First I will go through the definition of Mantiq and its types, then I will be sharing my notes from the Ahmad Najjar’s video.

What is Mantiq?

Mantiq is a science or a study of how to evaluate arguments and logical proofs. Its importance is that it helps people tell the difference between strong logical thoughts and weak ones, so that they can reach correct reasoning. Without correct reasoning, no person can know and reach true facts or correct beliefs.

The Greek philosopher Aristotle is considered the father of mantiq. Thinkers before him spoke about the nature of arguments and how to evaluate them, but he was the first to lay down organised standards for doing this, and his understanding of mantiq is still a main foundation in the study of mantiq today. (Austin Cline, “Introduction to Mantiq and Arguments”)

Many others also had important roles in the development of mantiq. They include Peter Abelard, William of Ockham, Gottfried Leibniz, Gottlob Frege, Kurt Gödel, and John Venn. Mantiq is the product of human thinking and argument. The aim is not mainly to offer a critical study of the way a person builds an argument in order to improve the process of thinking itself, but to improve the results of human thinking, which are a person’s conclusions, beliefs, and thoughts. (Austin Cline, “Introduction to Mantiq and Arguments”)

Types of mantiq

Formal mantiq

Formal mantiq is a body of knowledge made up of facts that are not disputed. It aims at a systematic account of a group of phenomena about which there is fairly wide agreement. Formal mantiq is seen as a necessary subject, and no modern philosopher can do without it. (Peter Milne, “What is mantiq and why do philosophers study it”, University of Missouri Kansas City)

Informal mantiq

Informal mantiq is everyday human thinking and a person’s analysis of arguments. It consists of two kinds of logical thinking. (“What is Mantiq? Definition and Examples”)

Deductive reasoning is the type of reasoning that begins with a general subject and then limits it to specific understandings. (Sharon Takiguchi, “Human Brain Thinking Process”)

Inductive reasoning is the opposite of deductive reasoning. In it, specific data is used to form a wide and general conclusion.

It is the process of starting by collecting details about a subject, then widening the concepts so that they cover a range of observations. (Sharon Takiguchi, “Human Brain Thinking Process)

Philosophy of mantiq

The philosophy of mantiq is the study of the nature and types of mantiq from a philosophical view. It includes problems that relate to the link between mantiq and its place in mathematics and other fields. The term mantiq comes from the Greek word logos.

This word covers different senses that are ruled by reason, and this may point to the hidden difficulties in describing the nature and range of mantiq. Among the many translations of the word logos are: statement, reason, speech, ratio, judgment, report, definition, and principled reasoning. Alongside these meanings, it has also been said that the subject of mantiq is expressed through the laws of thought, the rules of correct reasoning, and the principles of sound arguments. (Jaakko Hintikka, “Philosophy of mantiq”, Encyclopaedia Britannica)

Introduction

Aristotelian logic as a practice existed among the Greeks before Aristotle, but Aristotle wrote most of the works that became the foundation of this science. The word “Aristotelian logic” itself was not used for this science until about two centuries after Aristotle, so the practice came first, then the technical naming.

Origins of Aristotelian logic and the Organon

The first person who gathered Aristotle’s writings on Aristotelian logic was Andronicus of Rhodes. He collected them into one book and called it “The Organon” in Greek. This title then became a technical name for the whole science of Aristotelian logic. This already shows how strongly this discipline is tied to Greek language and heritage.

Logos and mantiq and the Greek language link

The terms “logos” and “mantiq”. In Greek, “logos” is used both for speech and for thinking. In Arabic, “mantiq” is used for spoken speech. So “logos” in Greek and “mantiq” in Arabic do not have the same meaning. “Mantiq” in Arabic refers to apparent spoken speech, not to inner thought.

Because of this, some philosophers tried to stretch the word “mantiq” so that it would match the Greek meaning. They said “mantiq” has an apparent side and an inner side. The apparent is speech with the tongue. The inner is reflection and thinking. They did this just to make “mantiq” cover thinking, so that it would resemble “logos”. Al Farabi (d. 339 AH) mentioned this.

