Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār’s Refutation of Saʿid Foudah

The First Fabrication: The Claim That the Eternity of the Type of the Universe Is Necessary

Foudah says in the introduction, after presenting the madhhab of the philosophers and the Ashʿaris:

“The third view: this is the madhhab of Ibn Taymiyyah. Its summary is that the visible universe which we see, or see part of, and in which we live, is originated in form and matter, as the mutakallimun affirm. He says that the newly occurring will of God is the cause for the existence of this visible universe. But he does not stop at this amount.

Rather, he says: since God being an actual Creator is an attribute of perfection for Him, it is not correct to say that He had not created another universe before this universe, with its matter and form, because this statement requires that endless ages and times passed over God in which He had not actually created anything. According to him, this is taʿtil (negation) of His power and a denial of it.

“For this reason, it is necessary to say that there existed another originated universe before this universe, and so on without any beginning. None of these universes is eternal in terms of matter or form, of course. But the total series which gathers them together, meaning the universes each of which is preceded by another universe, this series is eternal and has no beginning, and non existence did not precede it when considering it as a whole.

“Ibn Taymiyyah believes that this method is what truly establishes that the God is powerful, willing, and an acting chooser, and that it negates deficiency and taʿtil from Him.” (Tanzih al Rahman!, p. 18, Saʿid Foudah.)

Ahmad Najjar says: By Allah, this is pure falsehood against Ibn Taymiyyah.

Where does Ibn Taymiyyah clearly state that the existence of universes with no beginning is necessary?

By Allah, neither he nor anyone else, no matter how much he searches through the Shaykh’s writings, will be able to bring a single clear statement from him saying that this universe must have been preceded by another universe without any first.

Ibn Taymiyyah differentiates between the sequence of occurrences and the sequence of created things. The sequence of occurrences is the sequence of Allah’s actions that subsist in Him, without any beginning and without any end. Among these actions is the act of creating, though not all of them are that, as is known by obvious necessity.

The act of creating is not only for the universe, nor only for the type of the universe. If we say that the sequence of the act of creating is necessary, that does not mean, nor is it equal according to anyone who has even a little reason, that the act of creating the like of this universe is beginningless in sequence. In other words, it does not equal the statement that the sequence of the like of this created thing is necessary.

What Foudah has brought here is among the strangest things he has ever read in his life. It contains a premise, and Najjar does not know how he produced it, namely that Allah’s act of creating is only for the universe. So Allah only creates a universe. He does not create a human being, nor a plant, nor an animal. Rather, He creates nothing except a universe. So if the act of creating is sequential, then universes must be sequential.

Ibn Taymiyyah’s words on the issue are clear. There is nothing in them which shows the necessity of the sequence of universes. Rather, qidam nawʿi (eternity of the type) contains nothing of necessity.

It does not go beyond possibility, meaning that it is not impossible that before this universe there was a universe before it, without any first. But there is nothing in that to show that this is what is actually real and true in the matter itself, and there is nothing in it to show that it is necessary. The general body of the people of knowledge concerned with the writings of Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah are upon this. So the statement of necessity is nothing but a fabrication invented by Foudah and those like him. (Mawsuʿat al ʿAqidah wa al Adyan wa al Firaq wa al Madhahib al Muʿasirah, 2/1079, compiled by a group of academics and specialised researchers in universities around the world. See also al Safdiyyah, 1/129, by Ibn Taymiyyah, and his Risalah fi al Sifat al Ikhtiyariyyah, within Jamiʿ al Rasaʾil wa al Masaʾil, 2/6–10, and Darʾ Taʿarud al ʿAql wa al Naql, 8/173.)

If what Foudah thought follows against Ibn Taymiyyah, then it also follows against his imam, al Razi. Ibn Taymiyyah used several proofs for the sequence of occurrences and qidam nawʿi (eternity of the type), among them what Ibn Taymiyyah took from al Razi. He says in al Matalib al ʿAliyah while proving the possibility of occurrences with no beginning: “The soundness of the occurrence of occurrences with no beginning is because, if that soundness had a beginning, then before that beginning it would have been impossible in itself, then it would have turned into possible in itself, and that is impossible. So it is established that possibility has no beginning.” (al Matalib al ʿAliyah min al ʿIlm al Ilahi, 1/143.)

