events is originated, because whatever does not lack them and does not precede them is with them or after them, and whatever is with events or after them is originated.
Many of them do not mention any proof of this because they view it as obvious, since they do not distinguish between the kind of events and a particular event. Those who pay attention to the difference mention a proof.
They say that events do not endure, but that it is impossible for there to be events with no beginning. Some of them also say that it is impossible for there to be events with no end, as is said by the two imams of this kalam, al Jahm ibn Safwan and Abu al Hudhayl.
Since the reality of this statement is that Allah, exalted is He, was not capable of acting in pre eternity, but only became capable of acting after not being capable, this was denied by the Muslims, to the point that it was mentioned among the innovations of the Ash’ariyyah in the trial which took place in Khurasan when they declared the innovators cursed. The story is well known.
It is said to Aristotle and his followers, who held that the capability to act is everlasting and its necessary consequences are also everlasting: plain intellect does not prove that any particular thing in the universe, neither a sphere nor anything else, is eternal. It only proves that the Lord, exalted is He, has always been acting.
If it is supposed that He has always been creating one thing after another, then everything besides Him would be created, originated, preceded by non existence, and nothing in the universe would be eternal. There is nothing you have to refute this supposition, so why do you deny it
If the necessary consequence of the rational proof is that there must be an eternal Being whose actions are successive, one after another, then this only contradicts the statement of the innovators from the people of the revealed ways who invented newly invented kalam that the Lord, exalted is He, had always been idle of action and speech.
What the people of intellect from the nations, from the philosophers and others, know by clear reason supports and helps what the Messenger ﷺ brought against those who invented in his community what contradicts his sayings.
What is known by the Sharia with clear reason further refutes the statement of the dahriyyah among the philosophers that the universe is eternal or that something in the universe is eternal along with Allah.
The statement that the universe is eternal is a statement which the majority of people of intellect agree is false. The people of the revealed ways do not alone refute it, rather the people of the revealed ways and the majority of others, such as the Magians and the different idol worshippers, the idol worshippers of the Arabs, the idol worshippers of India and other nations, and the great majority of the leading philosophers, all admit that this universe is originated and that it came into existence after not having existed.
The great majority of them also admit that Allah is the Creator of everything. The idol worshippers of the Arabs all admitted that Allah is the Creator of everything and that this whole universe is originated and that Allah is its Creator and its Lord. This is explained in its own place.
Ibn Taymiyyah said in volume 6 p 231:
“A group says: even if we accept that an action needs an action before it, why do you say that this is impossible They say to those who call this a regress: this is not a regress in agents and causes that act, which is impossible by agreement of intelligent people, rather it is a regress in effects and actions, meaning the occurrence of something, and this is the point of discussion.”
The Salaf say: He has always been speaking when He wills, and the Most High said:
قل لو كان البحر مدادا لكلمات ربي لنفد البحر قبل ان تنفد كلمات ربي ولو جئنا بمثله مددا
“Say: If the sea were ink for the words of my Lord, the sea would run dry before the words of my Lord ran dry, even if We brought another like it as a supplement.”
So the words of Allah have no end. This is an infinite regress which is permissible, like the infinite regress in the future, since the bliss of Paradise is everlasting and will never cease. There is nothing except that after it there is something else without end.
As for the eternity of acting, that He has always been acting, it is said: this is a word which must be explained. You philosophers intend by “acting” that His created thing accompanies Him in time. If He is an actor in this sense, then His created thing must accompany Him and not come after Him. This is your main argument.
For most people of intellect, for the Salaf and for your own earlier scholars in other places, the actor is the one who does something one after another, so the created thing cannot accompany Him in this sense. Rather in this sense every created thing must come after Him, so that none of His created things are eternal with His eternity and everything besides Him is originated.
Then people differ here. One group says that every created thing must come after Him and that He remains idle and then acts, as is said by the people of newly invented kalam from the people of the revealed ways, from the Jahmiyyah, the Mu’tazilah and those who follow their path. This denial contradicts the eternity of acting, so it contradicts the necessary consequence of those arguments.