From here the author shows the close tie between Aristotelian logic and the Greek language, a tie that does not separate. This is why Abu Said al Sirafi (d. 368 AH), the grammarian, when debating the Aristotelian logician Abu Bishr ibn Matta, argued that Aristotelian logic in reality does not leave the Greek language and tongue, while Arabs already have grammar and other sciences in Arabic that serve similar roles. This debate is transmitted in the book “al Imta wa al Muanasa”.

Early Muslim criticism of Aristotelian logic

Ibn Taymiyyah was not the first Muslim to criticise Aristotelian logic. Many earlier scholars from different groups did so. Among them were Abu Ali al Jubba’i (d. 303 AH) from the Mutazila, Abu Bakr al Baqillani (d. 403 AH) from the Asharis, Abu Said al Sirafi (d. 368 AH) the grammarian, Abu Said ibn Abi al Khayr (d. 440 AH) the Sufi, Qadi Abd al Jabbar ibn Ahmad (d. 415 AH) from the Mutazila, and others from among the ulama.

From the Shia there was al-Hasan ibn Musa al-Nawbakhti, who wrote a now lost book called “al Ara wa al Diyanat” which contained criticisms of Aristotelian logic.

Ibn Taymiyyah, in “al Radd ala al Mantiqiyyin”, quotes a section from this book where al Nawbakhti criticises Aristotelian Aristotelian logic, especially the issue of the “copula” in categorical propositions and its relation to language. This may be the earliest piece that has reached us which criticises a specific detailed issue in Aristotelian logic.

The copula and the tie between Aristotelian logic and language

The work then brings a clear example of how Aristotelian logic is tied to language, using the issue of the copula in categorical propositions.

In Arabic, when one says “Ahmad is a reader”, this is a predicative statement where a predicate is affirmed of a subject. It is a categorical proposition with subject and predicate, and there is no extra linking word mentioned. In this context, “subject” means the grammatical subject, and “predicate” is the predicate of that subject. The predicate is attached to the subject without any extra copula.

In some other languages, such as Persian, a linking word must be mentioned, like “ast” (is). In English one must say “is”: “Ahmad is a reader”. So these languages require a copula, unlike Arabic which does not need it.

To make Greek Aristotelian logic fit Arabic, Aristotelian logicians divided categorical propositions into two types. One type explicitly mentions the copula, and the other does not. They called the first a “three part” proposition and the second a “two part” proposition.

In Arabic, to mirror the structure of languages that need a copula, they introduced an estimated copula such as “huwa” (he) or “hiya” (she).

They would say something like “Ahmad is a reader” or “so and so is a reader”. They added a separate word meaning “he” or “she” only to make Arabic resemble languages such as Persian or English. In truth, Arabic does not need this at all. This again shows the strong connection between Aristotelian logic and the Greek language and its terminology.

Porphyry and the Isagoge

After Andronicus gathered the Aristotelian logical writings of Aristotle, Porphyry of Tyre, from the city of Sur (Tyre) in Lebanon, wrote his well known introduction “Isagoge” (introduction). He was Greek, not Arab. This work is an introduction to the chapter on the five universals, so he titled it “Isagoge”, which in Greek simply means “introduction”.

When this was translated into Arabic, the word “Isagoge” was taken over exactly as it is. Some later writers treated “Isagoge” as if it means “the five universals” themselves, and they said “Isagoge” is the name for that chapter. But this is a mistake that came through translation. The word itself in Greek only means “introduction”. It does not mean “five universals”.

Main subjects of Aristotelian logic

Aristotelian logic is presented as dealing with two main subjects. The first is conception. The second is assent or proof.

In the part about conception, the aim of Aristotelian logic is to reach what is unknown in the realm of concepts. In the part about assent or proof, the aim is to reach what is unknown in the realm of judgements and propositions.

They say that the unknown in conception is reached by definitions. The definition is either complete, which they call “al hadd (complete definition)”, or incomplete, which they call “al rasm (incomplete definition)”. The unknown in assent is reached by propositions, reasoning, and proof, until one arrives at an unknown proposition that becomes known.

