An Introduction to the Risalah & Its Background

The risalah by Shaykh Ibn Qadi al Jabal رحمه الله , in which he wrote as a response to Baha al Din al Ikhmimi. He was not known among the ulama, so Ibn Qadi al Jabal described him as unknown.

The book where Baha al Din al Ikhmimi tried to refute the views of Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah رحمه الله contains many clear errors and confusions.

Because of this, Ibn Qadi al Jabal wrote this treatise to reply to him.

The treatise is printed as an appendix to Ahmad Najjar’s book titled Masʾalat Huduth al ʿAlam bayna Ibn Taymiyyah wa al Falasifah wa al Ilhad al Muʿasir (The Issue of the Origination of the Universe Between Ibn Taymiyyah, the Philosophers, and Contemporary Atheism).

In the second volume. It is based on two manuscripts. One is from the Zahiriyyah Library in Damascus, and the other is from the Taymuriyyah Collection in Egypt. Both manuscripts have the same missing parts, so the treatise is not complete.

Shaykh Ibn Qadi al Jabal is one of the well known Hanbali imams, and one of the close students of Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah.

The reason it was written is that Ibn Qadi al Jabal came across a writing in which an author tried to criticise and reply to Ibn Taymiyyah on the issue of hawadith la awwal li nawʿiha (events with no first for their type), and on matters linked to Allah’s actions, will, and creating.

The treatise therefore sits inside a wider debate between the ahlul hadith and the mutakallimun, and also against the Peripatetic philosophers, about whether Allah is faʿil mukhtar (a doer by choice), whether His actions are tied to iradah (will) and qudrah (power), and how to answer the famous objections about an effect coming later after a complete cause.

The treatise begins with several introductions that lay the ground clearly, defining terms like the universe in the language of the philosophers, explaining the main proofs used by the mutakallimun, exposing their weak points, then showing how the sound approach returns to the transmitted reports from the imams, especially the words reported from Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal رحمه الله about Allah not ceasing to speak when He wills, and how this supports the understanding that Allah does not cease doing and creating by His will.

The surviving manuscript is incomplete, with gaps in the middle and at the end, and there are two known copies with small differences, so much of the value that remains is in these introductions, because they preserve Ibn Qadi al Jabal’s clear framing of the dispute and his way of linking Ibn Taymiyyah’s position back to earlier Sunni imams.

The meaning of events and occurrences

The risalah explains that hawadith (events or occurrences) are everything that comes into existence after not existing, whether they are movements, stillness, changes, actions, or states in the universe.

All created things other than Allah are under this ruling of hawadith, including the Throne, Kursi, angels, heavens and all created beings. The expression hawadith la awwal laha (events with no first beginning) does not mean there is an eternal event alongside Allah, but that there is an ongoing chain of created events, each one coming after non existence and dependent on Allah. These events can be seen in simple things such as rain falling and the creation of a human being, which show that every new occurrence needs an acting cause.

Whether events have a beginning or no first starting point

The question of the risalah is whether this chain of hawadith must have a first event, or whether there can be tasalsul al hawadith (an ongoing chain of events) with no first limit.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal affirms alongisde Ibn Taymiyyah and ahlul hadith that every single event is originated, comes after non existence, and is fully created, but the kind of events, in terms of sequence, does not need a first starting point.

There is one eternal being, Allah, and besides Him everything is originated, yet He has always been acting, willing and doing as He wills, so created events related to His action have no first beginning in terms of sequence, even though each particular event is originated and not eternal.

Allah’s actions and will

The risalah says that Allah is al qadir (the able one) and al faʿil al mukhtar (the doer by choice), not al mujib bi al dhat (one who necessitates by His essence).

The people of truth say that Allah acts by will and choice, and that His actions and decrees are tied to His mashiah (will) and hikmah (wisdom), not to blind necessity.

Philosophers who say that the universe flows from Him by essential necessity liken His action to light coming from the sun, which removes will and choice.