The second group says that He has always been doing one thing after another, so that everything besides Him is originated, coming into existence after not having existed, and He alone is the One Who is eternal and first, with no beginning, and there is nothing with Him. He has always been doing one thing after another.
We say to the philosophers: the arguments which you use to prove the eternity of acting, just as they refute what the people of newly invented kalam say, also refute what you say.
If they proved the eternity of acting in the sense which you claim, then no new event would ever occur in the universe, since the created thing, which you call the effect, must, according to you, accompany in time its cause, which you call the cause that acts. Everything besides the First is a created thing and an effect of His, so it must accompany Him.
In that case nothing new would ever occur in the universe, and this is contrary to what is observed by sense and intellect. It is false by agreement of the children of Adam and contrary to sense and reason.
If the effect must accompany the cause in time, then every event must have events associated with it in time such that not one of them precedes another and they have no limit. This is the statement that there are infinite causes in a single moment, and this also is false by clear reason and by agreement of the people of intellect. There is no difference in the impossibility of that whether it is in the Essence of the cause or in one of its conditions.
It follows that every event has an infinite number of causes at one and the same moment, and it follows that there are infinite causes at the time of the conditions of the cause and its completion, since its completion is one of the two parts of the cause. It is therefore not allowed that there should be an infinite number of things in one moment of time, not in this part and not in that part. This is agreed upon among the people.
As for the disagreement over the existence of an infinite number of things in succession, their argument has lost one of its premises. The conclusion is not what they said. Its necessary implication is the other saying, namely that the actor has always been doing one thing after another.
Everything besides Him is originated, coming into existence after not having existed. This is the opposite of their statement.
This is one of the strongest proofs for what the prophets informed about, that Allah is the Creator of everything, for by this it is established that there is nothing eternal except Allah and that everything besides Him is coming into existence after not having existed, whether it is called an intellect, a soul, a body or something else.
As for the proof of the people of newly invented kalam for the origination of bodies, if it were sound it would only prove the origination of bodies. They have affirmed other existents besides bodies, such as intellects, and the people of kalam have no proof to refute them. The later scholars, such as ash Shahrastani, ar Razi and al Amidi, joined them upon that and claimed that the people of kalam have no proof that these intellectual substances do not exist and that their proof for the origination of bodies does not include them.
Those who thought they could answer them with a brilliant answer fell into the contradiction which has been mentioned. Thus it becomes clear that the very proof which they use indicates that the sayings of both parties are false and that everything besides Allah, exalted is He, is originated and that only He is eternal. The proof shows this clearly in a way that does not allow criticism.
Thus, all praise is for Allah, it becomes clear that the main argument of those who say that the universe is eternal only proves the opposite of what they say, which is that everything besides Allah is originated, and all praise and favour belongs to Allah.
He said in the eighth volume p 380 and what follows:
“As for the fact that this necessitates that voluntary events stand with His Essence, this is the saying of the Salaf, the imams of hadith and Sunnah and many of the people of kalam.
As for the fact that this necessitates an infinite regress in the future, if He creates something for a wisdom which only comes into existence after it and that wisdom exists for another wisdom, then an infinite regress in the future follows.
This is permissible according to the Muslims and others who say that the bliss of the people of Paradise is everlasting with no end. Only those who doubt deny this, like al Jahm ibn Safwan, who says that Paradise and Hell will cease to exist, and Abu al Hudhayl, who says that the movements of the people of Paradise and Hell will cease. Both of them claim that it is impossible for there to be an infinite number of things without beginning or end, and they oppose in this the great majority of the Muslims.”
“The second answer is that it is said that regress is of two types. One of them is regress in causes that act, so that every cause has a cause. This is false by clear reason and by agreement of the people of intellect.
The second type is regress in effects, such as the statement that Allah has always been speaking when He wills and that His words have no end. This regress is allowed by the imams of the people of the revealed ways and the imams of the philosophers. The philosophers claim that the movements of the spheres have no beginning and no end, and this is disbelief and is contrary to the religion of the messengers and false in clear reason.