Major writers on Aristotelian logic

The work then names the main authors who wrote at length on Aristotelian logic. Among them are al Farabi (d. 339 AH), Ibn Sina (d. 428 AH), his student Bahmanyar ibn al Marzuban al Azarbayjani (d. 458 AH), Abu Hamid al Ghazali, Abu al Barakat al Baghdadi, Shihab al Din al Suhrawardi al Maqtul, al Razi, Athir al Din al Abhari, later al Jurjani, al Taftazani, and Mir Baqir Damad al Istarabadi.

Among the Rafida, Mir Baqir Damad is called “the third teacher”. For them the first teacher is Aristotle, the second teacher is al Farabi, and the third is Mir Baqir Damad.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s general criticism of Aristotelian logic as a whole

The first general criticism from Ibn Taymiyyah is that there is no real need for Aristotelian logic among rational people at all. Rational people do not need this Greek system in order to write and verify sciences. Doctors, engineers, and others before Allah created the Greeks and Aristotle did not use this science. They wrote books in medicine, mathematics, and geometry without Aristotelian logic.

The so called Aristotelian logical rules are in reality things shared by all rational people and known by instinct and natural disposition. The intellect already knows these patterns without a special Greek science.

Some people tried to answer this by saying that in fact a number of rational people from the mutakallimeen, that is, some of the philosophers, did use Aristotelian logical rules in writing and checking their sciences, so this shows there is a need.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s answer is that he never denied that some people used these tools. His point is that the sciences do not depend on them. The issue is not whether someone has used Aristotelian logic, but whether the sciences actually need Aristotelian logic as a condition for being written and checked.

This insight agrees with a remark by Bertrand Russell in the first volume of “A History of Western Philosophy”, where he says that whoever spends time teaching or learning Aristotelian logic is in truth wasting time without benefit.

How to study Ibn Taymiyyah’s critique

Anyone who wants to study Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of Aristotelian logic should begin with volume 9 of “Majmu al Fatawa”.

In that volume there is material taken from his book “al Intisar li ahl al athar” which gives a short summary of his criticism of Aristotelian logic.

In the same volume there is also an abridgement of “al Radd ala al Mantiqiyyin” by al Suyuti. After reading this volume, one can move on to the full book “al Radd ala al Mantiqiyyin”.

Ibn Taymiyyah on definitions and infinite regress

The work then explains Ibn Taymiyyah’s first specific criticism of Aristotelian definition. Aristotelian logicians claim that a thing is not properly conceived except by a definition, such as defining human as “rational animal”, where “animal” is the genus and “rational” is the differentia.

Ibn Taymiyyah points out that if we insist that a thing is only known through such a definition, then we must also define the genus “animal” and the differentia “rational”. Each of these definitions will again be made of two parts, each of which will need its own definition, and so on without end. This leads to an endless regress.

The other option is to admit that things can be known through sense perception. When one sees a human being with the senses, this sensory experience is enough to conceive what “human” is, so there is no need for an Aristotelian logical definition at all in order to conceive the concept.

So Ibn Taymiyyah shows that their claim that conception can only be achieved through Aristotelian logical definition leads either to an impossible endless chain, or back to the senses which make the definition unnecessary. In both cases their absolute claim fails.

Our knowledge without Aristotelian logical definitions

The next point is that all sciences of the children of Adam are not built on this type of Aristotelian logical definition.

The sciences in practice do not depend on the Aristotelian form of “hadd”. This is clear from modern universities. In western and Egyptian universities that teach sciences like biology, physics, engineering, and mathematics, definitions do not use Aristotelian “hadd”. Only some institutes that teach religious sciences and have inherited Greek Aristotelian logic still use that form.

This shows again that human sciences do not need this special type of definition.

Definition as differentiation not full conception

Another criticism is that Aristotelian logical definition in reality gives differentiation, not full conception. For example, saying “the donkey is a braying animal” helps distinguish a donkey from other animals. Saying “the human is a rational animal” distinguishes the human from other living beings.

But this does not give a full conception of the human. The person does not yet know the form, traits, and detailed features of the human beyond these two words “animal” and “rational”. So the definition helps to mark out the defined thing from others, but does not give a complete inner picture of the thing itself.