This is the proof to which no sound criticism has been given. The students of Ibn Taymiyyah continued using it. So if the statement that the sequence of universes is necessary follows against Ibn Taymiyyah, then it must also follow against al Razi (d.606AH).

Likewise, it would follow against others from the contemporaries, such as Shaykh Bakhit al Mutiʿi (d. 1354AH). So why do we not find these binding claims from him against the Ashʿaris who said the same thing as Ibn Taymiyyah?

Ahmad Najjar mentioned elsewhere that the problem, according to those who oppose the statement of qidam nawʿi (eternity of the type), can be reduced to two main matters.

First: Their thought that eternity requires the eternity of both the genus and the individual instances. This is not said by Ahl al Hadith (the people of hadith), nor by Ibn Taymiyyah.

Second: Their thought that the qidam nawʿi (eternity of the type) of a particular created thing means necessity. This is not said by Ahl al Hadith (the people of hadith), nor by Ibn Taymiyyah.

This is while noting that Foudah, in the same issue, used to bind Ibn Taymiyyah to the statement of the eternity of a specific created thing and a specific matter. This was in his verification of the treatise of al Ikhmimi, upon which I wrote a detailed criticism elsewhere. Then here he goes to the view that this is not a necessary consequence of Ibn Taymiyyah’s madhhab. Did Ibn Taymiyyah come out of his grave to change what he wrote on the issue, or was Foudah not precise at that time about the reality of Ibn Taymiyyah’s  madhhab?

In his comment on the treatise of al Ikhmimi, Foudah rejected the correct understanding of Ibn Taymiyyah’s (d. 728AH) madhhab on the issue of the sequence of occurrences, which affirms the origination of every individual of the type. He said, describing this understanding:

“Allah, Most High, has been creating an object of action from eternity and then making it cease to exist, then bringing into existence an object of action other than the first object of action, either in matter and form, or in matter only.

“And that this matter, meaning Allah’s creating and bringing objects of action into existence, has no beginning in eternity. So whenever we say that Allah created an originated thing and brought an object of action into existence, we may say that He, Most High, brought another object of action into existence before it, and created another originated thing before it, and this statement does not stop… Though it is not permissible rationally, because it is necessary that there exist an actually first originated existent… we reject this case as being the actual case, but here we wanted to point out that some opponents count it as an explanation of the sequence of the type.” (Risalah fi al Radd ʿala Ibn Taymiyyah fi Masʾalat Hawadith la Awwal Laha, p. 64.)

What proof did Foudah bring to reject this understanding of Ibn Taymiyyah’s madhhab, which is the correct understanding of the correct madhhab? Nothing.

Then we find him in that book, without clearly saying that he has retracted, telling us that Ibn Taymiyyah’s madhhab is the eternity of the type while every individual instance is originated. In his comment on the treatise of al Ikhmimi before this book, he bound Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728AH) to the statement of the eternity of a specific created thing. He said: “Is it not clear that his statement necessarily leads to saying that something from the objects of action is eternal, and that it is the origin of all these created things, whether that is water or something else?” (Risalah fi al Radd ʿala Ibn Taymiyyah fi Masʾalat Hawadith la Awwal Laha, p. 65.)

So first, Foudah bound him to the statement of the eternity of a specific created thing and a specific matter. Now, in the same issue, that is no longer necessary against him. Rather, what is necessary against him is the statement that the sequence of universes is necessary.

This issue, meaning the sequence of occurrences, is among the issues through which many of the Ashʿaris made severe attacks against Shaykh al Islam Ibn Taymiyyah.

Some of them use wordings from the statements of the Salaf to prove the corruption of the statement of the sequence of occurrences. This is a contradiction, because according to the Ashʿaris, the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the statements of the Salaf have no authority in foundational matters in the first place. Rather, according to them, holding onto these apparent meanings is disbelief.