Likewise the statement that the Lord could not speak or act by His will and then became able to speak and act by His will, as is said by the Jahmiyyah and the Qadariyyah and those who follow them from the people of kalam, is false. This is what caused confusion between the heretical philosophers and the innovators from the people of kalam in this chapter, and discussion of these matters is detailed in its own place.”
He said in the ninth volume:
“Aristotle and his followers would call the Lord an intellect and a substance. In their view He does not know anything other than Himself and does not will anything. They call Him the origin and the first cause, because the sphere moves in order to resemble Him or in order to resemble the intellect. The sphere needs the first cause, in their view, from the aspect that it resembles Him, as the follower resembles the leader and the student resembles the teacher. Some of them say that He moves the sphere as a beloved moves his lover. In their view He does not create anything and does not act anything.
They did not call Him the Necessary Being, nor did they divide existence into necessary and possible, making the possible something which can be eternal, as the sphere in their view. That is what Ibn Sina and his followers did, and in that they opposed their predecessors and all people of intellect. They also opposed themselves and contradicted themselves, since they themselves stated what their predecessors and the people of intellect stated, that what is possible, that which can exist and not exist, can only be originated, preceded by non existence.
As for what is eternal, which has always existed and will always exist, they and the other people of intellect held that it is impossible for it to be possible in their sense, that is, for it to be something which can both exist and not exist, since anything that can both exist and not exist is only that which is originated.
This is used as a proof that everything besides Allah is originated, preceded by non existence and coming into existence after it had not existed, as is explained elsewhere.
Then Ibn Sina and those who followed him contradicted themselves and claimed in another place that existence is divided into necessary and possible and that the possible can be eternal, having always existed and always existing without end and that it is impossible that it cease to exist, and they said that it is necessary by something other than itself. They made the sphere of this type.
They opposed the agreement of people of intellect that there cannot be a thing which is possible, in their sense, that accepts both existence and non existence and yet is eternal, and this is clear to those who understand what is meant by “possible” and who understand the nature of the possible.
These philosophers gained power over the mutakallimun from the Jahmiyyah and the Mu’tazilah and those who follow their way because the mutakallimun did not know properly what the messengers brought and did not defend what they wanted to defend with sound rational proofs. The mutakallimun were deficient in both knowledge of the revelation and in their rational arguments. They did not support Islam nor defeat its enemies. They shared with the philosophers some of their corrupt views and opposed them in some correct rational matters.
For this reason their ignorance of both revelation and reason was a cause for the strength of the misguidance of the philosophers, as is explained elsewhere.
Ibn Taymiyyah said in volume 16 p 94:
“Second, it is conceded that He has always been capable of creating creation. This necessitates that the existence of what is under His power in pre eternity was possible. If what is under His power was impossible, there would be no power. How then can He be said to have always been capable while it is impossible that what is under His power was always possible
Third, his statement, ‘because the meaning of creating is that it did not exist and then existed, so how can that which did not exist and then existed always have existed’ is answered by saying that every created thing is originated, preceded by its own non existence and that nothing is eternal and first except Allah alone.
If it is said that He has always been a Creator, this only necessitates that the kind of creating is eternal and that His being a Creator is everlasting. It does not necessitate that any of the created things is eternal.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between particular created things which are originated after not having existed, since no intelligent person would say that any of these has always existed, and between the kind of created things.
Those who say that some things in the universe are eternal, such as the spheres or their matter, call these created in the sense that they did not exist and then did exist, but in their view they have always existed as effects of the Eternal Being.
The statement that He has always been a Creator and that His being a Creator is one of the necessary attributes of His existence does not mean that any of His created things is eternal. Rather this statement means that everything besides Him is originated and that this is the meaning of the question of the questioner.”
He said in Minhaj as Sunnah 1/148:
“The main proof of the philosophers for the eternity of the universe is their statement that it is impossible for there to be events without a new cause, and that it is therefore impossible to suppose that the Essence was idle of action and then began to act without any new cause at all.