However, the Aristotelian logicians claim that definition gives full conception, not just differentiation. Ibn Taymiyyah rejects this claim. The author notes that some later western philosophers also criticised this aspect, though he does not recall the name.

The five universals and essential and accidental attributes

The work then moves to the five universals and the division between essence and accident in Aristotelian logic. The five universals are: the species (also called the essence or reality), the genus, the differentia, the general accident, and the specific property.

These are divided into essential and accidental. The essential ones are the species or essence or reality, the genus which is the more general essential, and the differentia which is the equal essential. The accidental are the general accident and the specific property. The accident is divided further into inseparable accident and separable accident.

They say the species or essence is “human”. Human is made up of the genus “animality” and the differentia “rationality”. These are essential features, without which one cannot conceive human.

Then come accidental features. The human is said to be conceived without needing these accidents. Accidents can be inseparable or separable. As an example of separable accident they say “writing in act”. A person may be writing now or not writing now, so this can separate from him.

As an example of an inseparable specific property they mention “writing in potential”. The human is always a writer in potential, meaning he is able to learn and perform writing. This is a specific property that never leaves the human.

Likewise, “walking in potential” is a general accident. A human is always able to walk in potential, even if at some times he is not walking in act. Walking in act is separable. Walking in potential is inseparable.

Ibn Taymiyyah then asks how they distinguish between what is essential, such as genus and differentia, and what is an inseparable accident, if in reality the human cannot be conceived without both. If “writing in potential” never leaves the human and is always there, then in truth it is also essential, because they themselves say it never separates from the type.

He concludes that their separation between essential and inseparable accident is only arbitrary. In reality there is no difference except that some features are grasped more quickly by the mind, such as animality and rationality, while others are noticed after reflection, such as writing in potential or walking in potential. The difference lies only in the order of attention in the mind, not in the actual being of the human.

So just as animality and rationality never separate from the human, writing in potential and walking in potential also never separate from the human. This removes the real distinction they want to make between essence and inseparable accident.

Knowing the specific through a more general genus

Another problem with their definition is that it defines something specific by something more general that is harder to grasp.

When the Aristotelian logicians define human as “rational animal”, the genus they use, “animal”, has many instances such as human, horse, lion, donkey and others. To grasp the meaning of “animal” one must grasp this wide field of instances.

“Human” on the other hand, has fewer instances and is more specific.

Usually, the more instances a universal has, the harder it is for the mind to grasp it, and the fewer instances it has, the easier it is to grasp. So the universal “animal” is harder to grasp than the universal “human”.

In that case, to know the specific and easier universal “human” through the more general and more complex universal “animal” is improper. It reverses the natural order of understanding. This is a brief presentation of another side of Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism of Aristotelian definition.

Ibn Taymiyyah on syllogism, analogy, and induction

The work then shifts to another subject, the criticism of Aristotelian logical syllogism. The Aristotelian logicians say that analogical reasoning does not give certainty, incomplete induction does not give certainty, and only what they call “universal syllogism” yields certainty.

In their terminology, syllogism is moving from a universal premise to a particular conclusion, such as “Every human is rational. Zayd is a human. Therefore Zayd is rational.”

Analogical reasoning is moving from one particular case to another particular case. Induction is moving from particular cases to a universal. If one has covered all instances, this is complete induction. If not, it is incomplete induction, which they say is not certain.

Ibn Taymiyyah asks where the universal premise in the syllogism comes from. If the premise “every human is rational” comes from analogical reasoning, then by their own statement analogical reasoning does not give certainty, so the syllogism cannot be certain. If it comes from induction, it is not complete induction because no one has grasped every single human. So it is incomplete induction, which they say is not certain.

They answer that such a universal is known by sense perception. Ibn Taymiyyah replies that senses do not grasp universals, they only grasp particular external things.

The senses see Zayd, a particular human, and see that he is rational. The intellect then uses this sensory material and by a form of reasoning produces the universal “every human is rational”. So the universal is still reached by reasoning over particular cases, which is a form of induction or analogy. The problem thus remains.

Ibn Taymiyyah concludes that they are forced to admit either that incomplete induction gives certainty or that analogical reasoning gives certainty. In either case their original claim falls.