The risalah mentions that this belief is kufr, as it contradicts what is known by necessity from revelation about Allah creating, choosing, speaking, commanding and doing what He wills. The position of Ahl al hadith is that Allah did not stop being mutakallim (one who speaks) when He wills, nor did He ever lack the ability to act, so His actions are many, renewed, and tied to His will, while His Essence is eternal and without beginning.

Motion and stillness

The famous proof of movement and stillness used by the mutakallimun (theologians) to argue that the universe is originated.

They say that bodies are never free from movement or stillness, that every movement must be preceded by something else, and that what is preceded cannot be eternal, so movement cannot be eternal. They then say that if stillness were eternal it could never end, yet we see stillness end, so stillness is originated, and since bodies are always in movement or stillness, bodies must be originated. Ibn Qadi al Jabal shows that this proof has serious problems.

First, it only proves that individual movements cannot be eternal, but does not prove that the kind of movement, as a sequence where every movement is preceded by another, cannot be without beginning.

Second, if stillness is simply the absence of movement, then it is a non existence, and eternal non existences can end, as seen in the non existence of each new event that was always absent before it came.In that case, an eternal stillness could end when movement begins, so a body could be eternal and still, then later move, which breaks the proof.

Third, even if the proof worked, it only covers bodies, not other created things that the mutakallimun affirm, such as the ruh (spirit), which they say is neither inside bodies nor outside them.

Time and sequence of events

The risalah then treats the proof of tatbiq (application).

Tatbiq is a kalami proof which works by applying or matching one sequence of events onto another sequence. They say that if past events had no beginning, then two endless sequences could be lined up against each other in full correspondence. If this matching leads to contradiction, they claim that an infinite past is impossible.

Another kalam proof used to claim that events must have a first beginning. The mutakallimun imagine two chains of past events, one starting from the Flood of Nuh عليه السلام back with no first point, and another starting from the Hijrah back with no first point.

Since the chain from the Hijrah is longer, if one applies each event in the longer chain to one event in the shorter chain all the way back, the shorter chain would end while the longer chain still has events, yet the process of one to one application forces them to be equal, so a longer chain becomes equal to a shorter chain, which is impossible. From this they argue that an infinite past chain of events is impossible.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal shows that this reasoning is weak and rests on unclear assumptions about how to treat infinity and how to compare two infinite sequences. He then sets out a careful distinction between dawr (circularity) and tasalsul (endless chain), and between tasalsul fi al muaththirat (endless chain in causes) and tasalsul fi al athar (endless chain in effects).

Circularity of precedence, where A depends on B and B depends on A in order, is impossible, as is endless chain in causes, where a present effect rests on a present chain of causes with no first cause.

However, tasalsul in events and effects, where events follow one after another through time, is allowed, and in some forms is real, such as the endless future movements and blessings of the people of Paradise.

Here the chain is successive through time, not a present linked chain of causes in a single moment.

Refutation of philosophers on eternity and causation

The risalah refutes the Peripatetic philosophers, such as Aristotle and Ibn Sina, on their claim that the universe, or the celestial bodies, are qidam (without beginning).

They argue that Allah is a complete cause for the universe, and a complete cause cannot have its effect delayed, so if Allah is complete from eternity the universe must also be eternal.

They make up rules such as al wahid la yasdur ʿanhu illa wahid (from the One only one comes out) and qaaidat al sanakhiyyah (the rule of similarity between cause and effect), and then invent a chain of intellects, beginning with al aql al awwal (the first intellect), to explain the many things in existence.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal says that saying Allah is a complete cause in this technical sense turns Him into a natural cause whose effect is bound to follow by necessity, which removes will and choice and makes the universe inseparable from Him. He shows that their distinction between qadim (pre existent) and azali (eternal) is often word play, and that their attempt to keep both an eternal universe and an originated universe, as Ibn Sina does, is contradictory.

