Summary
Saʿid Foudah’s claim is that Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with the philosophers on the principle of necessary emanation. He claims Ibn Taymiyyah took from the philosophers the belief that the Necessary Existent must necessarily produce existence, then only differed with them over whether the effect must be one and personally eternal.
The “Necessity of Emanation” is a philosophical belief associated mainly with the Neoplatonists and the falasifah such as Avicenna and Al-Farabi.
It means, if the “complete cause” exists, then its effect must necessarily proceed from it automatically and cannot fail to occur.
According to this view the universe proceeds eternally from Allah, not through a free choice that could either occur or not occur, but necessarily, just as light necessarily comes from the sun.
Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār refutes this by saying that Foudah has changed the real meaning of the philosophers’ position.
The philosophers did not just say that Allah is the cause of the universe.
They said that the mere essence of the Necessary Existent necessarily produces the universe, without will and choice. This is the core of their view.
Al Najjār says that Ibn Taymiyyah’s position is the complete opposite.
Ibn Taymiyyah does not say that Allah’s bare essence necessarily produces the universe.
Rather, he repeatedly says that Allah acts by will and choice. So the universe does not proceed from Allah by blind necessity, as the philosophers claimed. It is created by Allah’s will, power, and choice.
If Foudah had said clearly, “the philosophers believe that the essence of the Necessary Existent necessarily causes the universe,” he would not have been able to say that Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with them.
So, Foudah worded the matter vaguely in order to make Ibn Taymiyyah look closer to the philosophers than he really is!
Al Najjār also points out that Foudah himself admits the difference when he says that, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, the cause of the universe is not merely the essence of the Necessary Existent. This admission destroys Foudah’s own accusation, because it shows that Ibn Taymiyyah did not agree with the philosophers on the foundation of emanation.
Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār’s Refutation of Saʿid Foudah
The Second Fabrication: The Claim That Ibn Taymiyyah Agreed with the Philosophers on the Necessity of Emanation
Foudah says: “He took some of its foundations from the philosophers, some from the mutakallimun (theologians), and some from himself. What he took from the philosophers was their statement that the Necessary Existent must be overflowing in emanation and acting, meaning a cause, for existence. According to them, this necessarily entails that what proceeds from Him is one and eternal…
Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with them on this principle, but he opposed them on the necessary unity of the effect, and therefore on the necessity of its personal eternity. This is because, according to him, the cause for the existence of the universe is not merely the essence of the Necessary Existent. Rather, it is the subsisting of an originated existential attribute in the essence of the Necessary Existent, and this originated attribute is preceded by another like it without any first.” (Tanzih al Rahman, p. 19, Saʿid Foudah.)
Najjar says: This too is an error and it is merely a bad understanding of the madhhab of the philosophers or the madhhab of Ibn Taymiyyah.
In fact, it is clear deception.
When the philosophers said that Allah, Most High, is the cause of an effect, which is the universe, they said that this is necessary by essence. Meaning: the mere essence of the Necessary Existent necessarily produces the universe. So the statement of the philosophers is not merely that Allah, Most High, is a cause of the universe. Rather, they said: the mere essence of the Necessary Existent is a necessary cause of the universe.
Did Ibn Taymiyyah agree with them on that? Of course not, as became clear in the Treatise on the Origination of the Universe. Rather, Ibn Taymiyyah clearly says, in countless places, that Allah, Most High, is a doer by will and choice. Therefore, His mere essence does not necessarily produce the universe or any other created thing.
So the reality of the philosophers’ statement is this: the essence of the Necessary Existent is a necessary cause of the universe.
The statement of Ibn Taymiyyah is this: the essence of the Necessary Existent is not a necessary cause of the universe. Rather, will and choice are necessary.
Then Foudah came and said: Ibn Taymiyyah agrees with the philosophers that the Necessary Existent is a cause of the universe. So notice that he did not say: “the essence of the Necessary Existent,” because if he had phrased it by saying: “The philosophers say that the essence of the Necessary Existent is the cause of the universe,” he would then be unable to say that Ibn Taymiyyah agreed with them on that.
The theory of emanation specifies that the essence of the Necessary Existent is sufficient for the issuing of existents. But Foudah summarised the statement of the philosophers in the quote so that the wording would misleadingly suggest that there is a shared amount between the madhhab of the philosophers and the madhhab of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728AH). How vile this is.
What makes this clear is what he himself mentioned after that, when he said: “The cause for the existence of the universe, according to him, is not merely the essence of the Necessary Existent. Rather, it is the subsisting of an originated existential attribute in the essence of the Necessary Existent.”
Masʾalat Ḥudūth al ʿĀlam Bayna Ibn Taymiyyah wa al Falāsifah wa al Ittiḥādiyyah al Muʿāṣirah by Aḥmad ʿIṣām al Najjār 2/117–118