He therefore says that universal syllogism, analogical reasoning, and incomplete induction are in truth different shapes of one broader reasoning pattern, which is analogy in a wide sense. The middle term in universal syllogism is the same as the effective cause in analogical reasoning.

He explains that the rational cause may be something that entails a ruling, such as intoxication which entails prohibition, or it may be a feature of a thing that entails a necessary judgement, such as existing in the outside universe entailing that the thing is not non existent.

Aristotelian logicians often dismissed analogical reasoning because they mostly saw it used in speculative fiqh issues, where the rulings are not certain.

Ibn Taymiyyah answers that the frequent use of analogy in speculative matters does not mean analogy is inherently speculative. The same material content can be arranged either as universal syllogism or as analogy, and if the cause truly entails the ruling, both forms are equally certain.

For example, in one form they say: “Every intoxicant is forbidden.

Nabidh is an intoxicant. Therefore nabidh is forbidden.” In another form someone says: “Wine is forbidden because it intoxicates. Nabidh intoxicates. Therefore nabidh is forbidden.”

In the first form they call it a universal syllogism and say it gives certainty. In the second form they call it analogy and deny certainty. Yet the real content is the same. Intoxication is the middle term in the syllogism and the effective cause in the analogy. Since the premises are identical, if one arrangement gives certainty, the other must also give certainty.

So Ibn Taymiyyah holds that when the cause or the feature that entails the ruling is truly connected to that ruling, it does not matter whether one expresses the reasoning as universal syllogism, analogy, or incomplete induction. The certainty comes from the true cause, not from the form.

Privation and possession and the fourfold opposition

The last subject mentioned is the issue of “privation and possession”, which Ibn Taymiyyah discussed especially in “al Risalah al Tadmuriyyah” and “Dar al Ta arud”. The author says he has explained this in detail in his book “Naqd Ibn Taymiyyah li mafhum al adam wa al malaka”, listing all places where Ibn Taymiyyah dealt with it and explaining the seventh principle in “al Risalah al Tadmuriyyah” line by line.

The Aristotelian logicians say opposition is of four kinds. First, opposition of affirmation and negation, which is contradiction. Second, opposition of contrariety. Third, opposition of relation. Fourth, opposition of privation and possession.

Contradiction is between existence and non existence. The two opposites cannot come together in one subject at one time, and they also cannot both be absent from one subject.

Contrariety is between two existent things that cannot gather in one subject from one angle, such as some colours. For example, one thing cannot be black and yellow at the same time from the same angle, but both colours can be absent since the thing might be white or red.

Relation is like contrariety but with a special feature. Grasping one of the two related terms implies grasping the other, such as fatherhood and sonship.

Privation and possession is also between existence and non existence, but they claim that in this type the two opposites can both be absent from a subject. They give examples like hearing and deafness, sight and blindness. They say a wall is neither hearing nor deaf, and idols are neither living nor dead.

Ibn Taymiyyah answers with many linguistic, philosophical, and Aristotelian logical points. One major criticism is that this fourfold division is not complete. There are other oppositions that do not fit into it. For example, the opposition between obligation and possibility.

Obligation is not simply the absence of possibility, and possibility is not simply the absence of obligation. Both are real judgements. One thing cannot be both obligatory and possible in the same respect at the same time, and it cannot be neither obligatory nor possible. This pair behaves like a contradiction but does not fit into their fourfold pattern.

Another criticism is directed at their claim that in privation and possession the two opposites can both be absent, as when they say the wall is neither seeing nor blind or idols neither living nor dead because they do not accept life.

Ibn Taymiyyah says that this classification clashes with the language of the Arabs. In normal Arabic speech one may call a wall “dead”, and in the Quran Allah describes idols as “dead”.

According to the theory of privation and possession, this is incorrect because idols do not accept life. This shows that their pattern is not rooted in the Arabic language that the revelation came in.

There are many other lines of criticism of privation and possession and of the types of opposition, and he has given detailed explanations and examples for them in his book “Naqd Ibn Taymiyyah li mafhum al adam wa al malaka”.