The rule of similarity does not work between al wajib al wujud (the necessary existent) and al mumkin al wujud (the possible existent), since full likeness between cause and effect is impossible here, and that even if such rules have some use in natural causes and effects, they do not bind al faʿil al mukhtar (the doer by choice).

The claim that from the one only one comes out is called one of the most corrupt and filthy beliefs, because it rests on the false thought that the mere possibility of a thing in itself can produce multiple effects, and this possibility is only an imagined consideration in the mind.

Refutation of kalam philosophers on created events

The mutakallimun from the Ashari and others, agree that the universe is originated, but they make this depend on complicated proofs, like the proof of movement and stillness and the proof of application, and on technical terms such as the body being built from indivisible atoms.

These proofs only indicate the origination of bodies, as for what is not a jism (body), the proof does not include it, even though they affirm the ruh and say that it is not a body. The word jism (body) is an unclear term with disputed meaning.

According to the Asharis it is what is composed of atoms, and according to the Karamiyyah it is whatever exists by itself. What requires being preceded is only the individual movements, not the type of movement. So the origination of individuals does not require the origination of the type.

The position of Ahlul hadith is that proving Allah’s existence does not depend on proving the origination of the universe. Because speaking about the seen events and their need for an originator is like speaking about the origination of the universe.

These seen events, like rain coming down, or the creation of a human being, you see the conditions before the creation of a human, but you do not see the real originator of the creation of the human being. So speaking about these seen events is like speaking about the origination of the universe.

That is why the Quran argues with the creation of humans, because this is one of the events, and it must have an acting cause. No one can say that he is the acting cause. He is only a condition in the creation of the human being.

The father is a condition for the existence of the child, but he is not the acting cause. The mother is also a condition. Does the mother cause by herself the living processes that happen in the womb to create a human being? No.

These things happen in the womb without the mother’s will and without the father’s will, and without the mother’s knowledge and without the father’s knowledge. So these events must have an acting cause. This is enough to prove Allah’s existence.

So making knowledge of Allah’s existence, and knowledge of the truth of the religion, depend on knowing the origination of the universe is not the position of the people of hadith.

Sadly, some, or many, who speak in responding to atheism make knowledge of Allah’s existence depend on knowing the origination of the universe. In that, they follow the Western Christian approach, which took many of its proofs from Ashʿari theology.

Some of the mutakallimeen said that the Quran/the naql did not clearly mention the creation of the universe. The mutakallimun used several methods to argue that the universe is originated, and one of them is the proof of motion and stillness dalil al harakah wa al sukun (proof of motion and stillness). Ibn Qadi al Jabal mentions that the proof of motion and stillness, and other proofs like it or close to it, have four positions among people.

The first position is the one who accepts these proofs and says they are required, and this is the view of many of the Muʿtazilah.

The second position says that taking this path is allowed, and that it is correct.

The third position says it is correct but tiring, because many of its premises are disputed among the mutakallimun. One of the most important premises, especially in the proof of motion and stillness, is trying to prove that stillness is something that exists. Motion is something that exists, so is stillness simply the non existence of motion, which would make stillness non existent. If stillness becomes non existent, then this becomes a problem for the proof of motion and stillness.

The fourth position says these kalam proofs are false in themselves and do not reach what is wanted. This is the correct position, because many of these proofs are not correct, and many of their premises are not correct.

The Proof of Movement and Stillness and the Objection

This proof was discussed by Ibn Taymiyyah in length in Darʾ Taʿarud al ʿAql wa al Naql, and he mentioned the words of al Amidi and the words of al Razi about it.

Side Note:

The supposed proof of movement and stillness is that every body is never free from movement or stillness. A body must either be moving or still, and there is no third state. Movement and stillness can both begin and end. Something that can begin and end cannot be eternal. Because a body cannot exist without either movement or stillness, and because movement and stillness are originated, the proof concludes that the body itself must be originated.