This proof does not prove that any particular thing in the universe is eternal, neither the spheres nor anything else. It only proves that He has always been acting. If it is supposed that He has actions which stand with His Essence or created things which are originated one after another, this satisfies this proof and is in agreement with the fact that everything besides Allah is originated and created after not having existed, as the messengers informed when they said that Allah is the Creator of everything.
The kind of created thing would then be in continual renewal, as is the case with the events in the future. Each of them is originated and created, but there is no end to them in the future.”
He then said that the Most High informed that He created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days and that He is the Creator of everything and that the created thing must be preceded by non existence.
“The Qur’an therefore proves that everything besides Allah is created, made and originated. There is nothing in existence that accompanies Allah, as is said by the philosophers who say that the universe is an effect of Him, that He is a necessary cause for it and that He is prior to it in nobility, causation and nature, not in time.
If the complete cause, according to them, had to have its effect accompany it in time, then nothing in the universe would be originated, since no originated thing can come into existence because of an eternal complete cause whose effect accompanies it. No particular originated thing can be eternal.
It does not matter whether it is said that this originated thing comes directly from Him or through a medium, as they say that the sphere comes out of Him through a medium, namely an intellect or two intellects or anything else that is said.
Any saying that has as a consequence that something in the universe is eternal, being always with Allah, is false, because this implies that the Lord is a necessary cause by His Essence whose effect accompanies Him. If that were the case, no effect of His would ever be delayed. Nothing in what is called the effect and consequence of His would be delayed, so nothing in the universe would be originated.”
He said p 396:
“Among the things that this proves is that it is a clear proof for the falsehood of the statement of those who say that the universe or some of it is eternal, and it includes the answer to their main argument.
Among the things that it proves is that it provides the proof for what is desired without any need to distinguish between the necessary cause and the agent by choice. Many of the people of enquiry have erred in making this distinction. Among them are the Mu’tazilah and the Shia, who have followed them in this and many others. Scholars such as ar Razi and those who follow his path have been confused in this matter. Sometimes they are with the Mu’tazilah in distinguishing between them and sometimes they are against them. When they oppose them they become confused between the way of Ahl as Sunnah and the way of the philosophers who follow Aristotle.
This confusion arose because they did not know whether the capable agent who chooses between what he is able to do, when his will is fixed upon one of the two possibilities and his power is complete, must bring about the action or not.
The view of the majority of Ahl as Sunnah who affirm the decree, and the view of others who deny the decree, is that the action must occur when there is a complete cause, which is the fixed will and the complete power.
Another group, from those who affirm the decree, such as the Jahmiyyah and those who agree with them, and from those who deny the decree, such as the Mu’tazilah and others, do not accept this. They say that the capable agent acts in a way that is not necessary but possible; this, they say, is what distinguishes him from the necessary cause. They say that the capable agent who chooses between possibilities can prefer one of the two possible actions without a cause that gives preference, like a hungry person with two loaves of bread and a fugitive with two paths.
The Qadariyyah among them say that the servant can prefer one of two possible actions without a cause that gives preference, just as they say this in regard to the Lord.”
Ibn Taymiyyah then explained that the Qadariyyah say that Allah did not favour the people of obedience with any particular favour before they obeyed. Rather His enabling of the obedient and the disobedient is the same, but one of them preferred obedience by his sheer power without any cause and the other preferred disobedience by his sheer power without any cause.
The Jahmiyyah, such as al Jahm and his followers, say in contrast that the servant has no power at all. Abu al Hasan al Ash’ari agrees with them in meaning when he says that the servant has no effective power. He affirms something which he calls a power which is like its non existence. The same applies to the “acquisition” which he affirms.
Those who take this path cannot use the impossibility of preferring one of the two sides of a possible thing without a cause to refute the Qadariyyah, as ar Razi and some of the Jahmiyyah have done. For this reason al Ash’ari and his early followers did not use this argument.