Yes, some wordings of the Salaf from the favoured generations and others may be understood from their apparent wording, without careful reflection, as opposing the statement of the sequence of occurrences. But upon verification and careful reflection, most of them are not opposed to it.

Rather, they agree with it. For this reason, we say that many of the statements of the Salaf require the statement of the sequence of occurrences, just as many revealed texts from the Qur’an and the Sunnah have an apparent meaning indicating the permissibility of occurrences with no beginning.

Then, in this place, many people do not differentiate between the Salaf in the sense of the favoured generations, and the Salaf in the sense of the early ulama of the Ummah. The statement of one person from the favoured generations is not, by itself, a proof.

Likewise, many of the ulama of the Salaf, such as the generation of Imam Ahmad (d. 241AH), are not from the favoured generations according to the soundest views, and their statement in itself is not a proof unless it is ijmaʿ (consensus). The scholars of usul even examined the authority of the statement of a single Companion. So what then of someone other than a Companion from the favoured generations? And what then of an alim from outside the favoured generations? The issue, then, returns mainly to the Book and the Sunnah. The texts of the Book and the Sunnah affirm that Allah, Most High, is eternal with His active attributes.

From the Excellent Statements on This Issue

Among the excellent things said on the issue is what Abu Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Yusuf al Yamani composed in his reply to al Subki (d. 756AH), when he said:

“A Creator before a created thing that He brings into being,

A Subduer before a subdued thing that exists by Him,

A Merciful One before one shown mercy whom He then has mercy upon,

A Provider before one provided for in all its types.

From His command came forth all creation,

And the command, woe to you, without doubt, subsists in Him.

The Lord of the Throne has spoken with the revealed Books,

With speech unlike anything resembling it.

He has never ceased to be acting or speaking eternally whenever He wills,

And this is the truth, so be pleased with it.

These are occurrences with no beginning to their first,

By the revealed text, so understand it, O sleepy one, and wake up.

For they are attributes of the One described, subsisting in Him,

Eternal like Him, without any resemblance.

The madhhab of the people is to let them pass as they came,

Without the impurity of asking how or likening.

They do not hold to negating the attributes,

As Jahm and those who followed him in resemblance say.” (al Hamiyyah al Islamiyyah fi al Intisar li Madhhab Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 115.)

Likewise, the saying of al Surramari:

“As for occurrences with no beginning to their first,

That is among the strangest reports and most amazing of them.

You fell short in understanding, so fall short in speech,

For this is your limit, so move aside, for a falcon is not like one who resembles it.

If you had said: he said such and such, then the answer is such and such,

The mistaken statement would have become clear from the corrected one.

You gave a summary statement, so I gave a summary answer.

Had you detailed it, I would have detailed an explanation of its strangest points.

If you say: He was, while He had no knowledge with Him,

Nor speech, nor power at all, you have disbelieved in Him.

Or if you say: He originated them after they were impossible,

Then you have called deficiency His path, though you did not prove it.

How could He bring them into existence after they were impossible from Him?

Can a dead person raise his shoulder?

Or if you say: an action of choice from Him is impossible,

You have resembled the saying of a misleading man in his snares.

He has never ceased to be described with the attributes of action,

And with speech, far in His nearness.

Glory be to Him, He has never ceased doing whatever He wills,

In every time, with none to overrule Him.

The type of speech, and likewise the type of actions, is eternal,

Not the particular one from it in its ordered succession.

No person of reason understands the object of action

To be paired with the doer in the very same rank.

He loves, He hates, He is pleased, then He becomes angry.

This is from His description, so be pleased with it, far from the one angering.

Creation is not the created thing, as you think it is.

Rather, it is a verbal noun subsisting in the self, so know it.

The saying ‘Be’ is not the thing brought into being,

And a small child knows this while playing.

The Chosen One ﷺ said: Allah was before,

And nothing besides Him, exalted is He in His being veiled.” (al Hamiyyah al Islamiyyah fi al Intisar li Madhhab Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 68.)

Masʾalat Ḥudūth al ʿĀlam Bayna Ibn Taymiyyah wa al Falāsifah wa al Ittiḥādiyyah al Muʿāṣirah by Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār 2/110–117