The proof also argues that movement is not the body itself. If movement were the same as the body, then when movement stopped the body would stop existing. But a body can exist while being still. This shows that movement is something attached to the body, not the body itself. From this, the proof claims that bodies depend on originated states and therefore must themselves be originated.

Ibn Taymiyyah goes against the transition made in the argument from individual movements to the entire sequence of movements. He agrees that every individual movement is originated and has a beginning. He also agrees that every stillness is originated. However, he denies that this requires the entire series of movements to have a first beginning.

He says that saying “every movement has a beginning” only means that each movement is preceded by non existence. It does not mean that there was a time when there were no movements at all. The mind can clearly conceive that every movement is preceded by another movement and followed by another movement, without there ever being a first movement. This is like numbers. Every number has a limit, but numbers as a whole have no first number.

He also says that there is a difference between an endless chain of acting causes, which is impossible, and an endless sequence of effects, one after another, which is possible. Movements are effects, not independent acting causes. The proof of movement and stillness treats the sequence of effects as if it were a sequence of causes, and this is the mistake.

In simple terms, Ibn Taymiyyah says the proof fails because it assumes that what is true of each individual movement must also be true of the entire sequence. Each movement can begin, while movement as a continuing sequence does not need a first beginning.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal says when mentioning the proof of movement and stillness, the objection to it, and its explanation, that bodies, if they were eternal, would not be free of movement and stillness, and both are impossible, so it is false that they are eternal. As for the connection, it is apparent, because a body must be in a place. If it stays in it, it is still. Otherwise, it is moving.

And it is impossible that they were moving from eternity, because if they were moving from eternity, then movement would be eternal. Notice here there is a problem. He says, if they were moving from eternity, movement would be eternal.

But movement being eternal is impossible, because the reality of movement requires being preceded by something else, while what is eternal denies being preceded by something else. So it is not possible to combine them.

This is the explanation of the proof of movement and stillness in a very simple way. Something, if it is in the same place, it is still. If it does not stay in the same place, it is moving. Movement from eternity is impossible because the reality of movement requires being preceded by something else. No movement exists except that it is preceded by something else. Eternity denies being preceded by something else, so movement from eternity is not possible.

He said: A group of philosophers including al Razi, and al Amidi, and others, objected.

They said: What is meant by movement being eternal is that its kind is eternal, meaning every movement is preceded by another, with no first beginning. What requires being preceded by something else is the individual movements, not the kind of movement.

That is why that there is a problem in the wording: If they were moving from eternity, movement would be eternal.

But movement being eternal is impossible because the reality of movement requires being preceded by something else. This has a problem, because what is meant by movement being eternal is not that a specific movement is eternal. Rather, it is that the kind of movement has no first beginning.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal mentioned this objection as al Razi and al Amidi did. These are not their exact words, but the meaning is from them.

What requires being preceded by something else is the individuals of this movement, because each individual movement is made of a prior place and a later place, and it is known there is no contradiction between them. So combining them is possible and is within what is possible, not within what is impossible.

Then they said: it is not said, if each part of the times of movements is originated, then the whole is originated. Because we say the whole does not have to be equal to the part in every ruling.

Rather, it can be, like if each one of the black people was black, then the whole is black. And it can also not be, like each one of the individuals of ten is not ten, even though all of them together are described by ten. And there are many examples like this.

The shaykh then wanted to mention the famous objection, which is that the ruling of the part may not have to be the ruling of the whole. There is a difference between the whole and the part, and between the universal and the individual.

For example, a chair is a whole made from parts. We judge the chair as a chair, but each part of the chair is not itself a chair. Also, a wall made from red bricks is a whole. Each brick is not a wall, but the ruling can sometimes carry from the part to the whole in an issue like colour. The wall is red and each part of it is also red. So in one example, the ruling of the part is not the ruling of the whole, and in another example, the ruling of the part is the ruling of the whole.