A group of people, such as ar Razi and his followers, when they debate the Mu’tazilah on the decree, refute this principle and show that the action must occur when there is a complete cause and that it is impossible for an action to occur without a complete cause. They support the principle that the capable agent cannot prefer one of the two possible actions without a complete cause.
When they debate the philosophers about the origination of the universe and the necessity of an agent by choice, and when they refute the claim that Allah is a necessary cause by His Essence, they follow the Mu’tazilah and the Jahmiyyah in saying that the capable agent can prefer one of the two possible actions without a cause.
Most of those who follow the method of Abu Abdullah ibn al Khateeb fall into this contradiction.
The correct distinction is that what is meant by “necessary cause” must be clarified.
If by “necessary cause” is meant something which brings about an effect without will and power, this is an impossibility whose existence in reality is impossible, so it cannot be regarded as a cause which brings anything about.
The philosophers contradict themselves in this. They affirm for the First Cause an end and affirm that He acts for that end. This necessarily implies will. When they interpret “end” as mere knowledge and interpret knowledge as the Essence, their statement becomes extremely corrupt and contradictory, because it is known by necessity that will is not mere knowledge and that knowledge is not mere essence.
The contradiction of the philosophers in this chapter is that they make multiple meanings one meaning. They make knowledge power and will. They make attribute and Essence one thing. They say that knowledge is the very same thing as the knower, that the capable one is his very power, that will is the very essence of the willing one, and that love is the very essence of the lover. This has been stated openly by their leading scholars and even by those who defend them, such as Ibn Rushd the grandson in “Tahafut at Tahafut” and similar works.
If it is assumed that there could be an essence without will or choice, it is still impossible that the universe could come forth from a necessary cause in this sense, because a necessary cause in this sense would have its effect and what it produces as a necessary consequence of it. If the Maker of the universe were a necessary cause in this sense, then nothing would ever occur in the universe, and this is contrary to what is observed.
The statement that the First is a necessary cause in this sense implies the denial of His attributes and the denial of His actions and the denial that anything in the universe has come into existence, and all of this is known to be false.
Worse still is that they say that He is one simple entity and that nothing can proceed from Him except one thing. They then resorted to strange devices to explain how multiplicity could proceed from Him. They say that the first thing to proceed from Him is the First Intellect, which is something that exists and is necessary by something other than itself and possible by itself. In it there are three aspects. The first aspect is that it exists, the second that it is necessary by its cause and the third that it is possible by itself.
From the first aspect proceeds another intellect, from the second proceeds a soul and from the third proceeds a sphere. Some of them say that from its existence proceeds the form of the sphere and from its possibility the matter of the sphere. They differ among themselves over the soul of the sphere and whether it is a substance separate from it or an attribute which stands with it.
People have written at length to explain the corruption of their words. The one simple entity which they imagine cannot in fact exist outside the mind.
Their statement that only one thing can proceed from such a one simple entity is a general statement. Even if they knew it to be true in some particular case, that would not prove that it is always true except by analogy. In fact they do not know any actual case in which one can say that only one thing has proceeded from a one simple entity.
The main point here is that if “necessary cause” is interpreted in this way, it is false. If it is interpreted as one who brings about his effect by his will and power, then this does not contradict His being an agent by choice. Rather this would mean that He is an agent by choice whose essence is that of a capable agent who chooses, and that He acts by His will and His power.
When it is clear that “necessary cause” can have two meanings, one of which does not contradict His being an agent by will and power and the other of which does contradict that, those who say that the capable agent never acts out of necessity but always acts in a way that is possible, as the Qadariyyah and the Jahmiyyah and those who agree with them say, take the position that acting by choice contradicts being a necessary cause. They say that the capable agent who chooses is only such if he acts in a way that is possible and not necessary.
The majority of Ahl as Sunnah and others say that the capable agent is the one who, if he wills, acts and if he wills, does not act, but when he wills to act with complete power, his action must occur. Whatever Allah wills happens and whatever He does not will does not happen. He is able to do what He wills. When there is complete power and fixed will the action must occur.