As for the individual and the universal, for example the universal “human being” has rulings, and the individual people have other rulings. And examples are many.

The whole does not have to be equal to the part in every ruling. It can be, and it can also not be.

The approach of the Salaf in aqeedah

A goal of the risalah is to show that the position of Ibn Taymiyyah on events with no first beginning and the attributes of Allah is the same as the madhhab of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and the Salaf, not a new path.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal brings many reports from Imam Ahmad, Imam al Bukhari, al Darimi, al Sijzi, Ibn Mandah and Abu al Hasan al Ashari after his return to Ahl al hadith, which all affirm that Allah has always been speaking, commanding, acting and doing as He wills, and that His speech and actions are attributes of His dhat (essence) and are not created.

Statements like “He did not stop being One who speaks when He wills” and “He did not stop commanding as He wills” show that speech and command are eternal in kind, with particular commands and words occurring as He wills.

Likewise, descriptions of Allah rising and descending as He wills, given by early imams, show that movement of action is affirmed for Him in a way that fits His Majesty.

Relationship between reason and revelation

There is a clear balance between naql (revelation) and aql (reason). Revelation has already come clearly with the creation and origination of the universe, and that the Quran argues using simple, clear events like the creation of a human being or the sending of rain. These are originations that everyone sees and that obviously need an acting cause, and this is enough to know the existence of the Creator and the truth of the religion.

At the same time, reason supports revelation by showing the impossibility of circularity in causes and of an essential endless chain of causes, and by distinguishing that from an accepted endless chain in events and effects.

Clarifying misunderstandings about Allah’s attributes

A large part of the risalah by the Shaykh clears up the confusion caused by philosophers and some kalam groups about the sifat of Allah.

Affirming events without a beginning in Allah’s actions does not mean that created things are inside His Essence or that there are other eternal beings with Him.

Rather, His Essence is eternal without partner, and His attributes of action, like speaking, commanding, creating, moving as He wills, and His decrees, are always linked to His will and power, with every specific act and speech being originated and created.

Treating Allah as a complete cause of the philosophers, whose effect cannot be delayed, actually restricts His qudrah (power) and iradah (will), and clashes with the clear reports that He does what He wills when He wills.

The fear of attributing action and change to Allah led some people to deny or reinterpret clear texts about His speech, movement and other attributes, which in turn forced them into contradictions such as accepting some kind of eternal created thing with events in it, while rejecting the simpler position that Allah has always been acting.

The correct way is to affirm without distortion what Allah affirmed for Himself, to know that His attributes are perfect and do not resemble the attributes of creation, and to hold that endless actions and decrees in no way mean that the universe itself is eternal.

Responses to Ashari theological claims

Some Asharis define al ʿalam (the universe) as only bodies made of indivisible atoms, yet at the same time affirm things like the ruh (spirit) which they say are neither inside bodies nor outside them, which makes their definitions unclear and harms their proofs.

It shows that their use of the proofs of movement and stillness and tatbiq (application) does not prove what they claim, and that even if those proofs worked for ajsaam (bodies), they leave creation without bodies untouched.

Al Razi and al Armawi said that Allah created a soul that has no beginning. This soul is not a body. Inside this soul, events happen one after another with no first beginning.

When these events gather and reach a certain point, the universe comes into existence, which is very close to the view of an eternal created thing besides Allah, yet this did not receive the same harsh rejection that Ibn Taymiyyah’s position received from them.

Ibn Qadi al Jabal uses this to show their inconsistency.

He then says that the Hanbali imams stood with Ibn Taymiyyah in affirming hawadith la awwal laha (events without a beginning) in the sense of endless divine actions and decrees, and in affirming the apparent meaning of the attributes without taʾwil, and that this is closer to the path of the Salaf than the kalam method of the Asharis.

In this way, the risalah by the Shaykh answers both their theological claims and defends the creed of Ibn Taymiyyah as a continuation of the creed of Imam Ahmad and Ahl al hadith.