When “necessary cause” is interpreted in this sense, the disagreement is verbal. The proof which we have mentioned can be expressed with the word “necessary cause”, with the word “cause and effect”, with the word “influence and influenced” and with the word “agent by choice”. With all of these terms it is clear that nothing in the universe can be eternal and that everything besides Allah must be originated.
There is another point. People have differed over the capable agent by choice. Must his will precede his action and is it impossible that his will coincide with his action, or must his determining will coincide with his action and that anything that precedes the action is mere resolve and not determination, or is either of the two possible These are three positions.
We have already shown that everything besides Allah must be originated on each of these three positions, whether it is said that the will coincides with the action, or that this is impossible, or that both the coincidence and the coming before are possible.”
He said in Dar al Ta’arud 1/341:
“This is according to the view of the majority that the thing which brings about the effect must have its effect come after it and that the effect must come after the one who influences it, the action after the completion of the act of the agent, and the thing caused after the completion of the cause.
As for those who say that the effect must accompany the cause in time, as some of the philosophers and those who agree with them say, they must accept consequences which invalidate their statement, because when the influence is complete, there must be an influence before it and so on without end. That is an infinite regress in the completion of the influence and is of the same type as an infinite regress in causes, not in effects, since an infinite regress in effects means one effect after another and an infinite regress in causes means that every cause has a cause which exists with it and does not exist when it does not exist. The thing does not act when it does not exist, but only acts when it exists, so when influence exists there must be a cause which influences.
The complete influence cannot exist when the effect does not exist. It exists only when the effect exists. The influence necessarily has an effect after it, and if the completion of the influence is said to be simultaneous with the effect, there must be another influence before that ad infinitum. This is an infinite regress in the completion of the influence and is of the same type as an infinite regress in causes, not in effects.
If they say that an infinite regress in effects is permissible, which is their saying, their argument for the eternity of something in the universe becomes invalid, because their proof does not prove that any particular thing in the universe is eternal. It only proves that Allah has always been acting.
It can then be said to them: why can there not be an assumption that the spheres, or everything that exists in the universe, or everything which Allah brings into existence, depends upon events before it one after another, and that the whole universe which exists now is like one of the individual originated things
It is therefore clear that their proof for their desired conclusion is invalid, whether the infinite regress of events is deemed possible or impossible. If it is impossible, then their proof is invalid and the common saying among them that the movements of the sphere have no beginning is invalid, since this only follows if the infinite regress of events is possible. If they hold the infinite regress of events to be impossible, the movements of the sphere must have a beginning.
If the infinite regress of events is considered possible, this does not prove that anything in the universe is eternal. It is then possible that the origination of the spheres depends upon events before that and so on without end.”
He said p 345:
“The cause of error and confusion here is that the word “regress” is sometimes used to mean regress in the action itself and sometimes regress in the effect, meaning that things occur one after another, and sometimes regress in the completion of the agency, which is what those dahri philosophers mean when they say that the complete cause and its effect must accompany each other in time. This implies that when the existence of the effect follows the completion of the cause, the effect must be accompanied by the completion of the cause and not precede it, and that makes the succession of the completions of the cause like the succession of the effects, leading to an infinite regress in the completion of the cause, not in the effects.
Those who say that the effect must follow the completion of the cause can say what al Armavi has mentioned, namely that the fact that He acts upon this effect is conditioned by a new event and that this effect follows that event and does not accompany it. But this invalidates their statement that something in the universe is eternal and agrees with the position of the imams of Ahl as Sunnah and Ahl al Hadith, that He has always been speaking when He wills.”
Indeed, according to the view of these people, it is said that His action in relation to events that occur is conditional upon the occurrence of an event within Him by which the effectiveness of the One who brings about effects becomes complete. Yet immediately after that completion occurs, the event itself takes place. On this basis, it becomes impossible for there to be anything eternal in the universe, because what is eternal can only exist together with a complete effectiveness, and the effect occurring at the same time as the cause is impossible
